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University Knowledge Commercialisation‘ (UKC) has come to be seen as a 
stimulant for developing economic performance.  Regardless of the increasing 
body of literature in the UKC, it is revealed to be undertheorized, whilst existing 
theories are the result of inductive theorizing based on successful KC stories 
within the western context.  Moreover, the literature provides modest practical 
directions and pay insufficient attention to the role of mechanisms, such as 
power, mimetic isomorphism, and intermediation, in bridging differences in 
institutional logics between actors.  These gaps inspired the study aim, which is 
to explore the implication of such mechanisms in bridging differences in logics 
within UKC institutionally emerging context, Oman. 
Through a qualitative, multiple case-study approach, data was collected from 
four contract research projects through semi-structured interviews. The first 
three interviews served as a pilot study, the results of which were then used to 
formulate the second stage which was interviews with participants from 
academia, industry, and government.  This approach improves the internal 
validity of the research, and provides a rich picture of the Omani UKC emerging 
institutional environment. 
The findings suggest that the influences of power, mimetic isomorphism, and 
intermediation have significantly shaped bridging, though not always positively, 
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in logics in the Omani UKC context.  The findings show that adverse influences 
in this process included: asymmetric power relationships, mimetic 
isomorphism‘s simplistic view of logics convergence and negligence of 
institutional fragmentation, and insufficient intermediation activities. 
The novelty of introducing the concept of power adds a new theoretical 
dimension into the UKC and ILP theories.  Additionally, the novelty of using 
case of Oman as an empirical study added new contribution into the field. In 
addition, this study contributes to a better understanding of the Omani policy 
actions with regard to shift to an effective UKC approach.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction of the study. First, the chapter discusses 
the background of the study, highlighting the research issues and the 
significance of the study. Next, the research background, the research 
questions of the study, and the unit of analysis are clarified. The chapter then 
explains the research process including the methodology used in the study.  
Finally, the chapter discusses the main findings, contributions, and structure of 
the thesis. 
1.1 Research background 
Knowledge has become the main driver of economic growth since the 1980s.   
In the last two decades, many countries around the globe have been actively 
pursuing national and regional innovation strategies aimed at establishing a 
knowledge-based economy. Special emphasis has been placed on broadening 
the role of academia to contribute to socio-economic development and 
entrepreneurship (knowledge exploitation), in addition to the traditional roles of 
teaching (knowledge dissemination) and research (knowledge creation).  In the 
context of socio-economic development and entrepreneurship, the concept of 
‗University Knowledge Commercialisation‘ (UKC) has come to be perceived as a 
stimulant for developing economic performance and capabilities of regions 
(Viale and Etzkowitz, 2010; Duch et al., 2011).  This can be achieved by 
transferring research outcomes generated inside universities into economically 
valued products/technologies (Lundqvist and Williams, 2006). In this respect, 
countries pursue effective ways to utilise the knowledge generated by their 
universities. They share the aspiration to exploit their human and funding 
resources in order to utilise their production of knowledge in a better way (Al 
Harthy, 2014).   
University Knowledge Commercialisation has been defined in numerous ways 
(see, for example, Lacetera, 2010, Debackere, 2004, Rossi, 2010, Mehrabi et 
al., 2013, Jahed, 2012, Fakour, 2005, Salter and Martin, 2001, Bardley et al., 
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2013, and Perkmann et al., 2013).  This study, however, adopts Salter and 
Martin‘s (2001) definition of Knowledge Commercialisation as (KC) ―a process 
that converts the produced knowledge in research organisations into suppliable 
products in the market or industrial processes‘‘ (Salter and Martin, 2001, p.516).  
Almost the same definition is provided by Mitchell and Singh (1996), who 
defined Commercialisation as ‗‘the process of acquiring ideas and 
complementary knowledge, and developing and manufacturing saleable goods‘‘ 
(Mitchell and Singh, 1996, p. 170).  Taking these two definitions as a basis, KC 
can be considered as an intentional, goal-oriented process that typically occurs 
between two organisations: the source or knowledge producer (i.e. universities), 
and the recipient or knowledge user (i.e. firms).  Thus, these two definitions are 
relevant to this study, because they consider UKC as an activity that brings 
actors (i.e. researchers, end-users) together and denotes a collaborative and 
engaged process between actors.  Its emphasis is placed at the micro, 
operational level, i.e. where interactions between actors take place.  Hence, KC 
is the activity which encompasses the institutions (rules and norms) governing 
interaction.  This could bring significant input to our understanding of the actual 
processes of knowledge production and appropriation.   
UKC can take on various mechanisms such as spin-offs, the collaborative 
research between firms and universities, consultancy, contract research 
commissioned by either industry or government, IPRs- Intellectual Property 
Rights development (i.e. patenting), and licensing of inventions by universities 
(Debackere, 2004; Rossi, 2010; Perkmann et al., 2013). This study focuses on 
contract research projects as a mechanism of interaction.  Many scholars (e.g. 
D‘este and Perkmann, 2011, Bjerregaard, 2010, Rasiah and Govindarajy, 2009, 
D‘Este and Patel, 2007, Fontana et al., 2006, and Ham and Mowery, 1998) 
emphasize empirically the importance of such mechanism in informing mutually 
beneficial collaborations between university and industry.  D'Este and Perkmann 
(2011), for instance, found that industry and academics engage more actively in 
the process of generating knowledge in contract research than in other 
mechanisms.  They found that the motive behind academics‘ engagement is 
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strongly positive as industry aims at both furthering academics‘ own research 
and commercialising the outcomes of their research.  Their research motives 
are strongly informed through using the mechanism of contract research. 
The development of University Knowledge Commercialisation is constrained by 
different logics between participants in the interaction or transactions of 
transfers (Bjerregaard, 2010; Siegel et al., 2003; Gassol, 2007).  Within the UKC 
context, three different institutional logics are present: the logic of the university, 
the logic of firms, and the logic of the government (i.e. public funding agencies).  
In other words, there are different logics at the university than in industry and 
government (Lind et al., 2013).  The logics within firms and universities, for 
instance, tend to give rise to differences in goals, interests, and time horizons 
informing R&D behaviour (Bjerregaards, 2010).  This, in turn, might act as an 
obstacle because institutional logics between actors are likely to cause 
differences in interests and goals generating different institutional assumptions 
for knowledge production and appropriation. 
Differences in logics might be overcome through mechanisms such as power, 
mimetic isomorphism, intermediating, and networking. Such mechanisms might 
act as potential solutions for bridging differences between the three spheres.  
Bridging logics differences between university and firms, for instance, often 
requires an intermediating mechanism to assist partners in discovering 
commonalty in needs and interests (Håkanson et al., 2011) as well as in 
improving and correcting individuals‘ ways of understanding how to approach 
the entire UKC process and provide guidelines appropriately (Villani et al., 
2017).  Relatively large empirical research on UKC has addressed how those 
potential mechanisms (i.e. power, mimetic isomorphism, intermediating, and 
networking) emerged and how they exert influence on bridging differences in 
institutional logics.  This study takes the same approach and addresses the on-
going debate pertaining to how such mechanisms enable/constrain the bridging 
of differences in logics, particularly, at the micro-level of contract research. 
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Oman is an interesting context to study this because of the additional 
complication of institutional development and transfer.  This can be justified with 
two main reasons.  First, Oman is a wealthy country as it has an oil-based 
economy.  However, oil wealth is a constraint that works against knowledge 
commercialisation. The fact is that the petro-chemical industry and its oil 
revenues dominate the economy in a way that they create discouragements 
towards KC because the economy grows mainly to service this sector (STIP, 
2014; AL Harthy, 2014).  The Omani economy is dominated by the oil and gas 
industry, with few large companies supervising and managing this industry 
(STIP, 2014).  The socio-economic development in Oman is heavily dependent 
on oil and gas revenues, as those few companies are still only focusing on 
finding solutions for exploring and extracting crude oil and gas (UNCTAD, 
2013).  Therefore, University Knowledge Commercialisation is yet to take place 
in Oman as the sustainability of industry relies on oil and gas availability rather 
than on fostering knowledge and commercialisation capabilities (Al Harthy, 
2014).  Second, the institutional environment of knowledge commercialisation in 
Oman is still emerging.  Although knowledge commercialisation has been 
acknowledged recently as one of the TRC‘s proposed policies under the 
knowledge transfer goal (TRC, 2014), the policy for implementation and 
practical activities towards commercialisation remains unclear.  For instance, 
the policies on whether or not to directly support the commercialisation efforts of 
Small Medium Enterprises SMEs is not yet clear (STIP, 2014).  Moreover, 
Omani universities still lack clear knowledge commercialisation programs (STIP, 
2014; AL Harthy, 2014) as the necessary institutions have only recently been 
established.  SQU (the only public university), for instance, established the 
innovation affairs department in 2010, and since then the efforts are still on-
going to resource and strategize the department. 
Therefore, a need to re-strengthen the innovation system in Oman has been 
acknowledged as a ‗high national priority‘ at all levels.  His Majesty the Sultan of 
Oman has urged related stakeholders and policymakers to design and re-
evaluate all innovation programs and policies in order to close the gap between 
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the innovation system outcomes and the relevant actors, such as industry and 
universities.  All three actors (university, industry, and government) are urged to 
play a vital role in the socio-economic development through knowledge 
production and commercialisation.  To my knowledge, no single study has yet 
investigated this phenomenon in Oman. Therefore, this research also intends to 
provide an important lesson for Oman in order to foster its knowledge 
commercialisation approach through bridging differences in logics.  
1.2 Research Gaps and Questions  
The review of literature in this study captured theories and research streams 
relevant to UKC, in which the role of actors and institutions were interpreted and 
conflicts between logics were identified.  Although, there has been a volume of 
published research on this area and researchers have indeed examined the 
impact of such conflicts, critical gaps were observed (as will be discussed in 
more detail in the following Chapter).  First, although Triple Helix Model (THM) 
scholars emphasize the co-existence of diverse institutional logics in the context 
of knowledge commercialisation, they rarely address the implications of 
conflicting logics methodologically (Tuunainen, 2002; Lu, 2007) at  micro-level 
interactions (Viale and Pozzali, 2010; Fogelberg and Thorpenberg, 2012).  In 
particular, the underlying assumptions of the necessity of pre-existing 
cooperative relations and the common interests among the three institutional 
spheres.  Actors from different institutional spheres have their own institutional 
logics guiding principles, assumptions, and symbolic construction, which they 
draw upon to guide their actions and form their own identities (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  Thus, despite the role of government 
being considered significant in forging university-industry linkages (Sohn et al., 
2009), institutional conflict may exist between the university, industry, and the 
government resulting in incongruity of goals and interests.  However, the 
empirical evidence underpins that university knowledge commercialisation 
involves studies focusing either on universities (primarily) or on enterprises, 
seldom both (Ankrah et al., 2013), and hardly ever exploring the implications of 
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the existence of multiple actors, often possessing different goals and interests.  
This may obscure the implications and the potential for conflict of different logics 
between multiple actors and the effectiveness of University Knowledge 
Commercialisation.  These two gaps demonstrate that THM and studies in UKC 
provide modest practical directions on how to bridge differences and nurture 
cooperation between actors.  They don‘t pay sufficient attention to the role of 
different mechanisms that surround and exert a direct or indirect effect/influence 
on knowledge commercialisation. Therefore, this study focuses on exploring the 
implications of mechanisms as potential solutions for bridging differences in 
institutional logics within the micro-level interaction of knowledge 
commercialisation.  
Second, the THM‘s simple and modest view of institutional and normative 
convergence between academia, industry, and government portrays it as the 
only institutional order surrounding all three spheres.  This is similar to the 
Mimetic Isomorphism (M.I) concept through which the concept of TH and its 
related activities have come to be the templates for action, which generates 
unified or monolithic responses to uncertainty that might lead to isomorphism, 
and a commonality in function and form (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  This 
overlooks the embeddedness of actors within different, conflicting logics 
(Thornton et al., 2012).  Although there exists, within the institutionalism 
literature, some research exploring the space between institutional logics (e.g. 
Furnari, 2014, 2016), very few empirical studies have attempted to study the 
effect of M.I on UKC.  Thus, considering mimetic isomorphism as a potential 
mechanism in bridging differences in institutional logics promises fresh insights.  
Third, the implications of conflicting logics can be bridged by the mechanism of 
power. Power is shaped by the opportunities provided for actors to challenge 
conflicting logics (Thornton et al., 2012).  When institutions (i.e. rules) of a 
project are established through processes of appropriating one logic over 
another, actors supporting the appropriated logic become more powerful.  
Actors who are in power often preserve their own logic as they have more 
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control over decision-making compared to those without power.  Thus, 
achieving synergistic cooperation is difficult as it requires bridging between 
different logics. However, THM ignores incentives and power relations among 
actors (Hira, 2013).  More importantly, there are very limited studies on UKC 
pertaining to how power bridges differences in institutional logics.  This calls for 
exploring the effect of power as a potential mechanism in bridging differences in 
logics.      
Fourth, undoubtedly, the conflicts associated with logics‘ differences call for 
intermediation (Yusuf, 2008; Swan et al., 2010; Lundberg, 2013).  However, 
both perspectives (i.e. THM and ILP-Institutional Logics Perspective) provide 
modest practical directions on how to bridge differences through intermediation 
mechanisms (i.e. intermediary and networking).  THM, for instance, doesn‘t pay 
sufficient attention to the role of intermediaries (Howells, 2006; Pollard, 2006), 
though the significance of bridging logics has been recognized (Suvinen et al., 
2010). ILP, however, gives relatively little explanation about the ways through 
which to manage such conflict at the micro-level (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
Although the interest in exploring this area is growing (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 
2009, Suddaby and Leca, 2009, and Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006), no 
attention is given to bringing about intermediation in specific situations within 
micro-level interactions.  This is in part because the ILP has not, to date, 
provided the conceptul tools to help assertain how conflicts logics are resolved 
at this level (Cloutier and Langley, 2013).  Hence, there is a need to explore the 
effects of intermediation as potential mechanisms in bridging differences in 
institutional logics. 
Finally, the development of THM is a result of inductive theorizing based on 
successful knowledge commercialisation stories within the western context.  
Although many followers have empirically examined THM in different national 
contexts (e.g. da Silva et al., 2012, Saad et al., 2008, Saad and Zawdie, 2011a, 
and Zhou and Peng, 2008), these studies have attempted to employ the model 
in their studies on countries despite institutional differences (Pugh, 2014; Cai, 
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2015).  From this, an investigation into the implications of potential mechanisms 
(i.e. power, mimetic isomorphism, intermediation and networking) that can be 
used in bridging differences in institutional logics within University Knowledge 
Commercialisation and in the Omani (institutionally emerging) context promises 
fresh insights.  
In light of the outcomes of the literature review, this study conceived and 
formulated research questions, which can potentially lead to filling the critical 
gaps identified above.  Therefore, the study‘s research questions are:  
The main research question is: 
What are the implications of power, mimetic isomorphism, and intermediation in 
bridging the differences in institutional logics involved in University Knowledge 
Commercialisation? 
The sub-research questions are:   
1. What is the effect of power in bridging differences in institutional logics? 
2. What is the effect of mimetic isomorphism (i.e. transferring institutions 
from the West) in bridging differences in institutional logics? 
3. What is the effect of intermediation (intermediating and networking) in 
bridging differences in institutional logics? 
1.3 Research Methodology and Unit of Analysis 
Critical realism was selected and justified as being the appropriate paradigm for 
this study.  It shows how the underlying assumptions influence the study‘s main 
focus on agency (i.e. actors‘ experiences and institutions) and structure (i.e. 
different institutional logics).  First, its ontological realism - what the world must 
be like to bridge differences in institutional logics - helped in establishing a 
better understanding as it explained the actual process of KC by considering the 
perspectives and institutions of actors who are involved in the same context and 
their decisions or actions determined by different, potentially conflicting logics.  
Second, in critical realism, logics and institutions are considered to be 
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interdependent, but empirically they are examined separately.  As institutions 
are the rules of the game, institutional logics are the underlying, fundamental 
principles of the game (Leca and Naccache, 2006).  Hence, institutional logics 
cannot be reduced to institutions.  This separation brought greater explanatory 
power to the study.  For more details, see section 3.2 of Chapter-3. 
A qualitative research approach was adopted as the most suitable research 
design (see section 3.3 of Chapter-3). First, it helped in obtaining rich and 
diverse accounts of KC actions in Oman, which would have otherwise remained 
obscure.  The institutional and governance of UKC has emerged recently in 
Oman.  Consequently, relationships are impacted by the underdeveloped 
institutional frameworks of interacting actors. Second, the qualitative approach 
supports the legitimacy of the main goals of the philosophical perspective of 
critical realism adopted in this study (Robson, 2011).  These goals include: the 
understanding of actors through using a process-oriented, instead of a variable-
oriented, approach of explanation (Maxwell, 2004); the explanation of single 
situations and events by using an inductive flexible design through applying 
case study strategies rather than basing explanations on regularities or 
universal theories (Savin-Baden and Major, 2013).  Third, the qualitative 
approach has been explained as being effective in examining institutions and 
logics.  A qualitative approach helped in generating intense and instructive data 
regarding peoples‘ decision-making and actions (Museus and Harper, 2007).  
Finally, the selection of a qualitative methodology is justified more by its 
effective application in this research piloted study (for more details see sub-
section 1.3.1 below). 
The research was based upon an exploratory qualitative study examining four 
cases of publicly funded research projects involving public university 
researchers and SMEs, which were sponsored by a new governmental research 
and innovation program under the TRC in Oman.  The context of the research 
was therefore a triple-helix environment and was investigated at the micro-level 
interaction of the actors partaking in collaborative research and development.   
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The unit of analysis in this study is the research project. This corresponds with 
the definition of IL, adopted in this study, which conceives logics as causal 
powers for shaping and influencing actors‘ actions and decisions within the 
micro-level interaction (i.e. the investigated contracted research projects). 
Moreover, it allows for, within the context of institutional logics (IL), the 
exploration of socially constructed, historical patterns of norms and rules ‗‘by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize 
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality‖ (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999, p.804).      
1.4 The research process 
This study was carried out through two phases comprising of (1) the pilot phase, 
and (2) the main study. Due to the shortage of empirical research that looks at 
University Knowledge Commercialisation (UKC) in the Omani context, the field 
trip was especially helpful for developing an understanding of the local dynamics 
and contexts of knowledge commercialisation in Oman. The field trip was also 
instrumental in the refining of the research questions.  In the second phase, the 
researcher executed the investigation on the ground having obtained a clear 
understanding of the Omani context and refined the research questions. This 
second phase, which is the main study, entailed the use of the process 
approach to implement a case study design (Yin, 2003b) that involved four 
publically funded research projects.  
Phase 1 – Pilot phase (September 2013) 
The field trip was conducted in Muscat, Oman with the following set of 
objectives: (1) To test the research design before commencing the actual 
empirical phase of the study, and (2) to generate a preliminary understanding of 
the processes of knowledge commercialisation particularly in the Omani setting. 
Data was collected through three open-ended interviews, which involved one 
university officer, one user-funding manager, and one TRC officer. All the 
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interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed.  Additionally, 
secondary data from reports, policy documents, and other publications were 
collected to gain more insight into KC processes.  These involved national policy 
reports, Oman Vision 2020, research projects records, statistical and 
institutional review reports, the university's annual research reports, and the 
projects‘ master plans. 
The pilot study provided several key lessons for the researcher. First, it enabled 
the researcher to further develop and refine the interview protocol that was used 
for the main empirical phase of the study. The pilot also allowed the researcher 
to gain awareness and understanding of how respondents may perceive the 
research. This brought to light potential barriers that may be encountered in the 
process of gathering data, as well as how these barriers might be resolved. 
Thus, the pilot study yielded the first empirical observations that complimented 
the researcher‘s understanding of knowledge commercialisation and the 
institutional literature. Moreover, the pilot study led to the identification of 4 
empirical contexts that were deemed suitable for exploring the research 
questions. These are: (a) SQU which has, as per its close geographical 
proximity to industrial incubation zones such as the Rusayl Industrial Area and 
Industrial Innovation Centre (IIC), a history of collaboration with industry at the 
publically funded research level with local SMEs; (b) TRC as funder and 
policymaker has launched many knowledge innovation program initiatives at the 
university and national levels as a way to encourage research collaborations; (c) 
Manufacturing SMEs within the AL Rusayl Industrial Area which had research 
collaborations with SQU through TRC, and (d) IIC which was etstablished to 
encourage R&D collaborations between academia and SMEs. A detailed 
examination of these four contexts led the researcher to conclude that these 
actors were the most appropriate for examining the process of University 
Knowledge Commercialisation within an emerging knowledge-economy. 
Furthermore, due to this field trip, the researcher was able to understand that 
the research can best be explored through a qualitative methodology using the 
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case study approach. All the empirical contexts that were selected exist under a 
natural setting in which the researcher has no control (Denscombe, 2007). 
Another justification for the selection of a qualitative methodology stemmed from 
the fact that the researcher had been in the field and had carried out the 
interviews successfully. 
Phase 2 - The main study 
The main study was conducted in Oman through the period from April 2014 – 
September 2014. This phase of the study was guided by the above mentioned 
research questions.  Four publically funded research projects involving 
perspectives of multiple actors (academia, industry, and government) were 
selected for this case study research. The researcher used a set of proxy 
criteria to select projects that fit with the overall research design as well as 
research questions. In total, 32 interviews were conducted in this multiple case 
research. Each case in the study was designed to include academics, 
enterprise, and personnel from university and government who can provide 
important insights into the institutional settings and governance structures of the 
selected projects. Finally, secondary data from brochures, websites, 
organisations‘ documents, and newspapers was also collected and used to 
complement the primary data. These involved the University‘s strategies, 
national research and innovation strategies, industry regulations and 
frameworks, Oman Vision 2020, the national five- year plans, TRC annual 
reports, and His Majesty‘s speeches.   
The data obtained from this empirical phase of the study was processed and 
analysed in four steps. The first step involved transcribing, where all 32 oral 
interviews were converted into written texts. In the second step, the researcher 
adopted the principles of coding which involved breaking down the data into 
separate units of meanings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This was followed by 
the within-case analysis where the researcher focused on individual cases and 
allowed patterns to emerge (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the fourth and final step, 
which is cross-case analysis, the themes that emerged from the within-case 
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analysis were rigorously compared and contrasted to arrive at the main findings 
of the study. 
Several measures were taken to protect the validity and creditability of the data. 
First, construct validity was considered in order to guard against the chances of 
subjective elements driving the data. This was done through (1) explicitly 
defining all the mechanisms and procedures that were used from data collection 
through to analysis in the methodology chapter of this thesis. Thus, another 
study can be conducted using the same procedures and similar case settings to 
obtain the same results (Ellis, 1995). (2) establishing a carefully constructed 
interview protocol that ensured a high degree of consistency in interview 
procedure, questions, contents, as well ethics (3)  the study applied credible 
conceptual constructs and theoretical assumptions in the fields of University 
Knowledge Commercilisation and Sociological Institutionalism (SI) to inform the 
research design and guide the data collection. This led to the use of the highly 
credible theory of institutional logic perspective as the major theoretical lens 
through which the mechanisms of knowledge commercialisation were 
examined. 
1.5 Research main findings 
The findings show that bridging differences in logics is hindered by asymmetric 
power relationships.  Power asymmetry, associated with structuring interaction 
around appropriating one logic over another, perpetuated the pre-existing 
conflicting logics.  When the rules of projects are established through processes 
of appropriating one logic over another, actors supporting the appropriated logic 
become more powerful.  The logic that is supported by powerful actors 
contributes to preserve the status quo as they provide the rules and norms of 
actions that guide actors in decision-making. Hence, powerful actors have more 
control over decision-making and their logics come to be reflected as dominant.   
The findings also reveal two dimensions around mimetic isomorphism (M.I).  
The first dimension is that M.I gave a simplistic view of the institutional 
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environment. The institutionalisation of western programs means that 
academics and commercial users have shared, certain concepts regarding 
knowledge commercialisation.  Hence, it presumed logics convergence and 
overlooked the embeddedness of actors within different, often conflicting, logics.  
The second dimension is that mimetic isomorphism, more relevantly, the action 
of transferring cutting-edge programs from the West overlooked institutional 
fragmentation within the Omani context.  Fragmentation is rooted in the internal 
characteristics of bureaucracy.  Despite their involvement in the governing 
boards, actors (i.e. government, university, and non-commercial users) still 
recognize bureaucracy as natural practice. Their mind-sets are much 
preoccupied by the deep-rooted concepts of rigid models of interaction, which 
has led to fragmented actions.  These two dimensions hindered the bridging of 
differences in logics, consequently constraining the production of research 
outcomes that have the potential for commercialisation. 
Further insights garnered from those findings established that for logics of 
various actors to be bridged, an intermediating network must be shrewdly 
designed.  However, findings show that the role of government as an 
intermediary provided insufficient activities to bridge differences in logics.  
Minimal progress in interactions between actors was established only when the 
research was conducted.  When the commercialisation action took place, 
conflicting logics regarding knowledge appropriation emerged.  Countervailing 
arrangements that bridge different logics are absent.  Rather, as 
aforementioned, the competition between logics led to one side winning over the 
other. 
Finally, the findings show how the emerged informal networks assisted in 
bridging differences of logics.  The engagement in co-production activities made 
the academics‘ and commercial users‘ previously existing logics less salient.  
However, this happened only when the research was conducted.  The findings 
also reveal the inability of formal networks to bridge differences in logics during 
both the research performance and commercialisation action.  This is, as 
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aforementioned, due to power asymmetry.  Power is granted to an individual 
actor, who is inclined to preserve his/her pre-existing logics against others‘ 
logics. 
1.6 Research contributions 
The primary purpose of this study is to develop the research into University 
Knowledge Commercialisation by addressing critical knowledge gaps. Hence, 
the results of this study have provided theoretical and empirical contributions.  
The overall thesis can be said to provide three main contributions. The first 
contribution is the novelty of introducing the concept of power within the 
Institutional Logics Perspective (ILP).  The concept was introduced through the 
adoption of arguments from two general institutional scholars (i.e. Schmidt, 
1987 and Samuels, 1971), which followed a novel approach in linking 
institutions with power.  Such introduction helped in analysing the effect of 
power in bridging differences in logics.  The study‘s results showed that as 
power was asymmetric (i.e. socially granted as rules were established around 
one appropriating logic over another), powerful actors had more control over 
decision-making, hence their logics were preserved and came to be reflected as 
dominant. The second contribution is the induction of the intermediation concept 
within Academic Capitalism (AC), THM, and ILP theories, which provided 
practical directions on how to bridge differences and nurture cooperation 
through intermediary and networking mechanisms.  The sufficient attention 
given to such mechanisms had generated more insights into how the role of IIC 
(as an intermediary) and informal networking opened possibilities for bridging 
academics‘ logics and commercial logics.  IIC intermediation, through 
matchmaking and mediation, increased the chances of academics and users in 
finding a research partner, assisted partners in recognizing the benefits of 
cooperation, and managed disputes regarding IP rights.  Moreover, the informal 
networking intermediation through the activity of resource sharing opened 
possibilities for bridging academics‘ logics and commercial logics around 
complementary knowledge (i.e. engaging in co-production for the purpose of 
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ensuring knowledge proximity or similarities in what they produced and how 
they produced it).  The third contribution is that the thesis successfully 
implemented the effect of mechanisms (i.e. power, mimetic isomorphism, and 
intermediation) in bridging differences in logics in a country where UKC 
institutions are emerging rather than already established. The use of Oman as 
an empirical reference is seen as a novel and two practical contributions were 
identified.  The Omani experience has contributed to understanding the effect of 
non-commercial users‘ logics in determining UKC.  As demonstrated, the Omani 
context provided the non-commercial users (i.e. governmental bodies and other 
public organisations) with the opportunity to exercise power over academics and 
commercial users (i.e. SMEs).  The funding rule of waiving ownership to Royal 
Oman Police (ROP) and Ministry gave them the power to restrain the 
procurement and application of the knowledge generated.  Being powerful 
actors, they were determined to preserve their logic of budget management for 
the sake of controlling the good use of public funds.  They were risk-averse.  
The Omani experience also contributed to a better understanding of the role of 
government as an intermediary. Empirical evidence was provided for the 
expansion of the Industrial Innovation Centre‘s (IIC) role from the traditional 
practices of:  provision of funding (Argyris and Liebeskind, 1998) and creation of 
policy context for the establishment of relationships between parties (Guerzoni 
et al., 2014; Lawton Smith, 2007) towards supporting the processes of UKC 
cooperatively with academics and commercial users (Leydesdorff, 2009).  Its 
activities of searching and matching partners across industry and university 
boundaries assisted in reducing search and bargaining costs (Kodama, 2008) 
as well as in bridging differences in logics (Villani et al, 2017). 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. An overview of the study is provided in 
the current chapter (Chapter 1) providing the background and outlining the 
broad field discussed in the study.  It sets out the main concepts of the research 
problem and highlights the significance of the study, the study‘s research 
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questions, the research process, the findings as, well as contributions to 
knowledge.  Chapter two presents a critical review of academic literature 
pertaining to Sociological Institutionalism (SI) and its relevance for the study and 
understanding of UKC (Chapter 2).   The review also presents, in detail, the 
Institutional Logics Perspective (ILP) as the proposed conceptual framework to 
underpin the study.  It highlights and explains the main elements supporting the 
need to understand the effect of differences in logics on KC from theoretical and 
conceptual perspective.  Moreover, the review captures theories and research 
streams relevant to UKC, which led to the identification of critical knowledge 
gaps and consequently, the formulation of the research questions.  Building on 
the research questions discussed previously, the next chapter provides an 
explanation of the research methodology adopted for this study (Chapter 3), 
illustrating the research paradigm and the multiple case study research design.  
It discusses related issues concerning data gathering and collection and sample 
choices.  This chapter also incorporates an explanation of the empirical 
research context that underpins the analysis of this work. The chapter is 
followed by within-case analysis, which depicts the findings of the study at the 
level of individual cases (given the size of the thesis, it was decided to include 
the findings of the within-case analysis in appendix 1 of the thesis).  The next 
chapter is the study‘s context, cases and the emergent themes (Chapter 4).  It 
explains the institutional contexts of the key actors of UKC in which the Omani 
innovation system functions.  It also provides a summary of each individual case 
that detailed in Appendix-1.  Additionally, it presents tables of themes explaining 
how the study‘s themes were driven and emerged from the data within the 
individual cases.  Following this chapter is the cross-case analysis, drawing on 
both Chapter 4 and Appendix 1, which presents the within-case analysis, where 
the findings of individual cases are compared and contrasted to generate 
patterns of outcomes which then led to higher summative results (Chapter 5).  
The chapter clarifies the links between analysis and research questions by 
providing a critical discussion of the implication of the emergent, potential 
mechanisms during the comparison of commonalities and differences in actors‘ 
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logics on the events and activities within UKC processes.  Following this chapter 
is the discussion, where results of the cross-case are further interpreted and 
linked to theories and constructs from the literature review with the aims of 
addressing the research questions posed leading to higher summative findings 
(Chapter 6).  The final chapter provides syntheses, conclusions, and 
implications of the thesis‘ ultimate findings, in addition to empirical and 
theoretical contributions and managerial and policy implications for Oman 
proposed by the research (Chapter 7). The chapter also acknowledges the 
study‘s limitations of applicability and suggests further research 
directions/possibilities. Figure 1.7, next page, presents an outline of the thesis 
chapters. 
1.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the entire thesis. The discussion of 
the research background highlighted the significance of the research and 
showed why it is important to investigate the potential mechanisms in bridging 
differences in the institutional logics of University Knowledge Commercialisation 
in an emerging institutional environment. Specific knowledge gaps in the 
literature were illustrated to justify the research focus and questions. This 
chapter has also outlined the research methodology and the unit of analysis as 
well as providing a summary of the research process. Moreover, the main 
findings and contributions of the research were highlighted. 
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Figure 1.7: Thesis outline and structure 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Chapter one provided the research background and explained the significance 
of the study. This chapter reviews the literature related to the main concepts and 
constructs that underpin the study. These are Sociological Institutionalism, the 
Institutional Logics Perspective, theoretical perspectives of University 
Knowledge Commercialisation, Intermediating, and networking, respectively. 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the relevant literature on university knowledge 
commercilisation through the lens of the instituional logics perspective. A review 
of the literature is important for understanding the research topic (Hair, 2003, 
2015, Baker, 2016) as well as identifying unexplored issues (Perry, 1998). 
Consequently, this literature review serves two purposes; first, to learn about the 
subject, and second, to facilitate the thesis‘ argument (Booth et al., 2016).   
The chapter is organized into five main sections.  The first section delves into 
sociological institutionalism and carries out a brief review of its analysis of 
understanding how the actions of multiple actors are shaped and influenced by 
institutions.  The second section conducts a systematic review of the 
Institutional Logic Perspective (ILP) and looks at all its ramifications.  It 
examines, in detail, the intellectual root that guides the conceptual development 
of the ILP, consequently, allowing clear justification for its selection as a 
conceptual framework underpinning this study.  The third section, attempts to 
gain an overall appreciation of the fundamental concepts and constructs that 
underpin this research study. As such, the section undertakes an examination of 
two theoretical perspectives used in these fields of enquiry through the lens of 
ILP.  This allows for a nuanced approach to examining the role of actors, 
institutions, mechanisms, and conflicting logics.  The fourth section looks at the 
mechanism of intermediaries. It explains how the role of intermediaries enables 
bridging different logics at the micro-level of interaction.  The last and final 
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section delves into the importance of informal and formal networking in 
facilitating knowledge commercialisation. 
Through the process of conducting this literature review, important knowledge 
gaps were identified which merit urgent attention. These identified knowledge 
gaps were instrumental in the development of arguments in this thesis and, 
fundamentally, they informed the formulation of the research questions that will 
be laid out at the end of this chapter. 
2.1 Sociological Institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism (SI) has its roots in sociology and organisational 
theory.  It emerged in the 1970s mainly within the sub-field of organisational 
theory and in parallel with the advancement of the concept of institutionalism 
across social sciences (Hall and Taylor, 1996).  It has emerged as a response 
to behaviourism, in which sociologists focus on explaining behaviour in an 
objective and quantified way.  Rather than focusing on ‗‘the sum of individual 
interests‘‘, SI begins with the society and the perception that ‗‘institutions are 
collective outcomes‘‘ (Thelen, 1999, p. 386).  Hence, institutions provide 
frameworks for actions (Brinton and Nee, 1998).  In this respect, sociological 
institutionalists focus on both the micro and macro-level of interactions, arguing 
that actors and institutions are co-constitutively related (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991).  Therefore, they draw attention to understanding the relationship 
between institutions and individual action (Hall and Taylor, 1996, Lowndes, 
2010), and they presume and focus on the consequences of institutions for 
individual actions.  The earlier sociological analysis solved the issue of 
identifying the relation between institutions and actions through connecting 
‗‘institutions with roles to which prescriptive norms of behaviour were attached‖ 
(Mackay et al., 2010).  Through this view, ―individuals who have been socialised 
into particular institutional roles internalise the norms associated with these 
roles, and in this way institutions are said to affect behaviour‘‘ (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, p. 950). Thus, sociological institutionalists are interested in highlighting 
both the high-interactive and mutual-constitutive nature of the relationship 
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between institutions and individual actions.  Individuals constitute themselves as 
social actors when they act as a social convention.  They engage in socially 
constructed acts and support the convention that they are adhering to and 
following.  However, this doesn‘t imply that individuals are not rational or 
purposive.  Sociologists argue that individuals perceive actions as rational when 
these actions are socially constituted.  Institutional actors are perceived to be 
basically social and act in habitual and customary ways, guided by the ‗‘logic of 
appropriateness that both prescribes and proscribes certain types of behaviour‘‘ 
(Mackay et al., 2010, p. 575). In support of this statement, Steimno (2008) found 
that individuals are not self-interested, but rather follow a ‗‘logic of 
appropriateness‘‘ (p. 163).  Thus, institutions within SI influence the way 
individuals view the world and the way they act within it.  Sociologists often 
conceptualise and analyse the goals and interests that actors are working to 
achieve.  They conceptualise a world of institutional actors striving towards 
defining and articulating their identity in more socially appropriate means or 
ways (Hall and Taylor, 1996).      
Moreover, unlike the earlier SI of Parsons (1995), the new SI explains 
institutions instead of assuming their existence.  Rather than highlighting the 
structural aspects and constraining institutions, SI emphasizes the social 
characteristics of institutions, in particular, the way institutions interact and the 
way they influence society.  Institutions are viewed outside the conventional 
perspective of economics through describing both how and why institutions 
emerge in a particular way within a given context.  This is because the SI 
perspective is grounded in the view that institutions are socially constructed.  
Institutions are seen as reflecting a shared understanding of world reality (Scott, 
1995) and ‗‘the way the world works‘‘ (Thelen, 1999, p. 386).  Sociologists draw 
inspiration from the notion of phenomenological and cultural traditions (Goffman, 
1974) around the socially constructed nature of reality, which emphasize the 
extent to which the social actors‘ behaviour reflects and reproduces the 
enactment of socially appropriated frames within a context.  Thus, sociologists 
emphasize the impact of the social context that shapes and ‗constitutes‘ social 
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actors, describing their identities and goals (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977).  They imply that social actors are deeply shaped by their 
environment, which guides their actions as well as providing them with interests, 
identities, and actorhood. 
Drawing on the above, this study is also concerned with how and why 
institutions matter within the context of knowledge commercialisation.  In 
particular, it is about how the actions of multiple actors are shaped and 
influenced by institutions.  This question defines the key concern of sociological 
institutionalism in analysis.  
There are dimensions to the relationship between institutions and actions, within 
this study, that can be elucidated by sociological institutionalism.  As it studies 
institutions and individual actions as part of social structure, SI gives emphasis 
to the context within which actors are embedded.   Hence, it implies the code of 
appropriate actions that imbue actors within a context.  Actors act according to 
their view of what is an acceptable code of action and resist changes that 
challenge their understanding of appropriate actions.  SI, hence, frames 
institutions as consequences of actors‘ belief systems, since actors are 
considered as members of specific professions or groups.   Its underlying 
assumption is that actors are conservative when it comes to change and are 
more inclined to defend their own interests.  Additionally, as SI explains that 
actors might choose specific actions, a new aspect can be identified, 
highlighting that the institutional environment might affect the actions taken by 
actors.  Given this, there is potential that sociological institutionalists can 
describe aspects of institutional impact that might be crucial backgrounds to 
instrumental or powerful actions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
As institutions matter, the following section discusses how this study 
conceptualises institutions. 
2.1.2 The concept of ‘institutions’ 
Institutions are ‗‘the rules of the game and consist of written and unwritten codes 
with enforcement mechanisms‘‘ (Friel, 2017, p. 213). In this respect, institutions 
are ‗‘rules, either formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning 
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power‖ (Scott, 2008, p. 54).  More precisely, it involves the setting of rules and 
policies in order to monitor and assert authority over the conduct of activities to 
influence the behaviour of people.  Institutions are also defined as norms ‗‘that 
structure choices, emphasizing how things should be done and defining 
legitimate means to accomplish them‘‘ (Friel, 2017, p. 213). These can, 
basically, be referred to as the concept of ‗culture‘ as they shape, on the one 
hand, what becomes an objective, and on the other hand, the appropriate way 
to achieve such objective (Scott, 2008).  Therefore, university knowledge 
commercialisation is affected directly by the rules and norms governing the 
actions of actors.  These rules and norms are social facts, which actors take into 
consideration when deciding appropriate actions (Zucker, 1977; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1983). 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of consensus on content and boundaries of 
institutions.  There is no consensus on the definition of institutions, which has 
generated difficulty in empirical studies (Hollingsworth, 2000). Conflicting 
assumptions over what constitutes the term ‗institutions‘ have limited scholarly 
discourses (Scott, 2001), as the term means different things to different scholars 
(Peter, 2000).  Hall and Taylor (1996) wrote that the varying conceptions have 
resulted in contradictions in how institutions are understood.  Clarifications as to 
what constitutes these rules and norms are often ambiguous.  Hence, some 
scholars (e.g. Schmidt, 1987, Aoki, 2001) argue that the term of institutions can 
only be sufficiently described by the subject matter of the analysis as a whole.  
Aoki (2001) pointed out: ―which definition of an institution to adopt is not an 
issue of right or wrong, it depends on the purpose of the analysis.‖ (p. 10).  
Therefore, the understanding of institutions might depend on which scholarly 
approach strengthens the use of a phenomenon. In this respect, some 
sociologists (i.e. Thornton et al., 2012, Friedland and Alford, 1985, 1991) 
developed a more nuanced approach to institutional analysis, termed 
‗institutional logics‘.  This study uses such an approach as it explains and 
defines the content and meaning of institutions that shape the behaviour of 
actors (Thornton et al., 2012).  In logics the rules and norms are perceived as 
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standards of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given identity.  Their 
emergence is linked to the action of actors who suggest ideas and models they 
consider to be appropriate, to interpret the surrounding environmental events.  
They become institutions whenever they are perceived by actors to be neutral, 
expected, appropriate, and legitimate.  Hence, institutional logics matters.   
Considering this, the following sections examine, in detail, the intellectual root 
that guided the conceptual development of the institutional logics perspective.  
This helps in giving a clear justification for its selection as a conceptual 
framework underpinning this study. 
2.2 The Institutional Logics Perspective (ILP) 
The concept of institutional logic was first introduced by Alford and Friedland 
(1985) as a way to describe how conflicting beliefs and practices, intrinsic in 
Western societies, shape human actions within the political field. The concept 
was developed further by the same scholar in 1991 as an explanatory tool for 
institutional change, where it is claimed that Western societies have central, 
dominant institutions with probably incompatible and conflicting institutional 
logics.  Whilst a fair amount of earlier empirical work showed ambiguity as a 
consequence of multiple and conflicting institutional logics at the societal and 
individual level of analysis (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991, 1986), Friedland and 
Alford (1991) detailed theoretically, multiple conflicting and competing logics at 
the macro-societal level of analysis.  They defined central logics as ‗‘a set of 
material practices and symbolic constructions – which constitutes its organizing 
principles and which is available to organisations and individuals to elaborate… 
These institutional logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally structured, 
politically defended, and technically and materially constrained‘‘ (Friedland and 
Alford 1991, p. 232).  Their institutional logics‘ conception relies on considering 
society as an inter-institutional system, and involves many diverse institutions‘ 
subsystems, such as a capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, 
religion, and family.  They considered these subsystems as the dominant 
institutions and examined their role in shaping both interests and actions, as 
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each are guided by distinct, conflicting institutional logics. Since these 
subsystems, or institutional orders, hold different definitions of logics, there is 
potential for conflict.  This study follows Friedland and Alford‘s (1991) 
conception and considers university knowledge commercialisation as an inter-
institutional system, involving three diverse institutions‘ subsystems, namely, 
academia, market, and the state.   
Since the concept of institutional logics was first coined by Friedland and Alford 
(1991), it has become the focus in analyses of responses to institutional 
tensions and forces, and over the past decade, more attention has been given 
to institutional logics.  In the early years, many empirical studies (e.g. Haveman 
and Rao, 1997, Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, Lounsbury, 2002, Thornton, 2002, 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) in institutional logics focused on the impact of 
institutional logics, focusing on the significance of dominant institutional logics 
and the shift from one logic to another.  Haveman and Rao (1997) analysed how 
the emergence of ‗progressive‘ thinking enabled the change in savings and 
loans organisational procedures.  Thornton and Ocasio (1999) examined how 
the shift in logics influenced the academic publishing industry.  The shift from 
professional, editorial, to market logic within higher education publishing was 
perceived to manifest itself in changes related to organisational power and 
causes of executive progression and succession.  In their study, they highlight 
logics as ―socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide 
meaning to their social reality‖ (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p.804).  Basically, 
logics can be perceived as sets of norms and rules that frame how individuals 
make sense of the world around them and subsequently know how to act.  The 
impact of logics can be further evidenced by other studies (e.g. Scott, 2000, 
Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005, Lounsbury, 2007).  Scott (2000) described how 
logic changes within the healthcare sector resulted in the acknowledgement of 
the diversity of actors, behaviours, and governance structures.  Glynn and 
Lounsbury (2005) found that the shifting logics in an orchestra occurred rapidly 
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because of the exogenous shock with impact on organisational evaluation 
criteria and practices, in this respect external stakeholders (i.e. critics) shifting 
criteria for evaluating appropriateness and quality of orchestral performance.   
However, these studies focused on macro-level, larger societal logics (e.g. 
market or growth logic) rather than on the micro-level – consisting of the specific 
logics represented by institutional actors that interact with each other. In 
response, more attention has been given to studying how logics are carried into 
the micro-level or micro-interactions by individual human actors, often in 
situations with co-existing, potentially conflicting logics.  In this respect, many 
empirical studies (e.g. Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, Marquis and Lounsbury, 
2007, Lok, 2010, Reay and Hinings, 2009, Purdy and Gray, 2009, Battilana and 
Dorado, 2010, etc.) investigated the micro-level, taken-for-granted logics that 
direct actions.  Scholars argue there is potential for field-level beliefs, norms, 
and practices being simultaneously affected by more than one logic.  During the 
transitional phase, co-existing logics predictably arise between shifting logics 
within either a mature field (in which a dominant logic is already 
institutionalised), or the initial phases of an emerging field (in which dominant 
logic is still to be institutionalised). It is during this transitional phase that 
institutional contestation and conflicts become salient or prominent as different 
groups of actors attempt to force their own and preferred logics, which are often 
incompatible, onto the field.  In this regard, scholars become interested in 
studying both the processes where a single logic is dominant and the processes 
that enable multiple logics to co-exist.  This assists in understanding the 
reasons why the dominance of a single logic continues to evade some fields. In 
this vein, some empirical studies (e.g. Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007, Lok, 2010) 
showed how competing logics hindered the development of a dominant logic, 
hence, allowing multiple logics to co-exist within the studied fields. These 
studies also helped in understanding the reasons why behaviours and actions, 
resulting from previously dominant logics, are persistently elusive, even after the 
dominant logics were shifted.  Other scholars (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 2009, 
Purdy and Gray, 2009, Battilana and Dorado, 2010) explored the mechanisms 
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that allow the preservation/continuance of both multiple and conflicting logics 
within a field, consequently invalidating and challenging former assumptions that 
a stabilised field is only dominated by one logic.  
Acknowledging the co-existence of multiple logics within a field has shifted 
scholars‘ attention to the concept of multiplicity.  Many studies that explored 
multiple logics had the tendency to differentiate two logics in opposition to each 
other (Greenwood et al., 2011).  However, by reducing reality into one or two 
logics, the field became reductive.  This is in accordance with the effect of social 
movement pressures (Lounsbury et al., 2003) and the concept that actors are 
exposed to multiple worldviews (Greenwood et al, 2002, Binder, 2007), which 
made other scholars question if this was, empirically, the reality in which actors 
truly found themselves (Stryker, 2000, Cloutier and Langley, 2013).  They 
claimed that, in any field, pluralism is a norm.  Consequently, recent discussions 
on institutional logics have called for analysing institutional pluralism or 
multiplicity explicitly and more systematically within institutional studies (Kraatz 
and Block, 2008, Greenwood et al., 2010).  This notion of institutional pluralism 
was discussed further by Greenwood et al. (2011), who claimed that some fields 
are more complex than the others, according to how centralised and fragmented 
they are, they also considered institutional pluralism to be a source of 
institutional complexity within organisational environments.  Institutional 
pluralism and multiplicity have also been considered recently in some empirical 
studies.  For example, Greenwood et al. (2010) studied the interaction between 
the state, the family, and the market in Spain. 
Considering the above review of empirical studies, the understanding of 
institutional logics has significantly developed since the concept was first coined 
by Friedland and Alford‘s (1991) seminal work.  More significantly, and in 
relation to this study, it can be argued that the perspective of institutional logics 
can be considered as an analysis tool that is beneficial for studying multiple 
logics (institutional multiplicity) both in conflict and in consensus (Thornton et al. 
2012). This study attempts to dig deep into the inner workings of institutional 
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conflict and consensus and open the ―black box‖ of institutional processes under 
conditions of multiplicity. As the institutional logics perspective provides the 
necessary conceptual tools to help effectively untangle how conflicts and 
consensus merge, the objective of this study is to contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of the impact of institutional logics in shaping actors‘ actions 
within the micro-level interactions of knowledge commercialisation - a situation 
with multiple, co-existing, and potentially conflicting logics.  Such issue was 
addressed by some scholars (e.g. Bjerregaard, 2010, Lind et al, 2013).  
Bjerregaard (2010) examined the way in which institutional logics enable and 
constrain the process of R&D between university researchers and SMEs.  His 
study contributed to understanding the complexities of institutional logics in 
shaping University Knowledge Commercialisation at the micro-level of 
collaborative research sponsored by governmental funding programs.   This 
study takes the same approach and extends Bjerregaard‘s work by showing 
how the logics of diverse actors, including not only university and industry but 
also public sector and government, enable and constrain the actual processes 
(knowledge production and appropriation) of contracted R&D projects.    
From the above, it can be concluded that the perspective of institutional logics 
can be considered as an analysis tool that is beneficial for studying logics at the 
micro-level.  Thus, the following sections provide a detailed discussion about its 
role in the micro-level of knowledge commercialisation process. 
However, before that, it is important to point out how institutional logics 
perspective has been criticised and the ways in which my study addresses 
those concerns. 
2.2.1 Critical Issues of Institutional Logics Perspective 
General criticism can be drawn on the concept of the ideal-type model within 
institutional logics studies (Freidson, 2001, Light, 1989, Rao et al., 2003, 
Thornton, 2004, Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  Scholars were influenced by 
Weberian thought.  They overlooked the impossibility of ideal types being found 
empirically as they were more inclined towards ‗verificationism‘ and 
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‗prescriptivism‘.  They presume similarity of the ideal type with reality and 
verifying the extent to which such ideal types are similar in reality (Cruz, 2016).  
Moreover, they tended to identify the ideal type as an example and a reference 
point to be reached and accomplished by social actors. For instance, Thornton 
and Ocasio (1999) and Goodrick and Reay (2011) built their ideal types from 
reality, yet never distinguished the developed types in different ways. The 
authors made no attempts to move the developed type away from what was 
noticed in reality, nor did they think about reconsidering the understanding about 
the used ideal type of institutional logics and the context within which actors are 
situated.  Thus, and as a long stream of work implies, these ideal types don‘t 
clearly map to institutional realities of sectors (i.e. academic and industrial 
sectors), this study takes a different approach by reflecting and interpreting 
realistic (not-ideal type) academic, industrial, governmental logics. 
The most relevant criticisms for this study are that the institutional logics 
perspective doesn‘t sufficiently address power and the micro, macro-levels of 
context.  First, although the institutional logics perspective presumes that the 
action of an actor within an organisational field is guided by institutions 
(Thornton et al, 2012, Lauren, 2016); it overlooks the link between power and 
institutions.  As will be explained in the following sections, this study rectifies this 
issue by calling for the need to integrate power with institutions, viewing their 
causal sequencing. Second, as aforementioned, most of the earlier studies in 
institutional logics focused on macro-level, larger societal logics, rather than on 
the micro interaction level.  Although some studies (Zilber, 2002, Reay and 
Hinings, 2009, Battilana and Dorado, 2010) attempted to fill this gap, many 
empirical studies in institutional multiplicity (or multiple institutional logics) have 
focused more on the macro-level (Cloutier and Langley, 2013).  The micro-level 
processes within which institutional logics might emerge and interact are largely 
overlooked (Barley, 2008, Hallett and Ventresca, 2006, Powell and Colyvas, 
2008).  Therefore, this study gives emphasis on micro-level processes, and 
particularly, the way in which multiple actors draw on the institutions associated 
with interactions involving different institutional worlds.  It argues that different 
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types of actors may bring distinct institutional logics in their interactions, leading 
to differences in actions in response. Third, this study follows Friedland and 
Alford‘s (1991) concept and considers university knowledge commercialisation 
as an inter-institutional system.  However, their work of determining central 
institutions at the macro-societal level has been criticised for its Western focus 
on democracy and religion (Greenwood et al., 2002, Thornton and Casio, 2008).  
This study aims to rectify this issue by exploring the logics of the three 
subsystems within a non-western context, that is, a country with a developing 
institutional context.       
 
2.2.2 ILP and the micro-level of KC: Institutional logics in comparison to 
Isomorphism 
In order to examine the role of institutional logics at the micro-level of university 
knowledge commercialisation, this study draws inspiration from Thornton and 
her colleagues‘ conception of heterogeneity, conflicting logics in comparison to 
homogeneity, and the Mimetic Isomorphism (M.I) concept of old sociologists.  
These are discussed next.  
Institutional isomorphism was first coined by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and 
Zucker (1977) who emphasised the significance of the role of culture in 
institutional analysis.  From a macro viewpoint, Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
highlighted the role of modernisation in rationalising taken-for-granted rules, 
resulting in isomorphism in organisations‘ formal structures.  Organisations seek 
legitimacy by conforming to external environments.  Meyer and his colleagues 
were interested in studying rationality that occurred from culture, and considered 
the development of the formal structures of organisations as an element of the 
social world and its cultural systems (Meyer et al., 1997).  Meyer and Rowan‘s 
(1977) theory was extended by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) through focusing 
on isomorphism from the societal level to the organisational fields level.  With 
their focus on the coercive, normative, and mimetic as sources or bases of 
isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell‘s approach has taken hold in empirical 
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analysis.  From DiMaggio‘s and Powell‘s (1983) perspective, mimetic 
isomorphism is a mechanism resulting from an organisational response to 
uncertainty. They argue that organisations tend to copy each other‘s structure 
―when there is new technology that is poorly understood, when goals are 
ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty‖ (p. 151). 
This occurs when an organisation ―consciously models itself after another that it 
believes to represent a high level of success and achievement in the public eye‖ 
(Hanson, 2001, p. 649).  Hence, mimetic reinforcement and support influence 
organisational isomorphism through organisational copying generated by the 
force and pressure to establish organisational legitimacy.  Ashworth et al. (2005) 
emphasize that the practice of ‗copying‘ becomes dominant when actors are not 
sure about the ―outcomes of the adoption of different processes or systems will 
be‖‘ (p. 3).  In support, Selznick (1996) argues that ‗copying‘ is reflected and 
deliberated from the response to uncertainty, apparently ―deeply rooted in 
anxiety than in rational efforts to avoid reinventing the wheel‖ (p. 273).  
Considering this, it becomes normal for organisations to imitate well-developed 
organisations in order to avoid loss.   
This study challenges such an approach.  It believes that institutions are shaped 
within a specific knowledge commercialisation context as a response to 
heterogeneity and institutional diversity.  However, the focus of mimetic 
isomorphism places more attention on homogeneity across organisations, 
besides deliberate legitimization activities and practices without consideration of 
contextual differences. Thus, this study adopts institutional logics as a new 
approach to institutional analysis by positing logics as defining the content and 
meaning of institutions (Friedland and Alford, 1991, Haveman and Rao, 1997, 
Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, Scott et al. 2000).  Although the approach of 
institutional logics shares with Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), and 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) the interest in understanding how cognitive 
structures and cultural rules shape organisational structures, it holds an 
opposite view.  Their perspective of multiple institutional logics differentiates 
new institutionalism in that the emphasis and attention is no more on 
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isomorphism, neither in organisational fields nor the world system society, 
instead the emphasis is on the implications ‗‘of differentiated institutional logics 
on individuals and organisations in a larger variety of contexts, including 
markets, industries, and populations of organisational forms. Institutional logics 
shape rational, mindful behaviour, and individual and organisational actors have 
some hand in shaping and changing institutional logics‘‘ (Thornton et al., 2008, 
p. 101).  More explicitly, and as per this study, the behaviour of actors within the 
micro-level interaction (i.e. contract R&D mechanism) is guided by institutions, 
which are defined by logics governing the interactions of actors located in 
different organisational fields (i.e. university, industry, and government).   In 
comparison to mimetic isomorphism, Thornton et al. (2008) view society as an 
inter-institutional system that allows sources of heterogeneity and agency 
(actors) to be both theorized and examined from contradictions between the 
logics of different organisational fields.  Rather than there being one source of 
rationality, as in global systems approaches (Meyer et al., 1997), there are 
multiple sources.  Hence, instead of suggesting homogeneity and isomorphism, 
the institutional logics perspective considers a context as theoretically and 
―potentially influenced by contending logics of different societal sectors‖ 
(Thornton et al., 2008, p. 104). For instance, a healthcare system is shaped by 
the professional logic of medical care, the logic of democratic state, and the 
market logic (Scott et al., 2000).  Thus, institutional logics are the belief 
systems, or cognitive maps, that are supporting individuals situated within a 
particular organisational field, to establish meaning to their activities.  Hence, 
institutional logics may be perceived as governing interactions by both enabling 
and constraining behaviour through systems of incentives and sanctions 
(Thornton, 2004).  In this study, the process of University Knowledge 
Commercialisation is considered as an inter-institutional system, and is 
therefore infused with institutional logics that exemplify the organizing principles 
that highlight how diverse fields‘ actors achieve their work. The long persistent 
traditions and practices within the three institutional spheres (or organisational 
fields) describe the historically constituted differences in the institutional cultures 
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of scientific community, industry, and government, exemplifying three different 
sets of institutional logics.   
2.3 Theoretical Perspectives of UKC 
The aim of this section is to examine the impact of interaction within the 
university knowledge commercialisation context by introducing two theoretical 
perspectives of Academics Capitalism (AC) and Triple Helix Model (THM). To 
allow for a nuanced approach to the role of actors and institutions, the main 
arguments of both perspectives are interpreted through the lens of the 
institutional logics approach, where conflicts between logics are identified.   
2.3.1 Academic Capitalism (AC)  
 
Background 
The term Academic Capitalism (AC) is directly used from the 'Academic 
Capitalism: Politics, Policies and the Entrepreneurial University' book of 
Slaughter and Leslie, 1997.  Their main theme is concerned with the "on-going 
changes in the nature of academic labour" (ibid, p. 1).  The study focuses on the 
transformations within the period 1980s-1990s.  They found that a 
transformation in the "nature of academic labour: changes in what academics 
do, how they allocate their time" (ibid, p. 60) was caused by the transformations 
in financial structures and growing relations and linkages with industry.  This 
makes academics shift further towards the market and away from their 
traditional positions within a "state subsidized shelter from pure market forces" 
(Bullard, 2007, p. 15).  In order to maintain professionalism, universities have 
traditionally discouraged their academics from the market and have kept them 
protected from it in order to sustain the academic freedom in pursuing basic 
knowledge.  However, this is now no longer the case., and Slaughter and Leslie, 
2001  have developed the concept of academic capitalism as a theoretical basis 
for better explaining the shifts towards the market by public universities.  
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Slaughter and Leslie (1997) define academic capitalism as "institutional and 
professional market or market-like efforts on the part of universities and faculty" 
(p. 11), in order to "secure external funds" (p. 209).  Market relates to for-profit 
activities, while the external funds include research grants and contracts with 
government and industry (Bullard, 2007).  From this perspective, the conceptual 
focus of scholars was emphasized by the "encroachment for profit motive" in the 
academia environment (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997, p. 210).  Therefore, 
academic capitalism encourages profit-making activities which bring about 
research products "close to the market" (ibid).  In this context, research is being 
commercialised in applied fields, making a new era in higher education as an 
entrepreneurial institution.  
Afterwards, the conceptual focus of Academic Capitalism has been shifted to 
the "internal embeddedness of profit-oriented activities" by universities and their 
academic staff (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004, p. 11).  This can be clarified by 
the theory of resource dependence (utility maximization) by Pfeffer (1992) from 
which the concept of academic capitalism is derived theoretically.  This theory 
assumes that the motivation of academic entrepreneurial activities depends on 
the importance of securing funds for conducting research.  Universities rely on 
key resources in order to support their research operations.  If these resources 
are scarce, the academics should engage themselves in industrial activities in 
order to get alternative resources.  Therefore, academic capitalism can also be 
referred to as "a situation in which the academics and universities operate in an 
increasingly competitive environment, deploying their academic capital, which 
may comprise teaching, research, consultancy skills, or other applications or 
forms of academic knowledge" (Deem, 2001, p. 14).  Specifically, academic 
capitalism involves the efforts of academics in securing "external moneys" 
(Awbery, 2002, p. 2). Academics who engage in market and market-like, 
activities have been named 'academic capitalists' (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).  
These academics enter into the context of academic capitalism mainly through 
commercialising their technology by gaining licenses and patents for their 
research outcomes (Park, 2011).  Universities are "pushed and pulled" in the 
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direction of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997, p. 211), as a 
response to the external pressures arising from the characteristics of their 
resources providers (i.e. industry and government).  Therefore, universities 
encounter difficulties in maintaining 'autonomy' (Zheng, 2010, p. 39).  Hence, a 
university is considered as a state-funded entrepreneur that initiates capitalism 
(Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004), where profit-motivation behaviours of 
academics tend to be aggressive and embedded within their university's 
community 
However, the literature on academic capitalism focuses on universities in 
Western countries (Hershberg et al, 2007, Kwon, 2010, Back, 2016).  Most of 
the early studies were situated in Australia (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997) and the 
US (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004), with more recent studies in Europe 
(Kauppinen, 2012), and many of these studies involve universities‘ 
entrepreneurial practices.  Little attention has been paid to exploring this 
phenomenon in countries with developing institutional environments, where lack 
of resources is a much starker reality for universities (Back, 2016).  The role of 
the university in such countries is different from those in countries with 
developed institutional environments.  Although countries with developing 
institutional environments have witnessed a policy orientation towards 
strengthening the interaction between academia and industrial application 
(Etzkowitz et al, 2000), the main mission of universities within these countries 
remains elite teaching since research and market oriented activities are not 
established strongly due to the lack of sufficient resources (i.e. research 
capacity and funding) (Kwon, 2010).   
Furthermore, although it captures the multitude/variety of actors involved in the 
relationship and despite its recognition of the positive economic possibilities of 
collaboration between universities, industry, and government, the theory of 
academic capitalism does not interpret this relationship as a natural rule 
governing knowledge commercialisation interaction (McClure, 2014). Rather, it 
adopts a narrow approach and remains squarely focused on understanding the 
nature of change in universities.  Universities remain at the heart of the research 
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that is taking place, admittedly using a more critical perspective of the academic 
capitalist knowledge regime.  Scholars tend to only emphasize the role of 
universities in encouraging market-like behaviour, and much of the inquiry into 
academic capitalism has focused on the activities of individuals—students, 
faculty, and administrators—in promoting and undertaking entrepreneurial 
activities.  
Given this, research on academic capitalism focus primarily on the implications 
of market logics on the university‘s institutional setting, without considering the 
effect of different, multiple logics governing the micro-level interactions.  It 
overlooks the exploration of the implications of the existence of multiple actors 
often holding different logics, which ultimately offers little explanation for how 
conflicts occur.  In other words, it obscures the implications of potential conflicts 
of different logics between diverse actors in university knowledge 
commercialisation. More importantly, with exceptions (Mars and Lounsbury, 
2009, Lauren, 2016), the perspective of institutional logics and academic 
capitalism theory have rarely been combined in research studies . This study 
fills this gap and pays attention to not just how market logics of academic 
capitalism are perceived and applied by academia, but also to the implications 
of industrial and government logics on the processes of knowledge 
commercialisation. 
By drawing from the institutional logics perspective, the following section 
discusses how market logics shape behaviour and actions in academia.   
2.3.1.1 Academic Capitalism through the lens of ILP 
From the institutional logics perspective, academic capitalism can be referred to 
as the characteristics of the broader professional and market logics associated 
with university knowledge commercialisation systems at the societal level. 
Hence, the logics of market and profession merit further detail.  The professional 
logic has been defined in both the work of sociology (e.g. Light 2000, Abbott 
1988) and studies applying the institutional logics framework (e.g. Thornton 
2004, Thornton and Ocasio 1999), as the ideology of arranged and organized 
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professionals who have expertise and knowledge and whose status is 
safeguarded by the condition in return for social benefit.  Some studies provide 
important inferences to the study of the institutional logic of professionals.  For 
example, in the examination of changes in institutional logics within universities 
publishing, Thornton (2004) finds that universities‘ publishing shifts from an 
independent culture of local publishers concentrated on generating markets for 
books based on personal, relational networks towards a culture of international, 
conglomerated corporations that generate markets from corporate hierarchies.      
The market logic draws from the field of sociology within both the institutional 
logics theory (e.g. Thornton 2004, Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), without explicitly 
applying an institutional logics framework (e.g. Fligstein 1993, Scott, 2000).  The 
inter-institutional system of the market is guided by rational self-interest, profit, 
and conceptualising interaction within society as market transactions (Thornton, 
2004).  Gumport (2000), for example, uses ‗industrial logic‘ as a label to study 
the impact of the rapid expansion of knowledge on university culture.  She 
argues that the conceptual understanding dominating universities has shifted 
due to the great growth of information.  In the examination of three universities 
(UC Berkeley, SUNY Stony Brook, and the University of Illinois at Chicago), she 
determined that the earlier conception of social-institutional logic within those 
universities is being replaced by industrial logic. The social institutional logic 
acts in response to societal expectations, the ideal inherent values, and to 
comprehensive and multidisciplinary scholarship.  While industrial logic reacts to 
market forces through admiring and recognizing commercialisation and 
revenue-generating knowledge that supports market demand and contributes to 
the development of the economy.  The legitimization of industrial logic implies 
that academics and other university actors act within a competitive enterprise.  It 
explains how universities have reacted positively to market logic, which denotes 
academics‘ acceptance to select a different environment for business and 
market-oriented stakeholders, such as firms.   
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The new logic of industry, as labelled by Gumport (2002), is remarkably similar 
to what is meant by academic capitalism, as there was a shift from the 
academic dominant societal logics to market logics through knowledge 
capitalism. In accordance with the work of Slaughter and Leslie (1997), 
Gumport‘s (2002) work describes how institutions of universities are being 
modified and restructured as a result of fund reduction which necessitates a 
more industrial approach.  This is consistent with the notion of different 
institutional logics, which offers a powerful lens for researchers to speculate and 
conceptualise how actors‘ logics are held in the broader environment and acted 
out locally in organisations in order to get legitimacy. Gumport (2002) clearly 
pointed out that one logic has not completely replaced and dominated the other.  
Rather, the two logics of academics and industry co-exist with one another, but 
sometimes with tensions (Ylijoki, 2003).      
However, although many scholars have argued for the benefits of shifting 
towards market logics (e.g. Clark, 1998, Wang, 2001, Embree, 2001, Marginson 
and Considine, 2000, Awbery, 2002, Brint, 2002, Ylijoki, 2003, Mendoza and 
Berger, 2008), others, especially those who joined the development of the new 
economics of science, have pointed out its intrinsic danger (Giroux, 2002).  The 
overall argument is that academic capitalism is considered an intruder with 
dissimilar logics that are not appropriate to the academic institutional setting.   
The opponents put out a general critique on the theory of neo-liberalism.  
Universities have begun to adopt the logics of (neo-liberal) markets as this 
enables them to access new streams of funding, through the establishment of 
new networks linking universities with industry to generate a new flow of 
knowledge and capital (Salughter and Rohades, 2004).  However, this 
encourages market power and considers academic choice as the basis for 
economic power (Aronowitz, 2000).  The interference of (neo-liberal) market 
logic with the process of research science is a long held fear in academia.  
Those opposing what may possibly be perceived as market logics‘ interference, 
encourage what others perceive as the excessively idealistic logic of academia.  
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The claim that entrepreneurialism within academia undermines academic logics 
can turn into a heated matter and those who oppose it describe the 
revolutionary, or ‗iconoclastic‘, logics of market as a danger to the fundamentals 
and traditions of universities.  Young (2005), for instance, found that as 
academics become aware of the growing financial cuts or income gap, they are 
becoming increasingly dependent on market logic, trying to strike their own 
‗Faustian bargains with capital‘ (p. 6), in other words, willing to sacrifice their 
own academic logics to satisfy the limitless desire for gaining more money.   
This can be explained more by the (neo-liberal) markets logic of knowledge 
commercialisation. The problem becomes a concern when the resources for 
academic research are allocated according to their usefulness to the market 
rather than their scientific importance.  This has changed the reward system for 
academics, which used to focus mainly on discovery and quality research, but 
now focuses on results in producing deals for patents and licenses that may or 
may not agree with the results of scientific research (Galston, 2004).  Academic 
researchers aggressively take part in capitalising knowledge and exploiting 
resources to make use of existing economic opportunities (Slaughter and 
Rhoades, 2004).  From this perspective, there is a concern that academia 
continues to experience pressures from capitalists (Bullard, 2007), and 
therefore, knowledge becomes a commodity to be manufactured, packaged, 
bought, and sold (Bertelsen, 2002) - the intellectual work of academics becomes 
a product that is cost-effectively produced at a production line.   In this context, 
universities replace the knowledge logic of public good with market logic of 
private good, which consequently highlights the privatization of knowledge 
through commercialisation.   
This has raised more concerns in academia.  The (neo-liberal) markets logics, 
championing competitiveness, truly confront the university‘s logics of open and 
free exchange of scientific inquiry that involves colleagues validating and 
replicating each other‘s research work (Bullard, 2007).  The process of the 
scientific community within universities is mainly influenced by the logic of 
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'communalism' (Merton, 1973, David, 2000).  Communalism relates to the 
common ownership of ideas, thoughts, and knowledge (Merton, 1973). It 
ensures the free flow of knowledge by disseminating information across the 
required areas (ibid).  In this perspective, the academic research depends on a 
'social process' (collective-action) more than 'an individual program' (individual-
action) (David, 2000).  Thus, and from the context of the community of 'open 
science', privatizing the outcomes of research hinders the open access of the 
members of society to the 'academic commons' (ibid).  However, universities 
engaging in commercialising their intellectual properties endanger the academic 
logics of open science (Bok, 2009).  Many scholars who present research 
papers at any scholarly meeting might neglect and exclude important 
information on the basis of patent, hence ―closing intellectual communication‖ 
(Aronowitz, 2000, p. 48).  From this perspective, universities' activities, along 
with academic logics, can be dominated by neo-liberal market logics.   
In short, the main challenge here is the need to merge and balance market 
logics with the professional logics of academia.  Thus, it remains an open 
question, how these conflicting professional and market logics inform knowledge 
commercialisation processes between different actors, and with the growth of 
University Knowledge Commercialisation phenomenon, how the fear that 
‗‘irreplaceable values may get lost in the relentless growth of knowledge 
commercialisation‘‘ in academia has been managed and governed (Bok, 2009, 
p.17). 
2.3.2 Triple Helix Model (THM) 
 
Background 
The Triple-Helix Model (THM) was proposed by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 
(1997), in which they highlight the role of the university in the context of 
knowledge-based economy as a central partner to industry and government.  
The triple-helix model is rooted in the traditional linear model, by integrating the 
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factors of interactive and recursive within it (Etzkowitz and Webster, 1998).  The 
linear model is based on separating the institutional areas in such a way that 
creates a one way stream of knowledge flow across clearly defined boundaries 
from basic research to applied research towards a product.  This can be clarified 
further by explaining the evolution of this model over time. Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdroff started by describing the development and progress of the systems 
of innovation.  They also explained the conflicts upon which the path should be 
considered in the relationships between university and industry.  These conflicts 
are caused by the different institutional arrangements of the relations of 
University-Industry-Government (U-I-G).  First, a historical situation can be 
distinguished by the first ‗Triple-Helix Statist Model‘.  As shown in figure 2.3.2, 
Government controls both academia and industry.  
Figure 2.3.1: Triple Helix Statist Model  
 
 
 
 
 
In this respect, the dominated institutional sphere is ‗government‘.  It is expected 
to take the lead in developing projects and providing the resources for new 
initiatives. The government plays the role of coordinator whenever relations are 
established between academia and industry.  A strong form of this model exists 
in some Eastern European countries, which are affected by the ‗existing 
socialism‘. 
 
 
Source: Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff  (2000) 
University Industry 
Government  
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Figure 2.3.3 shows the second model of Triple-Helix, which also labelled as 
‗Laissez-Faire Model‘.  
Figure 2.3.2: Triple Helix Laissez-Faire Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model the separated institutional spheres are divided by strong 
boundaries and restricted relations.  Additionally, individuals involved are more 
willing to compete rather than to cooperate in relation to others.  The critical 
separation makes the role of institutions narrower with strong boundaries as well 
as with justifiable standards for the interactions among the different spheres.  In 
the real world, the spheres usually have more close relationships than the ones 
within the model of Laissez-Faire of government-industry-university, which are 
working individually and without any close relationships.  Etzkowitz (2002) 
claims, in reference to this model, that the role of the university is shifted to 
providing knowledge mainly through publications and qualified graduates, who 
commercialise their tacit-knowledge to industry.  So it is the responsibility of 
industry to find and implement appropriate knowledge from universities without 
getting any support or coordination (Etzkowitz, 2003, p. 305).  In addition to 
considering the differences of the above two models, a current concern is 
generated.  The model of ‗Statist‘ is globally considered as an unsuccessful 
model, since the bottom-up initiatives rarely happen.  The second model 
encourages a policy of ‗Laissez-Faire‘, in which the role of government is 
reduced suddenly in comparison to its role in Statist model (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000).  Therefore, there was a need to develop a model that 
Source: Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) 
Government 
University Industry 
44 
 
integrates the interactive and recursive factors within it (ibid).  The global 
tendency is a move towards a balanced model, figure 2.3.4, in which the three 
institutional spheres overlap and collaborate.  The model assumes the flow of 
knowledge to be into two ways. The development of this model entails several 
steps (Etzkowitz, 2002, 2003, 2008; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997, 2000, 
Leydesdorff, 2012; Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1998). Etzkowitz (2008) has 
explicitly distinguished three steps, namely Triple Helix imputes, taking the role 
of the other, moving from bilateral to trilateral networks or inter-organisational 
interactions. The following gives a detailed discussion about main arguments 
within these steps.   
 
Figure 2.3.3: A Balanced Triple-Helix  
 
 
 
 
 
Within THM imputes, ‗‘a Triple Helix regime typically begins as university, 
industry, and government enter into a reciprocal relationship with each other in 
which each attempts to enhance the performance of the other‘‘ (Etzkowitz, 
2008, p. 8).  The rationality aligned with this argument is the social belief, 
shared by government and industry, that knowledge production is central to 
economic growth and development.  As government and industry are motivated 
by this belief, the university‘s involvement in knowledge commercialisation is 
driven initially, and mainly, by public policies and financial incentives.  Under 
such argument, the THM interaction starts, in which three institutional spheres 
realise the need for developing a reciprocal relationship.  
As demands for cooperation with each other arise, challenges might emerge 
that gradually lead to a stage where internal transformation is characterized by 
Source: Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) 
Government 
University Industry 
Tri-lateral Networks/inter-
organisational interactions 
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‗taking the role of the other‘ (Etzkowitz, 2008, p. 9, Etzkowitz and Klofsten, 
2005).  (Dzisah and Etzkowitz, 2011) claim that "university, government and 
industry that were differentiated with each other as a condition for the 
constitution of modernity are now intersecting with each other to create unique 
institutional configuration" (p. 38).  The three actors take the role of the other to 
blur the boundaries between them within the interaction process.  They are 
joined together, but remain independent from each other. The actors, in addition 
to performing their traditional and primary activities, each take the role of the 
other as additional secondary activities, while maintaining their own/individual 
primary roles and different identities.  Therefore, changes emerge within and 
between the different institutional spheres of the three players, which deal with 
each other recursively, as one is linked to the other two.  In this respect, the 
university preserves its traditional roles of teaching and research, while taking 
the role of industry, becoming more entrepreneurial oriented - acting as 
consultants, and giving attention to knowledge capitalisation, such as patents 
and licensing (Etzkowitz, 2008).  Industry maintains its focus on the production 
of products and services, while engaging in R&D, such as involvement in 
research of new technology development.  Government retains its responsibility 
of solving failures through regulating and amending public policies and 
establishing rules, while at the same time promoting interactions among 
universities and industries by establishing and implementing programs of 
innovation and acting as coordinator to make the interactions more successful 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2002).  In a nut shell, as universities and users are 
assumed to possess complementary knowledge, government ―changes the 
rules of the game‖ (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 114), in addition to 
encouraging interaction between the other institutional spheres (Etzkowitz and 
Klofsten, 2005).   
As they take the role of the other, the actors from the three spheres realise the 
necessity of engaging with the others‘ fields, yet their resources are insufficient 
to accomplish their desired goals (Cai, 2015).  Also, new challenges and 
demands might potentially surface between spheres, which raise the need for 
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closer cooperation and interaction through the evolution of trilateral interactions 
(Etzkowitz, 2008).  In this respect, interactive networks are established between 
the three institutional areas in common research focusing on developing 
knowledge-based economies (Etzkowitz, 2004).  New technologies and 
innovation can be produced by the new initiatives that take place within these 
networks.  Additionally, the new channels of interactions and organisational 
arrangements grow to be as essential as the production of physical devices in 
accelerating the growth of innovation (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2001, 
Etzkowitz, 2003).  As these institutional areas overlap, the communication of 
knowledge is built with an assumption.  So, the model offers a 'heuristic method' 
to study the different interactions between actors in relation to changes in their 
institutional networks (Leydesdorff and Meyer, 2006).  In this respect, trilateral, 
as opposed to bilateral, networks are the three players that are considered as 
the main institutions of knowledge communication (ibid).  Such networks are 
characterized by increasing interdependency between the three spheres.  One 
sphere has a considerable influence on the other actors‘ actions, and 
throughout the interaction, actors within each sphere are able to adopt new 
ideas from the others to resolve issues and meet new demands or needs.  For 
example, academics within a university cannot carry out knowledge production 
without industry.  In addition to being a source for research, academics need 
industry as a strong partner in knowledge production.  In the interim, knowledge 
commercialisation mainly relies on the environments and conditions established 
by the government.  Industry, such as the case with SMEs, becomes a unit of 
related entities related to other enterprises through the market rather than being 
a competitive unit, thus becoming a THM entity based on the relation with 
academia and government (Etzkowitz, 2008).  
Additionally, a dual-layered network is implied - the layer of institutional relations 
and the layer of functional relations.  The theoretical specification becomes 
more complex when the "institutional differentiation is added to the functional 
differentiation" (Leydesdorff, 2005, p. 10).  In the innovation systems of 
knowledge economy, for instance, the triple-helix lowers this complexity by 
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providing a tool to link the different perspectives of actors.  The assumption of 
functional differentiation and structural integration explains the changes at the 
interactions level among university, government and industry, in addition to the 
internal changes within each institution.  According to the triple-helix model, the 
involved institutions are changing and restructuring continuously as they widen 
their functions.  Some scholars may see the changes caused by the influence of 
emerging networks as a threat to the traditional identity of universities.  
However, and according to Leydesdorff, these changes can be considered as 
"creative destruction which entails the option of increasing development" 
(Leydesdorff, 2005, p. 13).  In this respect, Etzkowitz (1998) considers 
'entrepreneurial university' as the latest stage of advancement of universities, in 
which the new mission is cantered towards capitalising knowledge, where a 
university becomes closer to users of knowledge and a main economic player in 
its own right.  "The capitalisation of knowledge becomes the basis for economic 
and social development and, thus, of an enhanced role for the university in the 
society" (Etzkowitz, 2004, p. 66).  The knowledge is created and 
commercialised for practical application and for progresses in the basic 
theoretical disciplines.  To become more entrepreneurial, universities should 
carry on interdependent relationships with other involved sectors, but at the 
same time sustain their independency. The need to balance between 
interdependency and independency has resulted in the appearance of cross-
organisational formats that focus on dual goals.  By blurring the boundaries 
between universities and industry, a two-way flow of influence exists.  As 
universities‘ relations with government and industry transform, their structures 
also go through reconstruction. 
2.3.2.1 THM through the lens of the ILP 
From the above, the classic literature of TH suggests an overlap between the 
three spheres (university, industry, and government).  Etzkowitz (2008) argues 
that within the balanced model of TH, the three spheres all share similar views 
about their collaboration. It addresses the commodification and capitalisation of 
scientific knowledge as well as the associated institutional and normative 
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convergence between academia, industry, and government (Etzkowitz, 2003, 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdroff, 2000).  Hence, the success of knowledge-based 
economy depends on the cooperation between the three actors.  Useful 
knowledge is produced and developed from the permanent interactions and 
networks among the three actors.   
Thus, from the THM perspective, university-industry-government collaboration 
becomes a new institutional order - a new institutional field in the context of 
sociological institutionalism when there is an interaction between the three 
spheres‘ interests, which is later institutionalised and taken for granted by time 
(Benner and Sandström, 2000).  This is similar to the mimetic isomorphism 
concept by which, and as mentioned in section 2.2.2 above, the concept of TH 
and its related activities have come to be the templates for action which 
generated unified or monolithic responses to uncertainty that led to isomorphism 
- a commonality in function and form (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). THM and its 
activities have come to be the practices and routines that are repeated and 
reproduced through time and aim to function as a rational framework 
constructing the actions of the three involved actors.   Nevertheless, such 
perception tends to give a naïve and modest view of the institutional 
environment, as it portrays THM culture as the only institutional order and 
institutional field surrounding all three spheres.  This is contrary to the 
institutional logics perspective of organisations‘ embeddedness within different, 
conflicting institutional orders or inter-institutional systems (Thornton et al., 
2012). 
Although THM emphasizes the coexisting of diverse institutional logics in the 
context of knowledge commercialisation, the authors rarely address the tensions 
and conflicts between actors on the micro-level of interactions (Lu, 2007, 
Tuunainen, 2002, Viale and Pozzali, 2010, Fogelberg and Thorpenberg, 2012).  
In particular, the proposition of common interests, underlying assumptions of the 
necessity of pre-existing cooperative relations and the automatic flow of 
knowledge among the three institutional spheres.  Actors from different 
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institutional spheres draw on various institutions to direct their actions, and the 
concept of ‗institutional logics‘ offers a link between institutions and actions 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  Institutional actors have their own institutional 
logic-guiding principles, assumptions, and symbolic constructions which they 
draw upon to guide their actions and form their own identities (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991).  Institutions are continuously being reshaped by individual human 
actions, which in turn, are reflected in their interactive activities with other 
actors.  Hence, institutional conflict may exist between university, industry, and 
government, though government can be considered as an active participant in 
university-industry linkages (Sohn et al., 2009), resulting in incongruence in 
goals and interests. The empirical evidence underpins university knowledge 
commercialisation involving studies focusing either on universities (primarily) or 
enterprises, infrequently both, (Ankrah et al., 2013) and hardly ever explores the 
implication of the existence of multiple actors, often possessing different goals 
and interests.  This may obscure the potential for conflict of different logics 
between multiple actors and its implications on the effectiveness of university 
knowledge commercialisation.   
From the above, the validity of any theory depends on the context sensitivity in 
which actors are embedded (Whetten, 2009).  A theory must not just focus on 
the relationship between X and Y, yet must also involve explanatory factors that 
are related to a great intensity of contextual analysis.  However, Triple-Helix 
does not provide proper justifications that can be used as methodically 
structured criteria and guides for exploring the implication of conflicting logics.  
This demonstrates that THM provides no means, or practical directions, on how 
to bridge differences and nurture cooperation between actors.  For example, 
THM doesn‘t pay sufficient attention to the role and effect of different 
mechanisms that surround and exert direct, or indirect, influence on the 
knowledge commercialisation phenomenon. Therefore, this study adopted the 
institutional logics perspective as an analysis tool to explore the impact of the 
potential mechanisms that can be used in bridging the differences in institutional 
logics within the micro-level interactions of knowledge commercialisation. 
51 
 
Moreover, the development of the THM is a consequence of inductive theorizing 
founded on successful innovation stories within the context of Western 
countries.  Although the founders of THM (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1995, 
1997; Leydesdorff and Meyer, 2003) acknowledged the differences between 
Western and non-western countries, and even though many followers have 
empirically examined THM in different national contexts (e.g. da Silva et al., 
2012, Saad et al., 2008, Saad and Zawdie, 2011a, Zhou and Peng, 2008), these 
studies have attempted to employ the THM in their studies on developing or 
emerging economies regardless of institutional differences (Pugh, 2014, Cai, 
2015).  Though not specifically referring to the THM, Edquist (2001) expressed 
criticism that, in general, innovation system approaches overemphasize the 
interplay between interacted actors while paying little attention to the institutional 
environments in which those actors are situated and in which their actions take 
place.  Sotarauta and Kosonen (2013) promote this point by arguing that 
innovation policies are context sensitive and therefore must be customized 
according to local conditions.  Therefore, this study aims to rectify this issue by 
exploring the logics of the three institutional spheres within a non-western 
context, that is, a developing country.     
Furthermore, THM ignores incentives and power relations among actors (Hira, 
2013).  It is argued that the three actors, i.e. university, industry, and 
government, can be expected to have different incentives (Siegel et al., 2003).  
Academics are primarily driven by publication pressures.  Industry is driven by 
commercialisation possibilities through gaining proprietary control over the 
resulting knowledge.  Government is made of bureaucrats who drive policies 
within the political agendas.  The difference in incentives indicates that easy 
bridging and agreement between the three institutional spheres might not work 
in practice.  Cooperation means different things to different actors, depending 
on their view of dependence and status of power.  This can be explained more 
by the recent conception of the institutional logics perspective, specifically with 
respect to mechanisms of power (Thornton et al, 2012).  Power is shaped by 
opportunities provided for actors to challenge conflicting logics (Thornton et al, 
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2012).  For instance, the actors who are in power often regard cooperation 
within U-I interaction as valuable in addressing what has to be done in a 
changing world.  While those without power, perceive it as a way of distracting 
attention from achieving their interests.  Thus, achieving synergistic cooperation 
is difficult as it requires bridging the gap between different logics.  Hence, the 
implication of logics is explained by the mechanism of power.  However, there 
are a very limited number of studies on UKC and how power differences can be 
bridged between institutional logics. This is addressed in this study by providing 
mechanisms of multiple, conflicting logics of different institutional actors, which 
determine and shape the meaning of power guiding attention and decision-
making. 
Before discussing, empirically, the impact of the power mechanism, the 
following section discusses how this study conceptualises power within the 
context of THM. 
2.3.2.2 THM, Institutional Logics, and Power Mechanism 
To a great extent, the Triple Helix relationship of university, industry, and 
government involves cooperation and power redistribution (Cai, 2015).  
According to Thornton et al. (2012), the meaning of power differs by actors‘ 
institutional logics.  Actors‘ interests cannot be understood independently of 
their understandings. Thus, institutional logics assume interdependency 
between institutional meanings, actors‘ interests, and powers.  However, 
although the institutional logics perspective deals with power, it doesn‘t integrate 
power with institutions.  From its scholars‘ perspective, ‗‘power is rarely; if ever, 
free from culture, and thus power‘s effects in a situation carry the force of an 
institutional logic (Friedland, 2012, p. 586).  This study rectifies such issue by 
calling for the need to integrate power with institutions, viewing their causal 
sequencing.  The argument is that if power is theorized as independent from 
institutional fields, a problem needs to be addressed, which is that power is 
created in the course of action and doesn‘t exist before the action that explains 
it.  Given this, despite the fact that the institutional logics perspective presumes 
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that the action of an actor within an organisational field is guided by institutions, 
it overlooks the link between power and institutions.  Thus, this study adopts 
arguments from general institutional scholars, particularly Schmid (1987) and 
Samuels (1971).  Although these scholars are not approaching the issue from 
an institutional logics literature perspective (they have also taken the 
institutionalist perspective) their arguments explicitly explain the link between 
power and institutions, which provide a good tool for this study‘s analysis.  
Within the setting of institutions governance, Samuels (1971) suggests two 
dimensions to link between institutions and power.  The first dimension is the 
consideration of institutions as a form of power, which has received limited 
attention in the existing university knowledge commercialisation literature.  A 
relevant argument for this dimension is implied by Schmidt (1987), through 
establishing rules that define who may do what to whom, with what, when, how, 
and under what conditions, in other words, socially granted power.  Schmidt 
(1987) also argues that power to the people is a demagogic slogan and that 
when there is a conflict of interest, the issue always becomes which people are 
to be favoured. Hence, power is inevitable if interests conflict. He states that ‗‘if 
everyone cannot have what they want simultaneously, the choice is not power 
or no power, but who has the power. Power is the ability to implement one's 
interests when they conflict with those of others‘‘ (Schmidt, 1987, p. 9).  The 
second dimension is relevant to policymaking, particularly, the creation of rules 
through the exercise of power (Samuels, 1971).  Such dimension remains 
unexplored in the existing literature and research.  The process of rule creation 
or policy-making involves the exercise of power, since rules arise from the 
interaction of actors.  Even if rules are stemmed from legislative forces and 
enforced by the government, the essential assignment of rights to individuals is 
the result of contestation, mediated through power.  
The notion of power exercise that stems from the conflict of institutional logics 
and rule creation is one of this study‘s central reasons for analysis.  The study 
conceptualises the micro-level of interaction as field of power relations (Hira, 
53 
 
2013, Brin and Karabel, 1991). This considers the institutional setting power of 
the micro-level field, specifically, the power of logics governing the interaction 
within contracted R&D projects. Projects comprise the universe debates and 
discussions.  Logics act as a set of rules and norms in that they serve to limit 
the actions and the thoughts of those on the project.  When the rules and norms 
of a project are established through processes of structuration appropriating one 
logic over another, actors supporting that logic become more powerful.  They 
have more control over decision making and their logics will come to be 
reflected as dominant (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  The logics that are 
supported by powerful actors contribute to preserving the ‗status quo‘ as they 
provide the institutions (i.e. rules and norms) of action and interaction that guide 
actors in decision making (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).  Hence, actors‘ logics 
and their exercise of power matter in this study.  The following two sections give 
more details. 
2.3.2.3 Actors’ and Logics’ Differences 
Universities and users are governed by different logics. Thornton (2012) claims 
that the meaning and legitimacy of different sources of organisational identity, 
strategy, and structure are shaped by a prevailing institutional logic.  Otherwise 
stated, there are different institutional logics at the university than in industry 
(Lind et al., 2013). This is significant because institutional logics are embodied 
in practices and ideas, which shape the rules of the game (Dunn and Jones, 
2010).  Within the literature of university knowledge commercialisation, the 
differences of logics between firms and academia are often described as a 
constraining factor on the commercialisation of knowledge (Bjerregaard, 2010, 
Siegel et al, 2003, Gassol, 2007).  Bjerregaards (2010, p. 100) argues that the 
institutional logics within firms and universities tend to give rise to differences in 
goals, interests, and time horizons informing R&D behaviour.  This, in turn, 
might act as an obstacle to knowledge commercialisation.  Different institutional 
assumptions for knowledge production and appropriation in academia and 
SMEs may affect the process of knowledge commercialisation.  Thus, the 
literature (e.g. Bloden and Stokes, 1994, Davenport, 1999) indicates how 
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institutional logics between academia and firms are likely to result in differences 
in interests and goals informing the behaviour within knowledge production and 
appropriation.   
A growing body of empirical studies provides evidence that academia and users 
are characterized by conflicting institutional logics.  However, all of these studies 
are around commercial users (i.e. SMEs and large companies) without 
referencing to non-commercial users (e.g. government and other public bodies, 
as well as third sector organisations).   
The explanation of the ‗academic logics‘ draws mainly on Polanyi‘s (1962) and 
Merton‘s (1959) model of science, highlighting the search for fundamental and 
basic knowledge, freedom in research conduct, rewards in the arrangement of 
peer recognition, and the open science disclosure of research outcomes.  
Industry, on the other hand, is perceived as following ‗commercial logics‘, 
concentrating on applied researches within a situation shaped by restricted 
disclosure and the private appropriation of returns from research outcomes 
(Aghion et al. 2008, Fini and Lacetera 2010, Lacetera 2009, Murray 2010, 
Vallas and Kleinman 2008).  In the conflicting logics view, there is a clear 
division of work between academic and industry.  The research mission of 
academia is to increase and enhance public knowledge through conducting 
basic research, for example, research bringing about fundamental insight 
(Argyres and Liebeskind 1998, Bentley et al., 2015).  The focus of industry, on 
the other hand, is on applied research with the purpose of solving real issues 
that are valued in the market place (Aghion et al. 2008, Lacetera 2009, da Silva 
Campos, 2015).  
Researchers are often given freedom in choosing what research to pursue and 
how to approach it.  From the conventional point of view, academic norms 
permit researchers to freely choose research projects as per their personal 
interests or the perceived meaning for the advancement of science. The 
commercial logic, on the contrary, restrains freedom and academics‘ choices to 
the needs and requirements of industrial firms (Vallas and Kleinman 2008, da 
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Silva Campose, 2015).  Even if the research is initiated by industry or another 
body, there remains a high probability that the academic logic supports research 
freedom, particularly, if the mission of academia is to advance the existing, 
public knowledge.  Firms, in contrast, are less concerned with new knowledge, 
but rather care about knowledge that complements their existing product lines 
and services and maximizes their profits, expectedly directing them towards 
limiting academics‘ choice of projects (Aghion et al. 2008, Lacetera 2009, 
Calcagini et al. 2016). 
Industrial and academic logics differ with respect to appropriation of the values 
from the research (Sauermann and Stephan, 2013).  The conventional view of 
academic logic holds the perception that knowledge should be exposed for free 
to the broader community and that academics‘ key reward from research 
derives from peer recognition, status in the scientific community, or the desire to 
work in interesting projects of their own choice (Aghion et al. 2008, Murray 
2010, Calcagini et al. 2016).  On the other hand, the commercial logic holds that 
firms should aim to maximize their profit or financial returns from research, 
which naturally necessitates that academics should limit disclosure and waive, 
or sacrifice, some of the nonfinancial rewards provided by academia 
(Sauermann and Roach 2011, Sauermann and Stephan, 2013).  Perkmann and 
Walsh (2007) refer to such institutional norms as likely sources of incentive 
misalignment between reputation-based reward systems of open science and 
commercial requirements. Within the context of knowledge production, it is 
significant to know how, and whether, research outcomes are disclosed to the 
wider scientific community.  Certainly, the openness or open-disclosure of 
research outcomes in the form of publication is most often perceived as the 
major characteristic of the academic logic, while secrecy/data-withholding or 
disclosure in the form of patents are the main characteristics of commercial logic 
(Murray 2010, Fini and Toschi, 2016).  Moreover, although there is an increase 
in patenting in academia, academic conventional/traditional norms of openness 
remain strong, and some academics perceive patenting as inappropriate (Gans 
and Stern 2010, Murray 2010,  Fini and Toschi, 2016). 
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2.3.2.4 Actors, logics, and Power 
Some empirical studies highlight how the logics of powerful actors within the 
context of university knowledge commercialisation shape both action-taking and 
decision-making.  They argue that rarely does everyone around the table have 
equal power.  Actors exert their power as per their ability to make decisions and 
status/position as either knowledge producer (university), or knowledge user 
(industry), or knowledge manager (government).  Hence, power is socially 
granted (Schmidt, 1987). 
For instance, industry as a knowledge user exerts its power over IP.  As firms 
use knowledge generated in universities to secure financial gains, their primary 
goal is to gain propriety control over the resulting knowledge.  Some scholars 
argue that universities are forced by industry to make academics file disclosures 
for their contracted research whenever they have inventions with commercial 
possibility (Gerbin and Drnovsek, 2016).  Firms‘ logic of profit maximization is 
identified by their norm of data-withholding.  Pressure is exerted on academics 
to keep confidentiality by not disclosing the outcomes to other academics as a 
way of protecting the results of their research from being copied by their 
competitors. Thursby and Thursby (2007) found that firms include delay-of-
publication clauses in at least 90% of their contracts with universities. Hence, 
the power that is stemmed from their status as knowledge funder, gives firms 
the ability to shape the action-taking and decision-making, which constrains 
academics‘ ability to publish.  Firms‘ decision power is examined explicitly by 
Lacetera (2009) who examined contractual differences between academia and 
firm agreements in terms of the allocation of decision power.  The study shows 
evidence of the implications of the allocation of decision power in research 
knowledge commercialisation.  In one respect, the study examined the degree 
of control by sponsoring that was exerted by companies for different projects 
contracted with academia. Four major control rights given to the sponsoring 
company: termination without cause, change to the research program, 
extension of the duration of the research, and duties of the research partner to 
periodically submit research proposals and budget, subject to the approval of 
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the company. The findings show that the proportion of contracts giving stronger 
power to the firms is significantly high.  
Given these studies, the dominance of commercial logics (e.g. data-withholding 
to increase financial returns) is a function of power which firms exercise with 
academia.  However, it is found that the requirement of delay in publication is 
hard to put into effect as some academics refuse to disclose.  This is not due to 
their lack of awareness that their inventions are commercially viable, but rather 
to their unwillingness to risk delaying publication (Gerbin and Dmovsek, 2016).  
In this respect, some studies show the dominance of professional logics (e.g. 
open science and publication) as a function of the power exercised by 
academics.  Vallas et al (2007), for instance, found tension between commercial 
and collegial/professional logics to be evident within research universities where 
faculty members have relatively greater power, as their professional orientations 
are relevant to the entrepreneurial changes that their universities seek to 
pursue.  In support, some studies (e.g. Van Looy et al., 2011, Hewitt-Dundas, 
2012, Miller et al. 2016) found that the academics‘ need to publish conflicts with 
the priorities and objectives of industry during collaborative research projects.  
Academics were found to still be in doubt as to whether knowledge 
commercialisation is part of their responsibilities.   They agree that the extension 
to their traditional job role is forced upon them due to the changing university 
business model.  Thus, academics exert their power by withholding knowledge 
that could be potentially be commercialised. 
In view of the above, the difference between academic logics and commercial 
logics results in power asymmetry. As an actor has the ability to make decisions 
as either a knowledge producer or knowledge user, he/she attempts to exert 
power in order to maintain the achievement of their interest and goals. Hence, 
the role of knowledge manager (government) in balancing between academic 
and commercial logics is instrumental in avoiding conflicts. The following section 
gives more details. 
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2.3.2.5 Government Role and Power 
Government plays a big role in supporting the process of university-industry 
linkages (Mathieu, 2011).  Within this context, the normative governance role of 
government is to design incentive structures to encourage firms and universities 
to engage in a dialogue whereby commercially beneficial knowledge may be 
developed and exploited (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997).  Hence, dialogue at 
the local level involving government, universities, and industry is prioritized.   
Sohn et al. (2009) found that government policies are the main determinant in 
establishing such dialogue.  Through the establishment of many organisations 
(i.e. techno parks, regional innovation agencies, etc.), the government could 
bring both academia and industry together through executing different 
innovation programs including capacity building of local firms and networking 
among innovation actors.  Especially, it has fuelled/powered universities, which 
are distanced from industry, to take a role as knowledge providers for local 
industrial innovation, while government policies have focused on innovation 
generated through networking.  The positive effects of these diverse policies are 
reflected in practice. Many firms interacted with universities under sponsorship 
of techno park programs.  Also, universities‘ interaction with local firms was 
prompted through the research centre innovation program.  
More importantly, many studies show that the engagement of universities and 
industry in local governance is promoted by the government through providing 
financial and political incentives.  This role is institutionalised through 
universities and industry representation in local economic partnerships,  and on 
the boards of regional development agencies and science councils which were 
established to protect each region‘s interests by strengthening scientific and 
technological research (Charles, 2003, Lawton, 2007).  Universities, for 
instance, have joined forces with national authorities in order to produce holistic 
strategies for development, ranging from developing programmes targeted to 
improve the level of innovation within the economy and tackle issues.  Some 
scholars (e.g. Shapira, 2004, MacAdam et al., 2012) found that a research 
alliance was established jointly as part of the country‘s strategy of technology 
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promotion, which aims to exploit research infrastructure to produce business 
and economic development within specific local industries.  Pugh et al. (2016) 
also found that a particular university can be engaged in regional economic 
development through providing programmes and actions to support local 
industry in its home region and increasingly on a national level.  The university 
is engaged more directly in governance boards with the central government by 
developing and delivering various programmes funded by and in partnership 
with government.   Through participating in governance activities, the university 
secured additional revenue of funding beneficial for engaging in further research 
activities with industry.  It also assisted its researchers in securing access to 
data and informants, such as industry and policymakers, which they may not 
otherwise be able to do.  In sequence, researchers could communicate their 
research outcomes easily back to developing programmes, thus increasing the 
impact of their interactions with industry and providing a win-win situation.   
However, weaknesses are present in the local system of governance.  By 
considering them as a central actor in governing linkages, universities could 
exert some power.  Charles and Conway (2001) found that the engagement in 
the regional development agencies focuses on coordination and institution 
building instead of supporting science and technology commercialisation.  
Similarly, Shapira (2004) found that the research alliance targeted advanced 
research rather than diffusion and knowledge commercialisation.  In support, 
Miller et al. (2014) found that although government assisted universities to 
establish different innovation programs, the support for universities in relation to 
embedding university knowledge commercialisation and entrepreneurial 
activities into their core responsibility is limited.  This is due to organisational 
passiveness, which made it difficult to try to change the internal culture, and is 
also due to academics‘ mind-sets being accustomed to hoarding knowledge 
with the main focus of publishing.   
Other studies point out the negative effects of government-exercised power on 
knowledge commercialisation effectiveness. They show that the established 
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programs do not have delegated powers for science and technology policies.  
Universities appear to be increasingly determined and controlled by the central 
government and have far fewer powers of initiative (Charles and Benneworth, 
2001, Arbo and Benneworth, 2007).   McAdam et al. (2012) found that although 
a university‘s management may appear to be the most salient actors, 
government has more power in affecting and shaping the strategic direction of 
the university due to its power (i.e. ability to influence organisational action).  In 
order to receive funding for knowledge commercialisation activities, universities 
have to follow a set of rules developed by government.  Similarly, Miller et al. 
(2014) found that government doesn‘t fully understand the challenges involved 
in knowledge commercialisation between universities and industry in the pursuit 
of innovation.  There was much bureaucracy governing knowledge 
commercialisation.  The government was trying to exert its power to influence 
how interactions should progress by aligning funding for particular activities in 
innovation.  Hence, the government appeared to have power as it has control 
over withholding/withdrawing funding.   Moreover, although government policies 
have been important in setting agendas for promoting university-industry 
cooperation, such policies do not take into consideration the potential conflicts 
within the THM (Lawton, 2007).  Recently, Pugh et al (2016) found a 
fundamental challenge, that is meeting the right balance between providing 
value-added outcomes and taking participants away from their comfort zone.  
Some participants from universities highlighted the high degree of difficulty in 
meeting this balance between stability and change as they already have other 
missions to achieve (i.e. teaching and research).  This was evidenced from 
private sector participants, who perceived governance activities as going too far 
in the academic sphere.  Hence the challenge was to balance between the three 
spheres, academia, market, and governance (Stachowiak, 2013, Charles et al, 
2014). 
In short, the impact of power relationship is found to considerably influence 
knowledge commercialisation, where a dominant actor can exert its power, 
which has the potential to impact behaviours.  A defining characteristic of a 
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dynamic knowledge commercialisation is mutual interdependence.  However, 
the above studies evidence that the different actors often tried to exert their 
salience, creating an asymmetric power.  This competition of power had the 
ability to influence actors‘ willingness and behaviours in all stages of the 
knowledge commercialisation process.  Therefore, this study addresses power 
relations in contracted research projects involving three actors.   
2.3.2.6 THM, Fragmentation, and Bureaucracy 
As aforementioned, THM assumes a final convergence of the three actors.  
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2001) state that one of the sources of contextual 
transformation is the transition from vertical to lateral modes of coordination and 
interaction through creating horizontal networks and shrinking bureaucratic 
layers.  Correspondingly, this transformative change requires a structural 
change in the institutional settings of the three spheres.  However, as discussed 
hereafter, many empirical studies provide evidence that the scope of university 
knowledge commercialisation is constrained by the issue of fragmentation 
associated with bureaucracy.  This consequently causes rigid boundaries, 
hierarchy, and limits the scope for consensus, which is indicated as one of the 
main prerequisites for innovation development (Etzkowitz and Carvalho de 
Mello, 2004).   
Some scholars (e.g. Saad et al. 2008, Intarakumnerd and Cristina, 2007, Saad 
and Zawdie, 2005, Intarakumnerd, et.al. 2002) pointed out the emergence of 
such issues within developing countries.  They argue that although some 
countries have been successful in broadening the scope of their science and 
technology policy to cover ‗innovation‘, through having/applying selective 
intervention policies from the West for particular sectors/clusters, they faced 
several obstructions in transferring policies into practice.  This is mainly due to 
the deep-rooted fragmentation of these countries‘ innovation systems.  
Fragmentation can be related to bureaucracy.  Saad and Zawdie (2005), for 
instance, identify that institutional and organisational fragmentation has been a 
problem, militating against the process of transferring the THM in developing 
countries.  They claim that there are a lot of improvements to be made before 
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TH can be considered to be effective as a strategy of innovation. The countries 
still lack a well-articulated relationship between university–industry–government. 
A major factor behind this is the persistence of bureaucracy, which, by drawing 
rigid boundaries between different organisations, accounts for institutional 
spheres operating in relative isolation and sometimes competing against each 
other. In the same vein, Saad et al. (2008) found that fragmentation associated 
with bureaucratic character is one of the key factors that constrained the 
knowledge commercialisation process from translating into the development of 
innovation initiatives.  It prevents interaction within and between the three 
institutional spheres and perceives these spheres as something to be relegated 
to a passive role in the processes of knowledge commercialisation.  Moreover, 
decision-making at the level of an organisation depends on directives and 
instructions coming from the top.  Initiatives aimed at establishing interactive 
linkages with external agencies are not considered to be an important part of 
most organisations.  Thus, the traditional approach followed by actors within 
organisations is inadequate in resolving problems.  In general, within the 
knowledge commercialisation system, and without specifically referring to the 
THM, a similar notion is expressed by Inatrakumerd and Cristina (2007), who 
found that fragmentation, is caused by network problems.  The poor linkages 
between institutional spheres caused a lack of a clear and shared vision of 
policies, as well as inactivity in the process of policy formulation, due to the 
problem of locking in old logics.  Their mind-sets are very much preoccupied by 
the deep rooted concepts of the linear, hierarchical rigid models of interaction 
(Chaminade and Vang, 2006).  The outcome is a policy that, although is moving 
in the right direction, hardly tackles the identified systematic, micro-level 
problems in practice.  Van Buren et al (2003) argue that as long as there is a 
lack of interaction, actors‘ actions are fragmented and problems will only be 
solved independently.  In reality, what actors face are ‗joined-up‘ problems 
which cannot be simply separated and divided.  These problems are often 
‗cross-boundary‘ and cannot be solved by one sphere independently.  Thus, the 
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nature of bureaucratic structure falls short when facing cross-boundary 
problems.   
Given the above, it can be argued that fragmentation is rooted in the internal 
characteristics of bureaucracy.  Central to the THM is the commercialisation and 
use of knowledge through networking within and between organisational and 
institutional spheres with the view to establish common purposes and goals.  
However, some studies identified that the activities undertaken within the 
University-Industry-Government link system have been affected by institutional 
bureaucracy.  The organisational character of most institutions, even industry 
and universities, bears the features of bureaucratic culture.  In this respect, 
many scholars have pointed out the bureaucracy issue within universities (e.g. 
Valentin, 2000, Siegel et al., 2003, 2004, Litan et al., 2007, Arvanitis et al. 2008, 
Philibin, 2008, Huges. 2011, Kaymaz and Eryigit, 2011, Dezhina, 2012, Bradley 
et al, 2013). Siegel et al. (2003, 2004), for instance, conducted research on 
problems arising out of university knowledge commercialisation and defined 
several problems.  They interviewed participants from five US, non-top-tier 
group, universities.  The scholars define several problems and one of them is 
‗‘bureaucracy and inflexibility of university administrators‘‘ (Siegel, et al., 2003, 
p.118).  Bureaucracy and inflexibility is defined as a serious barrier to 
knowledge commercialisation by both industry (80%) and academic scientists 
(70%) (Siegel et al., 2004).  The same issue was highlighted by Hughes (2011).  
He found that due to bureaucratic structure, technical exchange did not take 
place in the most analysed interactions.  In this respect, Litan et al. (2007) found 
that although the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was a constructive step forward, giving 
the new rights to universities has given rise to new layers of administration and 
often bureaucracies. Instead of implementing broad commercialisation 
strategies, many universities have channelled their knowledge 
commercialisation activities through a centralised Technology Transfer Office 
(TTO).  This explains the bureaucratic inclination to achieve order and control.  
A similar notion is expressed by Kaymaz and Eryiğit (2011) who identified 
bureaucracy and the inflexibility of universities‘ processes and policies as a 
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barrier to knowledge commercialisation between academia and industry.  They 
found that the bureaucratic structures of public universities seriously slow down 
the decision-making process.  Bureaucratic hindrances experienced and faced 
in the mutual relationship with industry slowed down the rate of knowledge 
commercialisation and increased the time taken to complete the projects.    
Although some scholars (see Weber, 1947, 2009, Van den Belt and Rip, 1987, 
Ozlos, 2013) pointed out the positive effect of bureaucracy, in which they 
emphasized the role of government in constructing and controlling the growth of 
innovation, many empirical studies pointed out its negative impact on U-I-G 
interactions.  Decision-making, at the level of organisations characterised by 
bureaucratic structure, is dependent upon directives coming from the top.  
Initiatives aimed at creating interactive links with external agencies are not 
considered to be an important part of the culture of those organisations.  In this 
vein, Saad and Zawdie (2005), for instance, found that knowledge 
commercialisation can be supported strongly by the active role of university and 
industry, but the issue is that they themselves still perform less, lack autonomy, 
and remain reliant on the central government.  The range of activities generated 
by U-I linkages and the benefits resulting from these linkages are constrained by 
the fact that both actors are distant due to being independent players.  They 
operated under government control and relied on decisions made for them at 
the centre.  Despite that, many U-I linkages were created, largely, these 
linkages proved to be an extension of government bureaucracy, rather than the 
dynamic institutional mechanism envisioned/predicted by the THM for 
stimulating the process of knowledge commercialisation.  A similar notion is 
expressed by Chaykina (2012) who found that the control of government and 
the oversized bureaucracy mechanism of interaction unbalanced U-I-G linkages. 
The interaction was not correlated with other policies that created difficulty in 
their implementation.  Policies struggled with abridged approaches and were 
constrained by bureaucratic, institutional barriers.  This created obstructions and 
a high level of resistance by the interacted organisations, as all transformations 
were top-down.  As U-I-G interactions are organized by the central government, 
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these two studies explain the statist model of Triple Helix since the bureaucracy 
of state is still dominating.   
From the above, the context with highly bureaucratized structures of actors, 
especially university and government, results in fragmented governance of 
knowledge commercialisation.  This constrains transferring the adopted 
successful policies from the West into practice.  This also makes the actors‘ 
networks strive to be undertaken in a context of undefined roles and relations.  
Additionally, because of insufficiency of communication channels and 
cooperative frameworks, the involved partners are not willing to come together 
collectively.  Collective action is based on a high degree of interaction between 
parties.  However, this is not the situation in a bureaucratic structure, in which 
the actions within the knowledge commercialisation process are scattered within 
and across organisations.   Smooth interaction and joint outcomes don‘t occur 
by themselves, which makes decision-making unstructured.  This study 
analyses and addresses this issue by presuming that bureaucracy is a logic 
constituting interaction that is taken for granted, since it considered as a 
fundamental legitimating element in practices.  In other words, the logics of 
bureaucracy are possibly providing a pre-reflective base for enacting organizing 
practices.  This indicates that little efforts are required to organize collective 
actions or activities.   
2.4 UKC and Intermediation Mechanism 
In the context of knowledge commercialisation, the intermediation mechanism 
can be described as the ‘’co-alignment (i.e. the process of bridging, attuning, 
matching, bundling and, eventually, inter-braiding) of the specific research 
knowledge, technology, creativity and other innovation assets, as well as of the 
specific participatory interests, of each of the university-industry-government‘‘ 
(Reich-Graefe, 2016, p. 6). It facilitates and implements the sources of 
cooperative and interdependent innovation processes since none of the 
institutional actors are self-sufficient in commercialising knowledge. 
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However, although the above sections discussed the potential of institutional 
logics contradiction between academic and capitalism and between the Triple 
Helix actors, as well as fragmentation, in hampering the interaction within 
university knowledge commercialisation, both perspectives provide modest 
practical directions on how to bridge differences and nurture cooperation 
through an intermediation mechanism.  The THM, for instance, doesn‘t pay 
sufficient attention to the role of intermediaries (Howells, 2006, Pollard, 2006), 
though the significance of bridging organisations has been recognized (Suvinen 
et al., 2010).  Undoubtedly, the conflicts associated with logic differences call for 
intermediation to connect institutional systems that otherwise would not easily 
come into contact with each other (Yusuf, 2008, Swan et al, 2010, Lundberg, 
2013).  
In spite of the acknowledgement that actors are exposed to different and 
potentially conflicting logics, there is still relatively little explanation about the 
ways of how to manage such conflict at the micro-level (Greenwood et al, 2011).  
Although the interest of exploring this area is growing (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 
2009, Suddaby and Leca, 2009, Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) no attention has 
been given to intermediating activities.  Rather, these studies focused on 
identifying generic ways by which the bridging of logics occurs.  They also do 
not elaborate on the micro-level interactions and justifications that bring about 
intermediation in specific situations.  This is in part because the instituional 
logics perspective has not, to date, provided the conceptul tools to assist and 
demonstrate how conflicting logics are resolved at this level (Cloutier and 
Langley, 2013).  Furthermore, although some scholars (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984) 
consider the role of intermediaries as being important for economy qualities, 
their work does not specify the role of intermediaries in knowledge 
commercialisation between organisations (Callon et al, 2002).  A recent study 
conducted by Virani et al. (2016), in which they examined intermediaries as 
dynamic processes of transformation and translation.  Yet, they focused on the 
role of culture intermediaries at the macro-level.  This study addresses these 
issues by darwing on the literaure of innovation intermediaries.  Such literaure 
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helps in revealing how the role of intermediaries enables bridging different logics 
at the micro-level. 
Literature on intermediation is mostly established in the context of innovation 
intermediaries (e.g. Howells, 2006, Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009, Stewart and 
Hyysalo, 2008, Kivima, 2014). Intermediaries can be defined generally as an 
―organisation or body that act as an agent or broker in any aspect of innovation 
process between two or more parties‖ (Howells, 2006, p. 720).  Stewart and 
Hyyslao (2008), for instance, define them as ―actors who create spaces and 
opportunities for appropriation and generation of emerging technical or cultural 
products by others who might be described as developers and users‖ (Stewart 
and Hyysalo, 2008, p. 296).  Furthermore, more developed empirical studies 
tackling intermediation and intermediary organisation exist in the related 
research fields of innovation and knowledge commercialisation intermediation 
(e.g. van Lente et al., 2003; Hoppe and Ozdenoren, 2005, van der Meulen et al., 
2005, Howells, 2006, Kodama, 2008, Gassmann et al., 2011, Hakanson et al., 
2011, Suvinen et al., 2010, Kivimaa, 2014, Villani et al., 2017, etc.).  Thus, the 
aim of this section is to critically review some of these empirical studies 
concerning the importance and effects of intermediaries in university knowledge 
commercialisation.  The review focuses on exploring the reasons why 
intermediaries are necessary and the role played by them in facilitating and 
governing the university knowledge commercialisation process.   
The effect of an intermediary is captured in Hoppe and Ozdenoren‘s (2005) 
study, in which they explore the role of intermediaries (i.e. TTOs) between 
producers and users of new inventions.  They demonstrate that users‘ 
uncertainty about the profitability of investing in new inventions generated a 
basis for intermediation.  An Intermediary provides a chance for users to spend 
less as per its expertise in evaluating the value of inventions and matching the 
profitable ones with potential investors. Such expertise assists users in getting 
the opportunity to be exposed to asymmetric information.  In a similar vein, and 
with regards to reduction of costs, Kodama (2008) studied the way in which an 
68 
 
intermediary organisation has supported U-I links.  Intermediation was done by 
reducing research costs through providing universities and industry with 
information about the potential partners to collaborate with, providing partners 
with opportunities for face-to-face meetings and, at times, coordinating joint 
R&D projects to bring together universities‘ researchers and firms that have the 
resources and technology necessary for the specific research topics being 
pursued.  It was also done by reducing the bargaining costs of coordinating and 
negotiating activities, specifically those including asymmetric information.  As 
the projects are coordinated by top-management of the intermediary 
organisation, a sense of trust was fostered in the firms participating in the 
projects.  Additionally, the intermediary assists firms in obtaining resources that 
are needed but lacking to promote linkages with universities.  They provide 
assistance in applying for government funding schemes, to recruit HR, and 
secure necessary research equipment. This helped in mitigating the uncertainty 
arising from new business activities.  These two studies give evidence that by 
actively pursuing intermediation using different instruments, the intermediary 
organisation has demonstrated how much an intermediary can accomplish.  
They try to understand and ease the bottlenecks of U-I links; induce cooperation 
among universities, industry, and local authorities, in addition to winning the 
support of the central government.      
Furthermore, and with regards to actors‘ conflicting logics, some studies 
explored brokerage activity as a form of innovation and knowledge 
intermediation within not-for-profit innovation intermediary organisations.  
Håkanson et al. (2011), for instance, found that an intermediary can assist in 
engaging various parties individually to obtain their inputs to ensure 
confidentiality for both parties, as well as assisting them in discovering more 
commonality in their needs and interests than they had been able to achieve 
among themselves.  The intermediary does not only collect relevant information 
but also identifies new opportunities for cooperation between various parties.  
From the scholarly point of view, such intermediation is achieved through 
match-making and mediation.  In ‗match-making‘, the intermediary connects 
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previously unconnected individuals with one another in situations where 
individuals themselves are unable to identify and realise the profits and potential 
interactions of mutual cooperation.  By its connection to different organisational 
groups, the intermediary generates value by bridging ‗structural holes‘, 
brokering contacts between individuals who are not previously aware of one 
another.  Connecting individuals from different organisational fields opens 
possibilities for ‗knowledge arbitrage‘ through new combinations of existing 
knowledge (Burt, 2005).  Its ability to perceive opportunities for creative 
knowledge exchange across unconnected agents is illustrated by the 
cooperation instigated between user and producer.  In ‗mediation‘, an 
intermediary assists partners in exploring the benefits of cooperation and 
information exchange without disclosing their interests and plans before a 
contractual agreement.  This helps in avoiding the transaction costs of 
disclosing confidential information.  The intermediary acts as a credible insider 
by ensuring the involvement of the right people in the discussion from the start. 
Match-making and mediation assist in closing the innovation holes in the context 
characterised by logics incongruence.  Searching for a partner match across 
industry and disciplinary boundaries assists more effectively than individual 
actors acting on their own. 
Similar findings are evidenced recently from Villani et al‘s (2017) study, in which 
they show the role of intermediary organisations in addressing the fundamental 
issue of bridging the different logics of academia and industry.  Their study 
demonstrates that the mission of bridging both the academics and industrial 
worlds, and intermediating organisations such as Technology Transfer Offices 
(TTOs), University Incubators (UIs), and Collaborative Research Centres 
(CRCs) almost entirely focus on simplifying bureaucracy and investigation 
activities, which demonstrate distinctive activities for reducing cognitive 
proximity. They assist in addressing knowledge commercialisation issues during 
the conceptual stage of U-I collaborative research as well as in assessing the 
feasibility of knowledge commercialisation.  In this initial stage academics and 
firms are usually looking for sense-making triggers and need to face new logics. 
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Intermediaries were found to be well situated in reducing cognitive distance as 
they can facilitate knowledge commercialisation activities through joining 
together individuals from various worlds and reconciling different logics at this 
initial stage.  They are also very helpful in the later stages of the process 
through managing and monitoring more intangible and organisational activities.  
They assist in improving and correcting individuals‘ ways of understanding how 
to approach the entire University Knowledge Commercialisation process and 
provide guidelines appropriately.    
Some empirical studies examined the role and benefits of intermediaries within 
the context of Triple Helix Model (e.g. Johnson, 2008, Lundberg, 2013, Todeva, 
2013, Reich-Graefe, 2016, etc.).  They argue that intermediate organisations 
exist primarily to support collaborative R&D between Triple Helix Model 
members.  For instance, Johnson (2008) found that intermediates provide a 
unique governance structure for the management of collaborative R&D projects.  
One of the crucial roles played by the intermediating organisation in managing 
THM projects was as a mediator or arbitrator in cases of conflict and dispute 
where intervention is required.  Such role is significant within the setting of R&D 
projects and innovation networks where various actors from different 
organisations must cooperate with one another when problems emerge.  For 
example, the intermediating organisation assisted in saving the 
accomplishments of a project that technically was successful through 
negotiating the terms of R&D projects including IP rights with the members.  
This helped in mediating disputes, eventually acting as an arbitrator.  Another 
role played is as a sponsor and distributor of funding for innovation efforts.  The 
Intermediating organisation solicits funding from government through submitting 
proposals for public funding.  Hence, the intermediating organisation works as a 
mediator between government and agents.  As a sponsor, it ensures that the 
projects are properly managed financially and that the project‘s budget is spent 
wisely through performing periodic reporting of progress and spending.  An 
additional role is as a technology broker by acting as a repository of information 
regarding knowledge producers and as a channel between actors.  It helped in 
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bringing various players together in developing and commercialising generated 
knowledge (i.e. new intelligent systems technology) between and among 
different organisations.  Hence, it acts as knowledge brokerage resources 
whose consortium members are able to access in order to bring people and 
generated knowledge together.  For example, its administrative managers deal 
with participants of different projects that they assist to support and supervise.  
Hence, those managers play a key role in knowledge commercialisation.  They 
are in a position to bring different people together whenever they think that 
interaction is possible.  Another study (i.e. Lundberg, 2013) provides empirical 
evidence of how the role of an intermediary as a boundary spanner increased 
the inter-institutional interaction and coordination between politicians, academia, 
and firm managers, subsequently, achieving new interfaces and new forms of 
cooperation across sectorial boundaries.  The intermediary acted as a catalyst, 
stimulating, facilitating, and coordinating the boundary spanning activities of the 
other actors.  Such activities include: information brokerage; semantic 
translation; knowledge commercialisation; knowledge creation; resource 
pooling, and activation of interpersonal relationships.  The activity of information 
brokerage was demonstrated through actively informing the vision and THM 
cooperation in meetings externally and internally at the sites of the members.  
This assisted in developing a common frame and increasing legitimacy among 
the three actors.  In knowledge creation and commercialisation, the intermediary 
acted as a boundary spanner through smoothing, encouraging, and coordinating 
the practical interactions in R&D projects.  It scanned, translated, and pooled 
ideas and converge interests in particular projects.  It also facilitated knowledge 
co-production through building relevant networks in the member firms and 
universities‘ academics, and semantically translating domain-specific 
knowledge, consequently bridging the various involved cultures.  In addition to 
creating conditions for improved cognitive closeness, the intermediary facilitated 
the development of interpersonal relationships between the Triple Helix actors 
through ensuring the interactions of all individuals and helping them to get to 
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know each other in various settings, such as on the governing boards and in 
R&D projects.  
The role and benefits of intermediaries in the THM approach was also examined 
within the context of developing countries, in which the THM knowledge network 
is considered as an evolving phenomenon.  Although there have been many 
policies established for promoting university-industry cooperation, the U-I 
interaction to date has been driven through personal initiatives and on an ad hoc 
basis due to gaps and shortfalls in the development of institutional capacity 
within developing countries  (Saad et al 2008, Saad and Zawdie 2005, Nakwa, 
2013).  To mitigate such shortfall, and in order for developing countries to 
benefit from a combination of the activities of knowledge production and 
appropriation, many scholars (e.g. Intarakumnerd et al., 2010, Nakwa, 2013, 
Nakwa and Zawdies, 2015, 2016, Intarakumnerd, 2013, Watkins, 2014) focused 
their attention on the role of intermediaries in knowledge network development 
to mitigate the systematic failures of institutional rigidities and fragmentation of 
activities in the domains of knowledge production and appropriation.  
Intarakumnerd et al. (2010) examined the role of a successful intermediary 
governmental funded program in creating and strengthening Triple Helix 
relationships to mitigate systematic failures in developing countries.  They found 
that the intermediary played a role in matching expectations of firms with 
capabilities and limitations of the universities‘ researchers, building trust 
between two actors, solving problems that emerged during collaborative 
projects, and fine-tuning different expectations of both sides.  Nakwa and 
Zawdie (2015) found that the active participation of various actors in Triple Helix 
networks depends on the availability of intermediaries and their effectiveness as 
a catalyst accelerating the development of knowledge networks among all 
actors.  They considered intermediaries as policy vehicles for network 
development by the bridging, and closing, of structural holes that disconnect 
actors in the Triple Helix network (Burt, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005).  From their 
point of view, structural holes, caused by the absence of well-developed 
networks, leave actors disconnected and assigned according to their 
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institutional groups, and without network safeguards, structural holes create 
barriers against knowledge commercialisation which add to the transaction 
costs of actors and make them rather reluctant to cooperate.  They found that 
intermediaries help in transforming inter-firm networks into Triple Helix networks 
through bringing other institutional actors (i.e. universities and governmental 
agencies) together.  Within this transformation process, the intermediaries 
enhance network development, as sponsors, through providing funds and 
guidelines in order to create collective actions for trust building.  This way they 
could close internal structural holes as some firms cannot afford investments.  
They also bridged external structural holes by promoting the case for investment 
in HR development, equipment, and machinery as a strategy to reduce cognitive 
differences or distance between actors within different institutional spheres.  
Intermediaries also worked as brokers by closing and bridging structural holes 
that disconnect network players, in other words, through linking actors and 
building knowledge commercialisation mechanisms.  Furthermore, they worked 
as boundary spanners, facilitating knowledge circulation through providing 
operational services, such as facilitating the exchange of tacit knowledge of 
actors; converting tacit knowledge shared by players into explicit knowledge 
through socialising; assisting in advancing technological capabilities of network 
players across boundaries through reducing cognitive differences and 
substituting them with ties, hence encouraging integration of the diverse 
knowledge components/elements of heterogeneous actors; and finally assisting 
in commercialising newly integrated knowledge, hence generating economic 
values via internalisation, in other words, through making individuals accept 
others‘ norms and values through socialisation.    
However, these studies also pointed out some challenges.  Although some 
network development and knowledge commercialisation was facilitated by the 
intermediaries, the extent of this has not been adequate enough to produce 
dynamic Triple Helix networks.  There is still limited networking experience, 
weak social capital among THM actors, and a lack of trust among potential 
network players.  The role of intermediaries is as boundary spanners and 
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brokers that mitigate such issues constrained by cultural barriers, administrative 
bottlenecks, and absence of consistent and relevant policy provisions and 
support.  For instance, network development through intermediating is still 
determined as government-driven and a top-down initiative, rather than a 
bottom-up and grassroots initiative.  Intermediaries would be effective when 
they are positioned/placed in the bottom-up, rather than the top-down, culture of 
decision-making (Nakwa and Zawdie, 2015, 2016). 
2.5 UKC and Networking mechanism 
The university-industry links manifest themselves as network relationships.   
Some scholars (e.g. Perkmann and Walsh, 2007, Lee, 2011, Powell and Grodal, 
2005) argue that these relationships are initiated and maintained as either 
formal networks (i.e. formally established inter-organisational arrangements 
spanning different organisations) or informal networks (i.e. interpersonal 
networks between individuals).  The importance of formal and informal networks 
as mechanisms for knowledge commercialisation processes is inherent in the 
nature of knowledge creation as socially embedded processes.  Knowledge 
creation hinges on the capacity to manage and coordinate the exchange of 
complementary pieces of knowledge possessed by a diversity of actors between 
organisations.  Networks are not only considered as mechanisms that 
coordinate transactions (i.e. relations and negotiations), but also as vehicles that 
facilitate the commercialisation of knowledge (Korotka, 2015).  Thus, this 
section focuses on discussing the importance and benefits of networks (formal 
and informal) to university knowledge commercialisation. 
Many studies (e.g. Okhuysen and Eisenhardt, 2002, Perkmann and Walsh, 
2007, Hermans and Castiaux, 2007, Vlaar et al., 2007, Lee, 2011) give 
evidence on the importance of formally established networks in university-
industry R&D projects.  Hermans and Castiaux (2007) found that the formal 
networks (i.e. collaborative research projects) established between firms and 
academic researchers enable further knowledge commercialisation.  They allow 
the industry to decrease information asymmetries, counting on tacit, new 
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knowledge, thus knowledge becomes usable and useful.  In addition, Perkmann 
and Walsh (2007) found that knowledge commercialisation results, primarily, 
from formalised arrangements, even when informal interpersonal networks act 
as precursors and continue to strengthen organisational-level relationships.  
This is particularly important at a time when universities and industry grow to be 
aware of the value of knowledge commercialisation.  For instance, Feller (2005) 
determined that universities become aware of the importance of their IP and are 
eager to guarantee the development of protective formal mechanisms when 
academics collaborate with industry.  Hence, the formalisation of network 
governance is crucial.  In support, Vlaar et al. (2007) found one of the most 
important effects of formal inter-organisational partnerships to be intensified 
governance over university knowledge commercialisation.  They argued that 
partners‘ activities become disorganized, random, and infrequent without a 
formal structure, resulting in unsuccessful organized activities.  Formal inter-
organisational partnerships contractually function through careful matching to 
instigate research projects, define the IP rights and the responsibilities and roles 
of partners, and stimulate stronger commitment to the projects by all partners, 
all of which have contributed to the success of R&D projects.  In a similar vein, 
(Lee, 2011) investigated the way in which inter-organisational relationships, 
particularly university-industry alliances, are managed and examined for their 
impact on joint R&D projects.  He found that as inter-organisational relationships 
are being equipped with formal contractual agreements, 
specialised/professional coordination, university and industry commitments, and 
formal evaluations systems, they enable partnered parties to initiate more 
explorative research and establish larger scale R&D projects.  In more detail, 
different from informal and interpersonal networks, they assist firms in 
enhancing their ability to explore knowledge that generates future good returns.  
They also enable firms to overcome local searches through intensive search-
and-match activities by specialised coordinators and technology exchange 
mediums.  The coordination activities result in identifying novel search areas as 
well as establishing new informal, interpersonal networks.   This assists firms in 
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facing the shortcoming of interpersonal networks and offers access to wider 
knowledge sources within universities. In addition, the problems faced by 
industry are multifaceted and cannot be addressed through a single discipline.  
Inter-organisational alliances resolve such issues by giving high priority to firms‘ 
strategic interests over relationships.  Their specialised coordination assists 
academics from different disciplines in joining a project team to reach common 
research goals that match with industrial partners‘ interests.  Moreover, as the 
team grows in size, the formalisation of governance provides industry with 
strong protection against possible opportunism.  
However, some scholars highlight the negative effect of formalised 
arrangements in university knowledge commercialisation.  Boschma (2005), for 
instance, argued that the implementation of successful university knowledge 
commercialisation requires flexibility and formally, hierarchically organized 
networks are unlikely to provide such flexibility.  Too much hierarchy results in a 
lack of interactive learning, as such, networks locked-in specific exchange 
relations, in which asymmetric relations, arising from the power of partners in 
the network, may lead to hold-problems, or commitment problems, creating a 
high reliance on relationship-specific investments in both communication and 
understanding.  For example, a specific form of transaction, such as the type of 
research outcomes and time-scale of research projects, cannot be determined 
with certainty beforehand.  Furthermore, although he highlighted the benefits of 
formal inter-organisational alliances over informal networks, Lee (2011) found 
that inter-organisational alliances create strong isomorphic pressure between 
universities and industry due to fierce competition for research funds.  This 
makes partners rush into alliances without creating mutually clear and defined 
goals.  As financial commitment is not preconditioned for both, the alliances are 
much less rewarding.  Also, as successful positive loops fail to become 
established in the early stages, alliance activities rapidly wane due to conflicts of 
interest.  For instance, the scholar found that, although the generated 
knowledge is jointly owned by the firms and the university, firms still claim 
exclusive IP rights to gain a more competitive advantage.    
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Therefore, many scholars emphasize the importance of informal networks as a 
significant form of governance within university knowledge commercialisation.  
Cohen et al (2002) and Bekkers and Freitas (2008) found that informal contacts, 
as a common form of interaction between universities and industries, play an 
important role in commercialising knowledge to industry.  The technology was 
developed faster as interdependent knowledge was adopted through a 
bidirectional exchange of information.   In this respect, some empirical studies 
(e.g. Zucker et al., 2002, Agrawal, 2006, Lee et al., 2010) found that informal, 
interpersonal networks persist to work as a significant form of governance within 
university knowledge commercialisation, especially when the accumulation of 
academics‘ experiences and skills in the research process are difficult to codify.  
Interpersonal interactions play a vital role in commercialising such tacit 
knowledge as well as encouraging mutual learning across organisational 
boundaries. This is evident from Agrawal's (2006) study, in which he examined 
licensing strategies that directly engage inventors.  He found that the likelihood 
and degree of commercialisation success increase when the firms exploit latent 
(uncodified but codifiable) knowledge through interpersonal networks by 
engaging inventors directly during the development phase.  Similarly, Zucker et 
al. (2002) found that the research articles that were jointly written by the 
universities‘ scientists and the firms‘ scientists are considered to be a robust 
detector of tacit knowledge capture by firms and a strong predictor of firms‘ 
success.  The development of such articles was initiated informally by the 
universities‘ scientists as a way to take charge of their discoveries. This helps 
firms to communicate new discoveries with less cost through capturing sufficient 
knowledge, consequently increasing the number of patents.  The overall 
importance of informal interpersonal networks implies that working jointly is a 
critical commercialisation mechanism when knowledge has large or significant 
tacit elements/constituents.        
Moreover, the significance of informal networks, as a form of governance within 
university knowledge commercialisation, is emphasized by other scholars (e.g. 
Slavtchev, 2013, Korotka, 2015) who examined the facilitator for U-I partnership 
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through measuring different proximity dimensions (i.e. cognitive, organisational, 
institutional, demographic, and social). For instance, Slavtchev (2013) explored 
the attitude of academics towards partnership with business.  By taking 
organisational proximity as a measure (i.e. evaluating the extent to which 
individuals have autonomy and exert control within a network), he found that 
informal networks are important for academics.  It assisted them in controlling 
innovative projects more effectively as communication was more flexible in 
comparison to formal networks (i.e. initiated formally by universities through 
TTOs). Red tape, bureaucracy, and formal obligations were less involved.  It 
also guaranteed access to complementary sources of information and resources 
for knowledge production.  More interactive learning was achieved as partners 
had the autonomy to shift from one strategy to another.   
Given that university knowledge commercialisation can be governed 
successfully by the establishment of informal networks, more experienced 
actors are likely to participate in collaborative activities.  In this respect, many 
scholars (e.g. Schartinger et al., 2001, Giuliani et al., 2010, Haeussler and 
Colyvas, 2011, Landry et al., 2006, Bekkers and Freitas, 2008, D‘Este and 
Patel, 2007, Landry et al., 2006, etc.) found that academics‘ satisfaction and 
industry satisfaction from past experiences play a key role in encouraging their 
interactions.  Thus, past personal networking counts.    This is supported by 
Bekkers and Freitas‘s (2008) observation that previous experience with 
commercialisation, patenting, or venture creation increases the likelihood of 
academics‘ participation in collaborative activities with industry.  They found that 
the more knowledge can be written and published, the more important it is for 
informal contacts to be considered as a form of knowledge commercialisation 
between universities and industry.  Also, the more knowledge is interdependent 
and related to systems, the more informal contacts are expected to be 
important.  Other studies (e.g. Landry et al., 2005, and D‘Este and Patel, 2007) 
show that the propensity of researchers to further engage in a variety of 
interactions with the business sector is explained by their previous, routine 
involvement in industry interactions.   D‘Este and Patel (2007) found that in 
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order to enhance the process of interaction, academics utilised previously 
established informal networks in opposition to the formal knowledge 
commercialisation institutions, such as TTOs, which only support academics by 
concretizing and specifying their interactions with industry through securing their 
interests in negotiations.  The academics‘ ability to 'network' has a positive 
effect on their tendency to more willingly cooperate with industry, than the 
quality of their research.   
Furthermore, previous experience plays a major role in university-industry 
interactions and often constitutes both a precursor and a successor for formal 
linkages (Faulkner and Senker, 1994).  Hermans and Castiaux (2007) found 
that academics and firms used their already established informal relationships 
during the formal collaboration, subsequently enabling further knowledge 
commercialisation outside the project framework.  This is in line with Sing‘s 
(2005) findings pertaining to interpersonal collaborative networks as a 
determinant of knowledge flows.  He explained the extent to which empirical 
patterns of knowledge diffusion can be explained by the fact that academics and 
firms have close interpersonal ties.  The influence of organisations‘ boundaries 
on knowledge flow decreases once interpersonal networks have been 
accounted for (as actors already have close networks).  This provides evidence 
that interpersonal networks are an important determinant for knowledge 
commercialisation between academics and industry. 
 
2.6 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has critically reviewed the literature on important concepts and 
constructs related to the UKC process.  Such review allowed the clarification of 
important research issues and the identification of critical knowledge gaps in the 
literature.  
The review clarified the notion of SI and its relevance for the study and the 
understanding of the KC process.  The key concern of SI in analysis is how and 
why institutions matter, which is the main theme of this study, particularly, the 
analysis of how actions of multiple actors are shaped and influenced by 
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institutions.  One nuanced approach of SI, that explains and defines the content 
and meaning of institutions, is the ILP, in which institutions (i.e. rules and norms) 
are perceived as standards of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given 
identity (university, industry, and government).  Hence, this study considers ILP 
as an analysis tool beneficial for studying multiple logics, both conflict and 
consensus, through exploring the impact of logics in shaping actors‘ institutions 
within the micro-level interaction of KC (i.e. knowledge production and 
appropriation of contracted R&D projects) - a situation with multiple, co-existing, 
and potentially conflicting logics.  However, some issues were observed.  ILP 
doesn‘t sufficiently address both the micro and macro levels of context.  Most of 
the earlier studies on institutional logics focused on the macro, rather than the 
micro-level of interaction.  Despite some studies (e.g. Zilber, 2002, Reay and 
Hinings, 2009, Battilana and Dorado, 2010) attempting to fill the gap, many 
empirical studies on multiple institutional logics have continued to focus more on 
the macro-level (Cloutier and Langley, 2013).  Moreover, their work of 
determining institutions at the macro-level has been criticised for its Western 
focus (Greenwood et al., 2002, Thornton and Casio, 2008).  This study rectifies 
such issues by giving emphasis on micro-level processes, and particularly the 
way in which multiple actors draw on the institutions associated with interactions 
involving different institutional worlds within a non-western context, that is, a 
developing country.  More significantly, despite ILP scholars‘ assumption that 
the action of an actor within an interaction is guided by institutions (Thornton et 
al, 2012, Lauren, 2016); they neglect the link between power and institutions.  
As such, this study is not aware of any other empirical study that has examined 
such a link, consequently this research follows a novel approach by calling for 
the need to integrate power with institutions, and viewing their causal 
sequencing on KC.  Arguments were adopted from two general institutional 
scholars (i.e. Schmidt, 1987 and Samuels, 1971), which will provide a good tool 
for this study‘s analysis.   
The review of literature also captured theories and research streams relevant to 
UKC.  AC and the THM were reviewed critically through the lens of ILP.  The 
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role of actors and institutions was interpreted where conflicts between logics 
were identified.  Although, there has certainly, been a large volume of published 
research in this area and research indeed examined the impact of such 
conflicts, critical gaps were still observed.  First, although THM scholars 
emphasize the coexisting of diverse institutional logics in the context of 
knowledge commercialisation, they do not provide proper justifications for how 
to, methodologically, explore the implication of conflicting logics (Lu, 2007, Sohn 
et al., 2009) at the micro-level interaction (Viale and Pozzali, 2010, Fogelberg 
and Thorpenberg, 2012).  More importantly, the empirical studies examined the 
way in which UKC have focused either primarily on universities (McClure, 2014) 
or enterprises, infrequently both (Ankrah et al., 2013), and have hardly ever 
explored the implication of the existence of multiple actors, often possessing 
different logics.  This again obscures the implication of potential for conflict of 
different logics between diverse actors on the effectiveness of university 
knowledge commercialisation.  These two gaps demonstrate that THM and 
studies in UKC provide modest practical directions on how to bridge differences 
and nurture cooperation between actors.  They don‘t pay sufficient attention to 
the role of different mechanisms that surround and exert direct or indirect 
effect/influence on knowledge commercialisation. This may obscure the 
potential for conflict of different logics between multiple actors and its 
implications on the effectiveness of UKC.  Therefore, this study focuses 
on exploring the implications of mechanisms as potential solutions for 
bridging differences in institutional logics within the micro-level 
interaction of knowledge commercialisation. 
Second, THM‘s naïve and modest view of institutional and normative 
convergence between academia, industry, and government portrays it as the 
only institutional order surrounding all three spheres.  This is similar to the 
mimetic isomorphism concept by which the concepts of THM, and its related 
activities, have come to be the template for action which generated unified or 
monolithic responses to uncertainty that might lead to isomorphism - a 
commonality in function and form (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  This overlooks 
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the embeddedness of actors within different, conflicting logics (Thornton et al., 
2012).  Despite, and within the institutionalist literature, there is some research 
exploring the space between institutional logics (e.g. Furnari, 2014, 2016), very 
few empirical studies attempted to study the effect of M.I on UKC.  Hence, 
considering mimetic isomorphism as a potential mechanism in bridging 
differences in institutional logics promises fresh insights. 
Third, the implication of conflicting logics can be explained by the mechanism of 
power. Power is shaped by opportunities provided for actors to challenge 
conflicting logics (Thornton et al, 2012).  When the institutions (i.e. rules) of a 
project are established through the processes of structuration appropriating 
logic over another, actors supporting that logic become more powerful.  Actors 
who are in power often preserve their own logic as they have more control over 
decision making comparing to those without power.  Thus, achieving synergistic 
cooperation is difficult as it requires the bridging of gaps between different 
logics. However, THM ignores incentives and power relations among actors 
(Hira, 2013).  More importantly, there are very limited studies on UKC 
pertaining to how power bridges differences in institutional logics.  This 
calls for exploring the effect of power as a potential mechanism in 
bridging differences in logics.      
Fourth, undoubtedly, the conflicts associated with logics‘ differences call for 
intermediation (Yusuf, 2008, Swan et al, 2010, Lundberg, 2013).  However, both 
perspectives (i.e. THM and ILP) provide modest practical directions on how to 
bridge differences through intermediation mechanisms (i.e. intermediary and 
networking).  The THM, for instance, doesn‘t pay sufficient attention to the role 
of intermediaries (Howells, 2006, Pollard, 2006), though the significance of 
bridging logics has been recognized (Suvinen et al., 2010). ILP also gives 
relatively little explanation about the ways in which to manage such conflict at 
the micro-level (Greenwood et al, 2011).  Though the interest of exploring this 
area is growing (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 2009, Suddaby and Leca, 2009, 
Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006), no attention is given to bringing about 
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intermediating within specific situations at the micro-level interactions.  This is in 
part because the ILP has not, to date, provided the conceptul tools to assist the 
resolution of conflicts logics at this level (Cloutier and Langley, 2013).  Hence, 
there is a need to explore the effects of intermediation as a potential 
mechanism in bridging differences in institutional logics. 
Fifth and finally, the development of THM is a result of inductive theorizing 
based on successful knowledge commercialisation stories within a Western 
context.  Although many followers have empirically examined THM in different 
national contexts (e.g. da Silva et al., 2012, Saad et al., 2008, Saad and 
Zawdie, 2011a, Zhou and Peng, 2008), these studies have attempted to employ 
the same model in their studies on developing or emerging economies, despite 
institutional differences (Pugh, 2014, Cai, 2015).  From this, an investigation 
into the implication of potential mechanisms (i.e. mimetic isomorphism, 
power, intermediation) that can be used in bridging differences in 
institutional logics within UKC and in the emerging economy (i.e. 
developing country) context gives rise to fresh insights.  
In light of the outcomes of the literature review, this study conceived and 
formulated research questions, which can potentially lead to filling the critical 
gaps identified above.  The ILP will be the lens through which bridging 
mechanisms will be examined.   As actors from various institutional spheres 
draw on different logics to direct their actions, the potential mechanisms that 
bridge differences in institutional logics are at the nucleus of this study and, as a 
result, they are the unit of analysis.  Finally, the research is contextualised in the 
emerging economy (developing country) setting, that is, Oman.  Therefore, the 
study‘s research questions are:  
The main research question is: 
What are the implications of power, mimetic isomorphism, and intermediation in 
bridging the differences in institutional logics involved in University Knowledge 
Commercialisation? 
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The sub-research questions are:   
1. What is the effect of power in bridging differences in institutional logics? 
2. What is the effect of mimetic isomorphism (i.e. transferring institutions 
from the West) in bridging differences in institutional logics? 
3. What is the effect of intermediation and networking in bridging differences 
in institutional logics? 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
Building on the research questions discussed and formulated previously in 
chapter two, this chapter provided an explanation of the research methodology 
adopted in this study, illustrating the research paradigm and study research 
design.  This chapter also includes an explanation of the empirical research 
context that supports the analysis of this study. 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the philosophical stance, research design, and the 
relevant methods to empirically address the main question of this research, 
which is to investigate the implication of power, mimetic isomorphism, and 
intermediation (i.e. intermediary and networking) in bridging differences in 
institutional logics within the micro-level interaction (i.e. contracted research 
projects) of UKC. 
It explains and gives insight to the researcher‘s philosophical stance. It 
describes the different research paradigms by examining their advantages and 
disadvantages as a way of justifying the selection of a specific paradigm as the 
appropriate approach for addressing this study‘s research questions.  
Additionally, this section describes the important elements of the overall picture 
of the selected research design.  More specifically, it explains the ways in which 
the strategy of qualitative case study was carried out as well as the selected 
approaches through which the generated data was accordingly analysed.  
Additionally, this section presents an evaluation of the research process validity 
and reliability in reference to the limitations and ethical procedures of the case 
study method.    
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3.1 Research Philosophy and Research Approach 
3.1.1 Epistemological and Ontological Philosophical Positions 
Ontology is the nature of reality (Carson et al., 2001).  Epistemology indicates 
the relationship between the researcher and reality or how reality can be known 
(ibid). These two concepts relate to philosophical paradigms and, jointly with 
research methodology and methods, are considered as core notions in social 
sciences (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2015).  Recently, the two paradigms that 
have been dominating most of the social science research are labelled as: 
positivism and interpretivism (Bryman, 2015).   
In accordance with 'positivism ontology', there is a single and objective reality 
to any research question despite researchers' beliefs (Carson et al., 2001, 
Bryman, 2015).  Therefore, positivists adopt a structural method in performing 
research through initially finding a research issue, building research hypotheses 
and questions, and assuming an appropriate research methodology.  Also 
positivists distance themselves from participants as a way to remain emotionally 
neutral in order to create clear differences between science and personal 
experience.  They usually argue for making clear distinctions between facts and 
value opinions.  They seek objectivity through sticking to particularly structured 
statistical research techniques in order to discover single and objective realities.  
Their main objective is to construct a free generalisation of context as they 
believe that human actions can be explained due to real causes that precede 
their behaviours (Smith, 2006).  
In contrast, interpretivism believes that there is more than one reality and more 
than a single structured way of approaching these realities (Smith, 2006).  The 
knowledge is generated from socially subjective and constructed interpretations 
(Carson et al., 2001, Bryman, 2015).  Researchers' methods are open to 
meanings in human interactions and able to understand what is apparent as 
multiple realities.  Therefore, interpretativists are more mutually interactive with 
their participants during data collection to construct a collaborative explanation 
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of perceived reality.  They remain receptive to new ideas during the study and 
develop it with the help of the participants.  This is due to their belief in human 
capability to adapt and in the difficulty of gaining prior knowledge of context and 
time bound realities (ibid).  Hence, the main objective of interpretativists is to 
make sense and interpret human behaviour instead of generalising and 
predicting causes and effects.  It is important for them to understand the 
reasons and motives behind experiences that are context and time bound. 
However, the belief of positivism in generalising context by only explaining 
causes preceding human behaviour was found to be insufficient in justifying the 
undetermined social phenomena, or inherited explanations, that connect 
empirical events.  Also, the interpretativists‘ rejection of the independence of 
reality from the human constructions of it contradicts their reliance on the key 
set of causal influences that occupy the context of interaction.  These points 
towards the inadequacy of the ontological assumptions of both paradigms.   
This inadequacy can be conceptualised clearly by the 'critical realism' 
paradigm as it prioritizes ontology over epistemology.  It believes that a proper 
epistemology is determined by the nature of objects such as structure and 
agency, rather than vice versa.  Therefore, critical realists adopt a 
'transcendental realism' argument, in which they perceive social activities 
through producing knowledge about the ways in which the objects' actions exist 
and act independently (Bhaskar, 2014).  Hence, they ask what the social reality 
must be like in order for the actor's activity to be possible (ibid). 
Since, and as will be discussed hereafter, this study has a coherent approach to 
the problem of agency (i.e. multiple actors) and the ontological status of 
structures and actions (i.e. their distinctive emergent institutional logics) within 
which they interact; it adopts critical realism as its philosophical stance.  The 
phenomenon of University Knowledge Commercialisation will be seen through 
the lens of critical realism‘s main arguments in relation to the institutional logics 
perspective. 
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3.2 A Critical Realist Approach to Institutional Logics Analysis 
The goal of this section is to understand the impact of actors‘ actions and the 
structures which they are embedded in without conflating them.  Hence, it 
outlines a non-conflating model of institutional logics analysis through drawing 
on critical realism, particularly, Bhaskar‘s stratified model of reality.  As shown in 
table 3.1 below, the empirical domain reflects actors‘ actions and their practical 
experiences.  Researchers provide the actors‘ views of the world through 
discourse analysis.  However, since actors are not always familiar with the 
existing institutions, researchers cannot get access to all institutions simply 
through interpreting what actors perceive and analyse.  This is because some 
institutions may be taken for granted when they are well enforced by actors, 
without the actors actually perceiving them as institutions. 
Thus, it is essential to place institutions in the domain of the actual.  Institutions 
are self-producing repeated patterns of behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  
They ‗‘gradually acquire the ontological status of taken-for-granted facts which 
in turn shape the future interactions and negotiations‘‘ (Barley and Tolbert, 
1997, p. 94).  Ultimately, these taken-for-granted scripts can be reproduced by 
actors without them being totally aware of them and without questioning their 
legitimacy and efficiency (Scott, 1995).  Yet, despite the fact that some 
institutions might be not perceived by actors, they do still exist in actuality.  
Hence, researchers can reveal and characterize repeated behaviours and 
qualify them as institutions (Leca and Naccache, 2006).  This is the reason why 
institutions should be placed in the domain of actual. 
In relation to this study‘s conceptual framework, although institutions shape 
actions, they are themselves embedded in higher-order institutional logics 
(Thornton et al., 2002, 2012). The institutional logics perspective explains and 
defines the content of institutions, in which the rules and norms are perceived as 
standards of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given identity (university, 
industry, and government).  Thus, institutional logics are linked to structures 
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located in the domain of the real.  As institutions are the rules of the game, 
institutional logics are the underlying, fundamental principles of the game (Leca 
and Naccache, 2006).  Hence, as structures cannot be reduced to elements 
from the actual domain (Bahaskar, 2014), institutional logics cannot be reduced 
to institutions.  In this respect, logics and institutions are considered to be 
interdependent but are empirically examined separately.  This separation will 
bring greater explanatory power to the study.  For more clarification, logics are 
hypothesized as exogenous to actors.  Subject to actors‘ actions, institutional 
logics are clarified in the domain of the actual as institutions (Lounsbury et al., 
2003).  Hence, institutions are the consequences of the means by which actors 
transfer these logics through rules and norms within a specific context.   
Table 3.1: A stratified model of Institutional Logics Analysis 
 Domain of the Real Domain of the Actual Domain of the Empirical  
Institutional Logics  V   
Institutions  V V  
Experiences  V V V 
Source: Leca and Naccache, 2006, pg. 633   
To act, actors have to use institutional logics, more particularly, their causal 
powers (Bhaskar, 2014) through either reproducing the pre-existent institutions 
or changing them.  In order for actors to develop new models, they use the 
existing institutional logics which are the essential conditions of any action.  
Institutional logics do not represent a logical, coherent whole, as they could be 
either conflicting or complementary.  This is explicitly true in university 
knowledge commercialisation interaction where three inconsistent logics exist 
(i.e. academia, industry, and government).  The diversity of institutional logics 
describes a different cognitive world where actors can obtain principles to 
challenge new institutions and justify existing ones. Actors use them to justify 
the institutions they want to either establish or preserve.  
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In conclusion, ontological realism - what the world must be like for actors to be 
able to establish or preserve logics that influence knowledge commercialisation 
- helps in establishing a better understanding as it explains the actual process of 
KC by considering the perspectives and institutions of the actors who are 
involved in the same context as well as their decisions or actions, which are 
determined by different, potentially conflicting, logics. 
3.3 Research Approaches 
Research approaches are classified as quantitative, qualitative, or a 
combination of both, known as a ‗mixed method‘ approach (Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2010).  A brief examination of these approaches will be given in the 
following sections. 
3.3.1 Quantitative Research Approach 
The core of the quantitative approach is the notion that an objective reality 
exists independently of researchers.  In this approach a phenomenon is 
investigated through the systematic collection of numeric/statistical data (e.g. 
numbers, percentages, graphs, tables, etc.).  Research strategies that are used 
in this approach involve experiments and surveys along with typical data 
gathering methods such as questionnaires and structured interviews and 
observations (Bryman, 2015). 
The quantitative researcher believes that reality can be accurately measured.  
This is in relation to its positivist and objectivist stance.  Additionally, they are 
preoccupied with causality given that, as in natural sciences, causality can 
provide an explanation of ‗why things exist the way they are‘ (Bryman, 2015).  
Moreover, they pay more attention to generalising the research findings. 
Therefore, in order to ensure research validity, the quantitative researcher 
should be able to generalise outcomes beyond the specific context in which the 
research was performed.   
However, as argued by many scholars, the measurement processes of 
quantitative research might be either inaccurate or fake.  The measure of 
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validity can be affected by the research instruments used.  For instance, the 
questionnaire instrument, which is one of the powerful tools for collecting 
quantitative data, is subject to participants‘ interpretations. Thus, quantitative 
methods are likely incapable of explaining and justifying the perceptions and 
perspectives behind the participants‘ decisions and actions.  This study is 
concerned with understanding the processes of knowledge transfer through the 
perceptions and perspectives of participants, and thus a quantitative research 
approach is not appropriate for this study. 
3.3.2 Mixed Methods Research Approach 
In the literature, mixed methods have been acknowledged by using many terms 
such as integrated, multi-methods, convergence, and combined.  Simply stated, 
the application of mixed methods in a particular study is more specific because 
it involves the combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Researchers believe that mixing both approaches provides a better 
understanding of the research problems compared to each approach by itself.  
More specifically, they believe that the inherent biases of one method will cancel 
out or neutralise the biases of the other method (Creswell, 2013).  Hence, the 
mixed method approach is suitable when a single approach (quantitative or 
qualitative) is considered insufficient for exploring a research problem.  
However, and as aforementioned, this study doesn‘t need to use quantitative 
methods/instruments to explore and understand how the processes of 
knowledge transfer are affected by different actors‘ institutional conditions and 
frameworks.  Thus, the research approach of mixed method is not suitable to 
this study.  
3.3.3 Qualitative Research Approach 
In contrast to the above two approaches, the qualitative research approach 
gives emphasis to participants‘ perspectives and understanding of the subject of 
study.  It relies on the use of texts, image data, and audio-visual materials rather 
than numbers (Creswell, 2013).  It intends to establish a deeper and clearer 
understanding between researchers and their subjects of study (Hair, 2015).  
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Therefore, the key strength of a qualitative study is the ability to provide a 
multifaceted or complicated textual explanation for participants‘ experiences 
with regards to a specific research problem.  It involves the human side of a 
research problem, thus, investigating opinions, beliefs, relationships, as well as 
the behaviours of participating individuals.  In carrying out a qualitative study, 
many strategies can be used including case studies, ethnography, and 
grounded theory, while methods involve semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews, observations, and documentary, e.g. diaries, field notes, and journals 
(Hess-Biber and Leavy, 2010). 
These qualitative methods are useful in exploring and justifying intangible 
factors (e.g. gender role, religion, socio-economic behaviours, etc.) that cannot 
be analysed by quantitative means.  Hence, qualitative studies focus on 
attaining a complex and deep understanding of a particular social phenomenon 
more so than obtaining data that can be generalised to other populations and 
geographical settings. Additionally, the flexibility of the qualitative approach 
allows more freedom and helps in facilitating a better interaction between the 
researcher and the participants.  Its investigations are mainly inclined towards 
asking open-ended questions in which it is not necessarily for the researcher to 
use the same words with every participant.  Hence, participants are free to 
respond by using their own words.  Their responses are likely to be extended 
beyond stating simply yes or no towards more explanation and elaboration.  
This gives the researcher the opportunity to ask ‗probing questions‘ to reach a 
better understanding of the essence of the explored problem, which cannot be 
achieved through quantitative studies.  Consequently, the qualitative research 
approach is most suitable for investigating the knowledge transfer processes 
through the participants‘ perspectives and beliefs.   
3.3.4 Justifications for selecting the qualitative approach 
This study aims to investigate the implications of the potential mechanisms that 
can be used in bridging the differences in institutional logics within University 
Knowledge Commercialisation.  The understanding of this complex 
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phenomenon requires exploratory research based on a qualitative design.  The 
research is contextualised in an emerging UKC institutional environment, which 
is Oman.  The institutional governance of KC has only emerged recently, and 
therefore the relationships are impacted by the underdeveloped institutions of 
the divergent interacting actors.  Also, as these actors are embedded within 
different institutional frameworks, their logics differ as they carry out the 
interactions.  Therefore, as per these two reasons, the qualitative approach 
helped in obtaining rich and diverse accounts of UKC actions in Oman, which 
would have otherwise remained obscure.   
Additionally, the qualitative approach supports the significance and legitimacy of 
the main goals of the philosophical perspective of critical realism adopted in this 
study (Robson, 2011).  These goals include the understanding of actors' 
perspectives as real phenomena which are basic to social science research; 
using a process-oriented, instead of a variable-oriented, approach to 
explanation (Maxwell, 2004); emphasizing the significance of context for 
explanation; and lastly, explaining single situations and events by using an 
inductive flexible design through applying case study strategies, rather than 
basing explanations on regularities or universal studies  (Savin-Baden and 
Major, 2013).   
Also, despite the fact that a quantitative approach can integrate large samples 
and provide statistical verifications, it cannot explain a complicated phenomenon 
like UKC processes.  The qualitative methodology, on the other hand, helped 
the researcher in becoming flexible through asking open-ended questions and 
probing the response of actors whenever necessary.  This resulted in 
generating unpredictable findings for the researcher as participants‘ important 
matters were exposed clearly.   
Moreover, the qualitative approach has been explained as being effective for 
examining institutions and logics.  Museus and Harper (2007, for instance, 
pointed out the inapplicability of exclusive statistical analyses in assessing 
institutional effectiveness.  Hence, they suggested a variety of qualitative 
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approaches in order to generate intense and instructive data to derive people‘s 
decision-making and actions.  Finally, the selection of a qualitative methodology 
is justified more by its effective application in this research piloted study. 
In summary, section 3.3 discussed the epistemological and ontological 
philosophical positions of this study.  It justified the appropriate research 
approach.  In the next section, a discussion of the study‘s research design will 
be given. 
3.4 Research Design  
In this study, the design of the research is represented by the overall framework 
that directs and guides the data collection and the process of inquiry throughout 
the analysis (Bryman, 2015).  It is considered as the roadmap that describes 
how the study was conducted as well as the means by which it was conducted.  
Therefore, with regards to this study, the research design reflects the type of 
inquiry that dictated the logic of research as well as the research context.   
Many scholars (e.g. Creswell, 2006; Yin, 2013) described various approaches of 
inquiry within qualitative research (some of these approaches are shown in table 
3.2 below).  This study used the ‗case study‘ strategy.  Hence, this section will 
start by giving a clear justification for selecting the case study strategy instead of 
other strategies to address the study‘s research questions.   
Table 3.2: Relevant situations for research strategies 
Strategy Form of research 
questions 
Required control over 
behavioural events  
Focus on 
contemporary 
events  
Experiment how, why yes yes 
Survey who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
no yes 
Archival 
analysis 
who, what, where, 
how many, how 
no yes/no 
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much 
History  how, why no no 
Case study how, why no yes 
Source: Yin (2013) 
Though many scholars criticised the case study approach as being deficient 
with respect to producing generalisable outcomes, it is considered to be the 
most appropriate strategy for this study.  This is due to many reasons:  
First, the experiment strategy doesn‘t match with the study‘s research 
questions.  The UKC processes emerge within a natural context rather than an 
experimental one.  In fact, experimental methods are incapable of capturing and 
revealing the complications of actors‘ behaviour, particularly their decisions and 
actions.  On the other hand, the strategy of case study, as per its ability to 
investigate a phenomenon as per its natural emergence, can explore 
complicated behaviours effectively (Yin, 2013).  Through this, the researcher will 
not be under stress to change conditions or force control neither within nor 
around cases.  Also the usage of archival and historical analyses is not suitable 
for this study, because the issue under study is considered as contemporary (is 
currently emerging in the context of inquiry).  This calls for the need to use 
systematic interview techniques in order to acquire and capture the underlying 
casual powers of knowledge commercialisation actions and decisions.   
Second, surveys aim at drawing and obtaining generalisations instead of 
focusing on particular details.  They attempt to test hypotheses constructed from 
general theories regarding variables of economic or social units or relations 
among phenomena.  This necessitates the development of assumptions in 
relation to how contextual variables function.  Hence, by accepting generality 
and denying complexity, surveys are deemed an unsuitable strategy for 
exploring the complicated UKC processes.  For instance, as shown in the 
literature review, the UKC processes are iterative rather than linear.  Due to 
their numeric linear nature, surveys cannot capture the decision processes that 
influence bidirectional actions and activities within interactions.  Additionally, the 
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depth of the contextual factors and issues of UKC processes cannot be 
explained by surveys.  Thus, the usage of surveys in this study will limit the 
understanding of the dynamic or underlying forces of those processes.     
Third, surveys need adequate samples to form a continuous aggregation of 
events, while case studies draw deep descriptive theories from rich 
information/data within multiple case designs (Yin, 1994).  Hence, as per its 
ability to explain and justify complex actors‘ actions and decisions and the ‗how‘ 
and ‗why‘ research questions, and due to this study‘s nature of being 
contemporary, the case study approach is deemed the most appropriate 
strategy for exploring actors‘ multiple institutions and logics within UKC.       
3.4.1 Case study as a research strategy in this study 
A case study is a strategy of investigating "a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomena and context are not clearly evident"  (Yin 1984, p. 23).  In other 
words, and as this study focuses on understanding and examining thoroughly 
'the institutions of multiple actors within KC processes of knowledge production 
and appropriation‘, such understanding includes important contextual conditions 
because they are highly pertinent to the processes.  These conditions are 
related to the social and institutional settings of the actors involved.  
However, it is worth mentioning that the case study approach is not supposed to 
be considered as a methodology choice, but rather should be regarded as a 
choice of what is to be studied (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  Therefore, in 
addition to the above justifications, this strategy will be adopted for the following 
key reasons, which can be justified by the following two points: 
3.4.2 Case study and critical realism 
A qualitative case study is suitable for 'sticky' practice-based problems (Lu, 
2007) in which actors' experiences are significant and the context (institutions 
and logics) of actions is crucial.  In this study, the context of UKC will be 
examined while identifying actors' consciousness, intentionality, and 
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responsibilities (Knowler et al., 2007).  More relevantly, UKC will be examined 
while identifying actors‘ logics and institutions, as a knowledge producer, user, 
or manager.  Hence, actors‘ logics and institutions are interdependent but are 
examined separately, which is the main feature of critical realism. 
First, and with respect to context, as maintained by critical realism, the elements 
of reality are considered as given by actors existing within a context located in 
space and time.  This study focuses on analysing the influence of mechanisms 
on bridging multiple actors‘ logics on UKC and within an unexplored single 
developing institutional context that is Oman.  A context-rich knowledge (Kim, 
2012) will be produced by studying the contextual elements, such as institutions 
(i.e. rules and norms), within the pre-existing institutional logics of UKC in 
Oman.  Furthermore, a qualitative case study helps in investigating a 
phenomenon within its real-life context of interaction (Yin, 1984).  Thus, the 
process of UKC is influenced by the internal structure (logics) of the action 
situation in which interactions (contracted research) are regularized by a set of 
institutions (rules, norms) and governance forms and modes of organisation to 
put institutions into action.  In this study, these forms are related to the potential 
types of UKC mechanisms that have the power to facilitate and manage the 
interaction between actors, more specifically, in bridging differences between 
logics. 
Second, the case study approach is a multi-perspective analysis in which the 
researcher considers not only the perspective of an actor, but also the 
perspectives of the relevant groups of actors and the interactions between them. 
This supports the critical realist argument of considering actors as a 
mechanism, either for or against UKC, to be actualised or not.  Although the 
above-mentioned structures (logics) and expected mechanisms have power 
over actors, they are still influenced by actors' logics which shape decisions and 
behaviour within interactions.  
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3.4.3 The role of the case study approach as a method 
Though the two most dominant goals are exploration and theory building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), case studies also have several roles in research.  These 
roles can be classified as: explorative, theory building, theory testing, and theory 
refining or extending (Voss et al., 2002).  Likewise, the design of the case study 
can be used to research questions that are, in nature, either: confirmatory, 
exploratory, or explanatory (Yin, 1994).  In this study, the goal of the case study 
goes beyond any aforementioned single category.  This study aims at 
accomplishing multiple goals involving informing, exploring, and explaining.  Yet 
the main role of the case study research relates to the exploratory aspect, as 
this study intends to explore the implications of the potential mechanisms on 
UKC.         
The research of ‗exploratory case studies‘ is likely to be conducted in 
developing settings, in which the knowledge of the investigated phenomenon is 
inadequate to build a strong conceptual framework that can guide the 
investigation into the suggested research problem.  The knowledge of KC is 
very limited within the setting of an emerging institutional environment, such as 
Oman, especially considering that the phenomenon is still in its infant stage 
(new and not yet developed).  Even the existing literature in this area is not 
sufficient to establish a framework that helps in guiding the inquiry into how 
potential mechanisms influence the bridging of differences in logics within an 
emerging UKC institutional environment.  Therefore, there is a need to conduct 
exploratory research through case studies in order to build a robust conceptual 
framework relevant to Oman‘s emerging institutional environment. 
3.5 Case Study Strategy 
There are, as suggested by Yin (2013), four types of case study designs: 
holistic-single case, embedded-single case, holistic-multiple cases, and 
embedded-multiple cases.   
99 
 
Generally, it is acknowledged that multiple case studies result in more rich and 
understandable findings than single cases (Erikson and Kovalainen, 2015).  
They enable case comparisons, which make them more desirable in exploratory 
research. A number of comparative cases allow patterns in the UKC processes 
of contracted research projects to emerge and to segregate significant 
descriptions of the processes and their underlying features.  In other words, they 
allow in “mapping common patterns, mechanisms and properties among cases” 
(Erikson and Kovalainen, 2015, p. 119).  This might include, for instance, the 
identification of common institutional issues across cases that affect processes.   
Since this study is concerned with studying the processes of UKC (i.e. 
production and appropriation) from the perspective of multiple actors (i.e. 
university, academics, industry, governmental bodies, and government), the 
decisions of these actors are determined by their individual and organisational 
logics.  Hence, multiple accounts of contracted research projects, including all 
actors, would possibly result in more accurate findings.  Accordingly, 
‗embedded-multiple case studies‘ was selected as being the suitable design to 
conduct this study.  Given that such design is denoted as very time-consuming 
and expensive (Creswell, 2013), and the study‘s objective is to achieve an 
understanding about the concerned investigated phenomenon instead of 
achieving replication, 4 cases of publically funded, contracted research projects 
were selected for investigation in this study.   
3.5.1 The selection of cases 
In comparison to quantitative research, random selection of qualitative cases 
research is not preferable.  Since the nature of this research is exploratory, an 
application of purposive and convenience sampling was required (Yin, 1994, 
2013). First, the application of convenience sampling helped in selecting cases 
as per their accessibility and proximity to this study‘s researcher.  Hence, due to 
the researcher originating from Oman and having good networks in the area, it 
was easier for her to engage local actors such as the university, SMEs, and 
governmental entities.  These networks facilitated access and secured the 
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engagement of the expected participants involved in the projects.  Second, 
instead of following sampling logic and representativeness, case selection is 
usually carried out based on replication logic (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  From 
this perspective, a case is selected if it results in literal replication (expects 
similar results for expectable reasons); or in theoretical replication (generates 
conflicting results for expectable reasons).  Nevertheless, with respect to this 
study, the frame of limited sampling made following these two criteria difficult.  
Hence, purposive sampling was applied.  For the successful application of 
purposive sampling, a clear clarification is necessary to underline why the focal 
cases (i.e. projects) represent the subject of interest in this study.  The four 
selected projects were found to be interesting for the following three reasons: 
(a) The selection of these projects was related to the selection of 
‗embedded-multiple case studies‘.  In this respect, the researcher had the 
ability to investigate the logics of UKC from multiple institutional 
perspectives, including, knowledge producers (academics and university 
officers), knowledge users (commercial, i.e. SMEs, and non-commercial, 
i.e. governmental entities), and knowledge managers (government).  This 
resulted in getting rich information on the underlying causal factors of 
different actors that affected existing structures.   
(b) All of the selected projects raised interesting issues and, hence, resulted 
in more understandable findings.  They allowed the emergence of 
common patterns within the investigated processes, which consequently 
helped in identifying important similarities and differences in the 
explanations of these processes and their underlying characteristics. 
(c) The project initiation was synchronized with the commencement of 
different innovation programs at the university and national levels.  
Particularly, these projects were conducted after one year of launching 
the Innovation Affairs Department at the university for the purpose of 
enhancing innovation within local industry, and, on the national level, 
after the development and provision of many public funding programs by 
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the TRC as a way of encouraging R&D and KC between academics and 
industry.  
To ensure that the population of interest is covered, in addition to purposive 
sampling, a snowball approach was used (Robson, 2011).  Three key 
informants (from the university, TRC, and the governmental entity overseeing 
SMEs) were contacted first in order to get a relevant list and directory of the 
contracted research projects between academics and industry.  This helped in 
developing the study frame.  The researcher arrived at a sample of twenty 
public funded projects.  The participants within the listed projects were selected 
as per their direct involvement in those projects.  They had been classified as 
knowledge producers, users, and managers.  The producers are the large 
diverse groups that make the required knowledge available, such as the 
university and its academics from different disciplines.  Users are the ones who 
appropriate knowledge at any given time, such as SMEs from different 
industries.  Managers are officials from the government (fund operators, agency, 
and policymakers), who are responsible for supporting the processes by 
managing and making policies.   
Next, efforts were made to reach all the identified participants through phone 
calls and e-mails.  This was done after a formal letter, requesting access, was 
sent to the participants.  However, the final number of projects that were 
sampled was four out of twenty.  This was because the researcher couldn‘t 
cover multiple perspectives in most projects.  Most of the targeted interviewees, 
especially SMEs owners and policymakers, were hard to reach due to their busy 
schedules.  However, the selection of these four cases (i.e. projects) was made 
for several good reasons.  In addition to the abovementioned reasons, they 
were found to fulfil the criterion of ‗literal replication‘, in which similar results 
were expected for predictable reasons.  Additionally, the cases were rich in 
information, which facilitated a detailed understanding. 
Despite the argument about the ideal number of cases for a research being 
between four and nine cases (Eisenhardt, 1989), the researcher of this study 
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believes that too many cases would jeopardize losing the focus and detailed 
view of each case.  Hence, the need for getting a more detailed view on each 
case justifies limiting the number of cases to four.  As argued by Yin (1994), the 
quality of cases is more significant than their number.     
Again, with regards to the snowballing process, after interviewing the key 
informants, the research was snowballed outwards into the university's officers 
and academics involved in the project.  This helped in getting contact with other 
collaborative stakeholders from enterprises and governmental bodies.  In 
addition, it helped in generating a better picture of the actions and decisions 
taken by the involved actors, as well as in getting diverse opinions from different 
institutional contexts.   
 
3.5.2 Unit of Analysis 
Yin (1994) identified that unit of analysis as a concrete source of information, by 
which evidence will be created in interaction between the participants and the 
researcher.  It is the 'who or what' of the study, which an analyst may 
generalise.  Therefore, a unit of analysis can be regarded as several things such 
as a set of policies, a process, communities, social capital, or interest group of 
individuals and alliances.  
In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish between a unit of analysis and a 
unit of observation.  The unit of analysis is at the level where the researcher 
sets the conclusions, while the unit of observation is at the level where the 
researcher collects data.  In this study, the observation units are the individuals‘ 
(within the university, SMEs, and government) who have multiple, different, and 
potentially conflicting institutional logics.  The unit of analysis involves the 
research project.  This matches with the definition of instituional logics adopted 
in this study, which considers logics as causal powers for influencing and 
shaping actors‘ actions in the micro-level interaction, that is, the investigated 
contracted research projects. Furthermore, it gives the chance to explore the 
socially constructed rules and norms through which actors produce and 
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reproduce the meaning to their social reality (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 
Thornton et al., 2012). 
3.5.3 The logics of inductive and deductive 
In research, the investigation is guided by either inductive or deductive logical 
arguments.  In deductive logic, researchers usually start a study with a 
hypothesis which they presume to be true (Robson, 2011).  They, on the basis 
of this initial hypothesis, try to determine what else would be true.  The usage of 
such logic makes the proof of findings, and the conclusions to be reached, 
beyond doubt.  Nonetheless, the opponents of deduction argue that truth is 
maintained only when the initial hypothesis on which the study is based turns 
out to be right and accurate.  While in inductive logic, finding out meanings in 
contrast to causes is essential.  It uses theory to develop a clear explanation of 
data.  In this logic, the researchers start with collected data to derive inferences.  
Though induction‘s aim is not to prove the correctness of a theory, it can 
demonstrate how a theory can suggest a logical explanation of data.   
Since the goal of this study is both to explore and explain how potential 
mechanisms influence bridging the differences in logics within an emerging UKC 
institutional environment, a combination of induction and deduction was used.  
This is due to the belief that both logics are considered to be involved 
simultaneously and cannot be separated (Perry and Jensen, 2001).  At the 
beginning, the approach in this study was only induction; however, depending 
on this logic alone would direct the researcher‘s attention away from capitalising 
on theoretical concepts that already exist in UKC literature.  Therefore, existing 
literature was used as an instrument in guiding the preliminary exploration goal 
of this study.  More specifically, the initial protocol of this study was constructed 
using the framework established from literature and the initial inductive stage of 
investigation (which involved six interviews).      
There was a regular interaction between data and theory.  Moreover, many new 
themes emerged from the multiple institutional perspectives of participants.  
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Hence this study applied inductive and deductive logics concurrently rather than 
separately. 
In summary, the research design of this study, explained in sections 3.4 and 
3.5, provides justifications for using the case study strategy, unit of analysis, and 
sampling strategy.  An exploratory approach was adopted to investigate the 
research questions by using embedded-multiple case studies, which involved 
four cases. The researcher‘s view with regards to deduction and induction logics 
was also justified.   
3.6 Methods of data generation 
As data is generated rather than collected, this study uses the term of ‗data 
generation‘.  Data generation within case study research involves the usage of 
different data sources (Yin, 2013).  This is due to the logic of capturing sufficient 
insight that cannot be accomplished by using one data source.  Hence, the 
usage of more than one source can bridge the gaps.  Additionally, multiple links 
of evidence help in addressing discrepancies and conflicts that might result from 
various sources as well as allow the emergence of different layers of meaning.  
Furthermore, it enhances the validity of case study research (Creswell, 2006).   
According to Yin (2013), the evidence for case study may come from six 
different sources, namely: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts. While other 
scholars have suggested that the methods used in collecting data for qualitative 
research are to involve either interviews, documents, or observations (Merriam, 
1998), this study, in order to attain a rich understanding, adopted two sources of 
data: semi-structured interviews and documentation.   
The usage of two sources instead of one was supported by the recent principle 
of 'triangulation', which is defined as ―a validity procedure where researchers 
search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to 
form themes or categories in a study‖ (Golafshani 2003, p. 8).  The aim of 
triangulation is to compensate for the weaknesses of one data generation 
source by balancing that with the strengths of another data source (Jick, 1979). 
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The weakness of interviewing in this study is the possibility that the perceptions 
of multiple participants are likely to be indigenous statements of reality.  Also 
there is a possibility that the researcher‘s interpretations might be influenced by 
bias and inaccurate understanding.  Considering this, there is potentiality that 
the participants‘ perceptions and the researcher‘s opinions alone can overlook 
significant facts, consequently affecting the depth of understanding.  Hence, 
there was a need for building accounts of the studied phenomenon by using 
documents (published and unpublished) as supplementary data sources.   The 
following section explains these two data sources. 
3.6.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The primary data generation method in this study is the semi-structured, 
―structured-open-response-interviews‟‟ (King et al., 1994, p. 15). The study 
implemented 32 interviews in total.  The interview process is explained later in 
section 3.1.5.  The aim of this section is to explain the logic behind using semi-
structured interviews.   
First, structured interviews restrain the inquiry to particular dimensions, thus 
constructing specific meanings to interviews (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  The 
interaction in UKC is complex.  Hence, understanding such a process requires 
that the responses of participants are not dependent on the interviewer‘s biases, 
which can result from structured questions.  Therefore, the usage of a semi-
structured interview guide is significant as it includes a set of comprehensive 
themes and adaptable suggested questions.  Second, semi-structured 
interviews are highly flexible and allow the gathering of in-depth data (Bryman et 
al., 2004; Bryman, 2015). The researcher used a set of prepared questions as a 
guide.  While efforts were focused on ensuring that key questions were asked to 
every participant interviewed, semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher 
to interpose this with additional questions as the researcher deemed suitable.  
However, it was important to mention that the flow of the interview was intended 
to be mainly driven by the interviewees.  The interviewees were requested to 
talk freely and openly about whatever they viewed to be significant.  This 
encouraged further elaboration and took the conversations in an unpredictable 
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direction.  Third, it is important to note that actions and decisions are not 
documented, which makes it difficult for the researcher to observe them.  
Therefore, there is a need to obtain the perspectives of actors by asking them 
context-specific questions.  Semi-structured interviews enable interviewees to 
expand on what they consider to be important and to frame the concerned 
issues in their terms (Savin-Baden and Major, 2013).  Fourth, semi-structured 
interviews are in line with this study‘s philosophical stance of critical realism in 
stressing the demonstration of social reality with actual, empirical, and real 
causal powers.  Hence, in order to obtain reality, the researcher should move 
from being an external observer towards investigating UKC from the views and 
perceptions of individuals who effectively engaged in such processes.  Only 
those who are involved in the processes understand them and their 
mechanisms of work. 
 
3.6.2 Documentary data 
This study used documents as a secondary source of data.  Documents used in 
performing qualitative research can be either published or unpublished printed 
materials.  Documents can be considered as a source of massive data offering 
important insight into the subject matter of study.   
This study focuses on advancing a new topic (i.e. university knowledge 
commercialisation) in an emergent institutional environment in Oman – 
something which has already been performed successfully in developed 
countries.  Hence, in order to attain accurate findings pertaining to the national 
and organisational strategies, policies, and institutional frameworks in relation to 
the UKC movement, the documentary analysis approach was selected as a 
suitable method to strengthen the analysis of the interviews. Different types of 
official documents were identified after the development of the study‘s research 
design. 
There are two types of documents, primary and secondary.  The primary 
documents came into existence during the period under which the research took 
place (Bell, 2014); while secondary documents were written by a non-direct 
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observer or participants in the specific events (Anderson and Anderson, 1998).  
In this study ‗primary documents‘ from relevant organisations were used in the 
analysis.  These involve the university‘s strategies, national research and 
innovation strategies, industry regulations and frameworks, Oman Vision 202, 
national fifth year‘s plans, TRC annual reports, and His Majesty‘s speeches. 
National studies about KC and entrepreneurial potentiality in Oman were also 
used. 
 
3.6.3 Pilot study 
Before commencing the actual empirical phase of data collection, the study‘s 
research design was tested for the purpose of generating initial understanding 
about the institutions (i.e. rules, norms) and logics of UKC within the Omani 
setting. Hence, three open-ended interviews were conducted during September 
2013.  One university officer, one user-funding operator/manager, and one TRC 
officer were interviewed.  The interviews were recorded and transcribed.   
The pilot study provided five advantages for the researcher.  First, it helped in 
refining the interview guide and protocol that was used in final case studies 
work.  Second, it provided insight into how participants might perceive the 
research, consequently uncovering the possible barriers that might be faced by 
the researcher during the actual process of data collection as well as the way in 
which to overcome such barriers.  Third, a significant understanding was 
obtained regarding some of the UKC issues, which conformed to the existing 
literature.  Hence, the pilot study resulted in experiential and practical 
observations that were conformant to the researcher understands of the existing 
literature.  Fourth, it helped in identifying the appropriate empirical context, 
especially the types of industry and funding, that matches with the inquiry of 
‗how potential mechanisms enable/constrain bridging the differences in logics 
within the micro-level interaction (i.e. contracted research projects) of UKC‘.  
These, in addition to the university, form the empirical context of Public Funding 
Projects and SMEs within the AL Rusayl Industrial Area.  Fifth, the successful 
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carrying out of pilot interviews by the researcher gave additional justification that 
the qualitative approach was the suitable methodology for this study.  
 
3.6.4 Interview process 
This section explains the process of semi-structured interview.  The explanation 
covers interview planning, the actual delivery time, and process management.  
Prior to commencing the scheduled interviews, three documents were sent by 
the researcher to the participants at least one to two weeks in advance. These 
documents are: 
 Study‘s agenda involving the main aim of the study and methodology 
used. 
 Interview protocol supporting the study‘s aim with research questions and 
defining the intended subject of discussion. 
 Letter of intent highlighting the participant‘s agreement of confidentiality 
and anonymity.  The letter was signed by the researcher and her 
supervisors.    
Equity was used as a guideline to determine the interviews‘ date, time, and 
location.  The researcher was accommodating and adapted herself to meet 
participants‘ preferences.  For instance, as difficulty of accessing participants 
was faced due to their busy schedules, the issue was mitigated by sending the 
interview guides to the participants well in advance, in addition to allowing them 
to reschedule times and dates when they found them rather inconvenient.  Also 
travelling within and outside the capital (researcher‘s hometown) was done in 
order to meet the participants at their offices.  Hence, all interviews were 
conducted face-to-face. 
The interviews were conducted during the period of April 2014 – September 
2014.  As per the study‘s aims and as aforementioned in the selection of cases 
section, the participants were selected using the following categories: (1) 
knowledge producer, including university‘s management, KTO officers, and 
academics from different disciplines; (2) knowledge user, including commercial 
users, that are, CEO/Owners of local SMEs; (3) knowledge manager, including 
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governmental officers such as TRC managers and fund operators.  In total, and 
apart from the three key informants, 29 participants were interviewed.  This 
equated to a total sample size of 32 participants in this study.  The number and 
categories of the respondents are show in the table 3.3 below: 
Table 3.3: Interviewees’ Overview 
 
 
 
Categories/Interviewees  
Knowledge 
Producer 
Knowledg
e User 
Knowledge Manager 
 
 
Case
s 
   
Academic
s 
Universit
y 
Officers  
SMEs 
CEOs 
Public Fund 
Operators 
Policymake
r/ Public 
Funding 
Governmen
t Officers, 
MoCI & HE 
A Ac1, Ac2 UO1, 
UO2, 
UO3, 
UO4 
CU1 PFO1,PFO
2, PFO3, 
PFO4 
PPMF1, 
PPMF2, 
PPMF3 
GO1, GO2  
B Ac3 CU2 
C Ac4, Ac5, 
Ac6, Ac7 
CU3, CU4, 
CU5, CU6 
D Ac8, Ac9, 
Ac10 
CU7 
 10 4 7 4 3 2 
 
Total 
 
32 
Source: Author‘s research  
Before commencing the actual interview, an introduction about the researcher 
and her background was given.  This was then followed by a summary of the 
research main questions and sub-questions, in addition to, a restatement of 
confidentiality.  Despite the fact that confidentiality was assured by the 
interviewee‘s signed consent form, from the researcher‘s view it was essential to 
restate the matter verbally before each interview.  The permission was granted 
from all interviewees to audio-record the interviews.  The average duration of 
the interviews was between one to two hours.  Each recorded interview was 
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saved as an audio file, which was identified by the participant‘s category, name, 
position, and organisation.  
 
In summary, section- 3.6 gave details about data generation and methods.  In 
this study, data generation involved semi-structured interviews with multiple 
actors and key informants across the four selected cases.  Documentations 
were used as supplementing materials.  The next section presents the analytical 
phase of this study. 
3.7 Data Analysis 
This section presents the analysis phase of the study‘s research process.  Data 
analysis includes "organizing and interrogating data in ways that allow 
researchers to see patterns, identify themes,.., develop explanations, make 
interpretations" (Hatch 2002, p. 148), and draw and verify conclusions in order 
to discover and understand the relations between different issues.  Therefore, 
the analysis of data comprised four key techniques and steps.   
3.7.1 Interviews’ Transcription 
As mentioned above, each conducted interview was recorded as an audio file.  
This study used a digital MP3 Player.  Next, in order to facilitate analysis, all 32 
oral interviews were converted into written text and saved as a word document 
file.  A solid basis on which the analysis will be built and data interpreted was 
ensured by reading the transcripts repeatedly.    
During the reading of transcripts, the researcher had adopted four different 
views.  The first view focused on reading the experience of participants who had 
in fact experienced the events.  The second view was accepting that the 
respondents are neutral informants of different events.  The third view was 
considering respondents as subjective individuals who represent their 
experiences, hence their reasoning is supposed to be taken into account.  The 
fourth view was seeing respondents as pro-active agents in the investigated 
phenomenon, thus their beliefs were also taken into consideration.  After 
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concluding the deep reading of transcripts, the researcher moved to the second 
phase of analysis. 
3.7.2 Data coding and condensing    
Qualitative data is mostly bulky and includes much irrelevant material (Robson, 
2011).  Therefore, to facilitate analysis, the researcher carried on categorizing 
and organizing the data.  Hence, the data condensing approach was adopted.  
Data were organized and condensed in order to draw clear conclusions and 
confirmation (Cassell and Gummesson, 2006).   
Though the researcher was aware of qualitative analysis software packages 
(e.g. AQUAD, NVivo, etc.), none of these packages were used in this study.  
The researcher didn‘t find them essential due to the interest in the meanings 
that lie underneath the respondents‘ subjective reality in relation to their context 
of interaction.  Hence, a manual coding technique was preferred and considered 
sufficient for this process.   
Before starting the coding process, pre-categories were developed from the 
UKC literature.  They were established around institutions and logics of UKC, in 
addition to the potential mechanisms and their influence on bridging differences 
in logics.  This gave the researcher a starting point for the analysis.  
Nevertheless, the purpose of establishing these pre-categories was to assist the 
modification and re-specification of the themes that will emerge rather than to 
verify or test a particular theory. 
In this stage ‗thematic coding‘ was adopted.  The main goal of this technique is 
to set down the content of the transcripts' main ideas, which is known as coding.  
Coding is how researchers define what the data they are analysing is about 
(Robson, 2011).  According to (Bazeley, 2013), there are two stages for coding 
qualitative data.  The initial stage, called ‗open coding‘, in which interesting 
codes are identified and labelled, and the second stage, called 'focused coding', 
in which those codes interpreted and refined to build clear analytical categories. 
In these two stages, the researcher analysed each interview transcription line by 
line to find key words, phrases, or sections and then pasted them under 
particular relevant categories.   
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A code, or category, is a piece of text of the transcript that captures "the 
meaning of that unit text-not just the words" (Lee and Lings, 2008, p. 244).  The 
main type of code that was used in this study was 'interpretive code' because, 
first, the responses of actors were treated as "interpretive, 'storied', social 
products that they produced in unique contexts, to represent themselves or their 
worlds rather than facts to be assessed for truthfulness" (Savin-Baden and 
Major, 2013, p. 444).  This is because actors are embedded within particular 
institutional and central logic systems.  Their actions are restricted by the rules 
and norms of these systems.  Therefore, the researcher needed to analyse the 
effects of such systems on enabling and constraining actors' collective actions 
(i.e. logics bridging/spanning) through explaining the relevant institutional 
factors.  Second, was thinking about the nature of the generated data on the 
basis of the critical realism assumption of actors having the ability to narrate the 
experiences of knowledge creation and appropriation. Their 'narration', however, 
was based on the observable institutions (Blundel, 2007), and they only 
described the rules that they used at the operational level.  However, actors' 
narration was not only considered as evidence of 'what actually had/has 
happened', but also as a statement of 'what they believe to be true' as 
knowledge produced and appropriated by actors themselves through regular 
interactions within projects.  The researcher established a meaningful 
explanation of the unobserved institutions (i.e. norms) by finding out the 
activities that actors adopted in the process.   
Some scholars, however, raised the issue of the probability of coding system 
rigidity, which might consequently hinder rather than facilitate data analysis 
(Carson and Coviello, 1996).  To mitigate such issue, the researcher, first, was 
open to new themes that might arise separately from the pre-categories that 
were identified at the first stage of analysis.  Hence, other new analytical 
variables start to emerge from the identified categories or sub-categories.  Data 
that failed to conform to categories was listed under different analytical 
categories.  Second, the researcher used memo writings while proceeding with 
113 
 
coding. Writing notes supported recording the researcher‘s first impressions 
when reading a specific passage of text.   
In general, the process of coding established a clear structure of categories, 
sub-categories, and sub-units.  The process finished after ensuring that the list 
of codes was congregated to show the potential mechanisms of UKC as well as 
the positive or negative interactions between institutions and the logics within 
those mechanisms.     
3.7.3 within-Case Analysis 
After developing thorough details of cases and finalised coding for all transcripts 
in each case, the researcher began the next step, which involved the analysis of 
the patterns that emerged from the data within individual cases.  The focus was 
to enhance familiarity with individual cases and to make patterns emerge at 
case level before examining data across all cases.  The categories established 
in the coding phase, with written memos of each case, assisted in determining 
relations and connections.  In this within-case analysis, the researcher applied 
many strategies for the purpose of generating meaning of data.  These 
strategies included clustering, observing patterns, and observing links between 
variables (Miles and Huberman, 1994).     
When there was an instance of insufficient data in explaining particular 
relationships, secondary data sources (i.e. documents) and literature revisiting 
were used as ways to gain a better understanding of such emerged 
relationships.  As this research used an iterative approach, the researcher had 
the opportunity to rely on deductive thinking while at the same time revisiting 
data to search for evidence.  This process was similar to the pattern matching 
process (Yin, 1994).  Hence, a dialectic relationship was merged amongst data 
and theory, which represented the adopted inductive-deductive approach within 
this study.    
3.7.4 Cross-case Analysis 
Attached to within-case analysis is the cross-case search for patterns 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Such analysis technique is used due to the fact that people 
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are extremely poor at processing information as they jump to conclusions that 
are grounded within limited data.  They are influenced by selected respondents 
and might sometimes unintentionally drop evidence that contradicts their inquiry, 
which results in reaching false and immature conclusions.  Hence, a cross-case 
comparison was used in this study in order to overcome such ‗information-
processing biases‟ through examining data in different ways (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p. 540).   
The aim of cross-case analysis is to interpret the inquired research 
phenomenon by determining similarities and differences across cases (Stretton, 
1969).  In other words, it enables the comparison of differences and 
commonalities in the activities and processes that are the units of analysis in 
case studies.  Involving cross-case analysis increases the researcher‘s know-
how beyond a singular case.  It enables the researcher to define the 
―combination of factors that may have contributed to the outcomes of the case, 
seek or construct an explanation as to why one case is different or the same as 
others, make sense of puzzling or unique findings, or further articulate the 
concepts, hypotheses, or theories discovered or constructed from the original 
case‖ (Khan and VanWynsberghe, 2008, p. 2).  
The logic of pattern matching and explanation building were used for the 
purpose of making sense of different findings from cases.  This was done 
through rigorous comparison and contrasting of themes driven from individual 
cases. There were some patterns that were determined in this process across 
some cases, which necessitated the re-examining of the general pattern.  The 
researcher tried to solve the complexities of the situation by taking into account 
both the internal and external institutional contexts of the contracted research 
projects of UKC.  Hence, the cross-case considered both the inner -rules and 
actions of the actors involved in the project, and the outer -institutional contexts 
and frameworks at the national level (i.e. the study‘s research context discussed 
in section 3.2), in which the institutions (particularly rules) of interactions occur.  
Cross-case analysis sought to enhance the validity of the findings.  For validity 
checking there was a need to apply multiple data sources.  According to 
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Eisenhardt (1989), the comparison of emerging themes with existing literature is 
considered one of the significant features of case study research.  Therefore, 
the researcher considered the questions of what is similar, what is different, and 
why in the literature of UKC. 
 
In summary, section 3.7 presented the analysis stage of this study.  Both the 
within-case and cross-case analyses entailed a continuous iterative approach 
by examining patterns that emerged from interview transcripts.  The following 
sections will explain the research language, the operational procedures the 
researcher followed to meet the quality criterion of reliability and validity, the 
potential limitations of the case study research, and ethical considerations.  
 
3.8 Data gathering and analysis language: 
As the official language in Oman is Arabic, the researcher expected to 
encounter some participants (especially from the government) who might not be 
able to understand or speak English. Therefore, the final copy of the interview 
questions was written in both English and Arabic to make sure that the 
participants had no difficulty in understanding the questions. Prior to the actual 
data collection, the researcher made sure that the key informants could 
understand English, otherwise they were asked to choose which language they 
would prefer for communication. In fact, the majority of the interviews were 
conducted in English (as many Omanis had an English academic background 
and as some were non Arabic-speakers) and only three respondents (from the 
government) preferred to conduct the interview in Arabic.   
To ensure the accuracy of translations from English to Arabic, the interview 
guide was doubled-checked by the researcher.  To ensure the accuracy of the 
translation of interview transcripts from Arabic to English, the researcher wrote 
them first in Arabic and then translated them into English, again the transcripts 
were doubled-checked by the researcher.  In phase two, bilingual transcripts 
were given to two teachers who were proficient in both languages to check the 
translation of the transcripts.  The two were asked whether the translation of 
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these transcripts into English was clear and accurate.  Few changes were 
suggested in the wording in both versions.   The versions were subsequently 
modified as per the suggestions given.       
3.9 Case study validity and reliability: 
This section discusses the case study‘s quality concepts of validity and 
reliability.  Many scholars (e.g. Yin, 1994; Patton, 1990) raised the concern of 
the difficulty of establishing validity and reliability in qualitative research, due to 
its reliance on individual perceptions.  This study adopted procedural 
precautions, which aided in obtaining reliable and valid findings.   
Qualitative research supporters have questioned the appropriateness of 
quantitative validity measures and concepts for qualitative research.  Some 
referred to the validity in quantitative research as construct validity (Golafshani, 
2003).  This includes measurements of accuracy in whether or not they are 
measuring what they are intended to measure.  The notion of validity, however, 
is acknowledged differently in qualitative research, in that some scholars have 
gone as far as to reject the term of validity in itself.  They used other terms such 
as trustworthiness, rigor, and quality.  However, this study used the same term 
of validity and reliability, yet, it was used to better reflect the qualitative notion of 
quality.  Hence, in this study, validity and reliability denote redefined criteria 
which are applied to match with the reality of this study and assess the quality of 
research away from methodological dimensions (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; 
Robson, 2011). 
There were several measures followed by the researcher that helped in 
enhancing validity in this study.  First, credibility was ensured through the 
engagement in the country's contextual environment as a researcher and 
through the interaction with existing actors, which was more during the data 
generation period.  In addition, it was ensured by peer debriefing through 
sharing the data analysis process with a supervision team who are experts in 
the field and as part of the process of analysing and writing.  Moreover, a 
member-check was carried out with the selected actors.  A discussion about 
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findings and themes was done with actors in order to validate if the interpreted 
data reflected their accurate views.  Second, reliability was clearly satisfied by 
defining thoroughly the procedures used in studying the research phenomenon.  
These procedures were explicitly detailed in this methodology chapter.  Third, a 
constructed interview guide and protocol was established to ensure a high 
degree of reliability in the interview questions‘ focus, procedures, content, and 
ethics.  This guide was assessed in the pilot phase to resolve potential issues.  
The changes in the phrasing of some questions, as well as in the order of the 
questions, helped in allowing a pattern of responses to develop and emerge 
relatively.  Fourth, the researcher constructed clear conceptual assumptions 
from the existing literature of institutional logics perspective and UKC.  This 
helped in guiding both the research design and data generation.  Fifth, a clear 
route towards authentic responses was established by including many open-
ended questions within the interview guide.  This supported the aim of attaining 
an authentic understanding of actors‘ or participants‘ experiences.  Sixth, the 
usage of a triangulation principle was helpful in increasing the quality of the 
interview data. The usage of documents as a supplementary source helped in 
validating the findings from the interviews.  Lastly, the coding system and 
related coding tables, which were developed for 32 interviews, supported the 
systematic analysis of data illustrative instances.  They are considered as 
transparent evidence for data collection, sorting, and organizing.    
3.10 Potential limitations of case study research: 
Despite the fact that the case study approach was considered as the most 
appropriate method for this study, it has many limitations. 
First, the most popular criticism of case study is the difficulty of generalising 
findings to the whole population from which it was extracted.  However, the 
researcher is aware of the weaknesses and the strengths of what was carried 
out in this case study research.  The second limitation is related to the case 
studies vastness of information, which created a challenge in ensuring research 
quality and rigor.  A Large volume of collected data could result in more 
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complicated theories, consequently compromising accuracy (Leitch et al., 2010).  
The researcher tried to mitigate such issue through validity and reliability 
procedures, as mentioned above.  Third, an issue pertaining to determining the 
boundaries of the case study‘s time-scale, events, and processes was faced by 
the researcher. However, this was solved by assigning the boundaries of each 
case study from the very beginning of the study.   
Moreover, the semi-structured interviews, which were employed as the only 
instrument for primary data collection, have some weaknesses.  This is because 
of their reliance on verbal behaviour, which might cause the issue of 
interviewees‘ bias.  Participating actors may pay no attention to some 
information that is very critical for the researcher (Bryman and Bell, 2015).  To 
mitigate such problem, the researcher asked many probing questions during the 
interview whenever she felt that the interviewee was withholding something 
important. Additionally, it is argued that a researcher's absolute non-bias cannot 
be ensured totally in formulating the interview guide or in data analysis; 
especially if a researcher is seeking for better qualitative data.  The researcher's 
subjectivity may control the way in which the interview questions are formulated 
and the data is analysed in favour of her own bias to manipulate outcomes.  
Therefore, the issue of bias should be used consciously in order to find out the 
embedded views of actors. The researcher mitigated this by enhancing validity 
and reliability while maintaining a systematic process of data collection.  
3.8 Ethical issues consideration 
It is essential to ensure that the study is carried out in strict adherence to ethical 
standards and that its procedures are set down in line with the conventional 
practice of social science research.  In this respect, research ethics serve as 
protection for all participants involved in the study, such as the researcher, 
actors, organisations, as well as society against any possible harm that the 
study may cause.  Such harm was avoided in this study as follows: 
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First, before starting field work, an ethical approval was acquired from the 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Bradford.  This included the full 
required details and documents demonstrating that all precautions and 
measures were in place to protect the participating actors and their 
organisations, the university, as well as the researcher. Second, the 
participating actors were invited to participate in the research through written 
official letters signed by the university and the researcher.  In the letter the 
research objectives and questions were clearly communicated, in addition to, 
the way in which the data was planned to be used.  Third, a formal consent form 
was attached with the letter in order to ask for their signature to confirm their 
agreement in participating in this study.  In the letter a clarification was stated 
pertaining to their rights to confidentiality, anonymity, and the option to withdraw 
whenever they want.  To ensure anonymity, it was agreed that the names of all 
participants and their organisations were to be anonymized.  Fourth, all 
participants were informed that the collected data will be used for research 
purposes only, and that no one will get access to the collected data unless they 
requested so in writing.  Fifth, as interviews were recorded with a tape recorder 
in order to gain more accurate information and facilitate analysis, justification 
was given to the participants and no interviews were recorded without their 
permission and consent.  Sixth, a copy of the transcripts and written 
interpretations of the interviews were given to participants.  They were given the 
freedom to omit any details they disagreed with.   
3.9 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter has explained the philosophical stance, contextually developed 
research design, and the relevant methods to address empirically the aims of 
this research, which is to investigate the implications of power, mimetic 
isomorphism, and intermediation on bridging the differences in institutional 
logics within contracting research projects. 
A description of different research paradigms was given, in which their 
advantages and disadvantages were examined.  Critical realism was selected 
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and justified as being the appropriate approach for addressing the aim of this 
study.  The critical realism philosophical perspective was explained to show how 
the underlying assumptions influence the study‘s main focus on structure 
(logics) and agency (actors).  Then, a qualitative research approach was 
adopted as the most suitable for this research design.  Consequently, the case 
study approach was deemed to be the appropriate strategy for studying the 
processes of KC through the interaction of multiple actors‘ logics within 
contracted research projects in Oman‘s UKC emerging institutional 
environment.  An embedded-multiple case design was justified given its strength 
in describing complicated inter-relationships. The design incorporated four 
Omani cases of public funded contracted research projects.  The used primary 
source for data generation was semi-structured interviews, while the secondary 
source involved published and unpublished documents.  A thorough 
examination of the interview transcripts and emergent themes was planned to 
be carried out through within-case and cross-case analyses. Careful attention 
was given safeguarding quality criteria through directing efforts towards 
confirming constructed validity and reliability.  Finally, the practical and ethical 
limitations were explained with a demonstration of how they had been 
undertaken by the researcher.   
Having elucidated the study‘s overall research methodology, the next chapter 
explains the study‘s research context, cases and emergent themes.  
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Chapter 4: The Context, the cases and the emergent themes 
 
Chapter three elucidated the study‘s overall research methodology.  This 
chapter provided an explanation of the study‘s research context.  This chapter 
also includes a summary of the cases selected in this study and presentation of 
the tables of themes explaining how the study‘s themes were driven and 
emerged from the data within the individual cases. 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter is organized into four sections.  The first section provides a glimpse 
of the challenges within the Omani existing and developing UKC institutional 
settings.  It describes the overall contextual conditions of Oman in which a 
national innovation system functions.  Additionally, it explains the institutional 
contexts of the key actors of KC and innovation in Oman.  It gives more 
clarification on the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional environment 
within which each categorized actors is embedded.  The second section 
provides a summary of each case (presented in detail in Appendix-1).  Four 
contracted research projects were selected as per the justifications presented in 
3.5.1 of Chapter-3.  The third section presents tables of themes explaining how 
the study‘s themes were driven from individual case.  Precisely, the categories 
from the coding served as building blocks supplemented with comments and 
notes within each case file. This enabled the researcher to detect relationships 
and connections.  The fourth section entails the themes that emerged from the 
data within the individual cases.  It focuses on allowing the patterns at the case 
level to emerge before attempts are made to examine the data across the four 
cases. 
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4.1 The Context of the Research 
4.1.1 The Omani Overall Context  
 
Figure 4.1: The Map of the Sultanate of Oman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2012) 
The Sultanate of Oman is an Arab country located on the Eastern corner of the 
Middle East, bordering the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
and Yemen. It has a population of approximately 3 million, and occupies a 
territory of approximately 309,500 square kilometers (STIP, 2014).  Before 
1970, Oman was characterized by political chaos particularly in the South and 
interior regions, along with poverty and widespread illiteracy (Al Shanfari, 2012).  
Henceforth, a regeneration period of infrastructure developments in all sectors 
derived from ‗oil capital‘ began, which placed Oman as one of the most 
advanced countries in the Middle East (Al Moharby and Khan, 2007).  The 
discovery of oil was a keystone in the development of the economy and 
infrastructure in the region.  For the past 43 years, oil was the main export of 
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Oman and is still considered as the backbone of the economy, constituting 
around 53% of the GDP (Al Shanfari, 2012).  Despite the fact that oil has been 
the main source of most of the social and economic wealth in the past, it has 
become, to a certain degree, a curse with respect to the development of 
diversified and innovative economy.  Past efforts to diversify the economy have 
not been successful.  However, as it is predicted that Oman will have less than 
15 to 20 years of oil reserves left1, and especially nowadays, there is greater 
urgency to diversify its economy (STIP, 2014).   Furthermore, as the population 
grew faster than the economy could sustain, the country is failing to create 
sufficient jobs for national citizens.  The unemployment rate is estimated at 15% 
(ILO, 2010).  This is due to the massive import of cheap labour, which 
constitutes around a third of the whole population (CIA World Fact book, 
accessed on 14 April, 2017). These challenges called for accelerating the 
change to a new economic structure, especially with the focus of the creation of 
new jobs.  So far the government instated an Omanisation policy in the public 
and civil service.  Yet, this is not sufficient to solve such challenges.  There is a 
need for initiating new activities offering quality jobs.  In 2005, the government 
reconsidered its strategies, and began to look towards a knowledge-based 
economy where universities play a vital role in the country‘s socio-economic 
development (STIP, 2014, Al Harthy, 2014).  This is seen to be of national 
importance for Oman in its desire to diversify its national economy‘s resources 
in order to not depend fully on non-renewable resources such as oil and gas, 
and to try to improve its knowledge-based economy to provide good potential 
prospects for Omani future generations to become wealthier in attractive and 
quality jobs.  As stated by HM Sultan Qaboos: 
“One of the priorities of the current stage of development and the next stage 
which we prepare for is to revise the educational policies, its plans and its 
                                                          
1
All national and international indicators predict a continued decline in oil production.  There are 
two scenarios Oman and GCC are facing as being oil-based economies. First, the oil reservoirs 
will run out, and/or the oil age will disappear and become a ‗stone age‘, when energy becomes 
based on the increasing renewable energy alternatives. 
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programs, which need to be developed to keep pace with the changes that the 
country is going through.  More attention should be accorded to the 
requirements imposed by scientific and cultural development towards the 
evolution of a generation armed with awareness, knowledge, and the abilities 
required for worthwhile work.‟‟ (His Majesty Speech, 2012, page 6). 
However, fostering an indigenous knowledge-economy through universities is 
not going to be easy for a country in which KC is considered a new 
phenomenon.  Oman has low efficiency in terms of R&D and innovation.  Its 
scientific and technological research base is still in its infancy, with little or no 
track records in innovation and commercialisation achievements (GCR, 2009; 
GII, 2013; STIP, 2014)2.  Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Omani 
governance has an unconstructive feature.  The processes of decision-making 
together with joint policy development and inter-institutional consultations are 
greatly bound by a hierarchical organisation culture as well as rigid interactions 
and communication flows3 (STIP, 2014).  For more clarification see Appendix 2. 
                                                          
2
According to the 2009 Global Competitiveness Report, out of 128 countries Oman ranked 66
th
 
in innovation.  More specifically, it was 103
rd
 in quality of scientific research institutions, 86
th
 in 
private sector R&D spending, 86
th
 in industry research collaboration, and 76
th
 in availability of 
scientists and engineers.  There is no existence of technology transfer offices and extremely few 
patents registered.  Moreover, according to the 2013 Global Innovation Index (GII), out of the 
141 surveyed countries Oman ranked 80
th
 in innovation, while ranking a low 134
th
 for efficiency 
ratio.  This is because the country is still lacking the competence of exploiting the existing assets 
and environment that are beneficial for innovation.  When comparing inputs and outputs 
innovation dimensions, Oman ranked 53
rd
 for innovation inputs, but was lagging behind in the 
indicator of innovation outputs (ranked 111
th
).  On the output side, Oman performed poorly on 
knowledge and technology commercialisation (ranked 102
nd
).  There are extremely few 
innovative products (e.g. high-tech), patents and technological products (STIP, 2014).  What‘s 
worse is that Oman‘s overall rank has dropped significantly on the GII.  In 2011 Oman was 
ranked 57
th
 and 67
th
 in 2010, however, this dropped to 80
th
 in 2013.  This indicates that Oman 
has not transformed as much as it needed to in order to maintain its rank and position.   
3
The most serious administrative difficulty Oman has been facing is bureaucracy (Recabi, 2001).  
HM, the Sultan is the Head of the State, the Prime Minister, the highest and final legislative 
authority, and the Supreme Commander of the armed forces.  The Sultan presides over a 
Cabinet of Ministers, who are responsible for developing and implementing national policies in 
all aspects.  All Ministries have hierarchical structures, which are determined by the Royal 
Decrees.  Therefore, structures are strictly hierarchical and bureaucratic authority is assigned 
from the top to the bottom.  This bureaucratic procedure of organizing is found in all government 
organisations (Al Tobi, 2006).  In this respect, government employees are expected to act 
according to the decisions made by their superiors and to firmly adhere to the rules and 
regulations that manage and organize the work of these organisations (Al Busaidi, 2004, Al 
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4.1.2 The Institutional Contexts 
Within a particular interaction (i.e. contracted research project), various 
institutional actors have roles and responsibilities and relationships with other 
actors and logics (i.e. defined rules and incentives) that govern these 
relationships.  The mapping of these projects should help to explain the 
institutional logics through which actors take actions and make decisions that 
affect knowledge commercialisation.  However, the factors that determine the 
logics of actors may not come from inside the project itself, but be generated by 
the overall institutional contexts that surround it.  Hence, this section unfolds the 
challenges and weaknesses of institutional contexts within which each 
categorized actor is embedded.   
The Research Council-TRC (as an organisation that shape the institutional 
context): 
The establishment of TRC-The Research Council in 2005 arose from the desire 
to establish a knowledge-based economy4 (Royal Decrees No. 54/2005 and No. 
30/2010).  TRC acts as both a policy-making and funding body for science, 
technology, and innovation.  Fundamentally, it plays a key role in carrying the 
NRS-National Research Strategy and in the interim started funding research in 
2009.  By the end of 2013 it had funded a total of 114 various research projects 
at different institutes within Oman (TRC annual Report, 2014).  TRC is 
organized within different funding programs covering both research and 
innovation.  These programs were designed to further develop synergies in 
university-industry research collaborations.  Primarily, these programs were 
designed through benchmarking, by adopting models drawn from Western 
contexts, which are required to be customized as per the situation in Oman.  
They were designed by adopting Canadian and American models as a trial over 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Ghailani, 2005).  This supports the natural tendency of all bureaucracies to work in silos (STIP, 
2014). 
 
4
TRC has a different position within the government setting.  It doesn‘t act as ministry rather 
more as an adjacent body being chaired by a high level adviser to H.M. the Sultan.  It is 
managed and administered by 80 staff led by a Secretary General. 
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a five-year experiment.  Together these programs serve to help achieve Oman‘s 
Vision of 2020 and the strategic plans of different economic sectors, reflected in 
the TRC‘s vision of making „‟Oman a regional hub for innovation and a leader in 
new ideas, products and services… build the largest research capacity in the 
region‟‟ (TRC, 2014).   
Research programs, such as ORG-Open Research Grants, aim to increase 
applied research that directly fulfils the social, economic, and environmental 
needs of Oman.  They touch a considerable number of national research 
projects - hundreds including undergraduates and postgraduates - notably in 
view of the limited number of researchers who work in the country5.  Funds 
allocated to each individual research project are significant, and can reach up to 
OMR 250,000 per project (TRC-ORG, 2014).  However, the design of ORG is 
not aimed at supporting the business sectors‘ innovation needs or efforts (STIP, 
2014).  The program doesn‘t include mechanisms to involve industry directly in 
its design or performance to exploit innovation potentials from conducted 
research.  This is an unexpected aspect that may impact negatively on the 
economic relevance of the programs as well as the application of their results. 
Innovation is considered as an integral part of the TRC‘s mission from its 
commencement by the Royal Decree.  In terms of practical innovation support 
(where university-industry interaction is policy-driven), the only significant effort 
was the establishment of the Industrial Innovation Centre (IIC)6, located in the 
                                                          
5
The number of existing researchers (in full time equivalent) can possibly be estimated at 2000 
persons.  Of those researchers, around 25% (one fourth) is associated with Sultan Qaboos 
University (SQU) and other universities (500 in FTE); 10% (one tenth) with the Agriculture and 
Fisheries public research system (200 in FTE including service staff); while the rest (65%, 1,300 
FTE) are with the PDO and other enterprises.   
6
The IIC is designed to find out and fill the requirements and gaps within both enterprises and 
academia.  It is a government entity set up from the collaboration of TRC and the Public 
Establishment for Industrial Estates (PEIE).  The defined goals of each parent organisation were 
stipulated in the Industrial Innovation Assistant Program (IIAP), which has been executed 
successfully since the centre‘s official inauguration in February 2010.  The main aims are, first, 
to improve industry and academia R&D collaboration, second, to build capacity for sustainable 
industrial growth and knowledge creation.  
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Russayl Industrial Estate, Muscat.  However, regardless of the strong support at 
the national level for increasing industry contribution to socio economic 
development7, as well as for promoting and fostering its financial capabilities 
that focus on knowledge and innovation in 20138, a low budget was dedicated to 
the Industrial Innovation Centre (IIAP fund operator) and the project in which it is 
operating; only OMR 1.5 million in total in comparison to the significantly higher 
amount for the research program mentioned above (STIP, 2014).  This indicates 
that there are issues and obstacles in setting up the national innovation system.  
Although the knowledge commercialisation fund is acknowledged as one of the 
TRC‘s proposed policies under the knowledge transfer goal (Al Balushi, 2013), 
there still exists a lack of clarity in policy as pertains to whether or not to directly 
support innovation efforts of Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs).   
The priorities and parameters of the abovementioned research and innovation 
programs are developed and specified by the TRC board of governance.  On 
the board, the TRC attempted to accommodate a fair representative policy of 
shared governance, where its board consists of academia, government, and 
private stakeholders.  For more details, see Royal Decree 30/2010, Appendix 3.  
The governing board is dominated by high level government officials 
(represented by 13 members, in whom heads of the programs steering 
committee are involved).  They were appointed to be members by Royal Decree 
in ‗functional terms‘ and as per their organisations‘ duty for improving the 
climate of R&D and innovation.  While the private stakeholders (CEOs of two 
national large companies) are appointed in ‗personal form‘ as per their interest 
in R&D and experience in the field of managing financial institutions or public 
shareholding companies operating in Oman.  Moreover, the governmental units 
                                                          
7
‗‘The economy will no longer be an oil-reliant economy in 2020.  It is envisaged to be a 
diversified economy with higher levels of savings and investments.  The sources of national 
income will be diversified with the non-oil sector assuming the primary role‘‘ (MONE, 2008, p. 
18) 
8
In 2013, His Majesty called for a national symposium which assessed all aspects related to the 
weaknesses of local SMEs in which increasing financial support to SMEs through public and 
private funding programs is given significance.    
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overseeing local SMEs (i.e. MoCI-Ministry of Commerce and Industry, PEIE- 
Public Establishment of Industrial Estates) are appointed in order to champion 
the interests of enterprises.  This leads to the conclusion that the domination of 
governmental officials might have a negative effect on knowledge 
commercialisation.  Officials might put more emphasis on their demands, such 
as political agenda (e.g. building research capacity), over the SMEs‘ agendas 
(e.g. gaining profit through knowledge commercialisation).    
University Institutional Context: 
Sultan Qaboos University (SQU) is the oldest and only public university in 
Oman.  It was established in 1986 as a realisation of the promise announced by 
HM Sultan Qaboos during the 10th anniversary of the Oman national day in 
1980.  Construction started in 1982 and students were enrolled in 1986.  As per 
the Royal Decrees of HM, the university started with five colleges: Medicine, 
Engineering, Agriculture, Education, and Science.  Then the College of Arts was 
established in 1987, followed by the College of Commerce and Economics in 
1993. The College of Law joined the University in 2006, and finally the College 
of Nursing was established in 2008.  With over fifteen-thousand students and 
eight colleges, it is definitely the largest university in Oman.  It is also the most 
distinctive institution in terms of its curriculum variety, established research 
centres and postgraduate programs. 
Here it is worth pointing out that, as per Royal Decree 2006/71, SQU is 
considered a public academic entity, which is administratively and financially 
independent within the framework of national higher education policies.  Its 
organisational structure, VC appointment, and salary scales are determined by 
Royal Decrees.  Its employees (academics and admin) are subject to Civil 
Service Rules and Regulations.    
The university operates under restrictive hierarchical administrative structures 
within a top-down decision-making culture (for clarification Appendix 2). There is 
a lack of bottom-up forums for campus-wide consultative processes (University 
Report, 2013).  More importantly, its governing board ‗The University Council‘ is 
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chaired by the MoHE- Ministry of Higher Education9 and dominated by high-
profile governmental officials, in addition to university faculty, only 2 of the 12 
are private members - a lawyer and the CEO of the Oman Refineries Company 
(for more details, see figure 4.1).  The Council is the supreme governing body.  
It is empowered by the charter of the university with the formulation of the 
general policy of the university and following up its implementation, and 
undertakes particular duties pertaining to the enhancement of the university‘s 
standing and enabling it to fulfill its aims and achieve its objectives.  Thus, 
although the university is independent, it is still governed by the governmental 
regulations developed by the MoHE.  The ministry is mandated to propose the 
general policies for higher education and scientific research (University Council, 
2015).  They prepare and draft laws for higher education and scientific research 
and issue the regulations for implementing them.  In doing so, the ministry and 
SQU developed a partnership with the Research Council (TRC) to generate and 
apply knowledge: „‟Our University and the ministry of higher education is 
cooperating with TRC in bolstering useful and innovative research throughout 
Oman‟s system of higher education.‟‟ (UO2, SQU), each actor is involved 
interchangeably in the boards of each organisation.  The Minister of Higher 
Education is appointed as the Deputy Chair of the TRC.  The TRC Secretary 
General is appointed as an important member of the SQU Council.  
The above implies that, similarly to the TRC, the SQU council is dominated by 
government officials appointed by Royal Decree in functional terms.  The 
Ministry of Higher Education (as per its position) and other governmental 
officials (as per their number) have ultimate control over the decision-making for 
any changes in the process, such as incorporating IP into the university‘s 
system.  This might explain the potential negative effect of government 
exercised power on UKC.  It can be presumed that even the university‘s 
                                                          
9
The decisions of the Higher Education Council are governed by the decisions made by the 
actors involved in the Council‘s Board.  The Council is chaired by the Royal Court, which 
delegates the establishment of the policy (especially the Research policy) to the Ministry of 
Higher Education.  SQU (represented by the VC) and TRC (Represented by the Secretary 
General) are important members of the Council. 
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management may appear to be the salient actors; the government (represented 
by MoHE and other officials) has more power in influencing and shaping the 
direction of the university towards knowledge commercialisation.  
With regards to Knowledge Commercialisation, the university has a written 
strategy with visions and goals towards research and innovation (SQU 
Research Regulations, 2014).  It restructured its governance to adapt to 
entrepreneurial change, and has included innovation through the establishment 
of the IAD-Innovation Affairs Department in 2010.  Since then, the efforts are 
still ongoing to resource and strategize the department10 (SQU-AIAP, 2014).  
Additionally, the university has a strong collaboration and joint projects (at the 
consultancy level) with local oil, gas, and energy companies (STIP, 2014).  The 
main purpose of collaboration is to solve industry problems in the oil and gas 
fields as well as knowledge application. These are engineering project-oriented 
programs with oil and gas companies and mostly with a single partner, which is 
PDO (SQU annual report, 2009).  It has also good collaboration with the TRC 
(SQU Research Regulations, 2014).  The collaboration is for resource funding 
and knowledge brokering between academics and industry.  More clearly, the 
collaboration is for knowledge generation and accredited publication (ibid). 
However, apart from the accredited programs at international standards, SQU is 
way behind in terms of being identified as an entrepreneurial university.  It is still 
trapped in teaching in order to provide societal demands and produce skilled 
and educated graduates.  Teaching and education is still the core mission of the 
university (STIP, 2014).  It is in a modest position in relation to knowledge 
commercialisation, and is lagging behind in terms of performance and quality 
standards.  This can be evidenced from its limited number of quality published 
articles and journals, limited patents, and no licenses (Al Harthy, 2014).  
Additionally, none of the promotion criteria relate to entrepreneurship and 
                                                          
10
 As there is a lack of KT staff and professionals within the innovation department, the university 
attempted to fill the gap by making use of its existing staff (particularly assistant dean of 
research) by establishing an ‗Innovation Advisory Committee‘ in 2012 under the deanship of 
research (see appendix 2).  The committee works collaboratively with the innovation department 
in developing the rules and objectives of IP.  With regards to the IP disclosure process, the 
committee is responsible for reviewing the IP disclosures and finding new ways in developing 
them into patents when it is necessary. 
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innovation activities. The university is still way behind in terms of putting forward 
the organisational priorities and individual recognition and incentive systems in 
order to become an entrepreneurial university (ibid).  Furthermore, contacts for 
research projects with the business sector remain few and small, and rather 
informal in most of the university‘s departments. Researchers are more 
interested in publications in international journals and participation in 
conferences (ibid).  
 
Industry Institutional Context:  
Recognizing the challenges mentioned in the above section 4.1, the government 
has stepped up its efforts to develop and set SMEs as a principal component of 
its strategy to address unemployment challenges and promote economic 
diversification and growth along with private sector development.  Thus, it 
embarked on major projects in various sectors that aim to create downstream 
opportunities and activities for SMEs including industrial areas, such as the Al 
Rusyal industrial area, as well as for the IIC as an instigator for knowledge 
commercialisation. 
However, as per the Global Innovation Index, despite the fact that Oman has a 
satisfactory business environment (ranked 45th), its outlook is less promising 
when looking at the factors that determine the dynamism of the economy 
through knowledge commercialisation (GII, 2013).  SMEs in Oman are low in 
development and economic performance.  This can be related to the many 
cultural factors (e.g. merchant traditions and the inclination of citizens to work in 
the government rather than the private sector), which are influenced by 
institutional obstacles.  While the importance of SME development and 
entrepreneurship is acknowledged in the country‘s five-year plan (2011-2015), 
there is no separate policy framework drawn up for promoting entrepreneurship 
culture or SMEs in Oman.  Moreover, the Omani economy is dominated by large 
companies (Dhafar, 2010).  The bulk of these companies are in the oil and gas 
industries.  Although there are 91,000 active SMEs, which contribute to 13.8 % 
of the GDP, the majority are operating in the informal sector (STIP, 2014). Only 
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about 100 SMEs declare taxes, and the middle-intermediary layer of firms is 
missing.   
Most of the enterprises situated in the Al Rusyal industrial estates lack 
knowledge-based characteristics and capabilities.  They are not considered as 
knowledge-based firms (STIP, 2014).  They are classic, traditional, and ‗family 
businesses‘.  The board of members and some management are family based 
(Dhafar, 2010).  Moreover, they are mostly owned by expatriates practicing 
‗hidden trade ‘- cases where Omani nationals are registered as SME owners, 
while in reality those nationals are agents of expatriate owners (Al Harthy, 
2014).  This ‗rent-seeking‘ behaviour generated the incentives that assist 
nationals in their efforts to grow businesses to be directed by expatriates, which 
might hinder innovation.  SMEs are also without ‗in-house‘ R&D (IIC annual 
report, 2014).  They are lacking technological resources such as research 
facilities and the qualified personal essential in facilitating complex industrial 
R&D (STIP, 2014).  The existing personnel (managers and employees) have 
low levels of education and knowledge. 
In conclusion, reviewing Oman‘s development over the last 43 years, there 
have been considerable transformations in all sectors and aspects of Omani life.  
There have been strong attempts to develop this small country from a very 
embryonic society to a modern nation.  Nevertheless, this development path is 
unlikely to be sustained for long. There are two primary problems: (1) all 
national and international indicators are predicting a continued decline in oil 
production; (2) as the population grows faster than the economy can sustain, 
the country is failing to create sufficient jobs for national citizens.  This has led 
decision-makers in Oman to re-think their strategies and begin to look towards a 
knowledge-based economy.  However, weak areas exist within actors‘ 
institutional settings that are hindering knowledge commercialisation.  Their 
institutional environment with regards to UKC is still embryonic and needs to be 
strengthened to address key issues identified before. TRC funding (western 
copied) programs (e.g. ORG, CIIAP) are not aimed at including mechanisms to 
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involve industry directly in their design or performance to exploit innovation 
potentials from conducted research.  Additionally, despite the desire to capture 
the concept of KC, there is still an unclear policy related to whether or not to 
directly support the commercialisation efforts of SMEs.  In addition, the priorities 
and parameters of these programs are mainly developed and specified by 
governmental officials, as the TRC governing board is dominated by them.  This 
implies that there is a high probability that officials might place more emphasis 
on their political agenda (e.g. building research capacity) over SMEs‘ agendas 
(e.g. gaining profit through knowledge commercialisation).    
With regards to the university, although it restructured its governance to adapt to 
entrepreneurial change through the establishment if IAD, the efforts are still on-
going to resource and strategize the department.  Moreover, despite the fact 
that universities have strong collaborations with both industry and TRC, such 
collaborations are only for knowledge generation and accredited publications.  
Furthermore, universities are lagging behind in terms of performance and quality 
standards. They are still trapped in teaching and have a modest position in 
relation to KC (i.e. having limited patents and no licenses).  Additionally, and 
more significantly, the government has exercised power in influencing and 
shaping the direction of the university toward KC.  The MoHE (as per its 
position) and other governmental officials (as per their number) have ultimate 
control over the decisions of making any change to the process, such as 
incorporating IP into the university‘s system.   
With regards to industry, the Omani SMEs are not knowledge-based firms.  
They are traditional and the board of members and management are family 
based. They lack knowledge-based characteristics and capabilities as they are 
lacking in ‗in-house‘ R&D and technological resources such as research 
facilities and qualified personal essential in facilitating complex industrial R&D.  
Additionally, they are influenced by national institutional obstacles such as the 
absence of policy frameworks for promoting entrepreneurship culture or SMEs, 
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and the middle-intermediary layer of firms is missing as the economy is still 
dominated by large companies.   
4.2 Summaries of Case-Studies:  
4.2.1 Case A 
The project was initiated by academics from the Department of Food and 
Nutrition Science, in CAMS-College of Agriculture and Marine Sciences, at 
SQU, in 2008. It was funded by the Public Fund of the Industrial Innovation 
Assistance Program (IIAP).  The project is about the commercialisation of a low 
fat halwa recipe generated by the university to a halwa local manufacturer. 
The collaboration with the factory was first initiated by academics after the new 
recipe was scientifically generated. Such collaboration was necessary in a 
curiosity driven process of taking the research outcome to application. The 
factory‘s decision of participating in producing the new recipe was influenced by: 
the non-financial production costs due to the IIAP‘s incentive of giving the 
factory the chance to cover the expenses of generating the recipe through 
contributing in-kind instead of in-cash, where they could contribute in the form of 
providing the required materials and resources for academics; (2) the similarity 
between the generated recipe and the nature of products that it produces; (3) 
the short time expected to produce the product tangibly and launch it in the 
market since the recipe was already generated by academics.  
Due to the relaxation of the IIAP rules the academics and factory had the 
chance to submit an application as if the factory was the one who initiated the 
project.  The academics‘ decision was influenced by their motive of getting an 
access to public funds, securing additional income for themselves and their 
Department/College; while the factory‘s decision was influenced by the IIAP‘s in-
kind contribution incentive (i.e. the non-financial cost of involvement). Thus, the 
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factory utilised the opportunity of getting consultancy services with less cost.  
For more details see section 1.3 of appendix 1 
A mutual agreement reached to disclose the expected IP to the factory, which 
resulted in a conflict between the academics and their university. The PI-
Principle Investigator did not report the potential patented outcomes to the 
Innovation Director before disclosing it to the factory through the IIC. This action 
was found to be inconsistent with the university‘s IP disclosure rules, which was 
stated as one of the PI‘s main responsibilities.  The PI found it more beneficial to 
disclose the IP to the factory than to his university as he and co-investigators 
wanted to benefit from the patenting incentive provided by the IIC, i.e. 
considering them as patent developers, which was found to be consistent with 
the their motive of individual academic development through getting the credit 
for IP development, which has more weight than publications. Therefore, the 
incentive gave the involved academics the motive to become more persistent in 
developing their generated research outcomes and making them novel in order 
to patent them. On the other hand, they found it costly to disclose their IP to 
their university as there was a lack of tangible return, especially a lack of 
‗patenting incentive‘. Section 1.4.1, Appendix-1 provides more details. 
The academics and the factory worked collectively to ensure the generated 
recipe was close to being patentable and commercially exploitable. An IP 
application was filled by the academics according to their formal agreement in 
disclosing the IP to the factory.  However, the patent application was rejected by 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) as the generated recipe was 
found to be inconsistent with the ministerial decree number 2004/104 which was 
developed by the ministry for the concern of protecting the local 
standards/criteria of making Omani halwa. The academics and the factory 
replaced the defined ingredients into fat-mimicking ones, which altered the 
defined specifications. Thus, the director asked the factory and the academics 
to not patent it elsewhere or publish unless they changed the name of the 
product.  This decree was found to be unexposed to the public electronically 
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and only known by the ministry‘s officers and Halwa factories, which are 
entrusted with the original formula in order to obtain an economical advantage.  
The factory‘s GM action of not informing the academics about the rule of the 
original recipe as a trade secret was due to his lacks of knowledge about the 
complicated process of patenting. This was his first experiment, which yet was 
initiated by IIC as a way to encourage the factory to become involved in the 
system as a way of protecting its ownership right. For more details see 
subsection 1.4.2 of the Appendix-1. 
A chance was given by the MoCI to change the name of the generated recipe to 
a different one to patent it. As the IP was disclosed to the factory, the decision 
was left to its GM, who was reluctant to change the name. Rather he was 
concerned about commercialising the new recipe.  For him, changing the name 
will not add any financial value to its business, which is entirely about the 
production of halwa under the traditional name of the ‗Omani Halwa‘ that is well-
known by consumers in the local market. So, there is the risk of the local 
market‘s lack of demand for a newly named product.  See subsection 1.4.3 in 
Appendix-1.  
This made the academics decide to take another direction for their research, 
which would enable them to change the name of the generated recipe. Despite 
of getting support from their university, the academics couldn‘t go through with 
the process as the factory (which had the authority as the owner of the 
generated recipe) was still reluctant to change the name and patent it through 
the university. The factory‘s refusal was because that there was a possibility the 
university, after patenting it, would sell it at a high price. Thus, it prefers to do 
things at a lower cost rather than bearing the expense of licensing. Additionally, 
there was a risk as the university will probably sell or license the protected 
patent to its competitors in the local market. For more details, see subsection 
1.4.4 of appendix-1. 
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4.2.2 Case B 
The project was linked with research initiated by two academics from the 
College of Economic and Political Science, Department of Information Systems 
in 2011.    It was funded by a public fund of CIIAP-Community and an Individual 
Assistant Program under the TRC‘s Innovation-Hub.  The project is about the 
commercialisation of a new radar device generated by the academics for the 
purpose of preventing and reducing the rate of road accidents in Oman. 
As mentioned in section 2.3 of Appendix-1, the collaboration with the non-
commercial and commercial users was initiated by academics after the radar 
device was generated scientifically by them.  The academics, first, wanted to 
approach the Royal Oman Police (ROP) as it is the only entity that has the 
authority in deciding whether to implement the proposed device or not.  They 
managed to raise a fund from one of the national popular telecom companies as 
a donation in order to develop the device into a prototype to test and show its 
practicality to ROP.  However, the ROP refused to adopt the device.  This is due 
to their common practice of getting ready-made solutions, which had already 
been applied successfully in developed countries (e.g. UK, US, etc.).  Thus, 
they resisted replacing the existing solutions as they had already paid a large 
amount of money for them.  This made the academics to seek a public fund that 
supports their generated radar device.  They got the opportunity to access the 
CIIAP fund, which assisted them temporarily in convincing ROP to adopt their 
device in the future.  The ROP‘s felts secured as the device would be funded 
and operated totally by TRC. Hence, no financial cost was involved apart from 
the time of integrating the new device into their system.  Second, the relaxation 
of TRC rules (i.e. bending the rule of commercialisation from start-ups) assisted 
the academics to get a partnership with a commercial user.  The academics 
lacked business experience, thus they preferred to continue as knowledge 
producer and got a partnership with a local medium enterprise after disclosing 
their research outcome to the public through the media. 
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The CEO of the enterprise was an acquaintance of the PI.  They had previously 
worked together on other projects through informal networking. Thus, they were 
able to negotiate fairly the responsibility of each party.  In addition to personal 
acquaintance, the decision of the CEO was influenced by two other factors:  the 
similarity between the generated device and his business product line and the 
non-financial production costs due to the CIIAP‘s pre-commercialisation 
incentive of covering the expenses of generating the final device for real life 
testing. For more details see subsection 2.3.1, Appendix-1. 
Before signing the contract with the enterprise, TRC gave the academics the 
chance to disclose their outcomes to their university in order to get the patent for 
the generated device.  The disclosure was reviewed carefully by the US 
International IP Company.  However, the application was rejected as the 
produced device was inconsistent with the international criterion of ‗inventive 
step‘. The device was produced by making a contribution to an existing device 
in order to reach innovation where novelty was not maintained.  Thus, there is 
an exclusion of innovative research outcomes from the university‘s IP protection 
fund.  Form academics perspectives, such exclusion was unfair and 
unreasonable as the university could also benefit from innovations by 
generating income through licensing them to industry after protection, which 
would help in building university‘s industrial reputations and networks.  While 
from the university‘s perspective, the exclusion was reasonable as this was in 
compliance with the aim of improving its image and global ranking by building its 
own patenting profile.  For more details, see section 2.4, Appendix-1. 
The failure to patent the generated device was also due to the university‘s 
underdeveloped IP disclosure guidelines.  Rather than exposing the 
international patenting invention criterion to academics, it was stated verbally by 
the university‘s Innovation Director.  The criterion was not stated explicitly in the 
research regulations or in the process of IP disclosure in the university 
website.  Additionally, there was a lack of communication as there is an 
absence of KT professionals who are competent to inform academics about the 
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criteria and advise them on the possibility of taking their generated device 
further by developing it into a patent.  Since the academics couldn‘t meet the 
inventive step requirement, they filed another application through the CIIAP.  
This is due to the CIIAP‘s flexibility of allowing academics in deciding the type of 
protection as per their outcome‘s nature (i.e. innovative outcome).  Yet, the 
academics‘ previous action of ‗public disclosure‘ in searching for an enterprise 
confronted them with the issue of fulfilling the requirement of prior art search.  
Some of the aspects of their generated device were copied by the public which 
destroyed the possibility of its protection.  This was influenced by the lack of 
recruited experts within the CIIAP who can point the academics‘ attention 
towards the negative consequences of public disclosure.  IP awareness is 
ensured by the temporarily engagement of international IP experts.  Due to this 
and to the TRC rules of commencing pre-commercialisation action in parallel to 
the IP registration process, the academics and enterprise shifted their attention 
to commercialising the unprotected device.  .  For more details for the above 
account, see both sections 2.2 and 2.4, Appendix-1.  
4.2.3 Case C 
The project was about an energy saving research initiated by a local electrical 
enterprise with assistance from one of the IIC consultants.  Smart boards were 
generated in order to be commercialised by the enterprise as cutting edge 
technology in managing power consumption within premises by means of 
prioritizing power demand.  The practical production of the generated boards 
was funded by the enterprise through in-kind contribution and financially by the 
IIAP- Industrial Innovation Assistance Program operated by IIC. While the 
decision of commercialisation of these boards was left to the enterprise in a way 
that they find yields commercial returns. 
As revealed in subsection 3.3.1 of Appendix-1, the collaboration between the 
enterprise and academics was established through the mediation of the IIC.  
After approaching many local universities, SQU academics in electrical 
engineering‘ was selected by the consultant due to their positive response and 
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strong initial research proposal.  In accessing IIAP fund the enterprise gained 
many opportunities: securing consultancy service money for solving their clients‘ 
problem without affording any financial costs (i.e. the fund incentive of in-kind 
contribution); engaging directly with academia to establish networks and to 
deliver accurate information necessary to generate the required boards to 
achieve commercial viability.  While the academics‘ decision to participate with 
the IIC and enterprise is influenced by: their motive of getting an access to 
public fund to secure additional income for themselves and their College; and 
the opportunity provided by the IIC in increasing their industrial research 
capabilities through smoothing the process of engagement with local SMEs.  
However, a conflict emerged regarding the project‘s short time-frame suggested 
by the enterprise.  The academics‘ logic is that the development of scientific 
outcomes into industrial products requires time.  They found the completion of 
project within one year to be insufficient for instilling and translating their 
scientific knowledge into a language that is understandable to the enterprise.  
They need to assess the reactions of basic concepts in producing such boards.  
Contrary, the enterprise‘s main concern was just to get a final commercial 
product in a short-period of time to gain a quick commercial advantage.  Its logic 
is that basic research is time consuming as it requires more time for the solution 
to come.  The enterprise‘s logic was supported by the IIC‘s rule of considering 
projects as ‗development projects‘, mainly oriented towards conducting applied 
research for the purpose of answering enterprise‘s specific questions through 
coming up with solutions that have direct applications.  This made the 
academics had no choice but to agree to develop the required boards within the 
agreed time-frame of one year.  For more details see sections 3.2 and 3.3, 
Appendix-1. 
A mutual agreement reached to disclose the expected IP to the enterprise.  This 
is as per the action enforced by the IIC consultant in safeguarding the 
ownership for the enterprise.  The academics understood, as they agreed from 
the beginning that they would collaborate through receiving a consultancy fee, 
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the IP would be disclosed to the enterprise.  After generating the boards, a 
patent application was filled by the academics and submitted by the enterprise‘s 
GM to the MoCI‘s IP Office as he found it costly to protect the generated boards 
internationally.  However, the MoCI was slow in processing the patent 
application.  An official recognition of the patent is still pending for more than 
two years.  This is due to the absence of the patenting process and 
professionals within the MoCI IP Office. For more details see sections 3.2 and 
3.4, Appendix-1. 
The academics found this as an opportunity to have more time to develop the 
design of boards further to make it patentable.  They decided to get support 
from their university.  To avoid conflict, the university asked them to get the 
agreement first from the enterprise as it has ownership of the generated boards.  
However, the enterprise‘s GM was reluctant as he didn‘t want to bear the 
expense of licensing.  There is a possibility that the university, after patenting it, 
would sell it at a high price, which hinders his enterprise from having the 
authority to market the boards to its clients.  Thus, he preferred to keep it 
unprotected.  For more details see subsection 3.4.2, Appendix-1.  
As mentioned in subsection 3.4.3 of Appendix-1, this resulted in the university 
losing the opportunity to patent the outcome generated by its academics.  
Hence, it approached the IIC to negotiate the possibility of convincing the 
enterprise.  However, the IIC found such negotiation with the university to be 
unreasonable since it would be non-compliant with the IIAP rule of safeguarding 
the IP for enterprises.  Since the participating enterprises contributed to the cost 
of the design generation and the centre paid the consultancy fees for the 
academics, the university doesn‘t have the right to claim IP.  
The slow process of patent application created a threat for the enterprise in 
terms of quick exploitation of the generated boards.  Thus, the GM decided to 
start commercialising the unprotected boards.  His decision was also influenced 
by other factors which emerged from the IIC‘s underdeveloped 
commercialisation guidelines: leaving the decision of commercialisation to the 
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enterprise and considering filing a patent application sufficient for protecting the 
generated boards.  To commercialise, the GM along with the academics 
demonstrated the generated boards to the concerned local electrical SMEs 
through a workshop.  Yet, the SMEs refused to invest.  They found it risky and 
too costly to buy the generated boards as it: incurred high capital cost (i.e. it 
required a great deal of investment for buying electrical fittings to tailor it 
according to their system requirements).  For more details see subsection 3.4.4, 
Appendix-1. 
4.2.4 Case D 
The project was initiated by two academics from CAMS-College of Agriculture 
and Marine Sciences, in addition to two post-doctoral fellows from the same 
college and one academic from the College of Engineering.  The project was 
about commercialisation of quality assessment software generated by 
academics to a local dates‘ factory under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. The production of the software was on the subject of 
using an existing computer vision technique in assessing date quality in Oman.  
The project was funded by TRC‘s ORG-Open Research Grants, while the 
commercialisation is considered as the responsibility of the ministry.   
The collaboration with the factory was initiated informally by academics during 
the production of the software to run pilot testing.  This was due to the PI‘s 
curiosity of practical applicability of the research outcome in solving the problem 
of dates‘ surface cracks. This was also due to the GM‘s factory support as their 
participation will help them enhance the quality of date processing without 
encountering any financial cost.    
The academics found an opportunity to get an access to public fund as there 
was consistency between their research and the issues within the 
‗Environmental and Biological Resources‘ sector, within ORG.  Before granting 
the funding, TRC requested the academics to reach an agreement with the 
factory‘s GM about the nature of his involvement.  After negotiation, the 
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academics decided to recruit the GM as an industrial research expert.  The 
academics‘ decision was influenced by the freedom given by ORG to academics 
in generating knowledge according to their interests, where the nature of user 
involvement is left to them.  Hence, the academics had the opportunity to avoid 
partnering with the factory where secrecy and withholding data was included, 
which would consequently hinder them from imminent appropriation of 
generated outcomes through publications. Additionally, in accessing the fund, 
the academics could: secure additional income for their college, which assisted 
in establishing a lab for computer vision technology for their students; attract 
and recruit postgraduates to assist them in the research and to gain personal 
financial awards as pocket money, for every postgraduate they recruited in their 
research.  For more details see section 4.3, Appendix-1  
As ownership conferred to university, the academics had the right to 
disseminate the scientific aspects of the research findings.  To ensure 
dissemination doesn‘t preclude the ability to file for a patent, the university 
asked the PI to submit a patent application before disclosing any scientific 
description of their research outcomes through publication.  The patentability of 
the generated software was assessed by the US IP Company.   
However, the application was rejected.  The software was found to be 
inconsistent with the criterion of ‗inventive step‘.  It was an obvious development 
of what had come before (i.e. usage of technology that implemented previously 
in other countries).  This was because the academics found it costly to go 
through the long process of patenting as it delayed publications.  Their 
academic promotion is based only on publications and specifically on the 
number of published papers rather than on patent development.  This can be 
evidenced more by incentives provided by the university (e.g. publication 
awards such as outstanding researcher and distinction in research). Thus, 
patenting doesn‘t add any value to their professional profile.  Moreover, the 
academics found it beneficial to use their time and effort in utilising the 
publication incentives provided by the ORG (i.e. granting academics personal 
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financial incentives as rewards whenever they took initiatives to publish). These 
incentives were consistent with the academics‘ motive of achieving research 
productivity by gaining credit for publishing their outcomes and increasing the 
number of publication in their profile.  For more details, see subsection 4.4.1, 
Appendix-1.  
After publishing, the generated software was demonstrated through a workshop 
funded by TRC.  They educated the concerned ministry by showing them the 
practicability of their proposed software in order to adopt and implement it in the 
existing local factories.   However, and as it lacks R&D policy as one of its 
mandates, the ministry was hesitant to adopt and asked TRC to cover the cost 
of implementation, as the software was generated through a research funded by 
their ORGs.  TRC found this unacceptable as they are not responsible for 
implementing the generated software as this is not considered to be one of 
ORG‘s objectives.  Thus, TRC didn‘t intend to impose implementation and left it 
to the ministry to decide whether to apply the generated software or not.  For 
more information see sections 4.2 and 4.4.2, Appendix-1. 
4.3The Process of Data Analysis: 
 
In this process, the data condensing approach was adopted in order to 
categorize and organize data as well as to draw clear conclusions and 
confirmation. 
First the researcher developed pre- categories, mainly from the UKC literature, 
before embarking on the coding process. The pre-categories were formed 
around the institutions as either enablers that facilitate or as inhibitor that imped 
UKC process.  The intention at this stage was not for these themes to serve the 
function of testing or verifying the theory. Rather they were applied to facilitate 
the contextual refinement and specification of the themes that will emerge from 
the data.  Hence, in the course of the research, pre- categories may not 
manifest into substantive themes.  
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Second the researcher adopted the principles of coding.  The process involved 
breaking down data into different units of meaning. The process began with a 
complete reading of text of all interview transcripts, documentary evidence, as 
well as the field notes and then examined line-by-line, seeking to identify words 
or phrases that suggest/imply specific meanings.  This was the first step of 
coding, and was done manually through a line-by-line analysis and identification 
of phrases, sentences, or sections, and then pasting them under particular 
relevant categories.  
As shown in Table 4.1 below, the process of coding culminated with the 
emergence of sub- categories (i.e. Open Coding) and categories (i.e. Focused 
Coding).  In Open Coding, interesting codes were identified and labelled within 
each individual case.  While in Focused Coding, these codes were interpreted 
and refined to build clear analytical thematic areas.  For example, the funding 
provided incentives and assistance during the collaboration establishment 
(Cases A & C Open Coding) were interpreted as an intermediation activity 
(Cases A & C Focused Coding), which consequently explained the positive 
influence of funding rules (Thematic Area 1). 
The process of coding was stopped after the researcher felt satisfied that the list 
of codes had converged to depict the process of UKC the institutions that shape 
the actions and decisions of participants towards bridging differences in logics.  
The coding process is detailed more in Table 4.1, which shows how codes 
converged to illustrate the actions/decisions involved in facilitating the 
development of UKC under major themes, which include: The Influence of: 
funding rules; government‘s board of governance; networking; fragmented 
policies; funding operational rules and actors‘ different logics. 
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Table 4.1: List of Study‘s Codes and Themes 
Open Coding 
(as per individual case initial coding)  
Focused Coding 
(Categories)  
The Emergent 
Thematic Areas 
Academics:   
A-Generating revenue for themselves and their 
organisation by securing additional income through 
consultancy; 
B-Engaging with non-commercial users (end-user), 
which increases the potentiality of the application and 
purchase of their research outcomes; 
C-Generating revenue; securing additional income 
through consultancy services; 
D-Generating revenue; securing funds for laboratory 
establishment (e.g. equipment, research assistants) 
which can be used for further research income (e.g. 
pocket money reward fund for every student they 
involved in the project) and for themselves through 
securing personal income; 
Benefits (from 
fund incentives) 
 
Theme-1: The 
influence of 
funding rules: 
 
Commercial User:  
A-Possibility of financial revenue (with less production 
cost) through the commercialisation of the product 
developed by the academics 
B-The CIIAP‘s production incentive ; Non-financial 
liability: 
C-coverage of consultancy service expenses (in-kind 
contribution incentive); accessing the university‘s 
resources (e.g. labs and scientists); 
D-Securing additional income through industrial 
consultancy; Enhancing the existing system without 
encountering financial cost; 
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A-ability of IIC to bend the rules of the research initiative 
direction to assist academics in getting the fund for their 
research and to take advantage of research outcomes for 
the benefit of the factory 
B-ability of the CIIAP manager to bend the 
commercialisation rule of ‗transferring outcome through 
start-up‘ to help academics in covering their weakness of 
business incapability  
IIAP & CIIAP 
Relaxed Rules  
A-reaching a mutual agreement due to IIAP provided 
incentives: 
-IIAP‘s financial assistance of ‗in-kind contribution‘ and 
ownership rules 
-IIAP‘s incentive for academics to become patent 
developers 
IIAP/IIC Role of 
Intermediary  
C-IIC‘ increased the chances of enterprise of  getting 
local services with less consultancy fees 
C-IIC assisted the academics in engaging SMEs in their 
research,  
A & B-nature of the IIAP & CIIAP as an experimental trial 
with a five-year experiment, 
C & D-incongruence policies: 
C -IIAP fulfills users‘ requirement of short-term research 
of achieving quicker returns and directs academics‘ 
actions away from achieving the long-term benefit of 
fundamental understanding of scientific inquiry;   
 D-ORG gives academic the freedom to assign the user 
as an industrial consultant, rather than a research 
partner; to keep the control of ownership with the 
academics 
Copying funding 
programs from 
the Western 
context  
A & B-Absence of financial incentive of patenting; the 
absence of patenting in promotion; 
The absence of 
written guidelines  
Theme-2: The 
influence of 
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A & C-the absence of ‗IP prior contract negotiation‘ with 
the industry 
C-university‘s difficulty of safeguarding the ownership of 
the knowledge generated by its academics 
B-lack of awareness about the criteria of patenting; 
giving verbal directions rather than written  
B & D-inability of directing the creation of knowledge 
toward invention while conducting research; 
within university 
(such as the 
patent criteria) 
that guide the 
academics in the 
process of IP 
disclosure 
government‘s 
governing board  
 
A-Academics communicated with the factory they 
networked with in the early engagement of their 
research; no financial liability; sharing of resources;  
A-congruity between the generated recipe and factory‘s 
business production line; 
B-They had previously worked together on different 
projects through informal networking; ability to negotiate 
fairly the responsibility of each party. 
B-The congruence of the generated device with 
enterprise‘s business production line: 
The positive 
influence of 
informal 
networking  
Theme-3: The 
influence of 
networking in 
producing 
research 
outcomes that 
have potential for 
commercialisatio
n; 
A, B & D -the assessment of patent protection is done 
through a US international IP company; 
B & D -Lack of experts in numbers and competency; 
university‘s inability to support the systematic 
development of inventions; 
B-the absence of permanent local experts within CIIAP 
who can guide academics throughout the process; 
international experts are present temporarily; lack of 
regular communication 
B-projects are assessed and coached by American and 
Malaysian IP companies 
C-patent assessment & protection for IIAP‘s projects is 
done through a contracted Egyptian IP firm; the absence 
-signing separate 
contracts with IP 
companies from 
different 
countries; 
-the absence of 
the physical 
presence of the 
required experts 
in Oman; 
Theme-4: The 
influence of 
fragmented 
policies in 
processing 
invention 
prototyping and 
patenting; 
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of a patenting process and recruited patent experts within 
MoCI; 
A-a collision of two IP elements (Omani Halwa Trade-
Secret and Patenting); Halwa is considered as an Omani 
traditional local product that was stipulated to Oman; 
A-halwa production should comply with the defined 
criteria to bear the name of ‗Omani halwa‘; otherwise it is 
subject to legal liability; 
A-Rejection of patent application due to changing the 
original traditional recipe; 
Misalignment 
between IIC 
actions and MoCI 
IP rules  
Theme-5: The 
influence of 
funding 
operational rules  
B-inherent misalignment between the ROP rules of 
getting ready made solutions and the CIIAP bent rule of 
commercial exploitation of knowledge:  
D-The fund and the ministry misalignment strategies: the 
practical application involves the cost of financial liability 
since it is not assigned as one of its mandates (e.g. lack 
of R&D strategy); generating knowledge according to the 
academics‘ interests only; exclusion of ministry 
Misalignment 
among TRC‘s 
rules of 
exploitation and 
the non-
commercial users‘ 
actions/rules; 
A-Academics disclosed IP to factory; personal 
remunerations from the IIAP incentive of becoming 
patent developers vs. their professional obligation of 
disclosure to the university; 
D-The academics disclosure through publication before 
assessing the option of seeking IP protection through 
their university; against secrecy through patenting, 
violates their classical ethos and moral duty open-
science; 
D-Academics‘ motive of publication in opposition to the 
users‘ requirement of secrecy or data-withholding.   
Academics‘ logics Theme-6: The 
influence of 
actors‘ different 
logics 
 
A-Cost of local demand risk: no financial value to its 
business, which is entirely the ‗Omani Halwa‘  
Commercial 
Users‘ Logics 
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A-factory‘s resistance to change; resisted changing 
something that has consistently yielded profit: 
A-the factory violation of national trade-secret; factory‘s 
prospect of making profit with less production cost: 
B-Academics‘ public disclosure: their interest in involving 
enterprise for accelerating the possibility of bringing the 
generated device into application; 
C:IIAP: dissimilarity between academics need of 
fundamental understanding of scientific inquiry and 
users‘ requirement of short-term industrial benefit to 
maximize profit. 
D-Ministry‘s perception of R&D as a cost; not assigned 
as a mandate or a routine practice within its institutional 
prerogatives; 
B-ROP preference to the practice of buying ready-made 
solutions; their perception of considering technology as 
imported, seen as cheaper and more trustworthy in terms 
of its existing successful application in developed 
countries. 
Non-commercial 
Users‘ Logic of  
maintain their 
logic of public 
fund protection 
A & C-the rigorous enforcement of patenting/licensing 
arrangement: 
A&C-Costs for factory and enterprise: The ‗non-exclusive 
license‘, and the risk of licensing the outcome to existing 
local competitors, the high royalty payment and inability 
to bear the cost due to financial incapability; 
University‘s KTOs 
logics 
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4.4 The Emergent Themes for Cross-case Comparison: 
Six themes derived from the within-case analysis (presented in detail in 
Appendix-1) and shown briefly in above section 4.2, table 4.1).  These themes 
were selected as per the pattern shaped by the confluence of meanings within 
individual accounts (Ayres et al., 2003).  They explain the influence of the 
participants‘ institutions in shaping power, mimetic isomorphism and 
intermediation within the UKC process.   
The first theme explains the influence of the funding rules.  Despite the actors‘ 
different motives, the financial incentives meant that the academics and users 
stood to benefit.  Also, the IIC‘s and CIIAP‘s relaxed management process 
supported actors‘ interactions in developing a collaboration arrangement 
characterized by greater flexibility.  This also facilitated the emergence of the IIC 
as an intermediary as it permitted its officers to make changes in research 
direction, which consequently reduced the costs of searching for a partner and 
bargaining.  However, the role of intermediary was found to conform only to the 
IIC rather than across all funding schemes.  Moreover, the transformation of 
funding programs from the west created incongruity among policies, which 
overlooked the conflict between academics‘ and users‘ logics.   
The second theme discusses the influence of the rules that shaped the 
activities of the government‘s governing board.  The missing operationalisation 
of IP guidelines within the university constrained its KT officers from creating 
awareness about the criteria of patenting and safeguarding ownership of the 
knowledge generated by the academics.  Moreover, the missing 
operationalisation of commercialisation procedures within the IIAP constrained 
the fund-operator (i.e. IIC) and the commercial users from commercialising the 
knowledge generated.  The funding parameters were established to control the 
scope of research projects towards only achieving the goal of knowledge 
generation. Commercialisation was deemed as the users‘ responsibility, who 
found it costly to do so due to their financial limitations.  The university and the 
IIC‘s inability to operationalise guidelines and rules and the users‘ inability to 
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commercialise has raised a question regarding whether or not the voices of 
those actors are considered within the TRC governing boards.  Such issues 
need to be explored further.   
The third theme explains the influence of informal networking in facilitating the 
negotiation of the responsibility of each party.  Mainly, it contributed to the 
decision of commercial users to engage in collaborative activities with 
academics during the conduction of the research.  This was viewed as being 
considerably beneficial because of the attributes of the knowledge to be 
produced: The congruence of the generated outcome with the users‘ business 
production line, and the parallelism between the short time expected for 
knowledge production and the users‘ goal of quick financial return.   
The fourth theme discusses the influence of fragmented policies in processing 
actions of invention prototyping and patenting.  The fragmented action of signing 
separate contracts with IP companies from different countries impacted 
negatively on UKC as each country follows different IP rules.  Fragmentation 
was demonstrated also by the absence of the physical presence of the required 
experts in Oman, which resulted in the lack of face-to-face and regular 
communication and guidance for academics and users.   
The fifth theme discusses the influence of funding rules in causing 
misalignment between actions and rules.  The relaxation of funding rules gave 
the managers and operator the chance to misalign their actions with existing 
rules.  They were able to reformulate rules in response to the requirements of 
the assigned goals, which impacted positively on the academics‘ and 
commercial users‘ collaboration.   On the other hand, the misalignment between 
TRC‘s actions and MoCI‘s rules caused a collision of two IP elements, which 
subsequently resulted in the academics‘ and the commercial user‘s inability to 
appropriate the knowledge generated.  Such inability was also caused by the 
misalignment among the fund and the non-commercial users (i.e. the Ministry 
and ROP).  For the users, the practical application of the outcomes appeared to 
involve the cost of financial liability since it is not assigned as one of its 
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mandates (e.g. lack of R&D strategy).  Such misalignment can be explored 
through the lens of institutional fragmentation. 
Finally, the sixth theme explains the influence of actors‘ different logics.  Many 
scenarios across the cases demonstrated that actors acted in accordance with 
their pre-existing logics, which resulted in conflict.  One of these scenarios 
showed that the user‘s resistance to change inhibited academics from 
enhancing their academic prestige through patent development.  For the user, 
changing the knowledge name involved the potential cost of local demand risk, 
consequently impeding him from achieving his logic of profit maximization.  
Another scenario was that as the non-commercial users (i.e. ROP, the Ministry) 
have the ultimate authority on the knowledge adoption and application 
decisions, they preferred to maintain their logic of public fund protection. 
Consequently, this inhibited commercial users from reaching their logic of profit 
maximization and the academics from achieving their logic of curiosity of 
knowledge application.  These and other scenarios are discussed in detail in the 
cross-case analysis. 
4.5 Chapter Conclusion: 
A description of the Omani overall context was given, in which a justification for 
why Oman is beginning to re-think its strategies and look towards a knowledge-
based economy.  The institutional context of the key actors of UKC was 
explained to provide a glimpse of the weaknesses of their developing 
institutional settings. Additionally, a summary of each individual case was 
provided to indicate the main issues/facts effecting UKC.  Moreover, a table was 
drawn to explain how themes were driven.  Finally, a brief description of the 
emerged themes was given to detect connections across cases.  
These emerged themes are important as they made sense of the diversity 
across cases in a way that integrates differences and similarities between them.  
They are noting the relationships between actors‘ institutions (i.e. rules and 
norms) and their embeddeness within particular institutional and central logic 
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systems.  They are also showing the positive and negative interactions between 
institutions and logics that might influence shaping power, mimetic isomorphism 
and intermediation in bridging differences in logics within the UKC process.  
Having elucidated the study‘s research context, and giving the summaries of 
cases and themes, the next chapter explains the analysis in details.  Given the 
size of the thesis, and as aforementioned, it was decided to include the findings 
of the within-case analysis in Appendix 1 of the thesis.  The next chapter is the 
cross-case analysis where the findings and emergent themes of individual 
cases were compared and contrasted to generate patterns of outcomes which 
then led to arriving at higher summative results. 
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Chapter 5: Cross-case Analysis 
5.0 Introduction    
The purpose of this chapter, as aforementioned in section 4 of the methodology 
chapter, is to (1) compare and contrast the four case studies with the goal of 
generating themes and patterns pertaining to the issues that resonated across 
individual cases, (summarized in Chapter-4 and presented in detail in Appendix 
1), and (2) utilise the themes generated within the study‘s research context and 
institutional frameworks (presented in details in section 4.1 of Chapter-4) to 
facilitate higher analysis in order to arrive at the main findings of the thesis.  The 
perceptions that come out of this analytical process will then be linked with 
theories and concepts from the literature in chapter six. For the purpose of 
clarifying the links between the analysis and the research questions, the 
chapter‘s headings represent the themes generated from the resonating issues 
as per the study‘s research questions.  Consequently, the chapter is designed in 
the form of questions focusing on the implications of the potential mechanisms 
that can be used in bridging differences in logics within UKC.  For each 
question, a critical discussion of the major implications of the emergent themes 
was made during the comparison of commonalities and differences in the 
actors‘ logics on the events and activities within the processes.  This helped in 
facilitating and reporting a higher summative analysis. 
5.1 How funding rules influenced the establishment of collaboration            
The findings across cases revealed the expansion of government role from the 
traditional practice of planning and regulating towards supporting and operating 
the processes of knowledge commercialisation cooperatively with academics 
and commercial users (Lu, 2007, Leydesdorff, 2009).  This can be justified by 
the following three findings:  
First, the analysis highlights the role of the fund-operator (IIC) as an 
intermediary in supporting the collaboration between commercial users and 
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academics.  Such a role was found to clearly conform to cases A and C.  This is 
because the design of the Industrial Innovation Assistant Program (IIAP) 
program is aimed at supporting practical innovation through 
intermediating/facilitating participation and linkages between industry and 
universities.  The role and responsibilities of the program‘s Consultants to work 
in multi-organisational settings and to serve as a connection between different 
constituencies played an integral part in facilitating the establishment of direct 
interaction and communication.  Such intermediary responsibilities include: (1) 
visiting and assisting SMEs in coming up with a research idea; (2) 
communicating with academic institutions to find the right knowledge 
producers;(3) inviting/bringing together both parties (academics and users) to 
jointly brainstorm the research proposals, responsibilities, and the ways in which 
to develop the required product into stages (TRC, 2014).   
More specifically, the role of the IIC as an intermediary is highlighted by its 
advantage of reducing search costs.  The search costs in this study referred to 
time and other resources essential to the search for potential partners (Kodama, 
2008).  In Case-C, for instance, a lack of information on which academics 
undertake relevant research and a lack of opportunities to meet potential 
collaboration partners were identified as serious obstacle for both (academics 
and commercial users) in entering into a university–industry collaboration.  The 
IIC increased the chances of commercial users finding knowledge producers.  It 
reduced the search costs for its member SMEs (clients), which are looking for 
researchers to support the firm‘s R&D activities (i.e. obtaining local services with 
less consultancy fees) by providing information, meeting opportunities, and, 
mainly, directly coordinating R&D consortia to bring together university 
researchers and firms that have the necessary knowledge, technologies, and 
other important resources for the targeted research themes.  This helped 
commercial users in identifying applicable knowledge locally and with less cost 
as well as in delivering the accurate information necessary for generating 
knowledge.  It also assisted the academics in engaging users in their research 
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and building good relationships.  The following statements by the University‘ co-
investigator and commercial user give evidence: 
“IIC encouraged us to engage directly with academics which helped in 
delivering our requirements accurately which was helpful in creating our design 
to be tailored afterward to be suitable for our clients.  By this also we could build 
good relation with academics that we can use in the near future when we have 
another problem to be solved with less cost.‟‟   (CU3, SMEs) 
“They (enterprises) are not willing to spend time to listen about ideas and 
knowledge. That is a big challenge for us … The IIC made it easy for us in 
getting enterprises involve in our researches.  Now they are keen to listen to 
us.‟‟ (Ac7, SQU) 
Furthermore, and as demonstrated in Case-A of IIAP, the role of the IIC as an 
intermediary had an advantage in reducing the bargaining costs.  Bargaining 
costs refer to the costs necessary to reach satisfactory agreements with the 
other party (Kodama, 2008).  They are associated with the negotiation and 
coordination activities with potential partners, particularly those involving 
asymmetric information11 and other transaction costs related to motivation and 
incentive problems with regards to each of the parties joining the collaboration.  
The financial assistance and incentive of ‗in-kind contribution‘ as well as 
ownership rules mitigated the commercial uncertainty arising from the 
involvement in new business activities (i.e. R&D activities) of commercial users.  
Additionally, the incentive for academics to become patent developers shunned 
the potential conflict of IP disclosure as they had a greater understanding of the 
knowledge and its production than the commercial users.  As argued by 
commercial user and university‘s principle investigator: 
                                                          
11
Asymmetric information in this study refers to information failure and is present whenever one 
party in a transaction possesses greater material knowledge than the other party. 
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“We are getting service and the IIC gave money to the university not us. For us 
it was in-kind investment by time and providing the materials, tools, space and 
so on.” (CU1, SMEs) 
“IIC consider us as patent developers…Patenting is important for us to get the 
credit that they have innovative ideas…Patent is different way of innovation than 
publication. It gives more weight for us within not only our career but also within 
the industry.” (Ac1, SQU) 
In summary, the above confirms that the government policy within IIAP, aimed 
at enhancing the role of the intermediary, can more effectively facilitate 
knowledge commercialisation interactions.  Its bridging role improved the 
connectedness between academics and commercial users and facilitated the 
diagnosis of needs and the stimulation of the search for solutions.  It helped in 
bridging the information gaps between academics (knowledge producer) and 
commercial users (knowledge user).  More specifically, it reduced search costs 
and bargaining costs for commercial users and academics seeking collaboration 
partners.  
However, the findings revealed that the role of the intermediary is not consistent 
across funding schemes.  This is due to their different rules and objectives.  The 
design of programs in cases B the Community and an Individual Innovation 
Assistant Program (CIIAP) and D the Open Research Grants (ORG) is not 
aimed at supporting the business sectors‘ innovation needs or efforts.  None of 
these programs include mechanisms to involve commercial users (i.e. existing 
SMEs) directly in their design or performance to exploit innovation potentials 
from conducted research.  Instead, the involvement of users, as evidenced from 
the cases, was driven and controlled by academics as per their research 
agenda and interests. 
Second, the findings revealed that the flexibility of the funding programs 
assisted the IIAP operator (IIC) and the CIIAP manager in attaining the scope to 
relax rules.  This, as shown in Case-A, can be evidenced by the client 
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manager‘s ability to bend the rules of the ‗research initiative direction‘ in order to 
support the development of collaboration arrangements that have greater 
flexibility.  The operator could integrate new policy towards assisting academics 
in their applied research by taking advantage of their outcomes for the benefit of 
local enterprise.  Similarly, and as shown in Case-B, this can be demonstrated 
by the ability of the program manager within CIIAP to bend the 
commercialisation rule of ‗transferring outcome through start-up‘ by assisting 
academics in covering their weakness of business incapability (lack of business 
experience and knowledge) through establishing partnerships with local medium 
enterprises. 
In short, the flexibility of the IIAP and CIIAP funding rules assisted the operator 
and the managers to relax the rules.  It gave them the power to make changes 
and integrate new formal rules, which ultimately had a positive impact on 
establishing successful collaborations between academics and commercial 
users. 
Third, the analysis shows that the financial incentives provided by all funding 
programs (i.e. IIAP, CIIAP, ORG) played a big role in facilitating the 
establishment of collaborations between academics and commercial users.  
Although the analysis shows that collaborations were assisted by the different 
motives of academics and users, both parties were ultimately positioned to 
benefit (See table 5.1 below).  However, this benefit was found to be different 
for each party because of funding, particularly institutional financial incentives.  
Such incentives had contributed effectively to academics‘ and users‘ decisions 
to engage in collaborative activities.  When examining cases with regards to the 
benefits gained from funding, the findings indicated that the majority of the 
involved academics placed a very high level of importance on additional income 
as a goal in collaborative practices.  They were incentivized more by the 
opportunity of securing a substantial amount of funds for themselves and their 
universities.  In Case-D of ORG for instance, revenues were generated for 
research assistants and lab equipment in their field of research, and personal 
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income was secured as a pocket money reward for every student they involved 
in the project.  While for users, the findings showed that all of them were 
incentivized by the opportunity to generate new knowledge (i.e. new product or 
system development) without incurring any financial liability.  As in IIAP cases-A 
and C for instance, the funding rule of in-kind contribution (i.e. usage of current 
materials and HR) assisted users in getting free consultancy services that 
resulted in developing new products similar to their production line through 
direct engagement with knowledgeable local consultants. 
Table 5.1: Motivation for and benefits of university-industry collaboration 
Actor Case Motivations Benefits from funding  
    
Academics 
 
A 
IIAP 
Curiosity driven - taking 
research scientific 
outcome into 
application; 
 
Generating revenue for themselves 
and their organisation by securing 
additional income through 
consultancy; 
B 
CIIAP 
Commercialising the 
final product, possibility 
of financial revenue for 
academics through 
licensing; 
Engaging with non-commercial users 
(end-user), which increases the 
potentiality of the application and 
purchase of their research outcomes 
C 
IIAP 
Insight into practical 
trends in industry; 
increasing their 
industrial research 
capabilities; yielding a 
positive effect on their 
student education. 
Generating revenue for themselves 
and their organisation by securing 
additional income through 
consultancy services;  
D 
ORG 
Curiosity relating to 
practical applicability of 
the research outcomes 
in solving the problem of 
Generating revenue: for their 
organisation through securing funds 
for laboratory establishment (e.g. 
equipment, research assistants) 
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concern; Testing of 
existing theory in 
practice;  
which can be used for further 
research income (e.g. pocket money 
reward fund for every student they 
involved in the project) and for 
themselves through securing personal 
income 
Users 
 
A 
IIAP 
Possibility of financial 
revenue (with less 
production cost) through 
the commercialisation of 
the product developed 
by the academics  
Getting consultancy services without 
incurring/experiencing any financial 
cost (e.g. IIC in-kind contribution 
incentive). 
B 
CIIAP 
Possibility of financial 
revenue (with no 
production cost) through 
the commercialisation of 
the product developed 
by the academics 
Avoiding the huge cost of outcome 
production and guaranteeing the 
potential future local market demand 
due to the involvement of the main 
buyer; 
C 
IIAP 
-New product 
development; 
-Access to university 
labs and scientists 
-coverage of the consultancy service 
financial expenses (in-kind 
contribution incentive);  
-opportunity of accessing the 
university‘s resources (e.g. labs and 
scientists); 
D 
ORG 
new development of 
technology;  
-Securing additional income through 
industrial consultancy; 
-Enhancing the existing system 
without encountering financial cost; 
Source: Author‘s research 
On the other hand, the analysis shows that the transferred funding programs 
hindered the production of research outcomes that had potential for 
commercialisation. The programs, as aforementioned in this study‘s research 
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context (see section 4.2 of chapter 4), were designed through benchmarking, by 
adopting models drawn from Western contexts, which are required to be 
customized as per the situation in Oman.  As stated by one of the TRC‘s 
Officers: 
„‟Benchmarking! All the used rules are from benchmarking, but eventually the 
rules were twinkled and customized according to the culture around. So they are 
implemented by us, the original work done in fact by two experts from 
developed countries such as Canada and others.  It is a way to learn how they 
did it.  So we make them viable and run them as an experimental;‟‟ (PPMF1, 
TRC) 
The IIAP and CIIAP programs, for instance, were designed by adopting 
Canadian models as a trial in a five-year experiment.  However, this resulted in 
unbalance between academics‘ and industrial logics.  This is shown through the 
emergence of incongruence between funding policies.  In this respect, and as 
conformed in Case-C, although the IIAP funding program (represented by IIC) 
was established to facilitate collaboration through filling the gaps between SMEs 
and academia, its research-orientation policy was found to be aiming at 
encouraging applied, rather than basic, research.  More specifically, the IIAP 
promoted interactions by directing academics‘ actions away from achieving the 
academic value of ‗research quality‘ (i.e. long-term benefit of fundamental 
understanding of scientific inquiry) by reason of fulfilling the users‘ requirement 
of ‗time‘ (i.e. short-term industrial benefit of achieving quicker returns to 
maximize profit).  In other words, it promoted interactions by shifting the 
academics‘ mentality of reward system from basic to applied research, 
specifically, from focusing on discovery and quality to focusing on satisfying the 
needs of the users.  Moreover, full ownership was given to the users to prevent 
academics from publishing through fulfilling their requirement of secrecy and 
data withholding.  This is evidenced by the fund‘s action of maintaining user 
control while neglecting the academics‘ need for publishing.  From the fund‘s 
perspective, with regards to solving their issues, users usually look for a 
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practical solution rather than theories.  For the users, the science is not quite as 
valuable as the commercial application, because they are into making small 
incremental improvements and getting ideas to the market fast.  Therefore, 
giving sufficient control for academics and prioritizing the long-term prospects is 
not seen as being as profitable for users.  Evidence to support this argument is 
seen in statements made by the IIC‘s CEO and one of the commercial users.  
„‟They (SMEs) used to look for a temporarily solution that makes them live for a 
while.  So they don‟t wait for theories to come and solve their issues…  I don‟t 
think doing long-term research is significant now, encouraging enterprises to 
start any R&D is more important.‟‟ (PFO1, IIC) 
„‟It (basic research) is timewasting because you are trying to say I am doing 
research now and I am expecting to get the return maybe after two years‟ time 
or more to start coming and we are not sure if it comes.  And when the time the 
technology comes to us to commercialise it becomes obsolete because 
someone else came with the same or something better.  So, there is a risk of 
taking long time to do it because we cannot guarantee success.‟‟ (CU3, SMEs) 
Conversely, and as evidenced from Case-D, the ORG research-orientation 
policy is seen to be targeting the other side, which encourages basic, rather 
than applied, research. It encouraged the interactions by directing academics‘ 
actions towards accomplishing their value of research quality without 
emphasizing the importance of accommodating the users‘ time constraints.  The 
interactions were promoted by supporting the academics‘ logic of ‗open science‘ 
as opposed to the users‘ requirement of ‗secrecy or data-withholding‘.  This is 
evidenced by the control given to academics in assigning the user as an 
industrial consultant, rather than a research partner, in order to keep the control 
with the academics and restrain the users‘ control over ownership and the type 
of research outcomes.  For the fund, giving such control to academics is 
essential as they are into targeting research that is based upon their interests.  
Therefore, restricting them to the users‘ logic of secrecy or data-withholding 
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hinders the fostering of high-quality research and developing the research 
capacity within the country.   As argued by one of the TRC‘s Officers: 
„‟I believe to ask me what the biggest challenge for Oman when it comes to 
research; I would say it is the lack of researchers.  We don‟t have enough 
researchers to do research and the number of high-quality publication is low… 
so this program was designed to fill this gap.  We need to encourage existing 
academics and generate new one.  That‟s why we don‟t impose academics to 
involve companies as research partners it is up to them.‟‟ (PPMF2, TRC) 
In summary, the fact that funding programs (i.e. IIAP and ORG) were copied 
from the Western context hindered the production of outcomes with potential for 
commercialisation.  The incongruence of funding research orientation policies 
caused a lack of incentive for exchange due to the logics divide.  An unbalance 
between academics‘ logics and industrial logic emerged as neither funding 
policies holds itself responsible for bridging the differences in logics.  They are 
focusing more on achieving their own agenda while neglecting the opportunity of 
producing successful commercialised research outcomes. 
5.2 How governing boards influenced knowledge appropriation                     
The findings revealed that the actors (university, fund-operator-IIC, and 
commercial users) are operating under opaque bureaucracy and government 
control in terms of knowledge appropriation activities.  This is highlighted by the 
opacity of decision-making, which was demonstrated by the absence of 
symmetric power within the governing boards of both the university and TRC.  
As aforementioned in this study‘s research context (see section 4.1 of chapter 
4), there is considerable interaction and involvement of high-level governmental 
officials on the boards, who are appointed by Royal Decree and Ministerial 
Cabinet (for more details see Appendix 2).  This resulted in an unbalance of 
power between actors in the decision-making process. In this respect, although 
the KTOs voice is welcomed by the University Council (The academic council, in 
which the officers take part) and has the power to contribute to the development 
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of policies with top management, and despite the fact that the voice of the IIC-
board members is acknowledged and they contribute to the development of the 
IIAP policies, both are still not satisfied with this power since they have failed to 
achieve full autonomy in designing and restructuring the operational guidelines 
of their programs.  The governing boards consult with them and take their 
feedback/suggestions, but do not share power with them or transfer power to 
them in making decisions and developing policy.   
Additionally, and with regards to commercial users, despite the fact that the 
TRC tried to accommodate a fair representative policy of shared governance, 
the decisions are still mostly made by the governmental officials, and the private 
sector members simply have to approve it as they have a fewer number of votes 
(for more details see this study‘s research context section 4.2 of chapter 4).  
More significantly, the members involved are individuals who work only in large 
companies and were appointed by the heads of the governing board on a 
‗personal basis‘ as per their interest in R&D and experience in the field of 
managing financial institutions or public shareholding companies operating in 
Oman.   SMEs owner/managers who would champion the interests and needs 
of commercial users in knowledge commercialisation were excluded from the 
board.   
The high-level governmental officials (as per their positions and representation 
on the boards) are considered to be the main drivers and producers of policy 
agendas.  They retain more control over the development of policy priorities and 
parameters.   This, as will be discussed hereafter, had a negative impact on 
knowledge appropriation. 
First, the officials‘ greater power compared to that of the university KTOs and 
the funding-operator‘, led to a lack of accessibility to the information necessary 
for designing the required policies (operational guidelines).  The voices and 
participation of the university‘s KTOs and the fund-operating officers were 
reduced and limited, which consequently resulted in secrecy and a lack of 
transparency, as the officials are the ones who hold such crucial information.  
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This left scope for ambiguity as actors do not share the entire process of policy 
development and implementation. 
With respect to the university, the University‘s Council practice of limiting the 
participation of KTOs (i.e. IAC12) in decision-making had caused a lack of 
transparency.  This can be evidenced by the unclear vision and understanding 
of the direction of the university‘ council as pertains to injecting the national IP 
rules into the university‘s existing IP regulations (i.e. publications, copyrights, 
etc.).  A proposal was drafted by the officers two years back, but has not yet 
been approved by the University Council.  Their suggestions were not applied, 
and they related this to the Council‘s unclear direction.  As stated by one of the 
KTOs: 
„‟See our suggestions are welcomed by the top management here, but we are 
not sure to what extent our suggestions are and will be applied; because we 
cannot see this in reality. And the direction of university council is not clear to us 
with regards to this.  So we have to wait for their decision.‟‟ (UO3, SQU) 
This constrained the operationalisation and dissemination of IP guidelines 
required for governing actions.  Instead of having written guidelines for IP (i.e. 
patenting), verbal directions are given by the department‘s staff as a way to 
coordinate IP matters whenever the academics disclosed their expected 
inventions.  This consequently caused: (1) the university‘s inability to create 
awareness about the criteria of patenting (which are enforced within the 
university‘s protection fund), as demonstrated by cases B and D, because the 
criteria were not exposed and disseminated among faculties; (2) the university‘s 
difficulty of safeguarding the ownership of the knowledge generated by its 
                                                          
12As the innovation department lacking experts, the university made an effort by getting 
use of its existing staff.  An IAC-‗Innovation Advisory Committee‘ was established in 
2012 for the purpose of ‗‘Developing, implementing and evaluating policies, procedures 
and practices of SQU IP and innovation policies (e.g. ownership of IP rights, royalty 
sharing, confidentiality clauses, material transfer agreements, etc.)‟‟ (UO2, SQU).  The 
committee consists of assistant deans in research of three colleges of (Engineering, 
Science, Agriculture and Marine Science).  They were selected as per their positions 
and colleges‘ high research performance.   
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academics due to the absence of ‗IP prior contract negotiation‘, which resulted 
in the failure of directing the action of concerned officers towards negotiating the 
possibility of safeguarding ownership to the university before signing the 
contract with industry.  As per the university‘s procedures, the research 
contracts were signed under the supervision of the consultancy and contracted 
research section within the university‘s research department, in which IP 
negotiation was not assigned as one of its mandates.  The absence of such 
guidelines, as confirmed in cases A and C, meant that the specifics of IP were 
not negotiated, in the signed contract between the parties (academics and 
user), neither by the section nor the innovation department officers.  This gave 
the university no right to claim ownership, consequently hindering it from 
safeguarding the ownership of the knowledge generated by its academics.  As 
stated by two of the university‘s KT officers: 
„‟we are developing the IP and that we are missing in our university… Now what 
we do is that we are giving verbal directions in how to process their 
application… So if they want patenting then we will support them with the initial 
system screen and sign an agreement with the US firm.  We are planning to 
place these guidelines in the website or in written in the future.‟‟ (UO4, SQU) 
„‟No, we cannot claim for it.  It is already disclosed to industry. You know what is 
actually happening they are developing in the university the innovation 
department but there is a unit of research department in handling new system. It 
should be our department.  We should be in the picture in negotiating IP with 
industry… Recently, we don‟t have any involvement and when we get the 
information from the research department, I saw they are having very minimal 
contracts and these contracts should come actually to us.  They don‟t negotiate 
IP because it is not their responsibility.‟‟ (UO2, SQU) 
Similarly, and with regards to the fund-operator, the limitation of IIC participation 
in the TRC board‘s decision-making process resulted in a lack of transparency 
about the probability of operationalising the knowledge commercialisation stage 
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as one of the IIAP fund‘s responsibilities. A proposal13 for further investment 
was drafted in 2012 by the fund-operator (IIC) to the TRC, but it has not yet 
been approved. Their suggestions were not applied, but rather parameters were 
established to control the scope of the activities followed by the IIC.  The 
activities are influenced mainly by the goal of achieving knowledge generation, 
first, as a way to encourage commercial users to adopt outcomes generated by 
academics to be used for their own benefits; and secondly, as a way to 
encourage academics to participate in research to find solutions for national 
issues.  Therefore, commercialisation is not operationalised in the interaction as 
one of the IIAP‘s activities, but is rather deemed as the commercial users' 
responsibility, who (as will be discussed hereafter) found it costly due to their 
financial limitations. 
 „‟until now we cannot commercialise, because TRC 5 years ago we gave a 
proposal and they said will do it.  We told them what about this, why don‟t you 
allow us to do commercialisation until you open your commercialisation office, 
and we will shift our experience.  But for 5 years we are doing the same things.  
We do research then when we finish we look what to do next, because we are 
waiting for TRC to approve our proposal.‟‟ (PFO1, IIC) 
Second, the greater power of high-level governmental officials (mainly as per 
their representation in the TRC board) against commercial users (as per their 
exclusion) led to the emphasis of their demands, such as political and national 
agendas (i.e. research capacity building) against SMEs‘ agendas (i.e. 
knowledge commercialisation requirements).  In this case, the voice of the users 
was absent, which restricted the users‘ control over the achievement of their 
need for KC. 
                                                          
13
The fund operator with TRC was planning to design a comprehensive database of services 
provided by existing public and private funding agencies.  This was in order to create a single 
point of reference for domestic innovators and SMEs. Moreover, a partnership with large private 
companies was planned in order to offer expertise to SMEs to help them to innovate and 
commercialise new products and services.   
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This is evidenced by the unclear standards of fund allocation, which can be 
shown by the incongruity between different funding policies regulating 
knowledge commercialisation. Regardless of the strong support at the national 
level for increasing industry contribution to socio economic development14, as 
well as for promoting and fostering its financial capabilities that focus on 
knowledge and innovation in 201315, and although the ‗commercialisation 
fund‘16 is acknowledged as one of the TRC‘s proposed policies under the 
knowledge transfer goal, such policy was not implemented in the IIAP program 
by any means.  Rather, further investment was allocated for other funding 
programs.  This, as shown in table 4.2 below, can be evidenced from cases A 
and C by the low budget devoted to the IIAP (which is considered the only 
funding program overseeing SMEs‘ R&D and commercialisation) in comparison 
to other programs, in Case-B (CIIAP-Community and Individual Innovation 
Assistance Program, and Case-D (ORG-Open Research Grants Program).  
Also, it is worth mentioning that there was no oversubscription within the IIAP.  
The fund‘s overall expenditures for the projects (total = 30) conducted during the 
5 years was 570.296 (equating to 39% of the total budget OMR 1.5 million), and 
the remaining 61% was not exploited for supporting knowledge 
commercialisation. 
Table 5.2: Comparison between funding programs 
 IIAP (Cases A & C) CIIAP (Case-B) ORG (Case-C) 
 
Overall Budget for 5 years 
(2009-2013) 
 
OMR 1.5 million 
 
OMR 11.5 
million 
 
OMR 15 million 
                                                          
14’’The economy will no longer be an oil-reliant economy in 2020.  It is envisaged to be a 
diversified economy with higher levels of savings and investments.  The sources of national 
income will be diversified with the non-oil sector assuming the primary role’’ (MONE, 2008, p. 
18) 
15In 2013, His Majesty called for a national symposium which assessed all aspects related to the 
weaknesses of local SMEs in which increasing financial support to SMEs through public and 
private funding programs are given significance.    
16
 ‘‟funding innovative ideas with commercial potential in the private sector‟‟ (PPF1, TRC) 
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Budget per project 
 
OMR 50,000 
 
OMR 100,000 
 
OMR 250, 000 
(differ as per type 
of project) 
 
Number of projects in 5 
years (2009-2013) 
 
30 projects  
 
23 projects  
 
102 projects  
Source: Author‘s research  
From the above, the availability of Public/governmental funding is not to be seen 
as a major concern, but the allocation of the funds is problematic.  The modesty 
of the budget engaged within the IIAP is incomprehensible at a stage where 
innovation is more expected, in view of the country‘s diversification goal.  This is 
particularly clear when compared to what is spent on other funding programs 
(i.e. ORG), as well as from the provision of the commercialisation fund for 
programs (i.e. CIIAP) which, by and large, are not found to be aimed at 
supporting existing users‘ commercialisation efforts and needs.  This is also 
clear from the lack of exploiting the outstanding percentage of the fund for 
achieving the goal of commercialisation.   
Hence, it is not surprising to find that policies within funding programs are not 
aimed at supporting users‘ commercialisation activities.  Certainly, the majority 
of actors (governmental officials and academia) involved in the funding 
governance board will take the opportunity and become more driven towards 
targeting their own agendas (such as building research capacity in preference to 
commercialisation) while neglecting the needs of absent actors (i.e. SMEs).  
This has consequently distracted users‘ commercial potentials and activities and 
has translated into marketing weaknesses and inefficiency.  In IIAP, particularly 
Case-C for instance, commercial users, as small enterprises, were unable to 
afford the high capital cost of final product production.  For them, the cost of 
implication of commercialisation was considered disadvantageous to such an 
extent that additional funding or fiscal support may be required, which again was 
not provided by any means.    
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„„Production cost is an issue for us.  See we are always struggling here to 
source finance support and partners in the commercialisation and marketing 
processes…They (government) consider it as a cost not as an investment… So 
it is hard to get support from them.  Now we are looking for a help from IIC but 
things are not clear yet.‟‟ (CU4, SMEs) 
„‟SMEs are willing to do research but providing them that they can see the 
outcome of their products!  They don‟t want the produced product to become 
obsolete.  They want to market it and I think there is adequate money for 
commercialisation, at lease seed-money because we are not using all budget.  
But the allocation system is not clearly standardized.‟‟ (PFO1, IIC) 
In summary, the opacity of decision-making of governing boards hindered 
knowledge appropriation. This was demonstrated by the boards‘ bureaucratic 
and regular practice of limiting and reducing the voices and participation of other 
actors. Hence, shared governance was missing and an unbalance of power 
occurred. The power of decision-making was not transferred or shared with the 
other actors.  This resulted in unbalanced decision-making between actors, 
which consequently had a negative impact on knowledge appropriation.  The 
unbalanced decision-making between high-level governmental officials and the 
officers of both universities and the IIC caused a lack of transparency with 
regards to the information required for injecting operational guidelines, while the 
unbalanced decision-making between high-level governmental officials and 
commercial users resulted in restraining the users‘ control over achieving their 
goal of knowledge commercialisation.                                                                                                            
5.3 How networks influenced the production of research outcomes  
The findings revealed the effect of the type of networks towards producing 
research outcomes that have potential for commercialisation.  The analysis in 
cases A and B indicates that the informal networks that emerged through early 
engagements between academics and commercial users (in the first and 
second stages of scientific knowledge production), and prior to forming a formal 
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collaborative R&D project, assisted in producing outcomes that have potential 
for commercialisation.   
The formation of such informal networks was interest-driven.  The process 
followed an emergent pattern as environmental interdependence17 and similar 
interests motivated actors to cooperate.  Here, and as demonstrated in both 
cases, the actors experienced and faced a common need for resources, which 
led them to form an informal tie.  For instance, as evidenced in Case-A, 
structural resources (i.e. personnel, tools, machinery, materials, equipment, 
research labs, etc.) as well as cognitive resources (i.e. professional 
experiences, research experiences) were needed and shared for ensuring 
knowledge proximity, particularly, similarities in what they produced and how 
they produced it (i.e. guaranteeing the congruence of the expected generated 
knowledge with the commercial users‘ production line).  
 “They provided us with resources. So he liked the idea. The natural fat-mimic 
ingredients are expected to provide similar mouth feel as high fat halwa. He 
allowed us to use all his piloted plans and facilities and we are taking all the 
ingredients and other things.” (Ac1, SQU) 
―We are producing similar product. So there was no loss as I said we gave the 
required resources which we are already using and available, in addition of 
using low fat materials which were less in cost.” (CU1, SMEs) 
Their common interests generated the preconditions for developing formal 
structures for their relationship, in which research outcomes were transformed 
into commercial tangible products. Central here were the prior personal 
relationships, which became a source of mutual trust on which the formal 
collaboration was based.  In the trial phases, the development process through 
which the actors get to know each other and learn how to work together led to 
the development of clear expectations, which together form the initial structure 
                                                          
17
“Interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions 
necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action” 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, p. 40). 
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for knowledge exchange.  Consensus was generated on the domain of their 
cooperation, which established a strong expectation of continuity of interaction.  
These factors reduced uncertainty and resulted in no cultural conflicts during the 
stage of practical knowledge production.  Hence, the emergence of informal 
networks assisted in merging/converging logics, in particular, the academics‘ 
logics of ‗discovery-driven research‘ (in Case-A) and curiosity of knowledge 
application (in Case-B) with the commercial users‘ logic of ‗profit maximization‘.  
Additionally, users‘ logic of profit maximization (i.e. gaining exclusive license) 
also converged with the academics‘ logic of individual career progression (i.e. 
patent developer).  In this respect, the commercial user, as per its strong 
relation with academics, utilised the collaboration to develop skills to interact 
with academics, in addition to the legitimacy generated from the project.  This 
ultimately reduced the tensions arising from logics: 
„Giving the ownership to academics helps in their career advancement.  See as 
they gave us license we don‟t have any issue.  We are still gaining profit…The 
outcome is innovative and similar to our production lines and this is our first 
project with academics here.  We want to build our skills in how to collaborate 
with academics and by this we establish stronger relation with them.‟‟ (CU2, 
SMEs) 
On the other hand, the analysis in cases C and D indicates that the networks 
which emerged through formal linkages (i.e. through IIAP and ORG) hindered 
the production of research outcomes that have potential for commercialisation. 
The formation process followed an engineered pattern as the government was 
considered as the triggering entity initiating the cooperation.  Here, an 
intervention of government was a necessary condition for collaboration 
establishment.  The actors didn‘t experience strong external stimuli to 
cooperate, such as a common need for resources, and didn‘t have an 
apparent/explicit common motivation.  Rather, the government created a 
‗perception of the need for the collaboration‘.  With this as a starting point, the 
collaboration establishment process followed a hub approach where the actors 
in the network cooperated with the government agent, but only indirectly with 
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each other.  As the actors at the start didn‘t recognize similar interests, their 
expectations of the relationship as well as the embeddedness within the 
networks were likely less. 
This, as seen in cases C and D, can be shown by the emergence of logic 
conflict between academics and commercial users.  Actors‘ conflicting logics 
had constrained the incentive for exchange across the divide. In this respect, 
the analysis shows that academics and commercial users complacently accept 
the divide between them as inevitable. Neither side holds itself responsible for 
breaking down the logic divide.    
In Case-C of IIAP for instance, a conflict arose with regards to the type of 
research outcome. While the user sought a profitable product in a short time, 
the academics prized excellent scientific research outcomes which only accrue 
in the medium to long run. For academics, there was a need to revisit and 
understand the basics in order to know the reaction of basic concepts in 
producing knowledge.  Therefore, the development of basic outcomes into 
industrial products requires a long time.  While basic research for the user was 
seen as time consuming as it requires a longer time for the solution to come (or 
to be obtained).  Therefore, he was afraid to take the risk of getting involved in 
long-term research where success and immediate profit are not guaranteed.  
Hence, time was a key element for the user whereas quality was vital for the 
academics.   
„‟the research for us is mainly basic research and for industry means a product; 
See the product has to be created but not at the cost of basic sciences. We 
need to revisit the basics first to get the knowledge from gross root to implement 
it.  But they want to get a final product quickly to get profit.” (Ac4, SQU) 
„‟It (basic research) is timewasting because you are trying to say I am doing 
research now and I am expecting to get the return maybe after two years‟ time 
or more to start coming.  So, there is a risk of taking because we cannot 
guarantee success.‟‟ (CU3, SMEs) 
Similarly, in Case-D of ORG, a conflict had emerged between the academics‘ 
logic of ‗open-science‘ and the commercial user‘s logic of ‗data-withholding‘.  
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While the intrinsic aspect of the academics‘ reward system was based on 
establishing IP priority through publications, the user sought a competitive 
advantage by safeguarding IP through data-withholding or outcome non-
disclosure. The academics view data-withholding as distracting the academic 
scientific community from generating publicly available research.  It violates their 
moral duty in academic science of emphasizing the importance of ―giving back‖ 
to society and making research outcomes available to the public. It also results 
in infringement on their rights to publish.  While commercial users view data-
withholding as significant for safeguarding their data from being leaked to 
competitors as academics had more intimate access to company information.  
Sometimes academics learn information that is outside the scope of the 
research project and therefore outside the scope of intellectual property-sharing 
agreements.  Hence, for them it was crucial to withhold data through signing a 
non-disclosure agreement in order to protect the information that the academics 
picked up during the course of the research. 
„‟You know if we have an industry as a partner in the project there is a possibility 
that they won‟t allow us to get use of our outcomes properly. They will have right 
to withhold publications and information dissemination because they are afraid 
that we will include confidential information.” (Ac10, SQU) 
 
In summary, the emergence of informal networks assisted in merging both 
cultures-the academics‘ ‗curiosity or discovery-driven research culture‘ with the 
commercial users‘ ‗innovation-driven environment‘- such networks emerged as 
environmental interdependence and similar interests motivated actors to 
cooperate.  The resources (structural and cognitive) that became available 
through the structure of informal networks gave the actors the opportunities to 
cooperate, but also led to recognition of common interests and explicated 
motivations for further cooperation.  Such resources were needed and shared 
for the common purpose/motive of ensuring knowledge proximity.  Hence, 
mutual trust was generated during trial phases.  Agreement was generated on 
the domain of their cooperation, which established a strong expectation of 
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continuity of interaction.  A formal collaboration was formed, in which research 
outcomes were transformed into commercial tangible products. 
In contrast, formal networks had hindered the merging of both cultures.  Such 
networks emerged through the intervention of government (in which the 
government created a ‗perception of the need for collaboration‘ within, e.g. IIAP 
and ORG).  Preconditions and motivations were not integrated.  The parties 
didn‘t experience common interests and motivations as stimulators for 
cooperation, as early engagements were missing.  Hence, they had a lesser 
degree of embeddedness within the network as mutual trust was not reached.  
A logic divide which resulted from conflicting logics, had emerged as both 
academics and users were inherently incentivised toward different motives.  The 
academics relied on producing high quality research through achieving scientific 
standards, whether it is product-based or service-based, while users depended 
on projects that maximize profit and survive in the market.  Therefore, users 
were rewarded for bringing commercial success, while academics were 
promoted based on publishing clout.  This consequently constrained the 
production of outcomes that have potential for commercialisation.   
5.4 How fragmented policies influenced invention prototyping                  
According to the interviewees, and in addition to the official documents, the 
university18 and government (represented by TRC as a policy-making and 
funding body) seem to have well-written rules with clear visions and goals 
towards knowledge research and innovation transformation.  However, and 
regardless of considering such rules as triggers for KC activities, the university 
and government are still in a poor position in relation to knowledge appropriation 
(particularly in invention generations and patenting).  Efforts are still on-going to 
resource and strategize the concerned bodies.  There is a lack of expertise, 
both in terms of numbers and competency, with regards to allowing and 
facilitating the assessment of invention prototyping and patenting.  The 
                                                          
18The university restructured its governance to adapt research and innovation changes 
through introducing the ‗Innovation Affairs Department‘ as part of its formal 
administrative structure in 2010. 
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university lacks in numbers as the IAD-Innovation Affairs Department has only 
four employees and lacks in capability as those employees are not qualified and 
don‘t have knowledge/experience in IP patenting law and process. Similarly, at 
the national level, despite the fact that the MoIC-Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry is considered the institution that is the main IP authority in Oman, its IP 
office lacks in numbers as it only has three administrators who lack expertise in 
how to search and assess patents. 
„‟yes the strategy is there, but we lack expertise.  At the moment in the 
innovation department we have only four staff but we are planning to get more 
specialised staff form chemical engineering, science, business and political 
science, so in this office we want people from different backgrounds.‟‟ (UO1, 
SQU) 
 „‟We don‟t have patent examiners.  There are only three admins in patenting 
and they only specialised in receiving applications for patent disclosures.  And 
the number of applications increasing and nothing is new.  No guidance is there 
yet to help them and they don‟t have the experience and the abilities to handle 
those applications and we shouldn‟t blame them… We need actually more than 
40 experts in different specialised areas to judge on the novelty of the patent 
and we cannot actually hire those‟‟ (GO1, MoCI). 
As the lack of experts can be, as stated by many interviewees, related to the 
policy priority of building research capacity at both the university level and the 
national level19, another more important factor emerged, which goes with the 
issue of fragmentation across university and government systems.   
                                                          
19
The focus on research capacity policy was due to the shortage of research competence (i.e. 
qualified researchers, assistant researchers, technicians, etc.).  In this regard, the university has 
considerable competence gaps within its different academic faculties due to the turnover of 
more than 25% professors and staff in 2014.  Significant part of faculty who are coming from 
foreign countries including developed industrial economies resigned and moved to another 
university.  One of the main reasons behind this turnover is university‘s low salaries as 
compared to those offered by other universities in the neighbouring region (GCC countries such 
as Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia) (USP, 2009-2013).  Moreover, and at the national level, the 
limited number of Omani researchers caused mismatch between country‘s priority sectors (i.e. 
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The findings across the cases revealed the emergence of fragmentation in 
processing actions of invention prototyping and patenting.  Instead of recruiting 
experts, the university and government initiated policies for using foreign 
experts as a channel for filling the gap of expertise.  However, such policies 
were initiated separately.  There was an absence of joint policy, and the policies 
were scattered and disjointed between both parties. From what is apparent, the 
initiated policies appeared to be rather uncoordinated.  Rather than having a 
single contract, they signed separate contracts with IP companies from different 
countries. At the university level, a contract with a US IP company was signed 
for assessing and registering IP disclosure; while at the national level, contracts 
were signed with IP companies from different countries (i.e. Egypt, Malaysia, 
Canada, etc.).  In Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) for instance, a 
contract was signed with an Egyptian IP company to assess the received patent 
applications from IIC (operator of IIAP).  Additionally, a contract was signed by 
the TRC under certain funding programs (i.e. CIIAP) with another US IP 
company to guide individuals in the process of protection in addition to 
examining and studying the strengths and weaknesses of disclosed IPs.  This 
had a negative consequence, as each country follows different rules and 
regulations.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
Oil and gas, biological resources and industry as per their GDP contribution) and current 
research efforts by academia.  The number of research scientific publications in such top 
sectors is small, which made TRC to allocate high research expenditures in building required 
competences within the country‘s different HEIs (TRC, 2014): „‟the fund is coming from the 
government and the government is into the area of building capacity in research.  They focus on 
research aspects and awareness, trying to encourage research to build infrastructures of each 
institution.  So they are not concerning about building capacity in IP, may be in the future, but 
not now.‟‟ (UO3, SQU); „‟The capacity building is very important.  But we cannot say it is 
important and we are not developing the skills in the area of innovation and KC.  We have to 
have staffs that are actually capable and have experience.  But they are building the capacity in 
faculties and forgetting us! We lack expertise.  And at the moment we have only four staff who 
are also under expertise.‟‟ (UO2, SQU) 
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More significantly, fragmentation across boundaries has emerged.  This can be 
explained by the absence of the physical presence of the contracted companies 
(required experts) in Oman, a situation akin to that of the lack of face-to-face 
communication which appeared to result.  Actions and decisions across 
systems and agencies were taken independently, which consequently limited to 
a great extent what the university and government can do as well as restraining 
experts‘ understanding about what is applicable consideration.     
The fragmentation across funding and university, as well as across boundaries, 
had adversely impacted the university‘s ability to support the systematic 
development of inventions.  This can be justified, as confirmed in cases B and 
D, by the IAD‘s inability to assess and guide academics in the potentiality of 
developing their research outcomes further to make them novel.  Lack of 
communication between department and academics resulted due to the 
absence of professionals who have the competencies to advise academics on 
the possibility of developing their outcomes into new ways of doing things that 
can be patentable and reach the international criteria required by the US IP 
Company. 
“There is a lack of qualified staff (experts) who can advise in patenting and IPs 
… who can go and communicate with academics, particularly the PI about the 
outcome of their research and give advice in how to develop it to a patent and 
as per the followed criteria.” (UO2, SQU)  
Moreover, the absence of the physical presence of experts resulted in the 
funding‘s inability to support patenting activities, consequently hindering 
academics and users from securing protection for the generated knowledge.  
This can be justified by the engagement of those experts after the outcomes 
were generated.  The absence of continuous guidance subsequently caused 
failure in governing the actions of academics within the process of patenting.  
For instance, as shown in Case-B, it resulted in the inability to govern the 
academics‘ action of public disclosure, which deprived them from the validity of 
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granting IP (i.e. failure of achieving the patenting criterion of ‗prior art‘).  
Furthermore, the absence of an operational patenting process within MoCI 
created slowness in processing patent applications.  This is found to be relevant 
to Case-C of IIAP, where an official recognition of patent was pending for more 
than two years, which subsequently hindered commercial users from securing 
IP ownership.  For them, the implications of such deficiency confronted them 
with the costs of knowledge commercialisation obsoleteness. 
„‟The process is taken very long.  We are afraid that we will lose the idea … 
when the time the protection come to us to commercialise the design it become 
out-dated because technology doesn‟t wait and maybe others from the market 
will come with better design.  So there is a risk involved and we will not be able 
to commercialise it successfully.‟‟ (CU4, SMEs) 
In summary, a core institutional challenge in actors‘ relations is a growing 
degree of fragmentation. The natural tendency of actors is to develop their own 
agendas and policies that largely ignore issues of coordination and interaction 
with each other.  On-going regulation and legalisation processes have led to 
functional overlaps between parties.  As a consequence, a problem of 
fragmentation occurring from the segmentation of governance systems along 
spheres has become unavoidable.   
Hence, the fragmentation across the university and funding (i.e. CIIAP and IIAP) 
systems, associated with the absence of coordination and joint policy (action of 
signing separate contracts with IP companies with different countries), and the 
fragmentation across boundaries, associated with the absence of the physical 
presence of the required experts in Oman, adversely impacted what happened 
on the ground. A lack of direct and regular communication and guidance 
occurred, which consequently impacted negatively on processes/actions of 
inventions prototyping and patenting. 
This caused a lack of communication between the university‘s department and 
its academics, which subsequently hindered supporting the systematic 
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development of its academics‘ inventions, specifically limiting the potentiality of 
developing academics‘ research outcomes further to reach patentability.  Also 
the absence of continuous guidance subsequently resulted in an incapability in 
governing the academics‘ action of public disclosure.  Additionally, the absence 
of an operational patenting process (within MoCI & IIAP) constrained 
accelerating the assessment process of users‘ patent applications, 
subsequently resulting in knowledge commercialisation obsoleteness. 
5.5 How the funding operational rules influenced KC                            
The findings revealed misalignment between the actions of funding operator and 
managers and the rules of programs.  Misalignment was found to have both 
positive and negative effects on the process of KC.  In this study, the 
comparison between two effects is significant in order to generate more 
understanding about the situation.  
As mentioned in section 4.1, the analysis shows, at earlier stages of interaction 
within cases A and B, the possibility that some degree of flexibility in funding at 
the organisational level (between the funding, i.e. IIAP and CIIAP, 
management's actions and rules) had resulted in benefits.  This is with 
reference to the positive effect of relaxing funding rules on facilitating 
collaboration establishment between academics and users.  In this respect, 
despite the although the actions of program managers and operators were 
found to be misaligned with the funding rules and procedures, the relaxation of 
the rules had a positive effect on the academics‘ and users‘ decisions to 
collaborate.  The fund managers and operators had the ability to reformulate 
rules in response to the funding objectives and internal requirements in relation 
to the assigned goals.  Hence, misalignment appeared to offer the benefit of the 
ability to bend the rules, while at the same time remaining relevant to the 
operational needs of the organisation, which is the necessity of collaboration 
establishment.   
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On the other hand, the analysis shows that misalignment between actors at the 
national level resulted in detriments/losses.  The successful commercial 
exploitation of the generated knowledge was found to be a hindrance for 
commercial users.  This issue was confirmed in all cases within this study.   
The findings in Case-A (of IIAP) for instance, demonstrated an emergence of 
misalignment between the actions of the fund-operator and the IP rules of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (which is considered the main IP authority in 
Oman) with regards to patenting. This can be evidenced by the action of the 
fund consultant in giving the user the chance to change the national trade secret 
recipe without prior coordination with the MoCI IP office (i.e. alteration of the 
defined specifications stated within the ministerial decree).   Hence, a collision 
of two IP elements (Omani Halwa Trade-Secret and Patenting) emerged due to 
the absence of legal written guidelines for the entire process (from knowledge 
production until appropriation).    
Moreover, there is misalignment between the actions of non-commercial users 
and the TRC‘s rule of knowledge exploitation.  Such misalignment can be linked 
to the lack of assigning R&D and innovation as a mandate within users‘ formal 
institutional prerogatives.  This, as shown in Case-D (of ORG), can be 
demonstrated by the ministry‘s refusal to implement the generated technology 
within the system of local factories under its supervision.  Similarly, it can be 
evidenced by Case-B (of CIIAP), where, although the non-commercial user was 
involved in the process of knowledge generation, there was the possibility of 
misalignment between the non-commercial users and funding rules with regards 
to commercial exploitation of knowledge.  Consequently, a potentiality of 
uncertainty of knowledge utilisation by the commercial user might emerge.   
Additionally, as evidenced by Case-D, the negative effect of misalignment can 
be explained by the exclusion of the concerned non-commercial user from the 
process of knowledge generation.  This exclusion was combined with the fact 
that the process was influenced mainly by generating knowledge according to 
the academics‘ interests, where it was not necessary for other entities to be 
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involved.  This consequently hindered the ministry from implementing the 
generated outcomes in small local factories that come under its supervision. 
While in Case-B, although the concerned non-commercial user was involved in 
the process of knowledge generation, there existed the possibility of inherent 
misalignment between the non-commercial user and the funding rules with 
regards to the commercial exploitation of knowledge.  This can be caused by 
the absence of a formal contractual agreement (as an obligation) for governing 
commercialisation action.  Consequently, a potential uncertainty of knowledge 
utilisation by the commercial user might emerge.   
In summary, misalignment appeared to offer the benefit of the ability to bend 
rules, while at the same time remaining relevant to the operational needs of the 
organisation.  Due to the flexibility of the funding programs (i.e. CIIAP & IIAP), 
the fund managers and operators had the ability to reformulate rules in 
response to the funding objectives and internal requirements in relation to TRC 
national strategy.  Yet they focused such abilities and flexibility on achieving the 
goals relevant to the processes of collaboration establishment rather than 
knowledge commercialisation.  This is due to the absence of written operational 
guidelines (i.e. IP national regulations, contracts) that direct the actions of fund 
managers/operators and concerned governmental entities towards knowledge 
commercialisation.  This is due to fragmented governance between the TRC 
and other governmental units (MoCI) as well as non-commercial users (ministry 
and ROP). 
5.6 How actors’ logics influenced knowledge appropriation                 
The analysis across cases shows that actors‘ (academics, university‘s KTOs, 
and users- both commercial and non-commercial) logics had a negative impact 
on knowledge appropriation. 
The findings revealed that academics and commercial users tried to achieve 
benefits by subverting rules in order to pursue their own goals. Their behaviour 
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was influenced by the calculation of the material consequences of deviating 
from the preferred course of action.   
As demonstrated by cases A and D, the academics‘ violation of university rules 
was affected by the perceived personal remunerations (i.e. building self-esteem 
through career progression) from the complementary benefits embedded within 
IIAP and ORG funding.  The academics‘ decisions of retaining the value had 
resulted in violating their university‘s disclosure rule (i.e. the academics 
professional obligation of IP disclosure to the university).  Despite their 
familiarity with the rules and despite their usage of the university‘s resources 
(i.e. labs, technicians, etc.), academics, in Case-A, disclosed the IP to the 
commercial user (the client of IIC-the IIAP operator) without informing their 
university‘s innovation department.  For the academics, disclosing their IP to the 
university involved the potential of losing the opportunity of gaining the 
perceived benefit of having the credit of becoming patent developers.  Hence, 
the provision of such incentive made the IP disclosure to the commercial user a 
better idea from the academics‘ perspective.  Similarly, in Case-D the 
academics preferred to disclose their outcomes through publication before 
assessing the option of seeking IP protection through their university.  For them, 
secrecy, which was promoted through patenting, appeared to violate their 
classical ethos and moral duty of academic science (logic of open-science) in 
emphasizing the importance of giving back to society and making research 
outcomes available to the public.  It conflicted, as aforementioned in section 4.3, 
with their intrinsic aspect of the reward system within ORG, which is based on 
the establishment of intellectual property through publications.  Novelty was not 
maintained as the generated knowledge was an obvious development of what 
had come before (i.e. usage of past experience of applying the same technology 
implemented successfully in other countries.). 
The academics‘ preference of preserving the benefits for the purpose of 
achieving their own goals (i.e. personal remunerations), had constrained the 
university‘s control over knowledge appropriation.  It hindered the IAD from 
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safeguarding the IP as well as from directing the academics‘ attention towards 
producing patentable outcomes.  This can be demonstrated by the difficulty 
faced by the university in changing the academics‘ mind-set towards patenting: 
‗‟researchers don‟t want to engage in knowledge patenting.  They prefer to go 
for publishing in high ranked journals, that‟s why they are targeting that 
(publication incentives within funding).‟‟ (UO4, SQU) 
“It is important to not disclose the invention to a third party in order to protect it. 
What is happening is that they are not negotiating and contacting directly with 
us…They would say why I bother myself to go through IP process, so what the 
benefit of patenting to academics, nothing! Also they get money from industry or 
public fund, so they will definitely target that. It is more profitable!‟‟” (UO2, SQU) 
Additionally, although the academics in Case-B were aware of the international 
patenting rules followed by the CIIAP fund, they deliberately subverted the ‗prior 
art search‘ rule through disclosing their research outcomes publically and before 
assessing the option of seeking IP protection from the International office.  They 
were driven by their interest in involving the commercial user for the purpose of 
accelerating the possibility of bringing the generated knowledge into application.  
This consequently hindered knowledge appropriation as it made the academics 
neglect the opportunity of safeguarding their research outcomes. 
„‟my concern was to get solution whether by me or by another person.  So I was 
not really concerned about or afraid if someone copy me; but my concern was 
the solution must be applied as soon as possible.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
Furthermore, the commercial user‘s violation of national IP rules (i.e. trade-
secret) in Case-A was affected by his prospect of making profit with less 
production cost (i.e. usage of low fat-mimic ingredients) compared to the original 
recipe.  Although he was entrusted with the original formula of the recipe, he 
made changes for the purpose of achieving his interest of controlling the 
continuity of his family business.   
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As family enterprises, commercial users are generally considered to be risk 
averse.  Risk aversion is influenced by the psychological factors, such as goals 
and behaviours of family members, which stem from the close relationship 
between ownership and control (in the form of family managers) within these 
enterprises.  Such relationship has likely created a strong emotional tie between 
the family and the enterprise.  Therefore, it is normal that one of the typical 
goals of the controlling families is to keep the family enterprises alive and in the 
hands of the family through the employment of family members, maintaining the 
harmony between family and workplace, and sustaining the association of family 
status with business ownership and management.  All these goals would be 
endangered if the family failed to control, or lost control of, the business.  To 
avoid business failure or losing control, avoiding risks is often regarded as the 
proper approach. Consequently, family enterprises have a higher degree of risk 
aversion, as higher risk might endanger the goal of business succession and the 
family enterprise‘s long-term survivability.  
However, the analysis across cases A and C shows that risk aversion in family 
enterprises, which is traditionally considered to be a positive attribute (RW 
Hiebl, 2014), have resulted in emerging behaviours that endanger family 
enterprises‘ long-term existence.  The negative consequence of risk aversion 
can be evidenced by the enterprises‘ unwillingness to invest in R&D and pursue 
growth strategies.  The findings revealed the absence of long-term spending in 
R&D projects because of their uncertain outcomes.  They are perilous (risky) 
and profit might not be granted.  Therefore, the non-investment in R&D is 
frequently perceived by family enterprises‘ owners and/or GMs as securing the 
survivability of the enterprise.   
„‟Most of these enterprises are family based and this is why they don‟t want to 
involve in high risk like spending in innovation and research projects. When they 
spend in research they are not sure of the outcome.‟‟ (PFO1, IIC) 
When the controlling family fears losing control of the firm, the owners/GMs try 
all means possible to save the socio-emotional wealth associated with 
controlling the firm, by maintaining the family firm‘s survival (RW Hiebl, 2014).  
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As such, risk aversion was subservient to the continuous loyalty to family 
members.  Nevertheless, the exaggerated risk aversion caused resistance to 
change.  The owners‘/GMs‘ perception of maintaining the ‗status quo‘ has been 
aggravated by a climate of caution with regards to business failure or losing.  
They were found to be very sceptical and quite traditional in terms of openness 
to change.  There was a lesser degree of propensity to adopt new ways of 
thinking and doing business, particularly in dynamic markets where enterprises 
need to manage internal and external resources to become innovative and stay 
competitive.   This consequently resulted in missing growth opportunities.  This 
can be evidenced and demonstrated in Case-A, through the GM‘s negligence of 
the opportunity of commercialisation assessment of what is a very different 
commercial opportunity (i.e. new product) which may possibly result in a better 
economic outcome in the long-run.  Despite the inability to use the same name 
and despite the opportunity given by the MoCI, the manager resisted changing 
the name of the generated knowledge in order to commercialise.  For him, 
changing the name involved the commercial cost of local demand risk, which 
would have consequently impeded him from getting his family members‘ 
satisfaction in securing quick financial gain.  He didn‘t want to be seen as cutting 
profit and spending money towards commercialising an outcome that resulted 
from research collaboration.   
‘’Industry board is quite sceptical.  They are happy with their status-quo as far 
as they are making profit.  Particularly that have board of family members and 
they want to satisfy them.  So logically the managers will target that in order to 
satisfy them.  You know the industry is nervous of doing research and being 
involved and this makes GMs ignoring the chances of innovation from those 
projects.‟‟ (PFO2, IIC) 
 
Additionally, the exaggerated risk aversion had, in the long run, impacted 
negatively on building the enterprises‘ knowledge-based capabilities, which 
constrained the businesses‘ ability to innovate and grow.   As evidenced in 
Case-C, for instance, the enterprise became deficient in in-house R&D 
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capabilities.  There is an absence of technology resources, such as research 
facilities and qualified personnel, essential in facilitating complex industrial R&D 
(TRC, 2014). The existing personnel (managers and employees) have low 
levels of education and knowledge experience, as the research ideas‘ ‗think-
tanks‘ are brainstormed by the IIC consultant.  
„‟They don‟t get the problem and discuss with us because most of them having 
low education and without knowledge experience.  We do the big think-tank. We 
do the thinking for them. They are not technical and not knowledge-based.  
They are based on certain technology rather than indigenous because they lack 
the skills and capabilities.‟‟ (PFO2, IIC) 
In short, the academics and commercial users acted in accordance with their 
perceived remunerative incentives solely due to their belief that doing otherwise 
would result in a loss.  Their orientation towards rules was such that they are to 
be broken in accordance with a calculation of material consequences.  
Therefore, rules were violated or subverted to maximize their own benefits.  
For academics, the violation of university rules was for the goal of avoiding the 
loss of retaining the benefits perceived from IIAP fund.  However, their 
preference of remunerative incentives prevailed over their professional 
obligations, which explains that the academics‘ engagement with industry and 
public funds are based on importance of securing personal benefits rather than 
maximizing the number of university patents.  This has restrained the 
university‘s control over knowledge appropriation. 
While for the commercial users, the violation of national IP rules was due to their 
family‘s long-term orientation and desire to enable business succession within 
the ranks of the family, which strengthened/reinforced the family enterprise‘s 
risk aversion, as more risk could endanger the enterprise‘s long-term survival. 
However, although family business owners and GMS may think of risk aversion 
as prolonging their enterprises, the exaggerated risk aversion caused the 
contrary: The probability of the family business‘ failure in the long-term.  Waiving 
growth opportunities due to unwillingness to take risks hindered innovation, 
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consequently compromising the long-term survivability of the family business. 
They tended to commit no investment to R&D projects and no resources for 
building knowledge-based capabilities, which led to nonexistence of innovative 
products or services, and hence to limited sales growth. 
The influence of non-commercial users’ logics: 
The analysis shows the lack of readiness and willingness of non-commercial 
users to procure or adopt the knowledge generated.  
Civil servants in public organisations systematically stick to their job descriptions 
and avoid initiatives and changes that may be seen as challenging established 
practices.  The established routine practices are institutionalised and seem to 
have predominated and reproduced throughout the administration for the sake 
of controlling a good accomplishment of assigned responsibilities.  
Concomitantly, financial auditing practices seem to have proliferated throughout 
the administration in terms of controlling good use of public money or protecting 
public funds.  The non-commercial users‘ overbearing preference of maintaining 
the accomplishment of the financial auditing practice, and as per this study, is 
linked to the fact that the production of new knowledge in Oman is still 
considered a new phenomenon20.  Therefore, the level of uncertainty of the 
outcomes generated through R&D was difficult to establish and any likelihood of 
                                                          
20
In this respect, and according to 2013 Global Innovation Index (GII), out of 141 surveyed 
countries Oman ranked 80
th
 in innovation, while being placed at a low 134
th
 for the efficiency 
ratio.  When comparing inputs and outputs innovation dimensions, Oman ranked 53
rd
 for 
innovation inputs, but was lagging behind in the indicator for innovation outputs (ranked 111
th
).  
On the input side, Oman‘s weakness appears to be on the indexes of: market sophistication 
(ranked 44
th
) and business sophistication (ranked 31
st
).  This denotes that its economy is neither 
adequately mature nor sufficiently complex.  While on the output side, Oman performed poorly 
on knowledge and technology (ranked 102
nd
), with very few innovative products such as high-
tech, patents, and technological products.  Also it performed poorly on creative outputs (ranked 
119
th
).  These include trademarks, new business models, online creativity (e.g. websites), and 
audio-visual creations.  Although these are easily produced and require less financing to gear up 
production, Oman still has few creative outputs.   
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bringing the new technology to market was required to be financed internally by 
commercial users. 
Hence, there is a degree of risk aversion as there was, as shown in cases B 
and D, a prohibitive incentive-structure for being open to new ideas and 
practices such as involvement in R&D collaboration.  This is evidenced by the 
lack of interaction of non-commercial users with other actors. The most 
straightforward signal is demonstrated by the academics‘ and funding programs‘ 
(i.e. CIIAP, ORG) difficulty in establishing early engagements with the involved 
non-commercial users.  The networks, in comparison to commercial users - as 
mentioned previously in section 4.3, were established formally through funding 
and after the knowledge were generated and became ready for 
commercialisation or application.   
The difference between commercial and non-commercial users can be 
explained by the recognition of the value and benefits of R&D interactions to 
their organisations.  For commercial users, the interaction was perceived as 
integral to their businesses.  They were more flexible and open to innovations 
as they are profit driven.  While for non-commercial users, the interaction was 
perceived as challenging since it risks their established practices.  They were 
inflexible and risk averse as they wanted to control maintaining the 
accomplishment of their routine practices.  Hence, they perceived interaction as 
a cost and resisted challenging the ‗status quo‘. 
This impacted negatively on KC and application.  In Case-D for instance, the 
non-commercial user‘s perception of R&D as a cost (since it was not assigned 
as a mandate or a routine practice within its institutional prerogatives), hindered 
the application of the generated technology within the system of local factories 
under its supervision.   
„‟In ministries research is not on their table!! This is not something that they are 
interested to do.  And if they are not interested they will not.  So we cannot 
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impose implementation of outcomes formally on them since they don‟t have it as 
a strategy or policy.‟‟ (PPMF2, TRC) 
More significantly, in Case-B, the non-commercial users‘ overwhelming 
preference to the practice of buying ready-made solutions from abroad or 
conducting any technology transfer through international trade is influenced by 
their perception of considering technology transfer as trade-based.  It is 
imported and it is always seen as cheaper and more trustworthy in terms of its 
existing successful application in developed countries.  This resulted in a lack of 
procuring local solutions.  A strong indication is their attitude of perceiving the 
generated knowledge as a cost since it was not applied successfully in 
developed countries.  
„‟They say we want you to go to UK and other European countries and apply it 
for 4-5 years then come to us with the results to make our final decision… 
because it is gona to replace the other solutions that they have and paid money 
for, and for them it is still new! And the main concern was that there is no 
country in the world that has this device, so we are the first.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
 
In summary, the non-commercial users‘ behaviour of avoiding the interaction 
with other actors within ORG and CIIAP was influenced by their risk aversion, 
which prevailed within their organisations, for the purpose of maintaining control 
over the accomplishment of the established/routine financial auditing practices.  
The proliferation of the same practices was seen/perceived as the best 
behaviour for the sake of controlling good use of public money (public fund 
protection).  Thus, there was a lesser degree of incentive-structure for being 
open to adopt new practices.  Rather than making changes, the non-commercial 
users: (1) rejected the introduction of R&D as a new practice within their 
institutional prerogatives; (2) circumvented the deviation from their routine 
practice of procuring ready-made solutions from developed countries.  
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The influence of KTOs’ logics: 
An important issue has resonated, which is inked to the university‘s policy of 
‗building patent profile‘.  The main reason for adopting such policy is related to 
the university‘s ‗low global rank‘.  In this regard, in addition to the international 
standards of accreditation programs, the university is still lagging behind in 
terms of performance and quality standards, and there is low performance in 
research and innovation.  This can be evidenced by the low number of patents. 
„‟with the GCCs yes we are one of the top universities but our rank among Arab 
universities is thirteen and our reputation internationally is very low.  This is 
clearly due to its (university) performance, particularly in research and 
innovation.  We have only two to three patents!  We are still way behind.  But we 
are working on this now.‟‟ (UO2, SQU) 
However, the findings revealed that the adoption of the ‗building patent profile‘ 
policy constrained knowledge appropriation.  The current emphasis and the 
centralisation associated with the policy have encouraged the IAD to become 
gatekeepers rather than facilitators of KC.  The department is charged with 
concentrating heavily on maximizing the number of patents and revenues from 
licensing rather than maximizing the volume of innovations brought to the 
marketplace.  This is evidenced by the mission statement, which showed 
greater focus on licensing and protection of the university‘s intellectual property 
through patenting (SQU Research Regulations, 2014).  It is also evidenced in 
the processes followed by the department.  In this respect, and with patent 
profile building as a central goal, the depiction of KC activities is portrayed as 
linear processes in which research is performed, inventions are disclosed, 
licenses are executed, income received and wealth is generated.  Hence, 
patenting and licensing of research are depicted as the only means for 
commercialising new knowledge from university to industry, whereas non-
patented innovations are ignored. 
„‟We are actually looking for putting the university in high rank.  So the recent 
concern is to focus on patented outcomes.  This will help in building our patent 
193 
 
profile which is important for getting good ranking.  It also will generate 
revenues by licensing them to industry.‟‟ (UO1, SQU) 
 
This is less the fault of the department‘s admin and more as a consequence of 
the way in which their department is structured with the existing financing and 
HR dedicated to patent-licensing and no resources dedicated to non-patented 
research outcomes - outcomes that don‘t fulfil the international patent criteria 
(enforced within the limited allocated fund). The net effect is that the department 
doesn‘t have an incentive to maximize outputs or the actual numbers of 
commercialised knowledge, as opposed to maximizing the number of patents 
and revenues earned by university. 
This consequently resulted in the emergence of a ‗home run‘ mentality, whereby 
the department becomes rigorous in enforcing patent-licensing rules.  It focused 
its limited resources (financial and HR) on knowledge and technologies that 
appear to yield the biggest payback/return.  While the outcomes that require 
more investment for development, and which have long-term potential or that 
might be useful for industry even if the return is little or nothing in the way of 
licensing fees, were overlooked entirely:   
„‟The university is actually looking for putting the university in high rank.  Good 
ranking and to compete for it.  So patents are very important.  So we need to 
build our profile in patenting…So giving us an opinion from a US patent lawyer 
and what is recommended to know if it is there or not, if not why we waste our 
money to patent it, so we are trying to avoid rejection by doing this.  The budget 
is limited so we have to be selective.‟‟ (UO2, Ln, SQU)  
This, as evidenced in Case-B for instance, frustrated academics as it 
constrained the consideration of other types of knowledge (i.e. non-patented 
outcomes such as research prototypes).  The exclusion of non-inventive 
outcomes from the university fund protection, and as a goal, had irritated 
academics as the productivity and usefulness of their research outcomes was 
not reaffirmed, consequently undermining their research capabilities.  This, in 
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the long run, will have negative consequences on knowledge commercialisation.  
It will demotivate academics as not all of them have the capability to invent. 
‟This is funny!  They rejected our application for no clear reason.  I don‟t how 
these people are thinking!! Why only inventions.  What about other outcomes? 
They are also good outcomes for universities.  They can protect and then 
license and sell them to the industry.  By this they can build good networks and 
image with industry.  But they are not doing it and this is really frustrated!‟‟ (Ac3, 
SQU) 
 
Moreover, this made the department neglect the opportunity of patenting the 
expected inventions disclosed to commercial users through IIAP funding. This, 
as shown in cases A and C, can be justified by the department‘s solid 
enforcement of licensing rules (e.g. non-exclusive license and high royalty 
payment) on users in return for IP disclosure to the university, thus losing the 
chance of safeguarding the users‘ agreement.  For users, such arrangements 
appear to involve the considerable costs of (1) inability to cover the high price of 
licensing due to their financial incapability; (2) risk of licensing the patent by the 
university to local competitors.   
„‟No, it will not be free.  Definitely they will charge us if we patent it through 
university.  These are their rules. And as I said we cannot afford the high price 
of licensing.  Why we should do that? They may will sell it to our competitors if 
we didn‟t buy it, so there is a risk.‟‟ (CU4, SMEs) 
In short, despite envisioning the innovation department as a gateway to 
facilitate the flow of knowledge, the university‘s policy (of building patent profile) 
resulted in it becoming a gatekeeper with a ‘home run‘ mentality, whereby the 
department became rigorous in enforcing patent and licensing rules.  It focused 
its limited resources (financial and HR) on knowledge and technologies that 
appear to yield the biggest returns.  This frustrated academics as it constrained 
the consideration of non-inventive generated knowledge.  It also resulted in the 
department neglecting the opportunity of getting users‘ agreement to disclose 
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the IP to the university as the enforcement of licensing rules yields high costs for 
users.  
5.7 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has compared and contrasted the four case studies with the 
objective of generating themes and patterns in the issues that resonated across 
individual cases. Consequently, a number of key themes as relates to the 
research questions have been identified. In relation to research question one; 
the analysis showed that the power exercised by actors (associated with 
establishing project rules around appropriating one logic over another) 
generated conflicts between different logics.  With regards to research question 
two; the analysis demonstrated that the action of transferring western programs 
into the Omani developing context disregarded the existence of both differences 
in logics and institutional fragmentation.  With respect to research question 
three; the analysis highlighted that the role of government as an intermediary 
assisted in some way in bridging differences.  Yet such a role was focused only 
at the beginning or the early part of the research process (collaboration and 
knowledge generation).  When knowledge commercialisation came about, 
intermediation was absent, which resulted in conflicting logics regarding 
knowledge appropriation.  Moreover, the analysis showed that the emergence of 
informal networks assisted in intermediation (logics bridging/spanning).  Yet 
again, this occurred at the beginning of the research process. This is due to the 
inability of formal networks to bridge differences in logics during knowledge 
commercialisation, because power is granted to a single actor, who might lean 
towards upholding the pre-existent logics in opposition to other logics. 
In order to address the research questions more and arrive at higher summative 
findings, the following chapter provides a further discussion through interpreting 
and linking cross-case findings to theories from the literature review (chapter 
two).  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.0 Introduction                                                                                           
This chapter presents an analysis of the cross-case findings in the context of the 
existing research related to University knowledge commercialisation in emerging 
institutional environments of knowledge production and appropriation. The 
chapter presents the major themes that emerged from the cross-case analysis 
and utilises theories and constructs from the literature review in chapter two, to 
arrive at higher summative findings.  The chapter is structured into three 
sections, with each section covering one of the three research questions in this 
study.  Thus, the first addresses the effect of power, the second section 
captures the effect of mimetic isomorphism, and the third one tackles the effect 
of intermediating on bridging differences in logics. 
6.1 Conflicting logics between U-I-G and Power Asymmetry                        
As shown in table 6.1 below, the discussion of this section is focused on the 
dominant logics as per the rules and norms represented by institutional actors 
that interact and compete with each other.  The following subsections give 
details. 
Table 6.1: The dominant logics 
Winner 
(Dominant) 
Loser 
(Non-
dominant) 
Theme Conflicting Institutional 
Logics  
Dominant 
Logic 
 
 
Academics  
Commercial 
Users 
Theme 5.3 
Case-D  
Academics‘ logic of open 
science conflicting with 
the commercial users‘ 
logic of  secrecy 
Academic 
logic of open 
science  
KTO Theme 
5.6: Cases 
A, D 
D-open science 
conflicting with KTO‘s 
goal of building patent 
profile; 
Academic 
logic of open 
science 
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A-Career progression 
conflicting with KTO‘s 
goal of building patent 
profile; (subverting the 
rules of the university) 
Academics‘ 
logic of 
career 
progression; 
Individual 
academic 
development  
KTO Academics  Theme 
5.6: Case-
B 
Building the university‘s 
patent profile conflicting 
with academics‘ interest 
of producing innovative 
outcomes, conflicting with 
commercial users‘ profit 
maximization 
KTO goal of 
building the 
university‘s 
patent profile  Commercial 
Users 
Theme 
5.6: Cases 
A, C 
Commercial 
Users  
Academics  Theme 
5.3: Case-
C 
Users‘ financial returns or 
profit maximization 
conflicting with 
academics‘ open 
science; 
Users‘ profit 
maximization 
Users‘ applied research 
and technological 
development projects 
conflicting with 
academics‘ long-term 
basic research 
Users‘ 
applied 
research and 
technological 
development 
projects 
Government 
(IIAP) 
Theme 
5.6: Cases 
A, C 
Commercial users‘ 
interest/goal of family 
business continuation; 
risk aversion (subverting 
rules) conflicting with the 
government‘s goal of 
knowledge exploitation; 
Commercial 
users‘ 
interest/goal 
of family 
business 
continuation 
Non-
Commercial 
Government 
(ORG, CIIAP) 
Theme 
5.6: Cases 
Non-for-Profit: budget 
management for the 
budget 
management 
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Users  and 
commercial 
users 
B, D purpose of public fund 
protection conflicting with 
government goal of 
knowledge 
exploitation/appropriation 
and commercial user‘s 
logic of profit 
maximization 
for the 
purpose of 
public fund 
protection 
 
Government  
University, 
represented by 
IAC 
Theme 
5.2: Cases 
A, B, D 
Government logic of 
bureaucracy conflicting 
with university logic of 
developing patent profile 
 
Government 
bureaucratic 
logics 
 Commercial 
Users and IIC-
representative 
of commercial 
users  
Theme 
5.2: Case-
C 
Government logic of 
bureaucracy conflicting 
with commercial user‘s 
logic of profit 
maximization  
Source: Author‘s research 
6.1.1 Conflicting logics between the university and users                            
In order to conduct contract R&D projects, a continued interaction process is 
required between the university and the users.  However, such interaction 
process could be impeded by conflicting institutional logics (Thornton, 2012).  
As shown in the cross-case analysis, actors brought distinct institutional logics 
to bear in their interactions, which led to differences in actions in response (Lind 
et al, 2013).  The differences in logics that faced partners during the actual 
process of conducting projects led to conflicting goals and interests 
(Bjerregaard, 2010).  For example, Case-C shows how commercial users 
(SMEs) acted according to their norms, towards profit making/maximization, in 
comparison to academics who acted in accordance with their academic norms 
towards dissemination of knowledge through publication.  Hence, the actors 
differed in their values and expectations regarding the appropriate actions for 
operating the projects.  Conflicting institutional logics that manifested in the R&D 
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projects shifted the attention of partners away from the scientific and 
technological contents and towards institutional aspects, which in turn affected 
the commercial applicability of the generated knowledge.  
Although logics differences enhance the need for negotiation and development 
of a common interpretation of the research aims and outcomes (Bjerregaard, 
2010), the pre-existing conflicting logics associated with academics‘ and users‘ 
norms were perpetuated because of power asymmetry.  It is argued that the 
rules governing the interaction within contracted R&D projects are considered 
as being forms of power (Samules, 1971), since they are socially granted 
(Schmidt, 1987).  As evidenced from the cross-case analysis, power asymmetry 
occurred as per the funding (i.e. IIAP and ORG) rules of ownership, in the view 
of the fact that the arena of interaction was structured around ‗one‘ appropriating 
logic over another.  Consequently, an actor occupied a more powerful decision-
making position than the others. Hence, rather than forming/structuring the 
interaction within projects around shared or complementary logics, pre-existing 
competing logics led to one side winning over the other.  Since actors had more 
power in (or control over) decision-making, the logics of these actors came to be 
reflected as dominant.  As shown in table 6.1.1 below, and as will be detailed 
hereafter, the appropriation of knowledge was controlled by only one of the 
parties.  There was no power balance between the university‘s and the user‘s 
logics.  In the research spectrum, the logics of the university seemed to be 
dominant.  The logics of academics and KTO had more control over the 
decisions of how to appropriate the generated knowledge.  Hence, knowledge 
appropriation was restrained by the university from the point of view of 
commercial users.  On the other side of the spectrum, commercialisation was 
based on the dominant logics of users (commercial and non-commercial).  For 
instance, the commercial users in cases A and C used IIC rules as a way to 
develop new products in order to maximize profit.  The logics of academics (i.e. 
open science, career progression through being the patent developer) were 
completely set aside.  Therefore, knowledge appropriation was restrained from 
the point of view of the academics.    
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Source: Author‘s research  
Table 6.1.1: Actors’ logics, research, and commercialisation spectrums 
Actors Actors’ institutional logics 
(How their belief systems 
shaped their behaviour?) 
Research 
spectrum 
controlled by only 
one of the parties  
Commercialisation 
spectrum 
controlled by only 
one of the parties 
Academics  1-Status in the scientific 
community (theme 5.6): 
-Career progression: open 
science: publication; patent 
developer 
-Industrial knowledge 
application  
2-Research and work 
practices (theme 5.3): 
Primary basic research; 
Long-term curiosity-driven 
research  
 
 
 
 
KTO Building the university‘s 
patent profile (theme 5.6) 
Commercial 
Users 
1-Profit maximization for the 
purpose of family business 
continuity (theme 5.6) 
2-Research and work 
practices (theme 5.3): 
Primary applied research; 
short-term research 
outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-
Commercial 
Users 
-budget management for the 
purpose of public fund 
protection (theme 5.6); non-
profit 
????  ????   
Dominated 
by 
Academics‘ 
logics 
? 
? 
Dominated 
by Users‘ 
logics 
a version of two 
logics; Logics‘ 
Convergence 
? ? 
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Thus, conflicting logics was inevitable as actors had the ability to implement 
their own logics when they conflicted with those of others (Schmidt, 1987).  
There was no chance of logics‘ convergence because actors were induced to 
work at maintaining the status quo (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) through 
preserving their pre-existing logics (Lunberg, 2013) in order to maintain their 
power.  Neither the university nor the users felt responsible for breaking down 
the logics divide.  They were complacently accepting the logic differences 
between them as inevitable.  As shown in sections 5.3 and 5.6 in the cross-case 
analysis, when logics conflicted, competition among the university (academics 
and KTO) and the users (commercial and non-commercial) was likely because 
each actor supported their pre-existing logic.  This had affected how actors 
communicated their own interests through activities that yield more benefits for 
them and their organisations.  The following provides more detail: 
First, the logic of academic professionalism conflicted with the market-like and 
market behaviour logic (Bullard, 2007, Bok, 2009). According to the funding and 
university ownership rules of waiving the decision to academics, academics, as 
powerful actors, were found likely to maintain their pre-existing logics (i.e. open 
science, career progression, and academic curiosity of knowledge application) 
to preserve their favourable exchange conditions (i.e. publication, patent 
developer, knowledge dissemination).  Academics were engaged in accordance 
with their perceived remunerative incentives solely due to their belief that doing 
otherwise would result in a loss.  Hence, their orientation towards rules was 
such that they were to be broken in accordance with maintaining their pre-
existing logics, which ultimately resulted in conflicting logics.  In Case-D, for 
instance, rather than moving away from ‗open science‘ logic to a model of 
identification, protection, and exploitation of intellectual property (Murray and 
Stern, 2007), the academics preferred preserving their pre-existent logic of open 
science (Polanyi, 1962, Fini and Toschi, 2016). Hence, the logic of open science 
became dominant, which subsequently conflicted with their university‘s logic of 
‗building patent profile‘, which consequently restrained their university‘s control 
over knowledge appropriation.  It also conflicted with the commercial users‘ logic 
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of profit maximization.  The strong open-science logic underpinning research 
practices in academic research fields was expressed in the publishing norm 
supported by peer review and resource allocation systems which are dependent 
on publication and citation (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003, Siegel et al, 2007, 
Murray, 2010, Calcagini et al, 2016).  However, the research in SMEs was close 
to the market and was guided by the commercial profit making logic (Aghion et 
al. 2008, Lacetera 2009, Calcagini et al. 2016).  Such institutional norms are 
likely referred to as sources of incentive misalignment between reputation-
based reward systems of open science and commercial requirements 
(Perkmann and Walsh, 2007).  
Second, the logic of KTO‘s patent profile development was dominant in cases A 
and C.  Since knowledge commercialisation highlights networking as being 
crucial, Knowledge Transfer Officers (KTOs) are responsible for the central 
importance of interaction by mediating the gap between the academics and 
users (Villani et al., 2017, Yusuf et al., 2008).  Therefore, and as per the 
nuanced view of the role played by KTOs, more ‗people centred‘ or relational 
linkages would be better supported by more decentralised arrangements (Gill et 
al., 2007).  However, as shown in subsection 5.6 of the cross-case analysis, 
despite envisioning KTO (represented by the Innovation Affairs Department) as 
a gateway to facilitate the flow of knowledge to industry, its goal of building a 
patent profile (which manifested as a rule) made it a gatekeeper rather than a 
gateway, whereby the department became rigorous in enforcing patent and 
licensing rules.  Rather than having an interactive model, the depiction of KC 
within KTO‘s activities was portrayed as linear processes in which research is 
performed, inventions are disclosed, licenses are executed, income is received, 
and wealth is generated (i.e. maximizing the number of patents and revenues 
earned by the university).  More importantly, this process is an internal practice 
concerned only with the university‘s interest of ‗knowledge protection‘ and 
doesn‘t involve potential users (either commercial or non-commercial) who can 
validate the commercial applicability of such inventions.  This came into conflict 
with the logic of intermediation.  As a boundary spanner, KTO is characterized 
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as a mechanism directed towards continuing to seek alignment of interests 
between its university and other actors, either internal or external.  
Nevertheless, instead of reducing distance between commercial exploitation 
and the generated knowledge, KTO focused its limited resources (financial and 
HR) on knowledge and technologies that appeared to yield the biggest returns, 
while neglecting the consideration of the non-inventive generated knowledge. 
There was distance between the research outcomes generated by academics 
and the exploitation mechanism used by KTO.  This was required to be 
mediated by commercialisation, which necessitates the development of new 
processes for exploiting non-inventive outcomes.  Furthermore, although the 
defining element of university-industry collaborations is identified as the two-
way, reciprocal dimension of engagement (Sandmann, 2007), this was not 
achieved as KTO didn‘t attempt to seek and maintain mutually beneficial 
arrangement with the commercial user.  Rather, they neglected the opportunity 
of getting the users‘ agreement in IP disclosure as the enforcement of licensing 
rules yields high costs for the users.  This came into conflict with the commercial 
users‘ logic of profit maximization. 
Third, as per the IIAP ownership rules of waiving decisions to commercial users, 
as powerful actors, users were found likely to maintain their pre-existing logics 
(i.e. profit maximization for the interest/goal of family business continuation).  
This came into conflict with the logics of research and knowledge 
commercialisation.  The users‘ orientation towards these logics was such that 
rules were to be violated or subverted to maximize profit and avoid risk, as more 
risk could endanger their family business‘ long-term survival (RW Hiebl, 2014).  
This came into conflict with the knowledge exploitation logic.  Risk aversion 
caused the contrary.  Instead of making changes, users waived growth 
opportunities (i.e. knowledge commercialisation) due to their unwillingness to 
take risks, thus compromising the long-term survivability of family business. 
They tended to commit no investment to R&D projects and no resources for 
building knowledge-based capabilities, which led to nonexistence of innovative 
products or services, and hence to limited sales growth.  The commercial users‘ 
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logic of profit maximization also came into conflict with the academics‘ logic of 
research quality (Lacetera 2009, da Silva Campose, 2015).  While commercial 
users sought profitable products in the short-term, academics prized excellent 
scientific research outcomes, which only accrue in the medium to long run 
(Bentley et al., 2015).  This gave rise to competing conceptions of time horizons 
(long-term versus short-term outcomes) and research types (basic versus 
applied).  The logics of powerful actors shaped how the knowledge could be 
appropriated and exploited mutually by the involved actors.  By preserving his 
logic of profit maximization, the user in case-C, for instance, attempted to 
maintain his advantageous conditions of secrecy or data-withholding, which are 
the conditions under which academics can appropriate generated knowledge, 
thereby reaffirming his power over the academics (Thursby and Thursby, 2007, 
Gerbin and Drnovsek, 2016). Similarly, and as per the CIIAP and ORG‘s 
ownership rule of waiving decisions to users, the logics of research and 
knowledge commercialisation were challenged by the non-commercial users‘ 
budget management for the interest/goal of public fund protection.  As 
aforementioned in subsection 2.3.2.3 of the literature review chapter, a growing 
body of empirical studies provides evidence for conflicting logics between 
commercial users and universities without referencing non-commercial users.  
This study filled this gap and gave evidence pertaining to the logics of non-
commercial users which came into conflict with other actors‘ logics.  As shown 
in section 5.6 of the cross-case analysis, the proliferation of the same practices 
was perceived as best behaviour for the sake of controlling the good use of 
public funds.  They were risk-averse as there was a lesser degree of incentive-
structure for being open to adopting practices within new logics.  Rather than 
making changes, the non-commercial users rejected the introduction of R&D as 
a new practice within their institutional prerogatives, and circumvented the 
deviation from their routine practice of procuring ready-made solutions from 
developed countries. Similarly, this conflicted with the knowledge exploitation 
logic as well as with the commercial users‘ logic of profit maximization.  As 
shown in Case-B for instance, rather than becoming interdependent, the ROP 
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was less dependent on other actors, as he perceived that there were better 
alternatives (i.e. importing from developed countries) for obtaining the same 
technology (i.e. radar device) provided by the academics and the commercial 
user.  This explains the inequality in the relative distribution of power between 
actors. The non-commercial user had more power than the other actors, to 
constrain the goal achievement (i.e. procurement of the generated technology) 
of the dependent academics and commercial user. Hence, the high degree of 
power asymmetry between actors captured the extent to which they differ in 
their power to constrain each other. Under this scenario, the dominant actor (i.e. 
non-commercial user) was motivated to preserve their pre-existing logic (i.e. 
budget management) in order to maintain the protection of public resources (i.e. 
public funds).   
By providing the above findings, the interplay in asymmetric power 
relationships, in which the generated knowledge was expected to be transferred 
(Lundberg, 2013), hampered bridging the differences in logics and the creation 
of mutually beneficial organizing structures, such as logics convergence 
(Bjerregaard, 2010).  The power asymmetry (or inequality of power distribution) 
associated with structuring interaction (i.e. established ownership rules) around 
appropriating one logic over another led to one actor winning over the other.  
This created a hindrance in knowledge commercialisation as balance between 
logics was absent.  As per the conflicting logics, the actors will not believe that 
the practices of other actors are useful and right unless they bring them 
benefits.  Therefore, for the logics of other actors to be appreciated by the 
participants, an intermediating network must be shrewdly designed in order to 
bridge the perceived gaps between institutional spheres of the university‘s 
research and the users‘ commercialisation (Håkanson et al., 2011, Villani et al., 
2017) .  For instance, an intermediating mechanism can be established whereby 
all parties relatively easily identified a shared and motivating research issue 
which could establish the foundation for stimulating the development of 
commercialised products following market-applicability logic as well as fulfilling 
the academics‘ norms of producing publishable research outcomes (Lind et al, 
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2013).  Accordingly, the involved parties might in some cases locate a shared 
research problem within ‗Pasteur‘s quadrant‘ whereby knowledge production 
can be developed within a dynamic interplay with technological innovation 
(Stoke, 1997).  Logics governing the collaboration practices of the university and 
the users will intersect giving rise to a shared and tacit understanding about the 
project.   This can be reflected, for example, by establishing flexibility and a low 
degree of formalisation within the KTO‘s contractual arrangements.  In order for 
KTOs to mediate the distance in commercial exploitation of knowledge, it needs 
to govern commercialisation by arranging with users a collective institutional 
arrangement - a cross-fertilisation format mixing their two different goals to 
achieve fairness and better results (i.e. exclusive royalty-free commercial 
license). Hence, the actors‘ behaviour could be based upon cultural 
convergence of institutional logics rather than a hindrance of knowledge 
commercialisation (Bejerregaard, 2010).  
6.1.2 Government’s bureaucratic logic against University and Industry 
logics of KC  
It is argued that the government plays a big role in promoting universities and 
industry engagements within local governance (Lawton, 2007).  Such a role is 
institutionalised through allowing universities and industry representation in local 
economic partnerships, on the boards of science and innovation councils that 
were established in order to protect the country‘s interests by strengthening 
scientific and technological research (Charles, 2003, Lawton, 2007).  In this 
context, the mechanism for participation is used to describe any activity 
associated with actors interacting with the government, where actors are 
presumed to have an equal opportunity to participate in decision-making.  
However, as shown in section 5.2 of the cross-case analysis, the concept of 
actors‘ participation and the manner in which participatory mechanisms have 
been implemented is different.  There is a domination of the bureaucratic logic 
of policymaking within the governing boards of universities and the government 
(i.e. TRC).  The counterparts of the bureaucratic logic in Oman are deeply 
rooted in the Omani tradition and political system (STIP, 2014).  All actors do 
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not participate equally, and are not given equal opportunity to be involved in the 
decision-making processes of government. There was, at first, an exclusion of 
commercial users (SMEs owner/managers) from the TRC governing board (see 
this study‘s research context, section 4.1 of chapter 4). The impact on decision-
making appears to occur only when the board members represent the right 
groups involved in the interaction.  However, the industry representation on the 
board involved individuals working only in large national companies who were 
appointed by the heads of the board on a ‗personal basis‘ and as per the 
companies‘ interests in R&D as well as experience in the field of managing 
financial institutions or public shareholding companies operating in Oman.  The 
involved large companies were not representative spokespersons for the needs 
and desires of those SMEs for whom the policies were being designed within 
the programs. The SMEs often had little impact on what was decided.  This 
resulted in the commercial users‘ inability to champion their logic of profit 
maximization through knowledge commercialisation.  Second, although the IIC‘s 
(as per the representation of its parent organisation and head-committee in the 
TRC governing board) and the IAC‘s (as per the representation of its members 
in the University Council and the university in the TRC governing board) voices 
were welcomed by the boards, they were excluded from participating in making 
final decisions.  In other words, they were not the actual decision makers in the 
policy process. The IIC and IAC were allowed to exercise only reactive, 
suggestive, or advisory roles, not actual decision-making. They plan for, rather 
than included, in the planning and decision-making process. The real decisions - 
those that ultimately become policies and programs - are made by government 
actors.  In other words, the IIC‘s and the IAC‘s efforts are considered more 
symbolic than substantive.  They merely rubber stamp the decisions made by 
government actors. The governing boards consult with them and take their 
feedback/suggestions, but do not share power with them or transfer/delegate 
power to them, to make decisions and develop policy (Abro and Benneworth, 
2007, McAdam et al, 2012, Miller et al, 2014).  For evidence see section 5.2 in 
the cross-case analysis chapter.  
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The exclusion and limited participation of actors in the governing boards is a 
result of requirements and attitudes generated by a bureaucratic structure, and 
characterizations of groups held by the main decision makers.  The 
governmental officials believe that it is their responsibility to make decisions and 
design policies for their constituents based on their designated position, their 
expertise, and their roles (Weber, 2009).  Such attitudes hinder participation 
because of the over representation of officials on governing boards.  This is in 
line with Samuels‘ (1971) second dimension of policymaking or creation of rules 
through the exercise of power.  The rules within interactions were established by 
appropriating the government‘s logic over the university‘s and the commercial 
users‘ logics.  The essential assignment of decision-making rights to high level 
governmental officials gave them the chance to become more powerful.  They 
had more control over decision-making and their logics came to be reflected as 
dominant (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  The bureaucratic logics supported by 
powerful officials contributed to preserving the ‗status quo‘ as they provided the 
bureaucratic rules of action and interaction that guided them in decision-making 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). The dominating logics of the IAC, IIC and 
commercial users aimed to push back bureaucracy exposing its negative effects 
on achieving their interests of knowledge commercialisation; while governmental 
officials (as per their over representation and position) had an interest in 
resisting the IAC‘s, IIC‘s and commercial users‘ interests and allowed 
bureaucracy to be seen as convention or the prevailing attitude. 
The exclusion of other actors, for instance, and as mentioned above, gives 
insights into how these officials viewed their bureaucratic role and where they 
limited/restrained power sharing.  More specifically, it gave the officials more 
chance to exercise purposeful power over the development of policy agendas 
and the involvement of other actors as the power was centralised with the 
governmental elite (Saad and Zawdie, 2005, Chaykina, 2012).  This was 
manifested into action in view of the fact that, as per the Royal Decree, the high-
level officials (i.e. heads of the board) had the authority to appoint actors from 
industry.  Rather than appointing SME owners/GMs, they appointed CEOs from 
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large national companies who, as aforementioned, were not representative 
spokespersons for the needs and desires of the SMEs.  Hence, it was not 
surprising to find that policies within funding programs were not aimed at 
supporting commercial users‘ commercialisation activities.  Certainly, large 
companies took the opportunity and became more driven towards their own 
agendas, while neglecting the needs of the excluded commercial users.  In this 
respect, power asymmetry had emerged due to unbalanced decision-making 
(i.e. exclusion and reduction of voices and participation of other actors).  In other 
words, there was a lack of power.  The representatives from the IIC and IAC 
tended to feel weak due to the uneven balance of information distribution.  The 
lack of transparency associated with opaque bureaucracy limited the IIC‘s and 
IAC‘s participation in the process of decision-making, consequently constraining 
their ability to operationalise the required IP according to the suggested 
commercialisation guidelines.  The exclusion of SME representatives (i.e. 
owners, GMS) made commercial users feel vulnerable due to the uneven 
balance of financial resources.  This is mainly shown by the unclear standards 
of fund allocation, which are justified by the incongruity between the different 
funding policies regulating knowledge commercialisation.  This resulted in 
restraining commercial users‘ control over achieving their goal of knowledge 
commercialisation.  For more details, see section 5.2 of the cross-case analysis. 
 
From the above, power, in the context of knowledge commercialisation, is not 
always thought about in terms of its use by one party over another.  Thus, 
supporting the inclusion of diverse actors and the substantive participation 
within governing boards are connected.  However, the rules of appropriating the 
government‘s bureaucratic logic over the university‘s and the commercial users‘ 
logics of KC resulted in power asymmetry.  This consequently allowed officials 
to exercise their power to keep their logic of bureaucracy. The taken-for-granted 
bureaucratic actions of the exclusion and limited participation of actors from 
policy-making had negative effects on knowledge commercialisation.   
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If the input of involved actors (i.e. IIC, IAC) does not make a difference or an 
impact on policies, then it makes no difference who participates as this is 
controlled by those who have more power (i.e. officials). On the other hand, if 
the actors‘ voice is significant in determining the distribution of benefits and 
burdens through policies, then all actors, especially those directly affected (i.e. 
commercial users), should have equal access to participation.  Therefore, 
sharing power does not mean that the officials (as per their position and 
representation) give up their roles and power but rather allow others to influence 
their decision-making.  In practical terms, it means that there is an interaction in 
which some decisions are made jointly and in a way that includes all actors‘ 
initiatives.  All actors commit to sharing information, giving their opinions on 
goals and developing an agreed set of actions.  This raises a question about the 
use of power in such collaborative settings, which is: ―How can power be shared 
between parties?‖ There is a need for a supportive context - a setting that allows 
room for collaboration to emerge and develop solutions as there is a relative 
power asymmetry among actors.  This requires a deliberate effort on the part of 
a powerful government. Officials may need to give up some of their autonomy in 
exchange for increased consensus.  Thus, a ‗delegation of power‘ is required.  
In this case, the role of government could be triggered to assist 
institutionalisation and the representation of all actors. 
6.2 The transferability of western models to the Omani context: Conflicting 
Logics and Institutional Fragmentation 
As knowledge commercialisation is a new phenomenon in Oman, the country is 
still seeking the best innovation and operational models to streamline the 
relation between university, industry, and government. One common approach 
of the Omani government is learning and transferring models from the West, as 
these have proven to be most successful in promoting innovation and economic 
growth. This can be linked to the concept of ‗mimetic isomorphism‘, suggested 
by DiMaggio and Powell‘s (1983), which is based on the conscious copying 
(mimesis) of structural elements of organisational arrangements that are 
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believed to achieve success and legitimacy.  As organisations encounter 
uncertainty, it becomes normal to imitate successful organisations to avoid loss.  
This is the case when the government (i.e.TRC) transferred cutting-edge 
innovation programs from the US and Canada to its local context as a way to 
foster the country‘s national innovation system.   
However, the TRC should be aware that it is not a matter of learning western 
practical and technical mechanisms, but rather the extent to which the 
institutions of these mechanisms can be transferred locally.  When the American 
and Canadian programs of funding were introduced into the Omani context, 
contextual factors inherent in the local context caused barriers for implementing 
such models.  The successful operationalisation and transfer process of these 
programs to the Omani context proved difficult due to the (1) overlooked, 
anticipated conflicting logics (Thornton et. al, 2012); (2) deep rooted 
fragmentation of the existing innovation systems (Saad and Zawdie, 2005, 
Inatrakumerd and Cristina, 2007). 
First, mimetic isomorphism, more relatedly the action of transferring cutting-
edge innovation programs from the West, made the TRC place more attention 
on homogeneity across institutional spheres and deliberate legitimization 
activities and practices (Meyer et al., 1997, DiMaggio besides and Powell, 
1983).  This is in contrast to the institutional-logics perspective, in which 
organisations are embedded in different, often conflicting, institutional logics 
(Thornton et al., 2012).  This can be evidenced in section 6.1 from the 
unbalance between academics‘ and industrial logics.  Each funding program 
presumed a logics convergence between academia and commercial users.  The 
institutionalisation of these western programs meant that academics and 
commercial users had to share certain concepts regarding knowledge 
commercialisation.  Yet, such perception gave a simplistic view of the 
institutional environment, as if these western programs became the only 
institutional order surrounding all three groups.  The rules and procedures of the 
transferred programs were considered the templates for action, which were to 
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generate unified responses that lead to isomorphism and commonality functions 
among spheres (Meyer et al., 1997, Benner and Sandstrom, 2000). Hence, the 
implications of conflict between institutional logics (Thornton et al, 2008) were 
overlooked.  This is shown by the incongruence of funding research orientation 
policies in cases C and D.  Rather than incentivising knowledge exchange 
across the logics divide, the programs‘ rules focused on supporting one logic 
over another.  In Case-C for instance, the IIAP funding program‘s research-
orientation policy was found to be aiming at encouraging applied, rather than 
basic, research.  It promoted interaction by directing academics‘ actions away 
from achieving the academic norm of ‗research quality‘, i.e. long-term benefit of 
fundamental understanding of scientific inquiry, by reason of fulfilling users‘ 
norms of short-term industrial benefit to maximize profit.  This is demonstrated 
by giving full ownership to commercial users to prevent academics from 
publishing through fulfilling their logics of secrecy and data withholding.  While in 
Case-D, the ORG funding program was applied the other way around, 
encouraging basic rather than applied research. It encouraged the interaction by 
supporting academics‘ norms of ‗open science‘ in opposition to the users‘ norm 
of ‗secrecy or data-withholding‘.  This is evidenced from the control given to the 
academics in assigning the user as an industrial consultant rather than a 
research partner in order to keep control with the academics and restrain the 
user‘s control over ownership and the type of research outcome.  In short, rather 
than becoming a source of dynamics for change towards innovation, the 
differences between institutional logics became a hindrance to knowledge 
commercialisation.  The implications of conflicts of different logics between 
multiple actors on the effectiveness of knowledge commercialisation were 
discussed more explicitly in section 6.1 previously.    
Second, there is a prevalence of institutional fragmentation21 governing the 
actions within the processes of knowledge commercialisation.  The cross-case 
                                                          
21Institutional fragmentation refers to the growing challenges to coordination among 
different institutional organisations.  It is driven by the fact that decisions are made in 
different places, and in different policy arenas in which actors from various 
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analysis demonstrated that institutional fragmentation had been a problem 
militating against the process of transferring those Western innovation programs 
(Saad and Zawdie, 2005) to Oman.  Fragmentation roots in the internal 
characteristics of bureaucracy (Saad et al, 2008, Intarakumnerd and Cristina, 
2007).   
Table 6.2: Actors’ Institutional Fragmentation  
Actors Fragmented 
responsibilities 
Consequence 
of 
fragmentation 
 
Implication on KC 
Between government 
and university: 
The responsibility of filling 
the gap of expertise is 
fragmented between 
different governmental 
agencies: TRC, MoCI, and 
the university (as a public 
one); explained by the 
separated contracted 
policies with different 
international IP countries, 
Organisations 
became self-
contained when 
acting in 
response to 
needs;    
 
Created material 
and functional 
overlaps between 
government and 
university; 
consequently, lack 
of experts; 
Incompletion of 
provision of 
resources and 
guidelines 
necessary for 
academics and 
users to take action. 
 
Government/University 
and international 
companies 
The responsibilities of 
invention prototyping and 
patenting and assessment 
is fragmented, which can 
be explained by the 
absence of the physical 
presence of experts in the 
country; 
Adverse impact 
on university‘s 
ability to support 
the systematic 
development of 
inventions and 
the fund‘s 
incapability of 
supporting the 
systematic 
assessment of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
organisations participate (decisions might have been made in arenas ranging from the 
international to the regional or local level).  Hence, the institutional setting in which 
problems are resolved and managed is highly fragmented.   
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patents. 
Government and non-
commercial users 
The responsibility of 
knowledge 
application/procurement is 
fragmented between TRC 
and non-commercial users;  
Misalignment 
between rules 
and actions had 
emerged as the 
visions and goals 
of the involved 
governmental 
organisations 
were not aligned 
with TRC policy; 
Hindrance to the 
successful 
commercial 
exploitation of the 
generated 
knowledge. Government and other 
governmental units:  
The responsibility of 
IP/patenting assessment is 
fragmented between TRC 
and MoCI,  
Between funding 
programs within 
government: 
The responsibility of 
incentivising the exchange 
between academics and 
the commercial user is 
fragmented 
Theme 5.1: 
Incongruence 
policies: 
-Incongruent 
policies of 
knowledge 
users‘ 
involvement in 
the process; 
absence of role 
of intermediary  
-Incongruent 
policies of 
research 
orientation and 
fund-allocation; 
hindered the 
balancing of 
academics‘ 
values and 
commercial 
users‘ needs. 
hindered the 
production of 
research outcomes 
that has potential for 
commercialisation 
Source: Author‘s research  
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As shown in table 6.2 and sections 5.1 and 5.4 in the cross-case analysis, the 
responsibility of addressing problems was fragmented among different 
governmental bodies, such as the university, TRC, MoCI, and non-commercial 
users (Saad et al., 2008, Chaykina, 2012).  Each organisation has an 
independent policy space and functional areas.  They each make their own 
policy agendas within their field and attempt to enhance the utilisation of 
resources (HR and financial) to accomplish their policy objectives. With regards 
to the matter of lack of collective action and coordination, organisations 
preserve their strength through utilising the available resources to achieve their 
own objectives.  As the governmental organisations in this study (i.e. university, 
TRC, MoCI, and non-commercial users) were involved in such scenarios, 
various problems, relevant to fragmented government, emerged and drawbacks 
in knowledge commercialisation resulted as well.  These are now discussed:  
Despite their involvement in the governing boards and attempts to address 
problems jointly, the TRC, MoCI and university were found to remain locked in 
old logics of bureaucracy (Chaminade and Vang, 2006).  Their mind-sets were 
much preoccupied by the deep rooted concepts of rigid models of interaction 
(Inatrakumerd and Cristina, 2007).  The findings in section 5.4 for instance show 
how the TRC, MoCI and university became self-contained when acting in 
response to needs.   They believe that they can solve the issue of lack of 
expertise on their own without coordinating and interacting with each other, but 
they ultimately failed to fulfil these needs. In this respect, the responsibility of 
filling the gap of expertise was fragmented between these organisations due to 
bureaucracy, which, by drawing rigid boundaries between them, accounted for 
operating in isolation (Saad and Zawdie (2005).  Rather than recruiting experts, 
the organisations signed separate contracts with different IP companies from 
different countries.  This created material and functional overlaps.  Repetition 
wastes resources (such as public funds). Additionally, it might generate 
confusion and conflict as different rules inherent in those contracts are copied 
and applied. Hence, instead of having different contracts, they could sign a 
single contract to tackle the issues of repetition/redundancy and incoherency of 
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policies. Even if organisations did have joint contracts, another element of 
fragmentation emerged as the overemphasis on professional interference is still 
a common practice by all.  When these organisations borrow or rent experts 
from developed countries, they should be aware that it is not the attainment of 
guidelines, but rather the physical presence of those experts within Oman that is 
most significant.  However, this was neglected, which had an adverse impact on 
what happened on the ground. The lack of direct and regular communication 
and guidance negatively affected the processes of inventions prototyping and 
patenting, which constrained the provision of resources (experts) and the 
guidelines necessary for academics and users to take action.   
Secondly, the findings in section 5.5 show how fragmentation associated with 
bureaucracy caused misalignment between rules and actions.  The visions and 
goals of the involved governmental organisations were not aligned with the 
national policy designed either by the central government or TRC.  The 
responsibility of patent assessment was fragmented between the TRC and 
MoCI, which caused misalignment between the actions of the fund-operator and 
the IP rules of the MoCI with regards to patenting. A collision of two IP elements 
(Omani Halwa Trade-Secret and Patenting) emerged.   Additionally, not 
specifically referring to governing boards, the responsibility of knowledge 
commercial exploitation (application and procurement) was fragmented between 
the TRC and non-commercial users (ministry and ROP), which caused a 
misalignment between the actions of the non-commercial users and the TRC‘s 
policy of knowledge exploitation.  Such misalignments were linked to the lack of 
assigning R&D and innovation as a mandate within those organisations‘ formal 
institutional prerogatives.  These findings explain that bureaucracy logic has 
been aggravated by a climate of caution, which has prevailed in the public 
organisations as civil servants systematically stick to their job descriptions and 
avoid initiatives and changes that may be seen as challenging established 
practices.  The established routine practices are institutionalised and seem to 
have predominated and reproduced throughout the administration. 
Concomitantly, the overbearing preference of maintaining the accomplishment 
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of bureaucratic practices seems to have proliferated throughout the 
administration‘s work for the sake of controlling and accomplishing assigned 
responsibilities (STIP, 2014).  However, such culturally embedded bureaucratic 
rigidity generated fragmented governance, which hindered the 
commercialisation of generated knowledge.   
From the above, the overlooked conflicting logics and the prevalence of 
institutional fragmentation have been the problems militating against the 
successful transfer and operationalisation process of Western programs in 
Oman, consequently hindering the production of research outcomes that have 
potential for commercialisation.  First, the action of transferring programs gave a 
simplistic view of the institutional environment.  It presumed logics convergence 
between academia and users and overlooked the embeddedness of actors 
within different, often conflicting, logics.  This resulted in the unbalancing 
between academics‘ and industrial logics.  Second, the domination of 
bureaucratic logics within the TRC, MoCI, University, and non-commercial users 
meant that the interacting actors hardly ever discussed and negotiated the 
practices governing their actions in resolving problems.  Bureaucracy was 
recognized as natural practice, which resulted in fragmented actions and 
policies, and the actions required to resolve problems were scattered across 
different governmental organisations.  Despite their involvement in the 
governing boards, problems were still resolved independently.  There were no 
shared or joint policies that tackled the systematic, micro-level problems in 
practice.  As per this section‘s findings, actors faced joined-up problems, which 
could not be simply separated and divided into departments or organisations.  
These problems were often cross-boundary and could not be solved by one 
sector or department independently (Chaminade and Vang, 2006, Chaykina, 
2012). 
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6.3 Intermediating and Networking 
The aim of the discussion in this section is twofold: (1) identifying the creation of 
intermediating activities that mediate different logics as the key to enhancing the 
knowledge commercialisation process; (2) identifying the factors that restrained 
intermediating activities‘ within the process.  
Figure 6.1 the issue of intermediating and networking 
  
  
Attempts/ Initiatives  
Dissimilarity between 
bureaucratic policy-
making and democratic 
policy -making 
Academia and Users 
competing/conflicting 
institutional logics  
Fragmented 
Government   
Intermediating 
Networks   
Intermediary    
Missing    Missing    
Networks    
Formal Informal Logics 
Convergen
ce  
Insufficient or 
Absent   
Logic Convergence 
through experimental 
collective activities 
Conflicting/Competing 
Logics due to absence of 
collective activities and 
power asymmetry 
How actors tried to overcome the issues: 
Source: Author‘s research  
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6.3.1 The Role of government as an intermediary 
The cross-case analysis (section 5.1) illustrates the emergence of the 
government‘s role as an intermediary.  As mentioned in section 2.4 of the 
literature review chapter, a key concept that could be applied to the intermediary 
is Burt‘s (1992) notion of structural holes.  The establishment of a bridge spans 
what would otherwise be a structural hole in the surrounding network of actors 
within a system (Burt, 2005).  The analysis in cases A and C shows that the 
government acted as a broker by facilitating participation and connecting 
otherwise disconnected actors (Burt, 2005, Howells, 2006).  Its bridging role of 
establishing a direct interaction and communication improved the 
connectedness between enterprises and academics.  The findings in both 
cases, as discussed hereafter, show how the IIC‘s consultant assisted in 
engaging enterprises (i.e. commercial users) and academics individually to 
obtain their inputs and discover commonalty in needs and interests (Hakanson 
et al., 2011).  In Case-C for instance, the IIC did not only collect information but 
also identified new opportunities for cooperation between academics and 
enterprises.  The IIC generated value through match-making between 
academics and enterprises that were not previously aware of one another (Burt, 
2005, Nakwa and Zawdie, 2015).  In this respect, the IIC provided a 
compensating mechanism for weaknesses and lack of domestic capability 
(‗holes‘).  Such a role was achieved as the IIC was designed to fill the gaps22 
                                                          
22
The IIC is designed to find out and fill the gaps within both enterprises and universities.  The 
decision of establishing the centre was mainly derived from studying and revising the Omani 
industry in the late 90s and early 2000.  In 2007, a survey was conducted by the TRC, from 
which they found that many enterprises situated in Oman‘s major industrial estates don‘t 
conduct any research with academia (IIC annual evaluation report, 2014).  In addition, they were 
without ‗in-house‘ investigative facilities and without channels to access universities.  They didn‘t 
have access to academic laboratories, essential for conducting R&D. Additionally, enterprises 
lacked the qualified personnel necessary to facilitate complex industrial R&D.  At the same time, 
the IIC also wants to encourage universities to provide these resources to enterprises by 
conducting applied research.  So they communicated with the different universities to find out 
about the types of research.  They found that most research was basic research rather than 
applied (ibid, pg.5).   
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within both SMEs and universities. Compensating mechanisms were 
established as weaknesses and appeared in the form of a lack of SME 
competence and a lack of applied research capability in the relevant part of the 
academic system.  In the same case, the lack of information on which 
academics undertake relevant research and the lack of opportunities to meet 
potential partners were identified as weaknesses for both to enter into 
collaboration.  The IIC compensated such weakness by increasing the chances 
of both for finding a research partner, which assisted in reducing research costs 
(Kodama, 2008).  For example, it assisted SMEs in finding solutions to problems 
by contacting IIC agents (i.e. ITAs) within universities, which consequently 
helped in obtaining local services with lower consultancy fees as well as in 
delivering the accurate information necessary for generating knowledge.  This 
was done through providing SMEs with meeting opportunities and, mostly, 
though directly coordinating R&D consortia to bring together academics and 
enterprises that have the necessary knowledge, technologies, and other 
important resources for targeted research issues.  IIC intermediation was also 
achieved through mediation in which it assisted academics and SMEs in 
exploring the benefits of cooperation and information exchange (Hakanson et 
al., 2011).  As evidenced, both parties (academics and enterprises) in cases A 
and C were positioned to benefit.  While the academics had the opportunity to 
secure a substantial amount of funds or additional income for themselves and 
their university, the user had the chance to generate new knowledge (i.e. new 
product or system development) without incurring any financial liability (i.e. free 
consultancy through the incentive of in-kind contribution).  For more details, see 
cross-case analysis table 5.1 and section 5.1.  
More importantly, the IIC brokerage and bridging role appeared to involve a 
value-added element specifically described as bridging differences in logics 
between academics and commercial users (Villani et al, 2017, Reich-Graefe, 
2016).  The building of networks through matchmaking and mediation opened 
possibilities for ‗knowledge arbitrage‘ through new combinations of existing 
knowledge (Burt, 2005, Johnson, 2008), consequently converging academic 
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and commercial logics around complementary norms. The IIC assisted in 
saving the accomplishment of the Case-A project, which was technically 
successful, through negotiating the terms of R&D projects including IP rights 
with academics and SMEs, it also helped in mediating their dispute and 
eventually acted as an arbitrator (Johnson, 2008).  It is argued that the role of 
the mediator in conflict resolution implies that the two actors are of a different 
nature and that some translation of the interests of one of the actors is needed 
for the other actor and vice versa (Van der Meluen et al., 2005).  In this respect, 
the IIC coordinated and negotiated the asymmetric information through giving 
actors the chance to talk to each other, thereby allowing them to resolve the 
dispute themselves.  In the interim, it managed the mediation session through 
creating awareness about compensating mechanisms (incentives) while 
remaining impartial.  In this role, the IIC was acting as a channel and selection 
aid to actors, which assisted actors in reaching a satisfactory agreement.  The 
incentive of becoming the patent-developer satisfied the academics‘ logic of 
career progression through individual development, while the financial incentive 
of in-kind contribution and ownership rules satisfied the commercial users‘ logic 
of profit maximization.  This assisted in reducing bargaining costs (Kodama, 
2008) and bridging differences between the two logics (Lind et al, 2013, Villani 
et al, 2017).  Hence, the gap of conflicting logics was bridged and a balance 
between actors‘ interdependency and independency (traditional role) was 
achieved (Etzkowitz, 2008), which ultimately facilitated knowledge co-production 
(Lundberg, 2013).  This is evidenced in Case-A by the cooperation instigated 
between the factory and the academics in the joint production of inventive 
outcomes or inventions.  The IIC acted as a boundary spanner through 
smoothing, encouraging, and coordinating the practical interaction during 
knowledge production.  It pooled ideas, converged interests, and ensured 
semantic translation of domain-specific knowledge, consequently bridging the 
various involved logics (Lundberg, 2013, Van der Meluen et al., 2005) of 
academics‘ curiosity and the factory‘s profit maximization.  Given the above, the 
role of the government as an intermediary assisted in establishing a bridge that 
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spanned what would otherwise be structural holes (Burt, 2005) in the context 
characterised by logics incongruence.  Searching and matching partners across 
industry and university boundaries, as well as the provision of beneficial 
incentives, assisted more effectively than individual actors can do on their own.  
When research is conducted, academics and firms are usually looking for 
sense-making triggers and need to face new logics. Intermediaries were found 
to be well situated in reducing cognitive distance as they facilitated the 
production of knowledge with potential for commercialisation through joining 
together individuals from various worlds and reconciling their different logics 
(Villani et al, 2017).  Nevertheless, as the above findings show, the role of the 
intermediary was found to be only conformant to the IIAP (operated by IIC) 
rather than across the funding programs.  This was demonstrated by the 
incongruity between the programs and the absence of mediating activities.  As 
shown in section 5.1 of the cross-case analysis, in comparison to the IIAP 
program in cases A and C, the design of programs in cases B (CIIAP) and D 
(ORG) is not aimed at supporting the business sectors‘ innovation needs or 
efforts.  None of these programs included mechanisms to involve commercial 
users (i.e. local SMEs) directly in their design or performance to exploit 
innovation potentials from conducted research.  Instead, the involvement of 
users was driven and controlled by the academics as per their research agenda 
and interests.  In Case-D for instance, since role of the intermediary wasn‘t 
included as a mandate within ORG, conflicting logics between the academics 
and commercial users (academics‘ logic of ‗open-science‘ versus commercial 
users‘ profit maximization) emerged.  Additionally, in Case-B, conflicting logics 
between commercial users and non-commercial users (non-commercial users‘ 
logic of budget management versus commercial users‘ logic of profit 
maximization) emerged as the role of intermediary wasn‘t considered as a 
mandate within the CIIAP institutional prerogatives.   
More significantly, the analysis in cases A and C shows that the IIC‘s 
intermediating activities were insufficient. As presented in table 6.3.2 below, 
there is still a need for a more bridging role as academics and commercial users 
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negotiated and reflected upon conflicting logics.  In Case-A for instance, the IIC 
carried out its intermediating activities only when the research was conducted.  
Efforts for improving and correcting individuals‘ ways of understanding how to 
approach each other‘s logics throughout the entire process of KC (Villani et. al, 
2017) were absent.  Conflicting logics regarding knowledge appropriation 
emerged when the action of commercialisation had taken place.  Although it 
was decided that the generated knowledge was to be owned by the user, with 
recognition of patent development given to academics, the user subverted such 
rules by refusing to go through the patenting process.  As a powerful actor, the 
user was found likely to maintain his pre-existing logic (i.e. profit maximization 
for the interest/goal of family business continuation).  This came into conflict 
with the academics‘ logic of building self-esteem through career progression.  
For academics, the disclosure of their IP to the commercial user involved the 
potential of losing the opportunity of gaining the perceived benefit of having the 
credit of becoming patent developers.  Furthermore, it is argued that the role of 
an intermediary depends on the possibility of freeing itself from the direct 
interest of a specific actor (Van der Meulen et al, 2005).  However, although the 
IIC attempted to remain unbiased, it didn‘t free itself from the direct interests of 
the commercial users as per its assigned responsibility of focusing on the 
achievement of SMEs‘ logic of profit maximization.  In Case-C for instance, 
there was a need for greater effort as conflicting logics existed, with regards to 
the time-scale of the research outcomes, before signing the contracts. While the 
commercial user sought profitable products in a short-time, academics prized 
excellent scientific research outcomes which only accrue in the medium to long 
run. 
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Table 6.3.1 Government Intermediating dimensions identified in the study 
 Intermediating Dimensions 
(examples from the cases) 
Consequences  
Compensating 
mechanism for 
weaknesses 
Theme 5.1: IIAP (Case-C): the 
advantage of reducing search 
costs: the IIC consultants 
assisted SMEs in finding 
solutions to problems by 
contacting university academics.  
This assisted SMEs in obtaining 
local services with lower 
consultancy fees and in 
delivering the accurate 
information necessary for 
generating knowledge.  This was 
done through providing SMEs 
with information, meeting 
opportunities, and, mostly, 
directly coordinating R&D 
consortia to bring together 
university researchers and firms 
that have the necessary 
knowledge, technologies, and 
other important resources for 
targeted research themes.  While 
for academics it assisted them in 
engaging users in their academic 
research. 
Its bridging role improved 
the connectedness 
between academics and 
commercial users and 
facilitated the diagnosing 
of needs and the 
stimulation of the search 
for solutions;  
 
Compensating 
mechanism for 
resolving conflicting 
logics: Logics bridging: 
R&D project was 
formed when logics of 
academics and 
commercial users 
regarding KC were 
bridged 
Theme 5.1: IIAP (Case-A): the 
advantage of reducing bargaining 
costs to reach a satisfactory 
agreement between the two 
parties: the IIC consultants 
coordinated and negotiated the 
asymmetric information and 
transaction costs through 
creating awareness about the 
incentives provided for both (i.e. 
the financial incentive of in-kind 
contribution, and the incentive of 
becoming the patent-developer) 
mitigated the users‘ uncertainty 
arising from being involved in 
R&D and shunned the potential 
conflict of IP disclosure. 
Source: Author‘s Research  
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Table 6.3.2 The Overlooked intermediating dimensions identified in the study 
 Examples from the cases Consequences  
IIC, insufficient efforts, 
as the mediating 
activities were not taken 
into account before 
signing the R&D 
contract; 
Theme 5.3, Case-C: 
conflicting logics in 
knowledge creation, 
specifically about the type 
of research outcomes; 
While the user sought 
profitable products in the 
short-term, academics 
prized excellent scientific 
research outcomes which 
only accrue in the medium 
to long run.  Hence, time 
was a key element for the 
user whereas quality was 
vital for the academics.  
It had constrained the 
production of outcomes that 
have the potential for 
commercialisation, 
additionally it restrained 
knowledge 
commercialisation; As 
conflicting logics had 
emerged, and both 
academics and users were 
inherently incentivised 
towards different interests. 
Absence of 
intermediating 
activities, as the role of 
intermediary wasn‘t 
included as a mandate 
within the ORG and 
CIIAP; 
Theme 5.3, Case-D, 
conflicting logics in 
knowledge appropriation: 
(Academics‘ logic of ‗open-
science‘ versus the 
commercial user‘s logic of 
profit maximization) While 
the intrinsic aspect of the 
academics‘ reward system 
was based on establishing 
IP priority through 
publications, the user 
sought profit maximization 
by safeguarding IP through 
data-withholding or 
outcome non-disclosure. 
Absence of 
intermediating 
activities, The R&D 
projects were not formed 
when interests 
converged; Gaps were 
not bridged through 
transferring and adapting 
information and 
adjusting the framing to 
different institutional 
logics 
Cross referencing with the 
issue of conflicting logics 
between the university and 
users (sub-section 6.1.1) 
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From the above, intermediation is usually referred to as one of the processes 
of the dispute resolution spectrum in which the intermediary brings two parties 
together with the aim of reaching a mutual agreement throughout the process 
(Van der Meulen et al, 2005, Intarakumnerd (2010).  Hence, it is working 
through logic differences, and towards a satisfactory resolution that is likely to 
strengthen the relationship during the project operation, which in sequence 
encourages norms tolerance among academics and users (Lind et al, 2013, 
Saad et al, 2008, Van der Meluen et al., 2005).  However, as discussed above, 
the role of the government as an intermediary provided insufficient activities 
(within the IIC) related specially to bridging logic differences and nurturing 
cooperation.  There were, however, a few positive implications, for example 
there was a small but explicit attempt to enhance the interaction between the 
academics and commercial users in cases A and C, in which joint production 
activities and logics convergence were created initially.  Minimal progress in 
interactions and better relations between actors were established by the IIC, but 
only when the research was conducted, hence, a minor change in logics‘ 
transformation was created throughout the process.  When the 
commercialisation action was taking place, rather than reforming the interaction 
around complementary norms, the competition between logics led to one side 
winning over the other, and the arena of interaction was structured around the 
winning dominant logic (for more details see the above sub-section 6.1.1 of this 
chapter).  The arrangements that offer a countervailing force to the imposition of 
new normative logics in order to reach convergence (Bjerregaard, 2010) were 
overlooked as the competing interests of actors were not disconnected or 
detached from the pre-existing institutional logics.  Hence, it is necessary to 
extend intermediating activities in order to blur and overlap logics between 
academia and commercial users.  This spans boundaries as it facilitates a short 
institutional distance between the parties‘ shared understanding and 
expectations. 
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6.3.2 The Role of Networking 
It is argued that how and where people do things together matters (Hallett and 
Ventresca, 2006).  The cross-case analysis, section 5.3, shows how different 
types of networks (informal and formal) enabled or constrained actors in 
undertaking different forms of institutional work.  The conditions within these 
different types of networks motivated actors to take actions aimed at either 
creating complementary logics or maintaining pre-existing ones (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999, Lunberg, 2013).  Evidently, as will be discussed hereafter, the 
conditions within the emergent informal networks assisted in enabling 
academics and commercial users to create complementary knowledge about 
their respective R&D projects‘ practices and responsibilities.  On the other hand, 
the conditions within the formal networks instigated by the government 
motivated the academics and users (commercial and non-commercial) to 
maintain the status quo or preserve their pre-existing logics, as the findings 
show that the academics and users negotiated and reflected upon conflicting 
logics.  The following gives more details. 
Informal Networks and bridging differences in logics: 
The emergence of an informal, un-scripted type of network facilitated the 
collective experimentation process, inducing actors to feel free to communicate 
openly and experiment.  The academics and commercial users in cases A and 
B for instance, felt free to engage in collective activities wherein trial-and-error 
processes of negotiation and adaptation to new information about each other 
came about.  When the research was conducted, the actors socialised and got 
to know each other and how to work together.  The collective activities 
underlying trail-and error processes led to advantages where synergies from 
pooling resources and know-how became more significant than independence 
(Slavtchev, 2013).  Hence, resources (structural and cognitive) available 
through the structure of networks were shared, which gave the academics and 
the users the opportunities to recognize their common interests in ensuring 
knowledge proximity, particularly, similarities in what they produced and how 
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they produced it.  In both cases, when the research was conducted, the 
academics and users worked collectively in guaranteeing the congruence of the 
expected generated knowledge with the users‘ business production line.  In 
Case-A for instance, the academics shared their research labs and research 
experience, while the factory shared its personnel, tools, machinery, materials, 
equipment, research labs, and professional experience in order to ensure the 
congruence between the nature of the outcomes (generated recipe) and the 
nature of the products that were used to produce, sell, and market.  This led to 
the development of clear role expectations (Lind et al, 2013), which form the 
initial structure for knowledge commercialisation.  Academics, as knowledge 
providers, and the factory, as the knowledge user, worked jointly to ensure the 
production of a recipe that has potential for commercialisation.   
It is argued that different institutional logics are likely to hinder knowledge 
exchanges between actors by causing misunderstanding and conflicts 
(Thornton et al., 2012, Lind et al, 2013, Siegel et al, 2003, Gassol, 2007, da 
Silva Campos, 2015).  However, when the research was conducted, diverse 
actors (i.e. academics and commercial users) engaged in ‗co-production‘ 
activities (i.e. ensuring knowledge proximity), which consequently assisted in the 
emergence of complementary, balanced norms.  As academics and commercial 
users in both cases A and B listened and paid attention to each other, they 
gained an understanding of their different logics, hence becoming better able to 
communicate and link their diverse logics in ways that covered and redefined 
the demands of the new situation.  Therefore, the activity of ensuring knowledge 
proximity worked as a basis for mutual understanding and communication 
(Slavtchev, 2013).  Such activity helped in converging the academics‘ and 
commercial logics around complementary norms. In Case-A, for instance, the 
academics‘ norm of curiosity and discovery-driven research was balanced with 
the commercial users‘ norm of profit maximization.  Whilst in Case-B, the user‘s 
norm of profit making through gaining exclusive license was balanced also with 
the academics‘ logic of individual career progression in becoming the patent 
owner.  In this respect, the academic logic converged towards the commercial 
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logic as academics put their efforts into producing commercially viable 
knowledge, while the commercial logic converged towards the academic logic 
as the user allowed the academics to carry out trial-and error experimentation, 
shared his resources, and most importantly built up the academics‘ careers 
through allowing them to become the patent owner. 
The bridging of academic and commercial logics around complementary norms 
during research performance helped in generating inventive research outcomes 
that have potentiality for commercialisation.  In other words, as per Stokes 
(1997) ‗quadrant of university-industry links‘, the academics and commercial 
user possessed complementary knowledge (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000, 
Etzkowitz, 2003, Kitagawa, 2010) as knowledge was integrated by converging 
the different logics required for developing the requisite new products.  
Complementary knowledge was accomplished by generating a consensus on 
the domain of the actors‘ cooperation, which established a complementary norm 
of knowledge production and appropriation.  Hence, uncertainty was reduced.  
For instance, in Case-B, instead of perceiving the collaborative project simply as 
a means to gain new technological products for profit, the SME owner utilised 
the network as a measure to exploit the legitimacy and goodwill produced from 
the project to stimulate shared meaning about the goals and objectives of the 
collaboration. This consequently assisted in converging the user‘s logic of profit 
maximization (i.e. gaining exclusive license) with the academics‘ logic of 
individual career progression (i.e. becoming the patent owner). 
Building on the above findings, the study shows how the collective activities 
underlying the research performance (i.e. the trail-and error process) within the 
emergent informal networks assisted in intermediating between the academics 
and the commercial users.  The engagement in co-production activities (i.e. 
ensuring knowledge proximity) made the academics‘ and the commercial users‘ 
previously existing logics (that were shaped by their respective institutional 
spheres) less salient (Thornton et al, 2012), encouraging them to try out 
alternative choices of actions and experiment with new activities, which in turn 
231 
 
shaped the likelihood of logics convergence between them.  The convergence 
around complementary norms, in other words, the balance between academic 
norms (i.e. basic, curiosity and discovery-driven research, career progression 
through becoming the patent developer/owner) and commercial norms (i.e. 
profit making and maximization), was created.  Consequently, complementary 
knowledge was generated through creating a consensus about their respective 
practices and responsibilities, which established complementary norms.  In 
Case-A for instance, when the research was conducted, the basic/scientific 
research outcome was translated into application.  While a high level of 
scientific knowledge was required within the interaction, the commercial users‘ 
needs were identified and associated collectively during the incremental 
development of ideas.  In this scenario, the academics and commercial users 
combined the diverse logics to their pre-existing logics (that previously 
socialised in their institutional spheres).  The logics converged into a novel way 
(i.e. Stokes ‗Pasteur quadrant, Use-Inspired basic research).  Subsequently, the 
production of research outcomes that have the potential for commercialisation 
as a means to reduce the impact of conflicting logics (Thornton et al, 2012, 
Bjerregaard, 2010) was achieved, and the interests of both parties were best 
aligned (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008).   
Formal Networks as a hindrance in bridging differences in logics: 
On the other hand, the analysis in cases C and D shows that the formal, 
governmentally scripted nature of networks (i.e. transferred IIAP, ORG 
programs) obstructed the collective experimentation process, deterring some 
actors, and making them feel too restricted to communicate openly and 
experiment (Boschma, 2005).  The processes within R&D projects followed a 
hub approach where the actors in the network interacted with the government 
agent, but only less directly (as in Case-C) or indirectly (as in Case-D) with each 
other.  In comparison to cases A and B, preconditions and motivations were not 
integrated when the research was conducted as both parties (i.e. academics 
and commercial users) didn‘t experience common interests as stimulators for 
231 
 
cooperation.  The process of incremental development, by which the parties get 
to know each other and learn how to work together, as strategies necessary for 
reducing the impact of institutional tensions or gaps, was neglected.  Therefore, 
as the perception of the need for collaboration was created by the government, 
the academics‘ and the commercial users‘ complementary norms and role 
expectations to the relationship (Lind et al, 2013) within such networks were 
likely less.  In other words, as positive loops were not established in the early 
stages, alliance activities, as discussed hereafter, were rapidly waned due to 
conflicts of logics (Lee, 2011).   
Although logic differences within networks enhance the need for negotiation and 
development of a common interpretation of the research aims and outcomes 
(Bjerregaard, 2010, Sauermann and Stephan, 2013), conflicting logics 
associated with academics‘ and users‘ norms still emerged due to the funding 
programs‘ isomorphic features and their presumption of homogeneity across 
institutional spheres (for more details see the above section of 6.2), and more 
importantly, due to the power asymmetry among actors (for more details see the 
above section of 6.1).  This highlights the tendency of networks,  that emerged 
through formal linkages, to pose barriers towards reciprocal partnerships as 
logic differences in values and priorities distorted the perception about the work 
of each counterpart (Boschma, 2005, Lee, 2011).  As evidenced previously in 
section 6.1, the arena of interaction within these networks was structured 
around putting one appropriating logic over another.  Power asymmetry 
emerged according to funding-IIAP and ORG-rules of waiving ownership to a 
particular party.  Consequently, the bridging of logic differences was overlooked 
as one actor occupied a more powerful position than others with regards to IP 
decision-making.  Actors were more motivated towards preserving their own 
logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, Lunberg, 2013) in order to maintain power 
over ownership.  In Case-D for instance, according to the ORG rule of waiving 
the decision of ownership to the academics, the powerful actor (i.e. academics) 
were found likely to maintain their pre-existing logics (i.e. open science) in order 
to preserve their favourable exchange condition (i.e. publication).  Another 
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example is in Case-C, as per the IIAP rule of waiving decision of ownership to 
the medium enterprise, where the GM had the power to preserve their profit 
maximization logic through imposing their norm of short-term applied research 
in opposition to the academics‘ norm of long/medium term basic research. This 
hampered the achievement of a mutual adaption as no consensus was 
generated on the domain of collaboration.  Complementary knowledge 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000, Kitagawa, 2010) was not possessed by the 
actors as knowledge was not integrated through combining different types of 
knowledge (i.e. Stoke‘ pasture quadrant, user-inspired research of basic 
curiosity-driven, and applied needs-driven). For evidence see sections 5.3 and 
5.6 in the cross-case analysis. 
Moreover, the structure of formal networks is based on actors‘ interdependency 
(Vlaar et al., 2007).  Interdependence exists when one actor doesn‘t control the 
conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the 
outcome desired from the action (Pfeffer and Salank, 1978).  However, power 
asymmetry captures the extent to which actors differ in their power to constrain 
each other, consequently explaining the inequality in the relative distribution of 
dependencies between actors.  When the action of commercialisation was 
taking place, the logics of the dominant/powerful actors shaped how the 
generated knowledge could be appropriated and exploited by the involved 
actors.  Rather than becoming interdependent (Etzkowitz, 2004, Bekkers and 
Freitas, 2008), one actor was less dependent on the other actor and vice versa.  
For example, in Case-D, the non-commercial user was less dependent on the 
academics and the commercial user, as he perceived that there were better 
alternatives (i.e. importing from developed countries) for obtaining the same 
technology (i.e. radar device) that was to be provided by the academics and 
commercial user.  This constrained the procurement of the generated 
technology, consequently hindering knowledge commercialisation. 
 
In accordance with the above, conflicting logics explained the inability of 
formal networks in overcoming major institutional constrains.  The bridging of 
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differences and creation of mutually beneficial organizing structures, such as 
logics convergence, were hampered as power was socially granted (Samules, 
1971, Schmidt, 1987) to an individual actor who was inclined to preserve his/her 
pre-existing logics over others logics.  
6.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has interpreted the findings of the cross-case analysis in the 
context of the existing literature with the aim of addressing the research 
questions posed. 
Although differences in logics increase the need for negotiation and 
development of a common interpretation of the research projects‘ aims and 
outcomes, the findings show that bridging differences in logics is hindered by 
asymmetric power relationships.  The power asymmetry associated with 
structuring interaction around one appropriating logic over another perpetuated 
the pre-existing conflicting logics.  When the rules of the projects are 
established through processes of appropriating one logic over another, actors 
supporting that logic become more powerful.  The logics that are supported by 
the powerful actor contribute towards preserving the status quo as they set the 
rules and norms for actions that guide the actor in decision-making. Hence, 
powerful actors have more control over decision-making and their logics come 
to be reflected as dominant.   
The findings also revealed two dimensions of mimetic isomorphism (M.I).  The 
first dimension is that M.I gave a simplistic view of the institutional environment.  
The institutionalisation and structure of western programs mean that academics 
and commercial users share certain concepts regarding knowledge 
commercialisation.  Hence, it presumed logics convergence but overlooked the 
embeddedness of actors within different, often conflicting, logics.  The second 
dimension is that mimetic isomorphism, more relevantly; the action of 
transferring cutting-edge programs from the West overlooked the institutional 
fragmentation within the Omani context.  Fragmentation is rooted in the internal 
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characteristics of bureaucracy.  Despite their involvement in the governing 
boards, actors (i.e. government, university, and non-commercial users) still 
recognized bureaucracy as natural practice. Their mind-sets are preoccupied 
with the deep rooted concepts of rigid models of interaction, which leads to 
fragmented actions.  These two dimensions hindered the bridging of differences 
in logics, consequently constraining the production of research outcomes that 
have the potential for commercialisation. 
Further insights gained from these findings established that for logics of various 
actors to be bridged, and for fragmentation to be minimized, an intermediating 
network must be designed.  However, the findings also showed that the role of 
the government as an intermediary provided insufficient activities and had a 
minimal effect in bridging differences in logics.  Minimal progress in interactions 
between actors was established only when the research was conducted.  When 
the commercialisation action was taking place, conflicting logics regarding 
knowledge appropriation emerged.  Countervailing arrangements that bridged 
different logics were absent.  Rather, competition between logics led to one side 
winning over the other. 
Furthermore, the findings showed how the emergent informal networks assisted 
in bridging differences of logics.  The engagement in co-production activities 
made the academics‘ and commercial users‘ previously existing logics less 
salient.  However, this happened only when the research was conducted.  The 
findings also revealed the inability of formal networks to bridge differences in 
logics in both research performance and commercialisation action.  This is due 
to power asymmetry.  Power is granted to an individual actor, who is inclined to 
preserve their pre-existent logics over others‘ logics. 
Insights garnered from the above contributed to the understanding of the 
important role of government in (1) extending intermediating activities in order to 
bridge differences in logics which spans boundaries as it facilitates a short 
institutional distance between parties, as well as developing shared 
understanding and expectations especially when commercialisation takes place; 
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(2) avoiding power asymmetry.  Rather than appropriating one logic over 
another, funding programs could be structured around balanced logics.  The 
role of government could also be to assist institutionalisation and the 
representation of all actors within its governing board.  This requires deliberate 
efforts on the part of powerful government officials by delegating power and 
giving up, or devolving some of their autonomy in exchange for increased 
consensus, and including SMEs owners/managers.  Moreover, policy initiatives 
that would remedy the institutional fragmentation problem are necessary.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Chapter five provided a discussion of findings in this study. This chapter 
presents the research results/findings with the aim of addressing the research 
questions.  In addition, it sums up the study by highlighting the contributions. 
Accordingly, the chapter begins with a recap of the research gaps.  This is then 
followed by a discussion of the empirical and theoretical contributions.  
Subsequent to that, the chapter provides the implications of the study for 
managerial and policy spaces.  Finally, the chapter concludes with highlighting 
the study‘s limitations and outlining suggested directions for future studies.  
7.0 Introduction and overview  
University Knowledge Commercialisation research has surged tremendously 
over the last few decades (Viale and Etzkowitz, 2010).  In this period, 
theoretical, empirical, and practitioner interests have risen exponentially (Duch 
et al., 2011).  Despite this, however, there exist gaps in the literature.  As such, 
the motive behind this study is to fill critical knowledge gaps and make 
contributions to UKC research.  Firstly, for several years many scholars (e.g. 
Tuunainen, 2002, Lu, 2007, Viale and Pozzali, 2010, Fogelberg and 
Thorpenberg, 2012, and Ankrah et al., 2013) alerted us that research has 
neglected exploring methodically the implications of differences in logics at the 
micro-level of triple-helix interactions. This demonstrates that existing studies in 
UKC provide modest practical directions on how to bridge differences and 
nurture cooperation between actors.  They don‘t pay sufficient attention to the 
role of different mechanisms that surround and exert a direct or indirect 
effect/influence on knowledge commercialisation. This research domain remains 
largely unexplored.  As such, the understanding of the implications of potential 
mechanisms for bridging differences in logics at the micro-level interaction (i.e. 
contracted research) of UKC remains quite limited.  Secondly, these 
mechanisms can involve: power, mimetic isomorphism (M.I) and intermediating.  
Because of its modest view of institutional convergence between academia, 
industry, and government, M.I overlooks the embeddedness of actors within 
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different, conflicting logics (Thornton et al., 2012). Despite this, very few 
empirical studies have attempted to study the effect of M.I on UKC.  As such, 
there remains an unfilled gap in considering M.I as a potential mechanism in 
bridging differences in logics.  Furthermore, although power (in linkage to 
institutions) is central for understanding how the opportunities provided for 
actors have been shaped to challenge conflicting logics, particularly the 
processes of appropriating one logic over another, this research domain 
remains largely unexplored (Hira, 2013).  As such, understanding the effect of 
power as a potential mechanism in bridging differences in logics within UKC 
remains very limited.  Moreover, because of its potency in explaining the ways 
with which to manage the conflict associated with logic differences at the micro-
level interactions (Suvinen et al., 2010), intermediation (i.e. intermediary and 
networking) is favoured as a mechanism for bridging differences in logics within 
UKC (Håkanson et al., 2011; Villani et al., 2017; Reich-Graefe, 2016).  Despite 
this, however, the literature linked to UKC provided modest practical directions 
on how to bridge differences through intermediation (Howells, 2006; Pollard, 
2006).  It is worth mentioning that practical direction is context dependent, as 
evident from the case of Oman (i.e. where institutions are emerging rather than 
being already established).  Although the interest of exploring this area is 
growing in ILP (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Suddaby and Leca, 2009; Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006), very few empirical studies have examined the ways of 
managing and bridging such differences at the micro-level interactions 
(Greenwood et al., 2011).  As a result, there exists little understanding of 
intermediation or indeed how intermediation can assist in bridging differences in 
logics.   
Thirdly, despite the importance of explaining logics differences within a country 
with an emerging institutional environment, this still remains largely unexplored.  
The growing body of empirical studies has focused on Western countries (in 
which UKC context is instituionally developed).  Additionally, despite the many 
endeavours to fill such a gap (e.g. da Silva et al., 2012, Saad et al., 2008, and 
Saad and Zawdie, 2011a), the studies have attempted to examine this 
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phenomenon in countries depsite instituional differences (Pugh, 2014; Cai, 
2015).   As such, the understanding of the influence of potential mechanisms on 
birdging differences in logics in the context of an emerging UKC institutional 
environment remains quite limited. 
Overall, the above stated gaps limit our understanding of UKC particulary in a 
country with an emerging instituional environment and should therefore be 
addressed.  Filling these gaps can improve our understanding of emerging 
mechanisms as potential solutions for bridging differences in institutional logics 
within the micro-level interactions of UKC in a developing institutional context, 
that is, Oman.  Thus, in consideration of these research gaps, this study has 
moved towards explaining and understanding the effects of power (RQ1), 
mimetic isomorphism (RQ2), and intermediating and networking (RQ3) in 
bridging differences in institutional logics. 
7.1 Questions’ answers/Main findings 
The present study has empirically contributed to the field of UKC. This has been 
achieved by understanding the process of UKC in the context of an emerging 
institutional environment and understanding how potential mechanisms enable 
or constrain the bridging of differences within the micro-level interactions of its 
contract research.  Consequently, this section discusses briefly the answers for 
the three research sub-questions in this study.  
The first research question aimed at exploring and understanding the effect of 
power as a mechanism that enables/constrain bridging differences in logics.  As 
a result of the analysis relating to power and institutions, the findings showed 
that while differences in logics increase the need for the negotiation and 
development of a shared understanding pertaining to research project aims and 
outcomes (Bjerregaard, 2010), the logics associated with actors (i.e. academics, 
users, and government) have been perpetuated due to power asymmetry.  The 
rules governing the interaction within the investigated contracted research 
projects are deemed as being forms of power (Samules, 1971) as they were 
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socially granted (Schmidt, 1987).  First, as findings show, power asymmetry 
emerged in line with funding rules of ownership, due to the fact that these rules 
were established around one appropriating logics over another.  Instead of 
structuring the interactions within projects around balancing/complementary 
logics, the existing rules led to one side winning over the other.  Since an actor 
had occupied a more powerful position in decision-making, the logics of this 
actor came to be reflected as dominant.  The appropriation of knowledge was 
controlled by one party as there was no balance between the university‘s logics 
and the users‘ logics (Lind et al., 2013).  On the research spectrum, the logics of 
academia were dominant as they had more control over the decisions of how to 
appropriate the generated knowledge.  For instance, the findings show how the 
funding (ORG) ownership rules of waiving the decision to academics, gave them 
the power to inflict their academic logic (i.e. open science) towards the 
dissemination of knowledge through publication (Polanyi, 1962; Fini and Toschi, 
2016; Siegel et al., 2007; Murray, 2010; Calcagini et al., 2016) against 
commercial users‘ logic of profit maximization. The findings also showed how 
the university rule of building a patent profile made KTO become gatekeeper.  
The department became rigorous in enforcing patent and licensing rules against 
commercial users‘ logic of profit maximization.  While on the commercialisation 
spectrum, the logics of commercial and non-commercial users were dominant.  
For example, the findings demonstrated, as per IIAP fund ownership rules of 
waiving the decision to commercial users, how commercial users (i.e. SMEs), as 
powerful actors, used such rules to act upon their norms towards the profit 
making/maximization logic serving the interest/goal of family business 
continuation (RW Hiebl, 2014) in opposition to the academics‘ logics of open 
science (publication) and career progression (being patent developer) (Aghion 
et al., 2008; Lacetera 2009; Calcagini et al., 2016).  Additionally, the findings 
showed, as per CIIAP and ORG fund ownership rules of waiving the decision to 
users, how non-commercial users (i.e. Governmental bodies- ROP and Ministry) 
used these rules to maintain their pre-existing logic (i.e. budget management) to 
maintain the protection of public resources (i.e. public funds).  The logics of 
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academics (e.g. career progression through patent development) were 
completely set aside.   
Second, the findings showed that power asymmetry emerged as per the 
government‘s board of governance rule of appropriating the government‘s 
bureaucratic logic over the university‘s and the commercial users‘ logics of 
knowledge commercialisation.  This is because power was concentrated in the 
hands of the governmental officials (on account of those officials‘ high 
representation within governing boards), consequently allowing them to exercise 
power in policy-making and rule creation (Samuels, 1971).  They had more 
control over decision-making and their logic of bureaucracy came to be reflected 
as dominant (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).  This 
can be demonstrated by their taken-for-granted, bureaucratic actions of the 
exclusion and limited participation of actors from policy- making.  The exclusion 
of commercial users (SMEs owner/managers) from the TRC governing board 
resulted in the commercial users‘ inability to champion their logic of profit 
maximization through KC.  The officials used their bureaucratic role to exercise 
purposeful power over the involvement of other actors (Saad and Zawdie, 2005; 
Chaykina, 2012).  This was manifested into action in view of the fact that, as per 
the Royal Decree, the high-level officials (i.e. the heads of the board) had the 
authority to appoint actors from industry.  Instead of appointing SME 
owners/GMs, they appointed CEOs from large companies.  These companies 
were not representative spokespersons for the needs of SMEs for whom the 
policies were being designed.  Therefore, large companies took the opportunity 
to achieve their own agendas, while neglecting the excluded commercial users‘ 
need for commercialisation. The exclusion of SME representatives (i.e. owners, 
GMS) made SMEs feel vulnerable due to the uneven balance of financial 
resources.  This is again manifested into action by the unclear standards of fund 
allocation, which are justified by the incongruity between different funding 
policies regulating KC, and the SMEs‘ lack of control over meeting their logic of 
profit maximization through KC.  Moreover, governmental officials had also 
exercised their power over the involved board of members.  While, the IIC‘s (as 
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per the representation of its parent organisation and head-committee in the TRC 
governing board) and the IAC‘s (as per the representation of its members in the 
university council and the TRC governing board) voices were welcomed, they 
were excluded from participating in making final decisions.  The governing 
board consults with them and takes their suggestions, but do not delegate 
power to them to make decisions and develop policy (Abro and Benneworth, 
2007; McAdam et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2014).  The real decisions - those that 
ultimately become policies - are made by high-level governmental officials.  In 
other words, the IIC and IAC merely rubber stamp the decisions made by those 
officials. This was manifested into action by the lack of transparency resulting 
from the opaque bureaucracy, which limited the participation of IIC and IAC 
representatives in the process of decision-making.  The representatives felt 
weak because of the uneven balance of information distribution, consequently 
restraining their ability in operationalising the required IP and commercialisation 
due to the suggested guidelines.   
In short, the power asymmetry that manifested in the rules of the investigated 
projects captured the extent to which actors differ in their power to constrain 
each other. Under this scenario, power was inevitable as powerful actors had 
the ability to implement their own logics when they conflicted with those of 
others (Schmidt, 1987).  There was no logics‘ bridging as each actor was 
motivated to preserve his/her pre-existing logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 
Lunberg, 2013) to maintain his/her granted power.   
The second research question aimed at exploring and understanding the 
effect of mimetic isomorphism (i.e. transferring institutions from the US and 
Canada to the Omani context) as a mechanism that enables/constrains the 
bridging of differences in logics. As a result of the analysis, M.I made the TRC 
place more attention on homogeneity across spheres (Meyer et al., 1997; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  The funding programs transferred from the US 
and Canada were deemed as the only institutional order surrounding all 
spheres. The rules of these programs were considered the templates for action 
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that generate unified responses and commonality of functions among actors 
(Benner and Sandstrom, 2000). This consequently hindered the bridging of 
differences in logics.  This was demonstrated by two dimensions. One 
dimension is that each funding program had presumed logics convergence 
between academia and commercial users and overlooked their embeddedness 
within different, often conflicting logics (Thornton et al., 2012).  Mainly, this was 
shown by the emergence of the incongruence of the research orientation 
policies of the IIAP and ORG.  Instead of incentivising the exchange of 
knowledge across spheres, the programs‘ rules focused on supporting one logic 
over the other.  The research-orientation policy of the IIAP, for instance, aimed 
at encouraging applied, rather than basic, research.  While the rule of waiving 
ownership to commercial users assisted in meeting users‘ logic of secrecy and 
data withholding, it prevented the academics from fulfilling their logic of ‗open 
science‘ through publication.  In contrast, the research-orientation policy of the 
ORG was encouraged basic, rather than applied, research.  The rule of waiving 
ownership to the academics supported the academics‘ logic of ‗open science‘. 
Rather than assigning the user as a research partner, the academics had the 
chance to assign him as an industrial consultant so as to restrain his logic of 
data-withholding.  Another dimension is that the TRC‘s action of transferring 
cutting-edge programs from the US and Canada overlooked institutional 
fragmentation within the Omani context.  The findings showed that the 
responsibility of addressing problems was fragmented among the university, the 
TRC, MoCI, and non-commercial users (Saad et al., 2008; Chaykina, 2012).  
They were still locked in old logics of bureaucracy (Chaminade and Vang, 2006) 
as their mind-sets were much possessed by the deep-rooted concept of rigid 
interaction (Inatrakumerd and Cristina, 2007), which accounted for operating in 
isolation (Saad and Zawdie, 2005).  This was demonstrated by two points. First, 
despite their involvement in the governing boards in an attempt to address 
problems jointly, the TRC, MoCI and university were self-contained when acting 
in response to the need of filling the gap in expertise. They believed that they 
could meet such a need on their own without coordinating with each other, and 
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they failed to fulfil the need in the end. Instead of signing a single contract, they 
signed separate contracts with different IP companies from different countries.  
This generated conflict as the different rules inherent in those contracts were 
copied and applied.  Also, signing contracts neglected the significance of the 
physical presence of those experts within Oman, which impacted adversely on 
what happened on the ground. The guidelines necessary for academics and 
commercial users as pertains to inventions prototyping and patenting were 
constrained due to the lack of those experts‘ direct and regular communication.  
Second, fragmentation stemming from bureaucracy caused misalignment 
between the rules and actions of the involved governmental organisations and 
the national policy of either the central government or the TRC.  As patent 
assessment was fragmented, misalignment between the actions of the IIC and 
the IP rules of the MoCI, with regards to patenting, was demonstrated by the 
collision of two IP elements (Omani Halwa Trade-Secret and Patenting). 
Additionally, as knowledge exploitation was fragmented, misalignment between 
the actions of non-commercial users (i.e. ROP and ministry) and the TRC‘s 
policy was shown by the lack of assigning R&D and innovation as a mandate for 
non-commercial users.  These two findings explain the overbearing preference 
of maintaining the accomplishment of bureaucratic practices for the sake of 
controlling the good accomplishment of assigned responsibilities (STIP, 2014).  
However, such rigidity resulted in the hindrance of bridging differences between 
the academics‘ logic (i.e. career progression through patent development) and 
the commercial users‘ logic of profit maximization.   
In short, bridging differences in logics was hindered by M.I. (i.e. transferring 
institutions from the West) through its (1) presumption of logic convergence 
(stemming from M.I), causing incongruence of the research orientation policies; 
(2) negligence of institutional fragmentation among the university, TRC, MoCI, 
and non-commercial users, which: (a) generated conflicts due to the different 
rules inherent in separately signed contracts as well as neglecting the 
importance of the physical presence of experts within Oman; (b) caused 
misalignment between the actions of IIC and the IP rules of the MoCI regarding 
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patenting as well as between the actions of non-commercial users (i.e. ROP and 
Ministry) and the TRC‘s policy regarding knowledge exploitation.  
The third research question aimed to explore and understand the effect of the 
intermediary and networking as mechanisms that enable/constrain the bridging 
of differences in logics.  As a result of the conducted analysis, the findings 
showed the emergence of both the government‘s role as an intermediary, and 
informal networks that appeared to involve a value-added element, specifically 
described as logic bridging/spanning between academics and commercial users 
(Villani et al, 2017; Reich-Graefe, 2016; Slavtchev, 2013; Korotka, 2015).   
With respect to the role of intermediary, the government‘s (represented by 
the IIC‘s) responsibilities of building networks through matchmaking and 
mediation opened possibilities for new combinations of existing knowledge 
(Burt, 2005; Johnson, 2008), consequently bridging the academics‘ logic and 
the commercial logic around complementary norms.  Through matchmaking, the 
IIC generated value by connecting academics and enterprises who were not 
previously acquainted with one another (Burt, 2005; Howells, 2006; Nakwa and 
Zawdie, 2015).  The IIC‘s consultants assisted in engaging enterprises and 
academics individually to obtain their inputs and discover commonalty in their 
needs and interests (Hakanson et al., 2011).  They did not only collect 
information, but also provided compensating mechanisms for weaknesses 
through increasing the chances of both in finding a research partner, which 
consequently reduced research costs (Kodama, 2008).  Enterprises lack 
competence and applied capability research (IIC, 2013), and, in order to fill such 
weaknesses, the IIC assisted enterprises in finding solutions to problems 
through coordinating with IIC agents within the university (i.e. ITAs), which 
facilitated the obtaining of local services with lower consultancy fees and the 
delivery of accurate information which is essential for knowledge generation. 
This was achieved by providing opportunities to meet through matching 
research consortia with the aim of bringing together academics and enterprises 
possessing the required knowledge, technologies, and other important 
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resources for targeted research issues.  Concurrently, through mediation, the 
IIC assisted academics and enterprises in realising the benefits of cooperation 
and information exchange (Hakanson et al., 2011). Both were positioned to 
benefit.  For example, while the academics had the opportunity to secure a large 
amount of funds or additional income for themselves and their university, the 
enterprises had the chance to generate new products/systems without incurring 
any financial liability (i.e. the benefit of free consultancy through the incentive of 
in-kind contribution).  Additionally, the IIC mediated disputes (Johnson, 2008) 
through negotiating the terms of the research projects including IP rights.  
Bargaining costs were reduced through negotiating asymmetric information 
exchange between academics and enterprises (Kodama, 2008).  Parties were 
given the chance to talk to each other, thus allowing them to solve disputes by 
themselves.  In the interim, the mediation session was managed through 
creating awareness about compensating mechanisms (i.e. incentives) while 
remaining unbiased/neutral (Van der Meluen et al., 2005). Given this, the IIC 
aided parties in achieving compromises between their two logics (Lind et al., 
2013; Villani et al., 2017). For instance, while the incentive of becoming patent-
developer satisfied the academics‘ logic of career progression (i.e. individual 
development through being a patent developer); the financial incentives of in-
kind contribution and ownership satisfied the commercial users‘ logic of profit 
maximization.  In addition, knowledge co-production of, for instance, an 
inventive outcome was facilitated by bridging the various involved logics 
(Lundberg, 2013; Van der Meluen et al., 2005) of the academics‘ curiosity and 
the factory‘s profit maximization.   
With respect to networking, although different logics are likely to cause 
misunderstanding and conflicts between actors (Thornton et al., 2012; Lind et 
al., 2013; Campos, 2015), the findings showed, in comparison to formal 
networks, how the collective activities underlying the research process of trail-
and-error within the emerged informal networks helped in intermediating 
between the academics and commercial users.  The activity of sharing structural 
and cognitive resources (i.e. academic labs and research experience and users‘ 
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personnel, tools, machinery, materials, equipment, and professional 
experience), for instance, led to advantages where synergies from know-how 
became more significant than independence (Slavtchev, 2013).  The academics 
and the commercial user recognized the common interest of ensuring 
knowledge proximity, particularly similarities in what they produced and how 
they produced it.  Their engagement in co-production (i.e. the activity of 
ensuring knowledge proximity) made their previously existing logics (that were 
shaped by, and socialised in, their respective institutional spheres) less salient 
(Thornton et al., 2012), which encouraged them to examine alternative choices 
of actions and experiments, thus shaping the likelihood of bridging their different 
logics.  Balancing the academics‘ logics (i.e. basic, curiosity and discovery-
driven research, career progression through becoming patent developer/owner) 
and the commercial logic (i.e. profit making and maximization) was created 
through generating consensus about their corresponding practices and 
responsibilities (Lind et al., 2013).  For example, academics, as knowledge 
provider, and the factory, as knowledge user, worked jointly to ensure the 
production of a product that has potential for commercialisation.  During the 
incremental development of a research idea, a translation of basic/scientific 
outcome into application was achieved in concert with the identification of the 
commercial users‘ needs.  Accordingly, the logics of academics and the 
commercial user were bridged into a novel way, such as Stokes ‗Pasteur 
quadrant, Use-Inspired basic research (Stoke, 1997; Kitagawa, 2010). 
Consequently, producing research outcomes that have the potential for 
commercialisation, as a means of reducing the impact of conflicting logics 
(Thornton et al, 2012; Bjerregaard, 2010), was achieved as the interests of both 
parties were well aligned (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008).   
However, the findings showed insufficient intermediating activities across the 
four investigated projects.  First, the role of government as an intermediary 
provided less means as relates to bridging differences in logics, as 
countervailing arrangements (i.e. compensation mechanisms, incentives, mutual 
benefits) were: (a) totally absent within the ORG and CIIAP funding 
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programs.  The role of intermediary was found to be only conformant to the 
IIAP (operated by the IIC).  Both programs (i.e. ORG and CIIAP) are not aimed 
at supporting local SMEs‘ commercialisation needs or efforts.  Particularly, there 
is a lack of direct involvement of SMEs in their design or performance. Rather, 
the involvement of SMEs was driven by academics and their research agendas 
and logics, which hindered the bridging of differences in logics between the 
academics and commercial users (academics‘ logic of ‗open-science‘ versus the 
commercial user‘s profit maximization) as well as between commercial and non-
commercial users (non-commercial user‘s logic of budget management versus 
the commercial user‘ logic of profit maximization) ; (b) absent during 
knowledge commercialisation within the IIC (more specifically in the IIAP 
funding program).  Few, but explicit, positive implications attempts were 
established to enhance the interaction between academics and commercial 
users, in which joint production activities and logics balancing were initially 
created (as discussed above).  Once the commercialisation action took place, 
the interaction was developed around complementary/balanced logics, and 
conflicts between the logics, with regards to knowledge appropriation, emerged. 
The arrangements that provide a countervailing force to bridge logics were 
overlooked due to power asymmetry.  Power was socially granted (Samules, 
1971; Schmidt, 1987) to an individual actor (i.e. structuring the arena of 
interaction around one appropriating logic over another), who was inclined to 
preserve his/her pre-existing logics against others‘ logics.  Accordingly, the 
arena of interaction was controlled by the powerful, dominant logics.  For 
example, despite the fact that an agreement between the commercial user and 
academics was reached at the beginning for knowledge to be owned by the 
user with recognition of patent development given to the academics, the user, 
as a powerful actor, refused to go through with patenting because the user 
wished to maintain his pre-existing logic of profit maximization for the interest of 
family business continuation.  Accordingly, the academics couldn‘t meet their 
logic (i.e. building self-esteem through career progression) as they lost the 
opportunity of gaining the perceived benefit of having the credit of being patent 
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developers.  Hence, minor changes in logics‘ bridging were created throughout 
the process and only minimal progress between the interactive actors was 
created when the research was conducted. 
Moreover, although the findings showed that the bridging of differences in logics 
was enabled by the emerged informal networks, this only happened when the 
research was conducted.  Again when the commercialisation action was taking 
place (i.e. after formal networks were instigated by the government during 
research performance), the logics of the powerful academics or users (i.e. due 
to the power asymmetry associated with funding rules of waiving ownership to a 
particular party) shaped the way in which the generated knowledge could be 
appropriated and exploited.  The academics and users were inclined to maintain 
power over ownership in order to preserve their own logics (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999; Lunberg, 2013). This indicates that formal networks posed 
barriers to reciprocal partnerships as their rules captured how actors differ in 
their power to constrain each other (Boschma, 2005; Lee, 2011).  As the 
academics, for instance in ORG, occupied a more powerful position than the 
commercial users with regards to IP decision-making, they were found likely to 
maintain their logic of open science to preserve their favourable exchange 
condition of publication. Instead of becoming interdependent (Bekkers and 
Freitas, 2008), the powerful actor was less dependent on the other actor.  For 
example, non-commercial users (e.g. ROP) were found to be less dependent on 
the commercial user and academics as they perceived importing technologies 
from developed countries to be a better alternative, which subsequently 
constrained the procurement and commercialisation of the generated 
knowledge.   
In short, although the emergence of the government‘s role as an intermediary, 
as well as networking, appeared to involve a value-added element described as 
bridging differences in logics between the academics and users, there is still 
insufficient intermediation.  The efforts of intermediation were either totally 
absent or absent during knowledge commercialisation.  Such efforts were 
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evident and carried out only when the research was conducted, but they were 
neglected when the KC action was taking place.  The absence of the role of 
intermediary as a mandate within ORG and CIIAP and the minor changes, or 
minimal progress, in logics‘ bridging within IIAP calls for the necessity to 
establish (within ORG and CIIAP) and extend (within IIC-IIAP) intermediating 
activities in order to bridge logics between academia and commercial users, 
particularly, during knowledge commercialisation.  This could bridge the 
differences in logics as it might facilitate a short institutional distance between 
parties‘ shared understanding and expectations. Moreover, and in comparison 
to informal networks, the absence of intermediating activities (that resulted from 
power asymmetry) within formal networks explained how actors differ in their 
power to constrain each other, consequently posing a barrier to bridging 
differences in logics.  This calls for the necessity to establish symmetric power.  
Instead of appropriating one logic over another, formal network (i.e. funding 
programs) could be structured around balanced logics.   
7.2 Research Contributions  
This study contributes to the theoretical and empirical domain of University 
Knowledge Commercialisation in several ways. These are discussed hereafter.   
7.2.1 Contribution to the Theory 
This research has made theoretical contributions to the applied/used theories, 
particularly, Institutional Logics Perspective (ILP), Academic Capitalism (AC), 
and Triple-Helix Model (THM).   
First, this study is the first to examine the concept of power within the 
Institutional Logics Perspective domain.  The introduction of such concept 
contributed to ILP theory and followed a novel approach by calling for the need 
to adopt arguments from two general institutional scholars (i.e. Schmidt, 1987, 
and Samuels, 1971).  Although these scholars are not approaching the issue 
from ILP literature, they have also taken the institutionalist perspective.  The 
application of their arguments helped in analysing the findings of the study, 
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more explicitly, in linking institutions with power, and viewing their causal 
sequencing on KC. Such a link has been considered significant for 
understanding actors‘ behaviour (Shapira 2004; Lacetera, 2009; Hewitt-Dundas, 
2012; Miller et al., 2016; Mathieu, 2011; McAdam et al., 2012, etc.).  As the 
analysis showed, power was inevitable when logics conflict.  Power asymmetry 
emerged as power was socially granted.  The rules of projects were established 
around appropriating one logic over another. Actors supporting the appropriated 
logic became more powerful and their logic came to be reflected as dominant.  
In other words, powerful actors had the chance to preserve their own logic as 
they had more control over decision-making compared to those without power.   
Second, the study contributed to ILP, AC, and TH theories by introducing the 
intermediation concept as essential within UKC (Yusuf, 2008; Swan et al., 2010; 
Lundberg, 2013; Villani et al., 2017, etc.).  The introduction of such concept 
provided practical directions on how to bridge differences and nurture 
cooperation through intermediary and networking mechanisms.  This has 
contributed to understanding how such mechanisms made the academics‘ and 
the industry‘s previously existing logics, that were shaped by their respective 
institutional spheres, less salient (Thornton et al., 2012) when the research was 
conducted.  Sufficient attention given to the role of the government as an 
intermediary has generated insights into how the IIC‘s intermediation through 
matchmaking and mediation opened possibilities for bridging the academics‘ 
logics and commercial logics (Johnson, 2008).  Through matchmaking, the IIC 
assisted in connecting academics and enterprises that were not previously 
aware of one another (Howells, 2006), consequently reducing research costs 
(Kodama, 2008).  Compensating mechanisms for weaknesses were provided by 
increasing the chances of both in finding a research partner.  While it assisted 
enterprises in getting consultancy services with low fees, it also helped 
academics in ensuring the knowledge‘s industrial applicability.  Through 
mediation, the IIC helped academics and enterprises in recognizing the benefits 
of cooperation (Hakanson et al., 2011). While academics were positioned to 
gain the benefit of securing research funds and additional income, the 
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enterprises gained the benefits of free consultancy (through the incentive of in-
kind contribution) which helped him/her in generating new products/systems 
with less financial liability.  Consequently, bridging the commercial user‘s logic 
(i.e. profit making) and the academics‘ logic (i.e. curiosity and discovery).  The 
IIC‘s mediating activities also assisted in reducing bargaining costs (Kodama, 
2008). The potential dispute regarding IP rights was managed through creating 
awareness about compensating mechanisms (i.e. incentives).  The academics‘ 
logics of career progression and academic curiosity were reached through the 
incentive of becoming patent developer, while the users‘ logic of profit 
maximization was reached through the incentives of in-kind contribution and 
ownership.   Furthermore, the introduction of the intermediation concept gave 
attention to the role of networking in generating insights into how informal 
networks opened possibilities for bridging academics‘ logics and commercial 
logics around complementary knowledge (Kitagawa, 2010).  The activity of 
sharing resources (i.e. academic research labs and experience and users‘ 
personnel and professional experience, etc.) made the academics and 
commercial user engage in co-production (i.e. the activity of ensuring 
knowledge proximity or similarities in what they produced and how they 
produced it).  The users‘ needs were clearly identified for translating 
basic/scientific research into application, subsequently shaping the likelihood of 
bridging the academics‘ logics (i.e. basic, curiosity and discovery-driven 
research, career progression through becoming patent developer/owner) and 
the commercial user‘s logic (i.e. profit making and maximization) in a novel way 
(i.e. Stoke‘s Use-Inspired basic research).  
7.2.2 Empirical Contributions 
The Omani experience has contributed in two ways in enhancing the 
understanding of the UKC phenomenon.  First, it contributed to understanding 
the effect of non-commercial users‘ logics in determining UKC.  Over the last 
decades, UKC scholars have sought to explore logics differences among 
diverse actors as a constraining/enabling factor for commercialisation of 
knowledge (Lind et al., 2013; Bjerregaard, 2010; Siegel et al., 2003; Gassol, 
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2007).  This has been considered vital for understanding these logics and the 
challenges of bridging them (Lind et al., 2013) through potential mechanisms.  
However, the existing UKC literature has, to date, paid little attention to the 
logics of non-commercial users (i.e. governmental bodies and other public 
organisations).  A growing body of empirical studies are focusing on academics 
and commercial users (e.g. Sauermann and Stephan, 2013, Bentley et al., 
2015, Aghion et al. 2008, Lacetera, 2009, da Silva Campos, 2015, Fini and 
Lacetera, 2010, Lacetera 2009, Murray, 2010, Vallas and Kleinman, 2008, and 
Calcagini et al., 2016, etc.) without reference to non-commercial users.  This 
study has contributed and filled this gap by exploring a context where non-
commercial users have a great influence in determining UKC. The study results 
showed that the Omani context gave the non-commercial users the chance to 
exert power over the academics and commercial users.  This is due to the 
government funding‘s rule of waiving ownership to the non-commercial users, 
which gave the Ministry and ROP the power to constrain the application and 
procurement of the technologies generated by academics and enterprises.  As 
powerful actors, they were motivated to preserve their logic of budget 
management for the sake of controlling the good use of public funds.  They 
were risk-averse.  Rather than making changes, the Ministry rejected the 
introduction of R&D as a new practice within its institutional prerogatives.  
Rather than exploiting the generated knowledge, the ROP circumvented the 
deviation from their routine practice of importing or procuring ready-made 
solutions from developed countries. For more details, see section 6.1, in the 
discussion chapter.  This has contributed to understanding the complexities of 
the non-commercial users‘ logics in shaping UKC as well as providing important 
implications for issues such as commercialisation activities in the public sector, 
and frictions/resistances in the interactions between the three sectors. 
Second, the Omani experience contributed to a better understanding of the 
government‘s intermediation role in UKC.  It provided empirical evidence of the 
expansion of the Industrial Innovation Centre‘s (IIC‘s) role from the traditional 
practice of  provision of funding (Argyris and Liebeskind, 1998), planning and 
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regulating (Lawton Smith, 2007), towards supporting and operating the 
processes of UKC cooperatively with academics and commercial users (Lu, 
2007; Leydesdorff, 2009).  This is because the IIC‘s role is viewed as being a 
response to the under-exploitation of university generated knowledge by 
commercial users (Siegel et al., 2003; Johnson, 2008).  Rather than viewing the 
IIC as exogenous to the KC activities (Sohn et al., 2009) providing only funding 
and policy contexts for the establishment of relationships between university 
and industry (Leydesdorff, 2009; Guerzoni et al., 2014), it was also perceived as 
an intermediary (Intarakumnerd et al., 2010; Nakwa and Zawdie, 2015, 2016).  
Its role in searching and matching partners across industry and university 
boundaries assisted more effectively than academics and commercial users can 
do on their own (Hakanson et al., 2011).  This reduced search and bargaining 
costs (Kodama, 2008) and assisted in bridging differences in logics (Villani et 
al., 2017).  For more details, see the above section 7.2. 
7.3 Implications of the study: for managerial and policy spaces of the 
study 
This section now draws out the implications for the Omani policy-makers.  It 
provides recommendations for Oman as an oil-based economy with the desire 
to diversify its economy and capitalise on a knowledge-based economy.  
Insights garnered from this study‘s main findings (see the above section 7.2) 
resulted in understanding the role that can be played by the government in 
enhancing UKC.  First, the role of government could be triggered to assist 
institutionalisation and symmetric power between all representatives of all actors 
in decision-making.  This is because power in the context of UKC is not always 
thought about in terms of its use by one party over another party, rather it is 
motivated by the power to do.  Hence, the government needs to revisit the 
structure of its governing board to open up and delegate participation, through 
giving up or devolving some of the high-level government officials‘ autonomy to 
low-management representatives in exchange for increased consensus.  
Moreover, the role of government could be triggered to also assist 
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institutionalisation through the representation of all relevant actors.  There is a 
need for a policy setting where inclusivity is given more emphasis.  What we 
have in Oman is up-bottom rather than bottom-up (Al Harthy, 2014). We need 
engagement and voice coming from the bottom and that is the voice of SME 
Owners/GMs.  Supporting low-level management substantive participation and 
SMEs‘ inclusion means that all involved actors commit to sharing information, 
giving their opinions on goals, and developing an agreed upon set of actions 
(Saad et al., 2005).  This leads to a clear goal, a flexible and fast decision-
making process, and a balanced choice approach between actors‘ logics.  
Secondly, the government needs to introduce an intermediary within the ORG 
and CIIAP as well as initiate more intermediating activities within the IIAP, 
especially during knowledge commercialisation. These funding programs have 
to be customized through considering ways of bridging differences in logics.  
The government, for instance, should design shrewd intermediating activities 
where logics of involved parties are balanced.  This can be suggested, for 
instance, by avoiding power asymmetry.  Rather than appropriating commercial 
users‘ logics (i.e. profit maximization) over academics‘ logics, the IIAP could be 
restructured around balanced logics, and, a similar thing can be suggested for 
the ORG and CIIAP.  Within the university, more intermediation can be 
suggested by establishing flexibility and a low degree of formalisation within the 
KTO‘s contractual arrangements.  In order for the KTO to mediate the distance 
of commercial exploitation of knowledge, it needs to govern commercialisation 
by organizing a collective institutional arrangement with commercial users - 
cross-fertilisation formats through bridging two different logics to achieve 
fairness and better results (e.g. exclusive royalty-free commercial license). By 
doing this, the government could ensure the dynamic interplay between logics, 
which might generate shared and tacit understanding about the research project 
(Villani et al., 2017), which could establish the foundation for stimulating 
development of commercialised products following, for instance, both the 
market logic of profit-maximization and the academic logic of producing 
publishable research outcomes (Lind et al., 2013).  Third, we need policy 
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initiatives that would remedy the institutional fragmentation between 
governmental organisations/bodies.  Hence, a central role is assigned to the 
government.  Instead of having different contracts, the government could 
suggest that the university and MoCI sign a single contract in order to tackle the 
issues of repetition/redundancy and incoherency of policies.  As the 
overemphasis on professional interference is still a common practice, the 
government also needs to ensure the physical presence of borrowed/rented 
experts within Oman.  This would assist in safeguarding direct and regular 
communication and IP guidance (i.e. inventions prototyping and patenting) to 
academics and users.  Moreover, the government needs to ensure total 
alignment between the actions of the IIC and the IP rules of the MoCI regarding 
patenting as well as between the actions of non-commercial users (i.e. ROP and 
) and the TRC‘s policy regarding knowledge exploitation. This again can be 
done through designing an intermediating mechanism that could develop stable, 
interactive relationships between the main actors, specifically, the governmental 
bodies.  These suggestions should be supported by the development of a 
culture of partnership and collaboration and the removal of the rigid boundaries 
and bureaucracy between organisations. This calls for a comprehensive 
orientation program, and hence for the active role of the government to increase 
the interaction between actors with less restrictions, consequently encouraging 
the development of joint policies and actions.   
Generally, the influence of the above three suggestions for the Omani context 
can be summarized into several outcomes. These are: stimulating a 
commercialisation mind-set and culture among the relevant actors and 
consequently among the entire Omani society; creating more jobs through 
producing innovative SMEs, which contribute to the national Omani economy, 
which also contributes towards solving the unemployment issues in Oman.  
Furthermore, knowledge commercialisation would enhance innovation and 
knowledge based activities, which could bridge the gap between the 
universities‘ outcomes and the industry sectors‘ requirements through bridging 
differences in logics, which will build strong collaboration activities, consequently 
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enhancing the knowledge- based industry in Oman.  This optimizes the 
successful interaction that manages to balance between different logics and 
socio-economic demands.  
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
This research study is not without limitations.  One limitation stems from the 
selection of a qualitative research strategy. The study was also carried out using 
a limited sample size, and the limited number of investigated projects and 
participants inhibits generalisation.  However, given that the study is not 
intended to achieve a statistical generalisation, but rather analytical 
generalisation, such limited sample size is acceptable since theoretical 
saturation is attained (Yin, 1994). As this study is focused on the knowledge 
commercialisation process, an enormous amount of data relevant to 
understanding this process in each of the cases was gathered and analysed. 
The level of depth of analysis carried out in each case certainly compensate for 
the limited size of the sample.  
Another limitation is that even though cases were selected through a rigorous 
purposive sampling process, there can be potential for some bias. The 
respondents could harbour some bias as they may rationalise a particular 
interaction with institutions or a sub-activity they conducted based on the 
favourable or unfavourable effect it had on them.  This is despite the best efforts 
of this researcher to (i) sample only those projects that invovled investigating 
logics from multiple instituional perspectives (i.e. knowledge producer, 
knowledge user, and knowledge manager), (ii) sample projects that allowed the 
emergence of common patterns, consequently assisting in identifying important 
similiarities and differences, (iii) projects that initiated synchronization with the 
commencement of different innovation programs at the national level, (iv) use 
the triangulation of data sources through supplementary interviews as well as 
documents. These measures will, to a great extent, control for potential bias of 
the cases. Also, the researcher‘s bias may influence the interpretation of the 
findings. This was however controlled by devising a coding framework which 
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emanated from the interview data and was then strictly applied. Since it was the 
codes that yielded the themes used in arriving at the findings, efforts were made 
to ensure that the researcher did not attempt to understand and interpret what 
respondents mean at the level of coding.  
Finally, the breadth/scope of the study was de-limited in four major ways. First, 
the scope of the study was restricted to knowledge commercialisation in the 
context of the public university (i.e. SQU).  As such, the why and how potential 
mechanisms influencing, for instance, private universities in bridging differences 
in logics has been excluded.  This is on account of different paths followed by 
each type of university.  Each individual university might witness different policy 
orientations towards KC.  Second, while the major purpose of this study is to 
understand which and how, potential mechanisms bridge differences in logics, 
that describe the rules of the game within the micro-level interaction of publically 
contracted research projects affected UKC, the macro-level actions also 
typically driving this interaction remain outside the study‘s scope.  Third, the 
scope of the study was also delimited to the UKC within the context of only three 
of the public government funding programs (i.e. IIAP, CIIAP and ORG).  This 
limitation is in the view that TRC funds and supports a range of innovation 
programs, which might be governed by more diverse logics, rules, and norms.  
Fourth, the data sources used for this study impose a number of limitations.  
More specifically, the study centred on a specific geographical setting (i.e. the 
Capital-Muscat) with significant implications for our ability to draw generalisable 
findings: on account of the diverse paths followed by individual universities and 
industrial areas and their differential distribution across space.  
7.5 Future Research Avenues/opportunities 
The abovementioned limitations open up some empirical avenues and 
directions for future research.  In addition, there are other several future 
research avenues that would be advisable from this study.  
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First, the study examined the influence of mechanisms on bridging differences 
in logics from an emerging institutional UKC context of Omani projects. This 
approach limited the countries examined to one single emerging market 
(Oman). As a result, there is an opportunity for future studies interested in UKC 
in emerging institutional environment to incorporate multiple countries (Bruton et 
al., 2010) in their analysis. This will no doubt benefit the field of KC research.  
For instance, an in-depth comparative study case between Oman and other Gulf 
Arab countries can be done in order to investigate UKC activities within their 
emerging institutional environment. Additionally, and with reference to the first 
limitation mentioned above, a future study can be conducted comparing two 
universities, one from the public sector and the other from the private sector, 
can be done according to the available records of KC.  A pattern of matching 
can be maintained between these two cases by suggesting criteria of 
comparison such as dividing in terms of their size, location, governance 
structures, years of establishment, motive funding, etc.  Second, as the results 
show, the development potential of UKC in the case of a country like Oman 
brought to the fore considerations of power and intermediation.  Power and 
intermediation matter in the differential logics of actors occupying different 
positions (knowledge producer, knowledge user, and knowledge manager).  
More research in this empirical setting, therefore, opens new opportunities for 
development in UKC.  Hence, research into these mechanisms, and their 
contextualisation in the specifics of Oman, is very important in informing policy 
action. 
7.6 Final Conclusion 
Appreciating that there is a need to improve the understanding of UKC in a 
country with an emerging institutional environment, this study conducted an in-
depth case study of Omani contracted research projects. The research‘s aim 
was to investigate the implications of the potential mechanisms that can be used 
to bridge differences in institutional logics within University Knowledge 
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Commercialisation.  This gave rise to the following research questions; (a) what 
is the effect of power in bridging differences in institutional logics? (b) What is 
the effect of mimetic isomorphism (i.e. transferring institutions from the West) in 
bridging differences in institutional logics? (c) What is the effect of 
intermediating and networking in bridging differences in institutional logics? 
The main findings of this study depicted that bridging differences in logics within 
UKC was hindered by: asymmetric power relationships, mimetic isomorphism 
(M.I), and insufficient intermediating activities.  First, power asymmetry 
associated with establishing projects‘ rules around appropriating one logic over 
another perpetuated the pre-existing conflicting logics.  Accordingly, the logics 
of powerful actors contributed to preserving the status quo.  Their logics come to 
be reflected as dominant as they had more control over decision-making.  
Second, the M.I presumption of logics convergence has overlooked both (a) the 
embeddedness of actors within different, often conflicting logics, consequently 
hindering the production of research outcomes that have potential for 
commercialisation; (b) institutional fragmentation within the context of the Omani 
governmental bodies as their mind-sets are still locked in old logics of 
bureaucracy, and deep-rooted concepts of rigid models of interactions, which 
led to fragmented actions.  Third, the role of government as an intermediary, 
when the research was being conducted, provided insufficient activities with 
regards to bridging differences in logics.  When the commercialisation action 
was taking place, competition and conflicts between logics regarding how to 
appropriate the knowledge generated emerged due to power asymmetry.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that the emerged informal networks assisted in 
bridging differences of logics, this happened only when the research was 
conducted.  Finally, the study has far in filling the critical knowledge gaps and 
providing empirical and theoretical contributions to UKC literature as well as the 
institutional logics perspective. The study has offered managerial and policy-
making implications that enhance the study of UKC in countries with emerging 
institutional environment and has offered further research directions to advance 
this field of scholarly research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix-1 – Within Case-Analysis 
Introduction: 
This appendix presents case studies concerning university knowledge 
commercialisation in Oman. It further explores the institutions governing the 
relationships between the involved actors within the case, and the actions taken 
by actors involved in the Knowledge Commercialisation in relation to the 
influence of the institutions explained.  Interview narratives of case participants, 
institutional actors and consultants were critically analysed. Further evidence 
was also gathered from documents. There are four cases contained in this 
within case analysis. Each case has been anonymised and code named as 
Cases A, B, C and D respectively. The within-case culminates in a detailed and 
comprehensive account of each case study. 
1. Case Study-A: Low fat Halwa Project 
1.1 Background of the project: 
The project was linked with research initiated by academics and an overseas 
PhD student from the Department of Food and Nutrition Science, in CAMS 
College of Agriculture and Marine Sciences, in 2008. The collaboration with the 
factory was initiated by academics after the research outcome (new recipe) was 
scientifically generated by them. It was funded by the Commercial User Public 
Fund of the Industrial Innovation Assistance Program (IIAP). 
The research was on the subject of ‗characterizing low fat Omani halwa‘. 
Though halwa is famous at home and abroad as a symbol of traditional Omani 
hospitality, it may be categorized as an unhealthy food, on account of its fat and 
sugar content. This encouraged academics to develop a healthier variety of 
Omani halwa. This could be developed with reduced input of fat and sugar and 
the addition of other functional compounds beneficial to health.  
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The research was preceded by two stages of engagement with users and 
manufacturers.  In the first stage they used structured surveys to study 
consumer preferences, while in the second stage they visited some factories to 
classify the different types of halwa available in the market by studying the 
physiochemical sensory and textural characteristics. The outcomes of these two 
aspects were published by the university in internal and ranking journals in 
2011. 
1.2 Governance Structure:  
This section explains the formal governance structures of the institutions that 
govern the relationships between the actors involved within the case. Initially, 
the relationships between actors were governed by the rules of the Commercial 
User Public Fund of IIAP, which are found to be incompatible with the 
university‘s rules and regulations.  
1.2.1 University Rules: 
The academics and commercial users signed the ‗research contract agreement 
form‘ through a consultancy and contracted the research under the Research 
Department (SQU, 2015). As the university considers the projects coming from 
IIC as consultancy services, the research is driven by the industry (commercial 
users) requesting the academics‘ advice and seeking solutions for their 
problems from the university, and ultimately paying them for the services. 
The form states clearly the responsibilities of both parties. The academics are 
responsible for knowledge production as per the user requirements, while the 
user is responsible for funding knowledge generation. The form also mentions 
that all rights and titles to Intellectual Property (IP) arising from a project shall 
vest i.e. come into the possession/ownership of the University. Such IP will 
include copyright of the reports, documents and computer software prepared by 
the University under the project, as well as any new development of products or 
processes and any improvements to publicly known products or processes. The 
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Sponsor shall have a non-exclusive and non-assignable license to use such 
intellectual property. 
According to the disclosure rule, the university requires academics to disclose 
the intellectual properties through the element of compulsion. Also, if the 
academic research (basic or applied) outcome contains IP which is considered 
by the university to be of substantial commercial value (from licensing royalties), 
no invention disclosure for a third party should be taken before assessing the 
option of seeking IP protection through the university‘s Innovation Affairs 
Department (SQU, 2014).  
Rules governing the actions of the university‘s innovation affairs department aim 
to maximize patent generation. ‗Building patent profile‘ is stipulated as one of 
the department‘s main responsibilities in coordinating the IP protection through 
patent registration and maintaining up-to-date databases for all university 
generated patents (ibid). Additionally, to ensure the ability of the department to 
generate patents, they state it clearly as one of the Principle Investigator‘s (PI) 
responsibilities within the university research rules and regulations. The PI‘s 
responsibility is to ‗ensure the report of any intellectual property arising from 
research projects to the Deanship of research and particularly to the 
Department of Innovation Affairs‘ to assess its patentability (ibid). 
1.2.2 Industrial Innovation Center Rules: 
The academics and the factory signed a proposal research contract (IIC-1, 
2010), which is based on a consultancy model. According to this model, the idea 
(or the problem to be solved) must be initiated by a Subject Matter Expert (SME) 
first. These ideas are pursued further with the help of the consultants and client 
managers, who are responsible for visiting the industry first in order to come up 
with ideas, through brainstorming, and then to communicate with the 
researchers through the Technology Transfer Agent in their university. 
According to one of the IIC consultants  
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“The idea should be started by the enterprises and not by academics. We 
(consultants and client manager) visit them to find ideas with them, and what we 
come up with is a research idea. We forward the idea to the TTA responsible for 
nominating researchers, so the researcher than contact me (consultant). I 
review them to make sure we have the right person for the job.” (PFO2, IIC) 
In this model, the fund is considered as if it were issued by enterprises and the 
academics should be considered as subcontractors. Therefore, the academics 
are responsible for knowledge and its production, testing, and application with 
the help of the factory as well through the usage of the university‘s chemical 
labs and technicians. They are considered as research experts (consultants) 
who help enterprises in generating outcomes that can be transformed into 
tangible products. While the enterprises are considered as the main funder and 
are responsible for supporting the academics in transforming/bringing the 
scientific outcomes (recipe, in this case) into a tangible product through the 
provision of the required resources, such as HR, tools, ingredients, and space to 
achieve the product‘s commercial viability. 
Additionally, within the section-10 of the form-2, the two parties have to decide 
about the ownership of any expected invention. A mutual agreement has to be 
reached with regards to how the outcome from the project is going to be 
protected. In this case, the IIC (IIAP) rules encourage enterprises to retain all 
rights to the IP for any technology/knowledge developed by the supported 
project, and to be responsible for protecting any IP through patents, copyrights, 
industrial designs, trademarks, plant breeders‘ rights, trade secrets, or any other 
available means (IIC-2, 2010). To do so, the center assists the enterprises in 
getting IP by filling a patent application through the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry IP office, where the enterprises have to pay a registration fee of 200 
OMR. 
Moreover, the relationships between actors were governed by the IIC developed 
financial incentives. In this regard, the IIC encourages enterprises to collaborate 
in R&D with academics in terms of incentivization. The enterprise involved in the 
285 
 
project can concurrently make its own R&D contribution/investment by paying 
only 25% of the knowledge production cost with 75% coming from IIC (through 
IIAP). Additionally, this contribution can be either in cash or in-kind through 
providing the raw materials and resources (i.e. HR) required by academics for 
production. As stated by the IIC Client Manager: 
“We made some changes in form-6. I mean some terms and conditions. Before 
the percentage that the factory supposed to contribute in the project was 50%, 
we increased our contribution to be 75% so the factory will pay only 25% and 
this 25% is not a condition to be in cash, it can be in-kind anything that is non-
financial that provided by the company related to the project and this counted 
according to its value.” (PFO4, IIC) 
1.2.3 Patent Rules (PR): 
Besides, the relationships among actors were governed by the underlying 
contradiction between the IIC developed and the university‘s underdeveloped 
incentive of patenting for academics‘ IP disclosure. The IIC encourage 
academics to disclose their IP to enterprises in terms of incentivization. In this 
regard, and while the enterprises have the right to own, use, manufacture, 
apply, and commercialise the knowledge generated; the academics and their 
university still hold the right as the expected patent developers. From the IIC‘s 
perspective, this helps in raising the academics‘ profile as industrial R&D 
specialists, which consequently will be in the interest of their academic 
promotion. It also helps in enhancing the university‘s contribution in developing 
industrial patents for the benefit of the country‘s economy. According to one of 
the IIC consultants: 
“What I say to the researchers is the patent is registered to the enterprise but 
the researchers and the institute are named as the patent developers. Now that 
way the researchers are happy, because when they try to climb the ladder in the 
universities and they are going to their professorship they have to prove and 
justify why they want a professorship and if they can say that they have 
286 
 
developed a patent and that‟s will help them to get promotion and the university 
can say it contribute to the development of the patent development of industry 
which is good for improving country‟s economy.” (PFO2, IIC) 
On the other hand, the university encourages academics to disclose their IP 
through the element of compulsion. This is as per the universities‘ 
underdeveloped financial incentive of patenting. The development of IP is still 
not included in the criteria of academic promotion. A proposal is drafted by the 
Innovation Affairs Department to the university‘s higher level, but is not yet 
approved. The only criterion for academic promotion is publication in internal 
and internationally high ranked or referred journals. Recently, the development 
of IP has been incentivized through management recognition only as a way to 
encourage academics to disclose their research outcomes with potential 
patents. The academics‘ efforts are recognized by means of non-financial 
incentives such as rewarding a certificate of appreciation. As argued by the 
University‘s Innovation Director:  
―The university is encouraging now because there are innovations, industrial 
collaborations, patenting and IP… but the incentive for patented innovation is 
still not there and we are looking at it in promotion. We proposed this to the 
higher level but it is not approved yet. But we do recognize this through 
awarding them a certificate as an appreciation for their efforts.‖ (UO2, SQU) 
1.3 Knowledge Production:  
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge production. These actions include: (1) collaboration 
establishment and the actors‘ reasons/motives for being involved in such 
collaborations; (2) The formal and informal institutions enabling/supporting the 
process of collaboration. 
1.3.1. Academic Initiated Collaborations:  
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The outcomes of the early engagement with users, described in the background 
section, helped the academics in identifying the ingredients that help to improve 
the health aspect and quality of the original recipe of halwa. The next action 
involved developing and formulating low fat halwa by substituting fat-mimicking 
natural ingredients that resulted from the earlier engagement. Practically, this 
involved a trial in one of the factories alongside the use of the university‘s labs. 
Thus, collaborating with an enterprise was necessary in a curiosity driven 
process of taking the research outcome to application. This motivation was in 
line with their Department and College objective of serving the community 
through finding solutions to issues through research with the goal of improving 
the health quality of life. According to the Principle Investigator: 
“Halwa may be categorized as an unhealthy food we as food scientists need to 
make it healthy for people. the collaboration with halwa factory helped us to 
learn from them in the real world how they are doing it and also transforming 
science knowledge through their products...” (Ac1, SQU) 
This alignment of Departmental and College Objectives with the motivation of 
academics was important in establishing the collaboration. In response, the 
academics started to communicate directly and informally with the factories they 
networked with in the early engagement of their research. After less than one 
month, they identified one of the most popular halwa factories in Oman. The GM 
of the factory was cooperative as the factory did not incur any financial cost 
except providing academics with the required information and materials to apply 
their science in the development of a product.  As argued by the Principle 
Investigator: 
“We contacted many factories that we communicated with in the second phase 
of our research. We could get a response from one famous factory. Actually the 
GM was motivated since he didn‟t need to pay any penny. All what we needed 
were to provide us with resources. So he liked the idea and he allowed us to 
use all his piloted plans and facilities and we are taking all the ingredients and 
other things.” (Ac1, SQU) 
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In addition to the reason of non-financial liability, the factory‘s decision of 
participating in such project (or in producing the new recipe) was influenced by 
two other factors, which emerged from its individual motives and benefits. 
The first factor is related to the nature of the research outcomes generated by 
the academics. The GM of the factory considered the outcomes as having 
significant commercial potential. There is a similarity between the nature of the 
outcomes (generated recipe) and the nature of the products that were produces, 
sold, and marketed. Additionally, there is potential profit as the generated 
formulation of the recipe can produce the same profit with less production cost 
and expenses since the materials (the natural low fat-mimicking ingredients) to 
be used cost less that the traditional/original one. According to the factory‘s GM: 
―We are producing similar product. So there was no loss as I said we just gave 
the resources which we are already using and available, in addition of using low 
fat materials which were less in cost.” (CU1, SMEs) 
The recipe was also expected to provide a similar taste to the original high fat 
halwa. Furthermore, a potential profit will be gained as there is an expectation of 
achieving local market demand successfully. This results from the academics‘ 
and the factory‘s previous action of ensuring market feasibility through studying 
consumer preferences during the process of generating the recipe. As argued 
by the University‘s Principle Investigator:  
“The natural fat-mimic ingredients are expected to provide similar mouth feel as 
high fat halwa… You know he can make more profit from this with less cost. 
Also demand will be there because when we (academics and factory) studied 
the consumer preferences in the second stage we found people having positive 
response. They liked it same as the original one‟‟ (Ac1, SQU) 
The second factor is related to the short time expected to produce the product 
tangibly and launch it in the market since the recipe was already generated and 
required to be developed by academics. This is related to the factory‘s attribute 
of preferring short-term, focused projects that yield quick return. In this respect, 
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the factory found it time efficient as they were able to avoid going through the 
long process of academic R&D. This is with reference to its unwillingness to 
participate in R&D. Evidence of this argument is the statement by the Co-
investigator: 
“What motivated the factory, I would say there is a short-term view such as 
having a problem and it needs to be solved next week very soon. That was the 
Halwa project for instance it was a very good idea, very focused one and took 
little time to apply. You know they don‟t want to waste their time in 
research…the research was done by us before we approached them.'' (Ac2, 
SQU) 
The academics‘ decision to collaborate with the factory coincided with the birth 
of the IIC. The IIC provided them with an opportunity to access public funds, 
securing additional income for themselves and their Department/College. Within 
the rules of the funding program, academics were treated as subcontractors to 
the factory in return for a consultancy fee. According to the university rules, a 
high percentage (60%) of the fee was allocated to the academics while the 
remaining 40% was retained by: the University (20%), the College (10%) and 
the Department (10%). Thus, while academic curiosity was important in driving 
the early engagement of the collaboration, financial rewards, as well as 
contribution to the organisation, were important in motivating the academics to 
engage with the IIC funding scheme: 
“One aspect that motivates me to collaborate in IIC project is purely financial 
and when you have a contract with them you can claim some of your time as 
money, you can have them pay for your time…so for us it is beneficial to get 
such collaboration to gain money for us and our university” (AC2, SQU) 
In accessing the IIC funding, academics were confronted with resistance from 
the IIC, whose rules necessitated that the problem to be solved (by academics) 
must be initiated by the user (SMEs). In response, the SME suggested 
discussing the matter with the center‘s client manager, who was convinced of 
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the factory‘s willingness to adopt their research outcomes when they were 
reached. As argued by the IIC‘s Client Manager: 
“Yes our direction is from industry to academia and that‟s what makes us 
different. We work in favour of the industry... But there are some cases 
approached directly from academia such as the halwa project. We accepted 
these and took them further and discuss with the concerned factory. We didn‟t 
face any difficulty because we found the factory was willing to participate.‟‟ 
(PFO4, IIC) 
The Client Manager‘s ability to change the direction in an indirect way is linked 
to the nature of the IIAP as an experimental trial with a five-year experiment, 
because the IIC needs to learn how to achieve their main goal of encouraging 
local SMEs to participate in R&D and adopt research from academics to embed 
the importance of knowledge innovation within their businesses. This can be 
done by depicting the benefits and beauty of R&D to their businesses. 
According to him: 
“It doesn‟t matter the direction of the research; the most important thing is that 
we could convince enterprises to do R&D and implant the knowledge of 
innovation within the industrial sector here. We want just to show them the way, 
we won‟t be always there for them to fund. They need to try and see the beauty 
of it and see the benefit. We are just an experimental program provided by TRC. 
It is temporarily program.” (PFO4, IIC) 
The change of direction in the research is also supported by the action taken by 
the center‘s CEO in shifting the center‘s policy towards assisting academics in 
their applied research whenever there is an opportunity of making the most out 
of good ideas or outcomes initiated by academia for the benefit of local SMEs. 
This shift is related to his need for making changes each time they are gaining 
benefits for their clients (SMEs) in order to achieve their goal of injecting 
innovation into them. Evidence to support this argument is seen in a statement 
made by the Center‘s Chief Executive Officer himself: 
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“I built a policy where we should be as much aid to anybody…originally we used 
to turn down researchers when they bring their projects; I told them „no go 
away‟; then we gave them the chance, to see what type of ideas they have; to 
see what they can do for the factories, unless we get benefit from them, so our 
policy, whenever we get benefit and achieve our goals, we need to make 
changes” (PFO1, IIC) 
The factory‘s decision in collaborating with IIC was influenced by the in-kind 
contribution incentive developed by IIC and particularly the non-financial cost of 
involvement. This is affected by the developed funding incentives, done by IIC 
(the fund operator), where the factory contributed only 25% of the production 
cost with 75% coming from IIC. In addition, IIC gave the factory a chance to 
cover the remaining 25% through contributing in-kind instead of in-cash, where 
they could contribute in the form of providing the required materials and 
resources for academics. Therefore, the factory wanted to utilise the opportunity 
of getting consultancy services with less cost. As argued by the factory‘s 
General Manager: 
“It was funded by the innovation Centre and they had to pay certain fees to the 
university and we only gave the materials and time as an investment. So this is 
also how they are funding the project…. we are getting service and the IIC gave 
money to the university not us. For us it was in-kind investment by time and 
providing the materials, tools, space and so on.” (CU1, SMEs) 
In summary, this sections shows that the successful collaboration was assisted 
by the motives of the involved independent actors (academics, factory, IIC), 
which resulted in transforming the research outcomes into commercially tangible 
product.  As these motives differ (as per actors‘ cultural and institutional 
diversity), both actors are positioned to benefit, though this benefit was found to 
be different for each party because of the IIAP funding, particularly the 
institutional financial incentives developed within the fund.  In this regard, the 
academics perceived the opportunity of generating revenue for themselves and 
their organisation by securing additional income through consultancy.  Likewise, 
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the user perceived the opportunity of getting consultancy services without 
incurring/experiencing any financial cost (e.g. IIC in-kind contribution incentive).  
For the IIC (as a fund operator), collaboration was encouraged as it constitutes 
the core justification for the existence of their organisation. 
The analysis also identifies the positive effect of informal networking that 
contributed to the decision of the user to engage in collaborative activities with 
academics during the conduct of research.  For him collaboration appears to 
involve relatively little cost, aside from the time and usage of existing resources 
involved in helping academics in developing the recipe.  Whilst this was viewed 
as being considerably beneficial because of the attributes of the knowledge to 
be produced: The congruence of the generated outcome with his business 
production line, and the parallelism between the short time expected for 
knowledge production and his goal of quick financial return, etc.  
In this section, it is worth mentioning the positive effect of the IIC relaxed 
management process in supporting actors‘ interactions in developing an 
informal collaboration arrangement characterized by greater flexibility.  This was 
influenced by the institutional nature of IIC as an intermediary in facilitating the 
collaboration by permitting its officers to reduce bureaucracy in the process (e.g. 
made changes in research direction).  This consequently reduced the costs of 
searching for a formal partner.   
1.4 Knowledge Appropriation:  
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge appropriation. These actions were enabled and 
constrained by the formal institutions related to transferring knowledge through 
IPR. 
1.4.1 IP Disclosure: The Academic Choice of disclosing their expected IP 
to the factory and the university’s inability to appropriate the research 
outcomes: 
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The relaxation of the IIC rules by the IIC Client manager allowed the factory to 
submit an application as if it were the one who initiated the project. In parallel, 
the academics submitted their completed proposal through their College IIC 
Technology Transfer Agent (TTA). This meant that the relationship between 
academics and the factory was governed by two formal contractual agreements. 
From the university‘s side, they signed the research contract agreement form 
under the consultancy section of the Research Department, while from the IIC 
side they signed the proposal research contract. 
In case of a potential invention, and in accordance with the IPR rules of the 
research proposal contract, a mutual agreement by both the academics and the 
factory, regarding how the outcome from the project is going to be patented, 
was ensured by the consultant. This was done for the purpose of preventing any 
future conflict regarding patenting as the involved parties will become committed 
to fulfilling the formal agreement. As argued by one of the IIC‘s Consultants: 
“It is my role to ensure that an agreement is reached jointly between the 
participated enterprise and the academics. You know research proposal is a 
commitment and everybody have to cooperate and if we don‟t agree in patent 
there will be no project and will not be any continuation for that conversation. 
See I am quite straight forward about that because otherwise there will be 
definitely conflicts in the future.” (PFO2, IIC) 
After negotiation, the academics decided to disclose the expected IP to the 
factory.  Consequently, a conflict had resulted between the university‘s 
innovation director and the academics. Although they were familiar with the 
university‘s IP disclosure rules, the academics, especially the PI, did not discuss 
and report the expected IP (or potential patented outcomes) to the Innovation 
Director before disclosing it to the factory through the IIC. This action was found 
to be inconsistent with the university‘s IP disclosure rules, which was stated as 
one of the principle investigator‘s main responsibilities (as mentioned above). 
This hindered the university‘s appropriation through protecting it as a patent. 
According to the University‘s Innovation Director: 
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“It is important to not disclose the invention to a third party in order to protect 
it…. Our department should be in the picture in negotiating with researchers 
about IP.  What is happening is that they are not negotiating and contacting 
directly. It shouldn‟t come from IIC and it should come from the researchers. 
They have to appreciate that there is a value in their negotiation with the factory, 
but they are not coming to us” (UO2, SQU) 
The academic decision of disclosing their expected IP to the factory was 
influenced by many reasons. These reasons emerged from the existent rules 
(incentives) and regulations followed by the IIC and the absent/underdeveloped 
IP rules (incentives) of the university.  
From the academics‘ perspective, the main reason for their action is related 
mostly to the underlying contradiction between the IIC developed 
(existent/present) and the university‘s underdeveloped (nonexistent/absent) 
incentive of patenting for academics‘ IP disclosure, as mentioned in the 
governance structure.  In this respect, the academics found it more beneficial to 
disclose the IP to the factory than to their university‘s Innovation Affairs 
Department. From the IIC side, they wanted to use/benefit from the patenting 
incentive provided by the IIC. As mentioned above, even if the IP was disclosed 
to the factory, the academics and their university would still be considered the 
patent developers. This was in addition to the other two aforementioned 
benefits/reasons i.e. getting salaries/consultancy fees and developing their 
outcomes into a product. This incentive was found to be consistent with the 
Principle Investigator‘s motive of ‗individual academic development‘ through 
getting the credit for IP development, which has more weight than publications. 
Therefore, the incentive gave the involved academics the motive to become 
more persistent in developing their generated research outcomes and making 
them novel in order to patent them. According to one of the academics:  
“Patenting is important for the researchers to get the credit that they have 
innovative ideas…Patent is different way of innovation than publication. It gives 
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more weight for us within not only our career but also within the industry.” (Ac1, 
SQU) 
On the other hand, they found it costly to disclose their IP to their university as 
there was a lack of tangible return, especially a lack of ‗patenting incentive‘. 
Patenting is absent from the criteria of academic promotion, which is due to the 
university‘s underdeveloped IP incentive. As per the university system, the 
promotion is based only on the number of publications. Therefore, the 
academics found it more beneficial to disclose the IP to the factory, as it allowed 
them to become the patent developer, in addition to the other stated 
benefits/reasons. Thus, the benefits of disclosing it to the factory maximized the 
cost of not disclosing it to the university. According to the Co-Investigator:  
“Here (in SQU) for us the promotion is based on only publications, publications, 
publications whether we have patents or not it doesn‟t really matter or whether 
we have a two million contracts with a company it doesn‟t count at all; But if we 
have five papers out of that contract that carries more weight in promotion.” 
(Ac2, SQU)  
Moreover, there were two other reasons which influenced the academics‘ 
decision. These emerged from the IIC developed IP rules. The first reason was 
that the academics were worried as there was a possibility of rejecting their 
application, which consequently hinders them from achieving their goal of 
transforming their outcomes into a tangible product, which was the essence of 
this collaboration. This is related to the enforcement action taken by the IIC 
consultant, as per the IIC rules where the consultant is responsible for 
guaranteeing that the ownership of any expected IP must be disclosed to IIC in 
order for it to be owned by the participated factory. This is related to the nature 
of the IIC model as consultancy based, where the fund is considered as if it 
were issued from factory. Subsequently, the ownership of the research 
outcomes, even if an invention was discovered, is excluded for the factory. It is 
also related to achieving fairness to the participating factory, which contributed 
towards the cost of the knowledge production. The other reason is that the IIC 
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found that the factory was driven in participating in their system by means of IP 
so as to be able to get the exclusive right of manufacturing, using, and 
commercialising the generated product in the future. According to one of the IIC 
consultants:  
“if the industry (user) contributes towards the cost of the project, product 
development and the remaining of the cost come from the innovation center and 
researchers are acting as subcontractors to do the research, then it is in my 
opinion, the patent should belong to the factory… let us face it, if they are not 
driven towards IP then they will not see the need to go through the system from 
the beginning. So they have the right to be able to produce and market the 
product.‟‟ (PFO3, IIC) 
The second reason, and in addition to their aforementioned motives of securing 
an additional income, was that the academics found the disclosure of their 
expected IP to the factory to yield better benefits. Although they are against the 
formal publication of the research outcome, the IIC and factory were found to be 
receptive with regards to public disclosure. They allowed the academics to 
disclose the general aspect of their research outcomes to the public through the 
media (national and international newspapers). This is consistent with the 
academics‘ motive of awareness creation and their purpose of educating people 
about their healthy product. This is in relation to their background as Nutrition 
Scientists (role of discipline in improving the health and quality of the community 
life). This can be evidenced in the following statement given by the Principle 
Investigator:  
“We can publish (disclose) it to public. They (IIC and factory) don‟t have any 
problem in publishing (disclosing) the Omani Halwa and it comes in the media. 
We could publish in many newspapers…. we are in nutrition because we want 
people to be aware. The awareness for us is essential and so we want people to 
be aware.” (Ac1, SQU) 
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In summary, the underlying conflict between the IIC developed and the 
university‘s underdeveloped patenting incentive for academics resulted in the 
university‘s failure in appropriating the knowledge generated by its academics, 
consequently, hindering it from achieving its goal of building a patenting profile. 
For academics, the fund IP disclosure incentives appeared to involve 
considerable benefits (e.g. securing additional income for conducting further 
research, public disclosure receptiveness, and gaining credit for being the 
patent developer); while the absence of IP development as an incentive in their 
academic promotion appeared to involve the potential of losing the opportunity 
of gaining those benefits.   
This finding resonates an important issue.  The academics‘ decision of 
disclosure was strongly affected by the perceived personal remunerations from 
the complementary benefits embedded within IIAP incentives.  Hence, a conflict 
emerged between academics‘ logics and their professional obligation of 
disclosure to the university.  This makes one reasonably question whether the 
academics‘ decision of disclosure was affected by their logics.  Yet, it is a loss to 
the university to remunerate a private party for a research result that has utilised 
university resources (e.g. labs).  Hence, there is a need to rectify this issue by 
changing the system through introducing alternative IP incentives 
arrangements, where the university can employ the system to deal with the 
transfer of IP of its faculty members. 
This section has also demonstrated the role of IIC as an intermediary. The 
consultant ensured a mutual agreement regarding how the outcome from the 
project is to be patented.  Bargaining costs were also reduced as both the 
academics and the factory reached a mutual agreement due to IIAP provided 
incentives. 
1.4.2 Academics’ and the factory’s failure to patent the generated 
knowledge (inventive recipe): 
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After the two parties agreed about the IP and their responsibilities, the 
consultant submitted the signed proposal contract to the IIC board of directors 
for approval. The fund was granted successfully and the academics got a 
payment of 7,424 OMR as a ‗consultancy fee‘. The payment was given in 
installments after achieving each decided stage of the project.  
The project made significant progress in the form of prototype completion and 
market viability testing. The academics and the user worked collectively to make 
sure that the generated recipe was close to being patentable and commercially 
exploitable by the factory in the market. To ensure the safeguarding of the 
ownership right for the factory, the IIC consultant selected the project as one of 
the best showcases at the IIC INFOM exhibition in 2011. During the exhibition, 
the generated knowledge (new recipe) was disclosed to the public, but at the 
same time was registered with the local IP Office at the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry. The IP application was filled by the concerned academics 
according to their formal agreement in disclosing the IP to the factory.  
However, the patent application was rejected by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (MoCI), particularly by its IP Director. The main reason for this rejection 
was that the generated new recipe was found to be inconsistent with the 
ministerial decree number 2004/104 which was developed by the ministry for 
the concern of protecting the local standards/criteria of making Omani halwa. 
The special specifications issued for Omani Halwa were derived from special 
Omani descriptive measurements. This is because Halwa is considered as an 
Omani traditional local product that was stipulated to Oman. The reason for 
protecting the original recipe is also emphasized by the House of the Omani 
Heritage: different halwa producers would prepare the product with different 
results (taste) and this would keep each family‘s recipe secret so that it can 
pass from generation to generation. Thus, there is no relation of the 
international IP rules/principles (such as IPRs) as there is a need for it protected 
because it reflects the identity of the Omani local industry. Evidence to support 
this argument is seen in a statement made by the MoCI IP Director himself: 
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“Ministerial decisions are organisational matters and there is no IP right for any 
party. And the decision is about the way of making halwa. This is because 
halwa is an Omani traditional product which specifically represents Oman, so 
there is no need for international rules to be applied here.” (Government Officer, 
MoCI) 
The decree was intended for considering the Omani measured criterion number 
2004/1635 concerning the specifications of the Omani Halwa for protecting this 
industry from any intervening additions in order to increase its quality. In this 
regard, certain criteria (ingredients or components) are to be compulsorily 
applied by all local halwa-making factories. Each factory is responsible for 
ensuring that the production of halwa complies with these defined criteria in 
order for them to bear the name of ‗Omani halwa‘; otherwise they will be subject 
to legal liability. As argued by the MoCI IP Director: 
“The factories have to follow the standard measurements. They can change the 
cooking tools and equipment, but should not change the protected recipe such 
as using new ingredients or components/elements. For example, using 
vegetable oil than natural ghee and others; otherwise they will be subject to 
legal liability. For the halwa to be called as an Omani halwa it has to be under 
the decided measured standards.” (GO, MoCI) 
Thus, as the academics and the factory replaced the defined ingredients into 
fat-mimicking ones, which altered the defined specifications, the main issue of 
rejection was in producing the same name as an Omani Halwa. Consequently, 
the director asked the factory and the academics to not patent it elsewhere or 
publish unless they changed the name of the product. As stated by the Principle 
Investigator: 
“The issue is in producing the same name of the product, producing it as an 
Omani halwa is the issue; we should give a different name such as sweet halwa 
or totally different name. Because they said the new recipe changed the original 
one which is against the rule.” (Ac1, SQU) 
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The academics didn‘t expect that the application would be rejected. They were 
bound to fulfill the agreement (IIC Research Contract Proposal) signed with the 
factory, and were not aware of the rules (ministerial decree) at the national level. 
These rules were found to be unexposed to the public electronically, and only 
known within the ministry by the officers and the concerned users (such as 
Halwa Factories), who are entrusted with the original formula in order to obtain 
an economical advantage. Thus, protection must be sought from the MoCI, 
where a factory is not allowed to change the recipe and own it by itself. 
The factory‘s action of not informing the academics about the rule of the original 
recipe as a trade secret was taken naively. The factory‘s GM lacks patent 
knowledge and knowledge about the complicated process of patenting, as he 
did not have any past experience in patenting. This was the first experiment, 
which yet again was initiated by IIC as a way to encourage the GM to become 
involved in the system as a way of protecting his factory‘s ownership rights. 
Therefore, the GM was unable to realise the importance and benefits of 
patenting and took this matter for granted as he was driven mainly by his motive 
of commercialising the generated knowledge after transforming it into a real 
commercial product. As argued by the University‘s Innovation Director: 
“They are not aware of patenting. They don‟t know how to process it and don‟t 
know how the process is complicated…and it is normal that they will take things 
for granted. They are in commercialising rather than patenting.‟‟ (UO2, SQU) 
The lack of patent knowledge can be related to the gaps within the IIAP 
process. The IIC is not responsible for creating awareness about patenting 
among enterprises. As per the IIC IP rules, the protection of IP through 
patenting is the responsibility of the factory. The IIC consultant is only assisting 
him in getting IP by asking academics file a patent application through the MoCI 
IP Office, as they have better knowledge about the patenting process. They 
were the ones who produced the knowledge scientifically and have the full 
description of the generated knowledge. According to the IIC‟s CEO: 
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―We are noticing that local industries are not that much relying on patenting, that 
is why we encourage them to patent. Of course we are there to guide them but it 
is their responsibility to file an application with the help of academics through the 
ministry of commerce and industry.‟‟ (PFO1, IIC) 
In summary, there is a misalignment between TRC and MoCI.  The collision of 
two IP elements (Omani Halwa Trade-Secret versus Patenting) resulted in the 
user‘s failure in appropriating the knowledge generated (e.g. inability to use the 
name).  Hence, such collision caused a loss to the user.  Similarly, better results 
were not attained for the IIC, as they didn‘t retain the value of their fund 
investment nor did they succeed in ensuring SMEs competitiveness.   Thus, the 
negligence of such opportunity by IIC and MoCI, as well as misalignment merit 
exploring.  This can be explored through the lens of institutional fragmentation. 
Yet, there was a commercial assessment of what is a very different commercial 
opportunity, because of the inability to use the name.  For him, changing the 
knowledge name involved the potential commercial cost of local demand risk, 
consequently impeding him from achieving profit maximization, which was one 
of the important motives for his collaboration with academics.  Thus, the 
negligence of such opportunity by the user also merits exploration. 
1.4.3 The factory’s refusal to change the name of the generated recipe to 
patent it: 
As the main reason for the MoCI rejection was the name of the product, a 
chance was given to the academics and factory by the ministry‘s IP director to 
change the name of the generated recipe to a totally different one in order to 
patent it. However, since they disclosed the IP to the factory, the academics did 
not have the authority to make any changes unless they got the permission from 
the factory. Therefore, the decision was left to the factory, which was reluctant 
to change the name. According to the Principle Investigator: 
“The ministry people asked us to change the name to go for patenting... We had 
the intention that we will work with the factory and the factory will be producing 
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and give different aspect (different name), but we didn‟t receive any response 
from the factory.‟‟ (Ac2, SQU) 
The factory‘s GM, considering that the generated recipe yields good benefits for 
the factory, was concerned about commercialising the product. He was 
persistent in convincing the MoCI to allow him to at least produce and market 
the generated product with the same name and without filing a new patenting 
application. However, the ministry refused and commercialisation was 
discouraged by the higher authority, especially the Royal Court. The MoCI 
instructed the GM to not produce or market the product unless he changed the 
name to be in compliance with the national rule. As argued by the Co-
Investigator: 
“As far as I know the GM discussed many times with the ministry to permit him 
to commercialise it in the same name and without going through patenting. But 
the ministry refused and the GM was disappointed. You know because 
changing the name breached the national rule of halwa. It is a trade secret. So 
he had to make changes.” (Ac2, SQU)  
The reason for the GM‘s determination towards commercialisation was because 
he found it costly to change the name to a totally different one, on top of bearing 
the expense of patenting registration fees. From his perspective, changing the 
name will not add any financial value to its business, which is entirely about the 
production of halwa under the traditional name of the ‗Omani Halwa‘ that is well-
known/recognized by consumers in the local market. So, there is the risk of the 
local market‘s lack of demand for a newly named product. This was also 
influenced by the factory‘s attribute of ‗resistance to change‘ and resistance in 
taking a new path where success was not guaranteed. It resisted changing 
something that has worked for many years and has consistently yielded 
reasonable profit. The factory‘s aim was to commercialise the generated product 
to gain profit, and this was their reason for collaborating with academics, and 
ultimately their reason for not allowing the academics to file another patenting 
application with a different name. As argued by the Principle Investigator: 
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“They were happy with the status quo. They resist change. And why they should 
change something if it uses to work for the last 100 years. They would need 
significant increase in profit or potential benefits to suddenly change the 
question of patenting and this cannot happen… They would say why we bother 
ourselves to go through patenting process. So what is the benefit of patenting to 
them? Nothing! I mean they got profit so why should they spend money in 
patenting and changing the name. There is no commercial return from their 
point.‟‟ (Ac1, SQU)  
In summary, conflicting logics between academics (individual career 
development through patenting) and the user (maximizing profit through 
commercial exploitation) resulted in the academics‘ failure to appropriate the 
opportunity given by MoCI. For them, the user‘s refusal (e.g. resistance to 
change) inhibited them from reaching the benefits perceived from IP disclosure 
(e.g. enhancing their academic prestige through ‗Patent developer‘ fund 
incentives).  The user‘s negligence of the available opportunity of patenting, 
merit exploration as this was a new product that could have helped the user 
gain a better competitive advantage over the local market competitors by 
introducing a new innovative production line with less cost. 
1.4.4 The factory’ refusal to allow the academics to patent the generated 
recipe through their university: 
Because of the factory‘s reluctance to change the name, the academics (and 
particularly the principle investigator) decided to make use of the situation. He 
decided to take another direction for their research, which would enable them to 
change the name of the generated knowledge. He was persistent in enforcing 
and achieving his motive of patenting. Therefore, he decided to get support from 
the Innovation Affairs Department at his university. This is in line with the 
department‘s responsibility in coordinating the IP protection process (with the 
help of the US law company) through the fund provided by the university for the 
purpose of protecting and registering patentable research outcomes. However, 
the academics couldn‘t go through with the process as the factory (which had 
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the ultimate authority as the owner of the generated recipe) was reluctant to 
give the academics the chance to change the name and patent it through their 
university. The factory‘s refusal was for two stated reasons.  
The first reason is that it will be costly if the university patents the generated 
knowledge because there is a possibility that the university, after patenting it, 
would sell it at a high price. It will not be able to commercially manufacture, use, 
or sell the generated product without getting a license from the university. Thus, 
it prefers to do things at a lower cost rather than bearing the expense of 
licensing. As argued by the University‘s Innovation Director: 
“We are facing problem with patenting as they want things with less cost than 
going for high expenses, so patent will raise a price. They don‟t go for the 
university to patent the invention, because they know that it will be in a high 
price.” (UO2, SQU) 
The second reason is that there is potential risk as the university will probably 
sell or license the protected patent to its competitors in the local market. It is one 
of about 10,000 factories in Oman producing halwa commercially. Therefore, 
they found it costly for the recipe to be taken by their competitors, especially 
since they already contributed towards the cost of knowledge generation. 
Evidence of this argument is the statement given by one of the IIC Consultants: 
“They (university) may sell it to competitors. So there is a potential risk … they 
are contributing to the cost, don‟t want the competitors take their ideas, so it 
makes sense that the industry to be the patent holder.‟‟ (PFO3, IIC). 
In summary, the conflict between the university and the user about IPR and 
royalty payments from the patent created a barrier for successful knowledge 
appropriation.  For the user, the university‘s prevailed patent-licensing 
arrangements involved considerable costs: The ‗non-exclusive license‘, and the 
risk of licensing the outcome to existing local competitors, the high royalty 
payment and inability to bear the cost due to financial incapability; while for the 
university it appeared to involve the significant benefit of gaining additional 
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revenue (e.g. patent licensing income).  Yet, and by the rigorous enforcement of 
such arrangement, the university neglected the opportunity of patenting, and 
thus lost the chance of gaining better results (e.g. building patent profile and 
increasing the scientific productivity of their academics by reaffirming the novelty 
and usefulness of their research outcomes). 
 
2. Case (B): Radar Device Project 
2.1 Background of the project: 
The project was linked with research initiated by two academics from the 
College of Economic and Political Science, Department of Information Systems 
in 2011.  The collaboration with the non-commercial and commercial users was 
initiated by academics after the research outcome (radar device) was generated 
scientifically by them.  It was funded by a public fund of CIIAP-Community and 
an Individual Assistant Program under the TRC‘s Innovation-Hub23.   
The idea for the project began in 2009, the same year which His Majesty Sultan 
Qaboos gave a Royal Speech on the issue of road accidents, where he 
emphasized the need for the community (all sectors of society) to unite and 
collaborate in finding solutions to reduce and prevent accidents which result in 
deaths or permanent disabilities.  Since then, the academics began developing 
new ways to prevent and reduce road accidents in the Sultanate.  They studied 
the issue of the high rate of accidents.  After months of research, they decided 
to come up with a new device to be installed inside cars to monitor the speed 
level.  According to the Principle Investigator: 
                                                          
23
The CIIAP program is run independently by the Innovation Hub.  Funded and facilitated by TRC, the 
program encourages a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship in Oman.  It was set up in 2013 in 
response to Royal Decree 54/2005, which requires TRC to address issues relating to supporting individual 
innovations within local communities, such as universities (TRC, 2014).  
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“As researchers have skills in this area and after all hearing HM speech when 
he instructing all people in Oman to come up with a solution to stop the rate of 
accidents in Oman, we decided like to work in such a project. The main goal is 
to come up with a new radar system to encourage car drivers to reduce their 
speed.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
The research was preceded by studying the different existing devices, both 
nationally and internationally.  The academics distinguished their idea by 
enhancing and refining the existed ones by adding better characteristics.  Thus, 
the scientific design of the device was proposed by integrating different existing 
technological components in an innovative way, evidenced by the following 
statement given by the Principle Investigator: 
„‟we first find whether this idea is existed or not, if yes then how can I add to the 
idea so I can distinguish mine from others…I have to enhance it and refine it, 
add some more features, if it is differing by 15% from the existing one and works 
fine then it is an innovation.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
 
2.2 Governance Structure: 
This section explains the formal structure of the institutions that govern the 
relationships between the actors involved within the case. Initially, the 
relationships between actors were governed by the rules of the Public Fund of 
Community and Individual Innovation Assistant Program (CIIAP) and University 
IP rules. 
2.2.1 University IP Rules 
According to the disclosure rule (and as mentioned previously in Case A), the 
university requires academics to disclose intellectual properties through the 
element of compulsion. Also, if the academic research (basic or applied) 
outcome contains IP which is considered by the university to be of substantial 
commercial value (from licensing royalties), no invention disclosure to a third 
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party can be taken before assessing the option of seeking IP protection through 
the university‘s Innovation Affairs Department (SQU, 2014).  
Rules governing the actions of the university‘s innovation affairs department aim 
to maximize patent generation. ‗Building patent profile‘ is stipulated as one of 
the department‘s main responsibilities in coordinating IP protection through 
patent registration and maintaining an up-to-date database for all university 
generated patents (ibid). Additionally, to ensure the ability of the department for 
patent generation, it is stated clearly as one of the Principle Investigator‘s (PI) 
responsibilities within the university‘s research rules and regulations. The PI‘s 
responsibility is to ‗ensure the report of any intellectual property arising from 
research projects to the Deanship of Research and particularly to the 
Department of Innovation Affairs‘ to assess its patentability (ibid) 
A budget of 20,000 OMR per year is allocated by the University Council for 
assessing and registering only 5 IP disclosures. While a budget of 250-500 
OMR per IP disclosure is allocated for the evaluation process, which varies 
according to the complexity of the invention and the country of the patent office.  
The total amount is approximately 22,500 OMR per year.  This fund is allocated 
exclusively for the purpose of registering patentable outcomes.  Thus, IP is 
protected through patenting as an exclusive right granted for an invention. From 
to the university‘s perspective, an invention is defined as the first occurrence of 
an idea for a new product or process, which would be normally suitable 
exclusively for patenting.  The innovation is considered after the protection is 
granted.  The following statement by the University‟s Innovation Director gives 
evidence: 
“If there is any IP raised from the academic research that needs patent 
registration, then we (the university) fund the process.  The assigned budget is 
tentatively 20,000 OMR annually for registering 5 IP disclosures for patent 
protection.  While for evaluation process 250-500 OMR per IP disclosure… We 
are concerning about protecting patentable research results only.  What I mean 
by results here is the generation of novel new product or process for the first 
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time.  The innovation comes later after protection.  If there is a chance to 
commercialise I mean.‟‟ (UO2, SQU) 
The disclosures are evaluated by a US international IP company (Becker and 
Poliakoff Law) in accordance with its used international patenting criteria of: 
patentable subject matter; novelty; exhibiting a sufficiently inventive step (this 
means that the invention must not be an obvious development of something that 
has come before it); it also must have some utility and usefulness, for example, 
it must be industrially applicable and useful (SQU, 2014). 
The reason for dealing with this firm in carrying out the process is that the 
department lacks the experts and the expertise in how to search patent 
databases as well as assess inventions.  The Innovation Department also lacks 
numbers - It only has four employees, who also lack capability as they don‘t 
have prior experience in IP law and processes.  As stated by one of the 
University‟s Officers: 
„‟at the moment in the innovation department we have only four staff who are not 
qualified.  We need people who have legal background and we are missing in 
the university. We don‟t have employees specialised in the IP especially in 
patenting… Now we are using patent databases, because we don‟t have really 
expert people in how to search.  We are dealing with the US firm to do the 
process.‟‟ (UO1, SQU) 
Although the fund allocated by the university is for patenting, the IP disclosure 
process within university is still unclear.  The patenting process with the 
international US Company is operated internally by the department, and is not 
exposed to academics.  There is no channel for academics to apply within the 
department.  There is also no existence of clear written guidelines that guide the 
academics in the process of disclosure. The Innovation Director simply gives 
verbal directions to academics as a way of coordinating their IP matters with the 
department whenever there is a possibility for an expected IP.  More clarification 
would subsequently be given under the knowledge appropriation section.  
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Evidence of this is the following statement given by one of the University‟s 
Officers:  
„‟we are developing the IP and that we are missing in our university. So we are 
in the process of actually raising the first draft of IP policy in which we are 
developing the IP procedures on how receiving the disclosures from academics.  
In a system where there is a channel academics can apply and with the 
innovation department… Now what we do is that we are giving verbal directions 
in how to process their application… So if they want patenting then we will 
support them with the initial system screen and sign an agreement with the US 
firm.  We are planning to place these guidelines in the website or in written in 
the future.‟‟ (UO4, SQU) 
2.2.2 CIIAP-Community and Individual Innovation Assistance Program 
Rules:  
TRC, through CIIAP, encourages individual innovators to retain the full 
ownership rights to the intellectual property of their generated knowledge. The 
IP is protected through the category of industrial property which includes not 
only patents for inventions but also patents for innovations.  This is as per the 
TRC goal of building the innovation capacity within the country.  As stated by 
one of the TRC‘s Officers: 
“They (innovators) can protect it through industrial property category if they 
want.  Say for instance they can get patent for their innovations.  Patent is not 
only related to inventions… By this we try to find the suitable type of IPR for 
building our capacity of innovation.   So we need to move beyond current ways 
of conducting researches so we can get innovative outcomes, but at the same 
time choose the appropriate IPR.” (PPMF1, TRC) 
It assists the innovators in getting IP by filling an application through an 
American IP Office while commencing pre-commercialisation actions 
(production of generated research outcomes).  In case there is a need for 
creating awareness about IP, TRC ensures the provision and involvement of 
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international IP professionals as IP professionals are lacking nationally.  The 
professionals are responsible for guiding individuals in the process of protection, 
in addition to examining and studying the weaknesses and strengths of their 
expected IP.  Evidence of this is given by the CIIAP Innovation Director:  
“The individuals (academics) have the right to get the full IP ownership and we 
do facilitate and support the IP and even contact them to the IP agencies. And 
we coach them through the process from A to Z until he/she owns the full 
patent. We don‟t have people experienced in IP.  They are missing nationally.  
So we are dealing with the American IP Office to help us in assessing and 
coaching the individuals in the process of protection.'' (PPMF1, TRC) 
The mandate of the fund is to support individual innovators until pre-
commercialisation, for example, when they own their functional prototype and 
can embark on a business start-up.  The prototype can be produced by either 
local or international producers. The number of prototypes is based on the 
scope of the CIIAP budget, which should not exceed 100,000 OMR.  As stated 
by one of the TRC Officers: 
„‟We also support them to do their innovation through prototyping either in Oman 
or outside Oman, if he knows the agency that will do the prototype for him it will 
be good if he doesn‟t we will contact him to a producer and best organisation 
that materialise his innovation into functional prototype and this all depends on 
the scope of the budget.  It shouldn‟t exceed 100,000 OMR.  We can produce 
as many prototypes as we can or products for each individual'' (PPMF1, TRC) 
After production, successful innovations/inventions are bridged to full 
commercialisation by linking individuals to the national stakeholders (from public 
and private sectors) responsible for supporting, incubating, and funding SMEs. 
The stakeholders‘ responsibility is focused on funding the commercialisation 
process of the generated knowledge.  While the individuals are responsible for 
establishing and running their own start-ups through using the sources of funds 
provided by those stakeholders (TRC, 2014). 
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2.3 Knowledge Production:  
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge production. These actions include: (1) collaboration 
establishment and the actors‘ reasons/motives for involvement in such 
collaborations; (2) The formal and informal institutions enabling and constraining 
the process of collaboration. 
2.3.1 Academics initiated collaborations: 
AS per their motive, described in the background section, of developing a new 
radar device, the academics wanted to take their research outcome further, to 
transform it into a tangible product that is useful to society.  They didn‘t 
approach their university as the internal funds (seed money) were limited, and 
were allocated only for the purpose of academic research, which, therefore 
could not ultimately cover the cost of their high tech research outcome.  
Therefore, they needed to get an investor to invest in their new proposed 
device.  In 2013, they approached the Royal Oman Police (ROP) as it is the 
only entity that has the ultimate authority in deciding whether to implement the 
proposed device or not.  However, they faced difficulty in convincing them. The 
ROP was not looking for theories and wanted to see the final tangible device in 
order to understand the difference between the proposed device and the 
existing solutions/devices.  They wanted to see how the device worked in 
practice before deciding whether to invest in it or not.  As argued by the 
Principle Investigator: 
“See look at the beginning they (ROP) said we see only papers, a proposal.  We 
want to see an item, see a product, because these guys don‟t know anything 
about the research papers. They want to see final products.  So they said to us 
don‟t tell that you are going to do this, Show us! Let us go in reality and test it. 
This is gona to convince them.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
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Therefore, the academics decided to search for a fund to develop the device 
into a tangible product (a prototype) in order to show its practicality.  They 
managed to raise a small fund from one of the national popular telecom 
companies as a donation and as part of its social responsibility.  Consequently, 
they signed a contract with an experienced international producer from Belgium 
to develop a sample prototype as per the fund raised.  After the prototype was 
produced they approached the ROP to test it in one of the vehicles to show 
them how the device worked. The ROP was somehow convinced but again 
refused to adopt the device, as they found it risky to inject such a device into 
their system because the device is new to the world and there is a possibility of 
loss.  This is related to the ROP‘s common practice of getting ready-made 
solutions, which had already been applied successfully in developed countries 
such as the UK and other European countries.  Therefore, they resisted 
replacing the existing solutions as they had already paid a large amount of 
money for them.  They asked the academics to present the real life device after 
testing it in a developed country.   The following quote provides supporting 
evidence: 
„‟They say look we don‟t want your experiment, we want you to go to UK and 
other European countries and apply it for 4-5 years then come to us with the 
results to make our final decision… because it is gona to replace the other 
solutions that they have and paid money for, and for them it is still new! And the 
main concern was that there is no country in the world that has this device, so 
we are the first.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
 
The academics were eager to find a way to convince the ROP to allow them to 
inject the real life device into different local vehicles.  Therefore, they decided to 
seek a public fund that supports their research outcomes.  Their search 
coincided with the inauguration of different TRC innovation initiatives for the 
purpose of resolving problems of national concerns.   Road accidents were one 
of the concerns that TRC was willing to resolve, as was imparted within the 
HM‘s speech in 2009 as mentioned in the background section.  Thus, the 
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academics were directed by TRC to disclose their research outcome under the 
fund of the CIIAP-Community and Individual Innovation Assistant Program.   
In accessing the CIIAP fund, the academics were able to convince the ROP to 
adopt their device in the future.  The ROP‘s decision to participate in such a 
project was influenced mainly by the benefit that emerged from the developed 
financial incentive provided within the CIIAP.  In this respect, the ROP felt more 
secure that the generated knowledge would be funded and operated totally by 
TRC as its national mandate indicated in the program itself.  Thus, the 
implementation of such a device appeared to involve no financial cost apart 
from the time of integrating the new device into the existing system to generate 
fines when the speed is high.  As argued by the Principle Investigator: 
„‟They (ROP) are not going to pay a penny. They don‟t do anything. We don‟t 
need anything from except just can you please generate a fine if the speed is 
high? … We are trying also to see it with them by telling them okay with very 
less involvement and very less effort from your side there is no problem anyway. 
TRC is going to fund this prototype so let us implement it in certain number of 
vehicles and let us see the results.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
On the other hand, in accessing the CIIAP fund, the academics had to make a 
decision about the commercialisation aspect.  However, they were confronted 
with the difficulty of fulfilling the CIIAP commercialisation rule, which 
necessitated that the commercialisation (selling and marketing) of the generated 
device should be the responsibility of the academics as they are required to 
establish their own business/start-ups after production.  As aforementioned in 
the governance structure, commercialisation is only facilitated by bridging the 
successful innovations (after production) to full commercialisation through 
linking them to national stakeholders (from public and private sectors) 
responsible for supporting, incubating, and funding SMEs.  Thus, the 
stakeholders‘ responsibility begins after the knowledge is generated and is 
mainly focused on funding the commercialisation process (start-ups fund), while 
the academics were responsible for establishing and running their own 
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business/start-up through using the funds provided by those stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, the academics were unwilling to embark on business.  This is 
because they possessed information regarding the knowledge production 
process and the knowledge produced.  They lacked business experience and 
knowledge of the local market.  Thus, they preferred to remain as the producer 
of knowledge and raised the need for getting a partnership with local enterprise. 
This is evidenced from the following statement by the Principle Investigator: 
‗‟well I am the researcher.  I just come up with the idea.  It is not my job to do 
business.  Actually I don‟t have experience and I don‟t want to follow that path.  I 
just want to do research and come up with good ideas… that‟s why we need to 
have a partnership with a local company to sell and market the product.‟‟ (AC3, 
SQU) 
Hence, the academics negotiated with TRC the possibility of involving a 
commercial user to handle the business aspects (e.g. production negotiation, 
selling, and marketing the generated device) for them in the future.  The 
academics didn‘t experience any resistance from TRC or the Innovation Director 
of CIIAP who was found to be understanding in giving the academics the 
chance to involve whichever local commercial user they found relevant to fulfill 
their target.  The Director‘s ability to change the rules of commercialisation is 
linked to the nature of CIIAP as one of the TRC‘s experimental programs.  As 
argued by him: 
“See all TRC programs are experimental.  So rules are still under modification.  
They are not final…  We adjust them according to innovators needs.  So why 
don‟t we give them the chance. If they think this (collaborating with an 
enterprise) is the right thing to achieve the commercialisation goal let it be then.” 
(PPMF1, TRC) 
The relaxation of the TRC‘s rules by the Innovation Director allowed the 
academics to get a partnership with a local medium enterprise after disclosing 
their outcomes to the public through the media (TV and local newspapers).  
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Here it is worth mentioning that the CEO of the enterprise turned out to be an 
acquaintance of the Principle Investigator.  They had previously worked together 
on different projects through informal networking mainly initiated by academics. 
Therefore, they were able to negotiate fairly the responsibility of each party.  It 
was decided that the partnership was to be governed by a ‗formal contractual 
agreement‘ through a legal consultant assigned by the academics via the CIIAP 
fund.  The agreement stated clearly that the generated knowledge should be 
jointly carried out by the academics and the enterprise who agreed to 
participate.  While the academics‘ main responsibility is to produce the research 
outcomes, the enterprise‘s responsibility is to bring the generated knowledge 
into a real testing product that can be applied successfully by the ROP.  The 
Principle Investigator found this to be beneficial as it would help them in 
performing and following up business tasks.  According to him: 
“We published our idea through newspapers and TV shows. A lot of local 
companies approached us. CEO of an enterprise I know called me personally to 
tell me he is interested to have a partnership with us…. As I said before we 
don‟t have any business experience and by partnering with a local company, we 
don‟t need to bother ourselves about business tasks anymore.  They will do it 
for us. We are only responsible to generate the device as per our research 
knowledge.‟‟ (AC3, SQU) 
„‟our responsibility is purely bringing that product into an active and actual 
product which can be utilised and used by ROP and final consumer.  We do all 
the business.  They (academics) are responsible to create the device according 
to what is there in the latest researches.‟‟ (CU2, SMEs) 
In addition to his personal acquaintance with the enterprise's CEO, the decision 
to involve him in this project was influenced by two other factors.  
The first factor emerged from his own individual business individual 
motive/benefit of no risk and similarity of business product line.  In this respect, 
he found the involvement of his enterprise in such a collaboration to involve no 
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risk as there exists a definite local demand for the generated knowledge (radar 
device). This is influenced by the agreement of the ROP in participating in the 
project.  There was also no risk because the user found similarity between the 
nature of the generated knowledge and the nature of products that he used to 
sell and market nationally and internationally.  Additionally, there is a similarity 
between the nature of the generated knowledge as an innovation and his motive 
of competitive advantage.  The generated knowledge would add more value to 
his product line, which consequently makes his business unique and allows it to 
outperform its competitors in the local and global market.  According to him: 
„‟From business point of view there is no risk.  As I said from our side we are 
doing similar line of business and similar line of products … So there is demand. 
There is market. There is buyer in the market. There is a need for such a 
solution, so I don‟t see any risk in investing in such an idea…. actually the 
motivation of this idea is actually saving the life of people…. I am sure there 
won‟t be any risk in bringing this idea into the market since ROP with us.‟‟ (CU2, 
SMEs)  
The second factor emerged from the CIIAP‘s production incentive.  It is related 
to the involvement of non-financial production costs.  He also found that the 
collaboration appears to involve no financial production cost expect the time and 
expertise they would invest in producing and marketing the product.  This is as 
per the TRC‘s pre-commercialisation incentive of covering the expenses of 
generating the final device for real life testing.  The fund provided a production 
budget of 100,000 OMR.  The enterprise, along with the academics, found the 
budget to be sufficient for covering the high cost of production as the device 
required high-tech equipment and materials.  They could produce a couple of 
thousand sample items for real life testing.  As argued by the enterprise‘s CEO: 
„‟They sponsored us with an adequate amount of money…. that‟s would really 
help us in our project to at least produce our product in couple of thousands of 
sample items; for the people to do real life testing, then to start selling them. I 
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mean innovate such a product requires a lot of money, because it is very 
costly.‟‟ (CU2, SMEs) 
In summary, the motives of the involved independent actors resulted in 
successful knowledge production.  Despite the actors‘ different motives, they all 
stood to benefit.  However, this benefit was found to be different for each party 
due to the CIIAP funding incentive (coverage of production cost).  In this regard, 
the academics saw the opportunity of engaging with the non-commercial user 
(ROP), which increases the potential of the application of their research 
outcome.  Likewise, the commercial user saw the opportunity of avoiding the 
huge cost of outcome production, as well as the guaranteed potential future 
local market demand due to the involvement of the main buyer (ROP).  
Similarly, the non-commercial user saw the opportunity of implementing the 
generated outcome without financial cost involvement, apart from the effort and 
time of integrating the new device into the existing system. 
The analysis also identified the positive effect of informal networking, which 
contributed to the decision of the commercial user to participate in collaborative 
activities with the academics at an earlier stage.  For him, collaboration appears 
to involve a considerable benefit because of the attributes of the knowledge to 
be produced: The congruence of the generated outcome with his business 
production line. 
Moreover, the conflict between the funding commercialisation rule (i.e. 
transferring outcome through start-ups) and the academics‘ business 
incapability (i.e. lack of business experience) was resolved by the TRC‘s relaxed 
management process.  The process facilitated the actors‘ interaction in 
developing a collaboration arrangement characterized by greater flexibility.  This 
was influenced by the institutional nature of CIIAP as being experimental in 
supporting the effective commercialisation of the generated innovations by 
permitting the fund manager to make changes to the process (e.g. allowing 
academics to get a partnership with a local commercial user).  However, it is 
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important to mention that the involvement of the user was initiated by the 
academics rather than by funding.  Hence, the users‘ involvement merits 
exploring.  
2.4 Knowledge Appropriation:  
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge appropriation. These actions were enabled and 
constrained by the formal and informal institutions related to transferring 
knowledge through IPR.   
2.4.1 IP Disclosure Theme: The Academics’ Choice of disclosing their 
expected IP to their university and their inability to protect their research 
outcomes: 
As per the university‘s rules of PI responsibility in coordinating the IP protection 
process for their research generated outcomes, the academics asked TRC 
about the possibility of disclosing their outcomes to the university‘s innovation 
affairs department before signing the contract with the enterprise.  The 
academics again didn‘t experience any resistance from the CIIAP innovation 
director.  The director, in line with the nature of the CIIAP as an experimental 
program, was aware that the university provides a fund for the purpose of 
protecting the good outcomes of research conducted exclusively by its 
academics.  He argued: 
“Yes we are mandated to protect their outcomes, but we give them the freedom.  
So they (academics) can protect their outcomes through their university why 
not.  As far as I know the university has allocated a fund for protection.‟‟ 
(PPMF1, TRC) 
The department reviewed the disclosure carefully through the US international 
IP Company.  However, the academics‘ application was rejected by the 
company and consequently by the university‘s department.  This was, as 
mentioned in the background section, in relation to the academics‘ production of 
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knowledge by making a contribution to an existing product in order to reach 
innovation where novelty was not maintained.  Therefore, the research 
outcomes were found to be inconsistent with the international criterion of 
‗inventive step‘ as the academics‘ outcome was an obvious development of 
what had gone before.  This criterion, as mentioned in the governance structure, 
is reflected as a general patentability requirement according to US patent 
international laws where an invention should be sufficiently inventive.  Evidence 
of This argument is evidenced by the statements given by the Principle 
Investigator and the University‘s Innovation Director: 
“We couldn‟t patent it through our university.  They (Innovation Department) said 
it is not an invention. They said combining many ideas together and coming up 
with a new one, adding like 15% extra is not acceptable.” (AC3, SQU) 
„‟combining different existing tools and devices in a logical manner way would as 
a rule not be patentable…we are looking for novel ideas and inventions to 
patent.‟‟ (UO2, SQU) 
The academics‘ failure to patent their outcome through their university was 
influenced by the university‘s underdeveloped rules within the IP disclosure 
application process, mentioned in the governance structure above.  For 
academics, the reason was related to their unawareness of the allocated fund‘s 
sole/limited goal of invention protection.  There is an absence of exposing the 
international patenting invention criteria to academics.  The criteria were stated 
only verbally (unwritten) by the Innovation Director of the Innovation Affairs 
Department and were not stated explicitly in (the research regulations) or in the 
process of IP disclosure (in the university website).  This is as per the absence 
of written guidelines (such as the patent criteria) that guide the academics in the 
process of IP disclosure.  As argued by the Principle Investigator: 
„‟See we were not aware of the criteria.  We thought the fund protects all the 
good outcomes of researches.  That‟s what we understood…If they are looking 
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for inventions why they don‟t state this in our research laws so we understand 
what they mean.” (Ac3, SQU)  
This is supported by the University‘s Innovation Director, who pointed out that 
the cause of the academics‘ lack of awareness was the lack of communication 
(information exchange) between the department and the academics.  The 
Innovation Director faced difficulty in communicating with the academics as 
there is an absence of KT professionals within the department, who can inform 
academics about the criteria and who are sufficiently competent to advise them 
on the possibility of taking their research outcomes further by developing them 
into new ways of doing things that can be patentable and can reach the 
international criteria required by the US company.  Therefore, there is a difficulty 
of role achievement as the absence of KT professionals hinders the 
department‘s ability to fulfil its main responsibility of liaising and negotiating with 
the academics (especially the PI-Principle Investigator) to provide support in the 
IP application process.  According to the University‘s Director:  
“there is a lack of qualified staff who can advise in patenting and IPs in business 
studies and market assessment and commercialisation… who can go and 
negotiate with academics, particularly the PI about the outcomes of their 
researches and advise them in how develop it (research outcomes) to go 
through the IP process.” (UO2, SQU)  
In this case, a significant cause for academics‘ failure regarding the exclusion of 
innovative research outcomes from the university‘s IP protection fund emerged.  
This was explained by two different perspectives and beliefs (Academics vs. 
University). 
From the academics‘ perspective, and particularly the PI, the rejection of their IP 
application was unfair and they felt that the exclusion of their innovations from 
the IP protection fund was unreasonable (irrational) as the university could also 
benefit from these innovations by generating income through licensing them to 
industry after protection, which would ultimately help in building the university‘s, 
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and the academics‘, industrial reputations and networks.  On the other hand, 
they didn‘t find it beneficial to conduct their research for the purpose of 
achieving inventive outcomes as there is an absence of incentive, in relation to 
patenting, within their university‘s academic promotion system. Evidence of this 
argument is given by the Principle Investigator himself: 
 „‟This is funny!  They rejected our application for no clear reason.  I don‟t how 
these people are thinking!! Why inventions why not innovations or both.  
Innovations are also good outcomes for universities.  They can protect and then 
license and sell them to the industry.  By this they can build good networks and 
image with industry… See even if we listened to them and came up with 
inventive outcomes, what is the incentive? This is not included in our promotion.  
So from my view what they are doing is unacceptable really.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
From the University‘s Innovation Director‘s perspective, the rejection was fair as 
this was in compliance with the university‘s management patenting goals.  In 
this respect, the university aims to improve its image and global ranking by 
building its own patenting profile.  This, and as mentioned in the governance 
structure, is stipulated as one the innovation affairs department‘s main 
responsibilities, as well as allocating limited funds in which the international 
patenting criterion of ‗inventive step‘ is enforced.  Hence, the goal of the 
university‘ management influenced the innovation affairs director‘s decision in 
utilising the limited funds to avoid bearing the cost of rejection by the US IP 
company.  As claimed by the University‘s Innovation Director:    
„‟The university is actually looking for putting the university in high rank.  Good 
ranking and to compete for it.  So patents are very important.  So we need to 
build our profile in patenting…So giving us an opinion from a US patent lawyer 
and what is recommended to know if it is there or not, if not why we waste our 
money to patent it, so we are trying to avoid rejection by doing this.  The budget 
is limited so we have to be selective.‟‟ (UO2, SQU)  
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 In Summary, the conflict between the way knowledge was created by the 
academics and the appropriation mechanism used by the university (patenting 
invention) hindered the academics‘ ability to protect their research outcomes.  
This conflict is partly influenced by the university‘s weaknesses: absence of 
operationalisation and dissemination of IP disclosure guidelines and lack of IP 
experts, and predominantly by the conflicting logics of the actors (knowledge 
providers: academics and university).  The latter can be justified through the 
costs and benefits of the exclusion of innovation from fund protection.  For 
academics, restricting the funds to patenting only appeared to involve 
considerable cost (e.g. inability to protect and retain the value of the research 
outcomes). For the university, represented by its Innovation Department, the 
exclusion was encouraged as it constitutes the justification for the existence of 
one of its main responsibilities, which stemmed from the university‘s strategic 
plan and reflected the goal of building a patent profile.  While the former can be 
justified by the costs generated by the university‘s weaknesses: lack of 
academics‘ awareness (e.g. non-exposure of patenting funding criteria and 
absence of written guidelines); university departments‘ inability of role 
achievement (e.g. lack of communication and lack of IP experts).  Despite the 
university‘s initiatives in developing its IP infrastructure, guidelines still seem to 
not be operationalised successfully.  This merits exploration.   
2.4.2 Academics’ choice of protecting their research outcomes through 
TRC: enablers and constraints: 
As the academic‘s application for patenting was rejected by their university, the 
academics decided to file an application through the CIIAP.  As mentioned in 
the governance structure, this is because the opportunity provided by TRC 
through CIIAP allows for flexibility in deciding the type of protection (e.g. 
innovation patent) as per the outcome‘s nature since the academics couldn‘t 
meet the inventive step requirement.  It is also because TRC coaches them 
through the process by involving international IP professionals to guide them in 
the process of patenting as well as examining and studying the potential of 
transforming the outcomes into patents, if possible, or if not, trying to find 
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another way to protect the research outcomes.   Evidence of this is given by the 
following two statements: 
“We submitted our complete research proposal and their task is to study the 
proposal and see whether this is qualified for patenting or not and if not how can 
we protect it… so they work through proposals to find ways to protect the ideas 
if possible.” (AC3, SQU)  
“In our fund we give the academics the freedom to decide about the way they 
protect their ideas.  This is because we are not focusing on one type of 
protection.  It depends on the nature of ideas…  And we are not like university 
looking for patents.  We are more on building innovation capacity within society.” 
(PPMF1, TRC) 
Before filing an IP application, and since the involvement of the commercial user 
was initiated by the academics themselves, the Director asked the academics to 
sign a formal contract with the enterprise in order to ensure a mutual agreement 
regarding how the outcomes would be protected.  This was done for the 
purpose of avoiding any future conflict regarding protection as the involved 
parties would become committed to fulfilling the formal agreement in the future, 
especially considering that the high tech device was expected to yield significant 
revenue. Due to familiarity with each other, as aforementioned, the IP was 
negotiated fairly.  After negotiation, both parties decided jointly that the 
academics would hold the rights as the patent owner and that the user‘s 
accessibility to the generated knowledge would be through exclusive licensing.  
„‟We agreed the ownership should be for me and my colleague and the 
company will have exclusive license.  Because we are the one who produced 
the outcome.  They didn‟t mind as were understandable‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
 
„Giving the ownership to academics helps in their career advancement.  See as 
they gave us license we don‟t have any issue.  We are still gaining profit…The 
outcome is innovative and similar to our production lines.  ‟This is our first 
project with academics here.  We want to build our skills in how to collaborate 
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with academics and by this we establish stronger relation with them.‟‟ (CU2, 
SMEs) 
 
However, the academics couldn‘t fill the IP application as they were confronted 
with the issue of fulfilling the requirement of prior art search.  This was due to 
their previous action of ‗public disclosure‘ in searching for a commercial user.  
Some of the creative aspects related to their research outcome were copied by 
the public which destroyed the protection of the knowledge.  As argued by the 
Principle Investigator: 
‗‘To be honest with you, some of the creative aspects related to our research 
are copied by others, because of the media, if you go in public people copy you 
and a lot of people copied our idea… Now what I see, some of the secrets of 
our idea are in the market, it is really hard, why did they do that?‘‘ (Ac3, SQU) 
The academics‘ action of public disclosure was naive.  Although they were 
aware that such a thing could happen, they didn‘t know that disclosing their 
outcomes publically should not be done before assessing the option of seeking 
IP protection.  This was caused by their lack of knowledge about the ‗prior art‘ 
rule instilled within IP.  Therefore, they took it for granted as they were 
influenced mainly by the concern of involving a commercial user for accelerating 
the possibility of bringing the generated device into application to resolve the 
local problem of accidents.  Evidence for this is given in the following statement: 
„‟my concern was to get solution whether by me or by another person; just to 
help the citizens here in Oman.  So I was not really concerned about or afraid if 
someone copy me; but my concern was the solution must be applied by ROP as 
soon as possible to help the citizen.‟‟ (Ac3, SQU) 
This is influenced by the lack of recruited local experts (within the CIIAP) who 
have IP knowledge and who can point the academics‘ attention towards the 
negative consequences of public disclosure before getting protection for their 
outcomes.  IP awareness is ensured by the temporarily engagement of 
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international IP experts, as aforementioned in the governance structure.  As the 
academics required working more on developing the IP of their outcome as per 
the international requirements, the proposed copied device was already in 
production.  This is in relation to the TRC rules of commencing pre-
commercialisation action in parallel to the IP registration process.  
Consequently, the academics and enterprise shifted their attention towards 
commercialising the unprotected device.  A contract was signed by the 
enterprise with an international producer from Belgium to produce large 
quantities of the proposed device in order to be able to do real-life testing with 
ROP.  According to the Principle Investigator:  
“Yes the secrets of our device were copied but we don‟t have any other option 
rather than going on the production of the device.  We already have a contract 
with Belgium Company and a huge amount of money was paid by TRC to 
produce large quantities.  After this we will sell it to ROP for real-life testing.‟‟ 
(Ac3, SQU)  
In summary, although the flexible rules of the funding (protection as per the 
nature of the outcomes) gave academics the opportunity to protect their 
innovative/uninventive outcomes, the absence of IP experts within TRC 
hindered academics from knowledge protection.  The academics‘ naïve action 
of public disclosure during the knowledge production phase, for the purpose of 
commercial user inclusion, resulted in depriving the validity of granting IP (i.e. 
failure to meet the patenting criterion of ‗prior art‘).  The fund‘s effort of engaging 
international IP experts was organized after the outcome was generated and 
disclosed to public.  Hence, the absence of permanent local experts who can 
guide academics throughout the process (from production to appropriation) 
merits exploring. 
In this section, another issue emerged pertaining to the potential hindrance of 
successful innovation, specifically the absence of formal contracts (as an 
obligation) between actors, which might result in the uncertainty of knowledge 
utilisation by the non-commercial user (ROP).  This argument is attributed to the 
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user‘s institutionalised practice of considering technology transfer as trade-
based (imported and always being seen as better based on its existing 
successful application in developed countries).  Hence, there is a conflict 
between the type of knowledge purchased by the non-commercial user and the 
type of knowledge produced by the academics and the user.  Consequently, 
considerable costs for the academics and the user might occur: for the user, the 
inability to reach its logic of profit gain through securing local demand, while for 
academics, the inability to achieve their logic of academic curiosity knowledge 
implementation as the ROP has the ultimate authority on the knowledge 
adoption decision. 
 
3. Case Study-C: Energy Saving Project 
3.1 Background of the project 
This project was linked to a research idea initiated by a local medium sized 
enterprise with help from one of the IIC consultants.  The collaboration between 
a local medium sized enterprise and academics from SQU was established in 
2011 through the mediation of the IIC24.  The practical production of knowledge 
was funded by the enterprise (through in-kind contribution) and financially 
supported by the Commercial User Public Fund of Industrial Innovation 
Assistance Program (IIAP). 
The research is in relation to the national concern of energy saving with the aim 
of achieving a social cost benefit.  Most of the local electricity companies are 
facing a problem in cutting the cost of expanding the transmission and 
                                                          
24
The IIC is designed to find out and fill the requirements and gaps within both enterprises and 
universities.  The decision of establishing the centre is mainly derived from studying and revising the 
Omani industry in the late 90s and early 2000‟s.  In 2007, a survey was conducted by TRC, from which 
they found that many enterprises, situated in Oman‟s major industrial estates, don‟t conduct any research 
with academia (IIC, 2014).  In addition, they were without „in-house‟ investigative facilities and without 
channels to access universities.  They don‟t have access to academic laboratories, essential for conducting 
R&D. Additionally, enterprises lacked the qualified personnel necessary to facilitate complex industrial 
R&D.  At the same time, the IIC also wants to encourage universities to provide these resources to 
enterprises by conducting applied research, so they communicated with the different universities to find 
out about the types of research.  They found that most research is basic rather than applied (ibid, pg.5).   
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distribution utilities, especially during off-peak demand (summer time).  This, 
alongside a solution developer, encouraged the enterprise to try to find a 
solution for its clients through developing a new product (smart boards) that 
implements cutting edge technology in managing power consumption within 
premises by means of prioritizing power demand.  As argued by the Enterprise‘s 
General Manager: 
"There is a need for energy saving from the country point of view.  It means 
social cost benefit.  Our clients (local electricity companies) face a problem in 
saving energy during summer as electricity consumption trebles. This requires 
the utilities to expand generation, transmission and distribution capacities, which 
is costly for our clients and the revenue is restricted with the off-peak demand.  
This can be solved by creating smart electrical boards that help in saving 
energy." (CU4, SMEs)  
3.2 Governance Structure:  
This section explains the formal structure of institutions that govern the 
relationships between the actors involved within the case.  The relationships 
between the actors are governed mainly by the rules of the Commercial User 
Public Fund (IIAP) and minimally by the university‘s IP rules.   
3.2.1 University Rules:  
The academics and the commercial user signed the ‗research contract 
agreement form‘ as a consultancy and contracted the research under the 
Research Department. As the university considers the projects coming from IIC 
as consultancy services, the research is driven by the industry (commercial 
users) requesting the academics‘ advice and solutions for their problems from 
the university and ultimately paying them for the services. 
As mentioned previously in Case-A, the form states clearly the responsibility of 
both parties.  In this case, the academics are responsible for knowledge 
production as per the user requirements, while the user is responsible for 
funding the knowledge generation.  The form also mentions that all rights and 
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titles to Intellectual Property (IP) arising from a project shall vest in, i.e. come 
into the possession/ownership of, the University. Such IP will include copyright 
of the reports, documents, and computer software prepared by the University 
under the project, as well as any new development of products or processes 
and any improvements to publicly known products or processes. The Sponsor 
shall have a non-exclusive and non-assignable license to use such intellectual 
property. 
Moreover, and again as mentioned previously in Case-A, the university 
encourages academics to disclose their IP through the element of compulsion. 
This is as per the universities‘ underdeveloped financial incentive of patenting. 
The development of IP is still not included in the criteria of academic promotion. 
A proposal is drafted by the Innovation Affairs Department to the university‘s 
higher level, but has not yet been approved. The only criterion for academic 
promotion is publication in internal and internationally high ranked or referred 
journals. Recently, the development of IP has been incentivized through 
management recognition only as a way to encourage academics to disclose 
their research outcomes with potential patents. Therefore, the academics‘ 
efforts are recognized by means of non-financial incentives, such as a certificate 
of appreciation. 
3.2.2 Industrial Innovation Center Rules: 
The enterprise and the academics signed a proposal research contract (IIC-1, 
2010), as in Case-A, which is based on a consultancy model. According to this 
model, the idea (or the problem to be solved) must be initiated by a Subject 
Matter Expert (SME) first. These ideas are pursued further with the help of the 
consultants and client manager, who are responsible for studying the industry 
first to come up with an idea through brainstorming and then communicating 
with researchers through the Technology Transfer Agent in their university25. 
                                                          
25
Technology Transfer Agents are IIC focal points who appointed by the university.  They are responsible 
for: (1) forwarding the e-mails sent from the consultant of the IIC research opportunity to academics; (2) 
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In this model, the fund is considered as if it was issued from enterprises and the 
academics should be considered as subcontractors.  Therefore, and as per this 
case, both should work collectively in transforming the generated research 
outcomes into a tangible product.  The academics were responsible for scientific 
knowledge and its production.  They are responsible for translating this scientific 
knowledge into a language that is understandable to the user.  The enterprise 
was responsible for supporting the academics by in-kind fund contribution 
through the provision of the required resources (HR, tools), as well as by 
providing the necessary information about their clients‘ requirements.  It also 
has to guide the academics through the process by using their technical 
expertise to achieve the product‘s commercial viability.  The following quote 
from one of the IIC consultants provides supporting evidence: 
‘’the generation of outcomes should be jointly carried out by the enterprise and 
academics…the academics are expected to produce the outcomes according to 
the enterprise requirements who is on the other hand responsible to contribute 
either in-kind or else and also to provide technical feedback because they are 
the one who got their eyes on the ground and it is their business.‟‟ (PFO3, IIC)  
Additionally, within section-10 of the form-2 and as mentioned previously in 
Case-A, the two parties have to decide about the ownership of any expected 
invention (IIC-1, 2010). A mutual agreement has to be reached with regards to 
how the outcome from the project is going to be protected. In this case, the IIC 
(IIAP) rules encourage enterprises to retain all rights to the IP for any 
technology/knowledge developed by the supported project, and be responsible 
for protecting any IP through patents, copyrights, industrial designs, trademarks, 
plant breeders‘ rights, trade secrets, or any other available means (IIC-2, 2010). 
To do so, the center assists the enterprises in getting IP by filling a patent 
application through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry‘s IP office, where the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
finding and nominating academics who are interested in taking a part in the research and inform the 
consultant about them.   
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enterprises have to pay a registration fee of 200 OMR.  The assessment of 
patent protection is done through a contracted Egyptian IP firm.  The office is 
responsible for assessing the applications to be patented within Middle Eastern 
countries.  The reason for dealing with this firm is that the office lacks 
professionals with sufficient expertise in how to search and assess patents.  As 
argued by the Ministry IP Director: 
„‟We don‟t have patent examiners.  There are only three admins in patenting and 
they only specialised in receiving applications for patent disclosures.  And the 
number of applications increasing and nothing is new.  No guidance is there yet 
to help them and they don‟t have the experience and the abilities to handle 
those applications and we shouldn‟t blame them…that is why we had now a 
contract with an Egyptian IP office to do the process for us.‟‟ (GO1, MoCI) 
Also, the relationships between actors were governed by the IIC‘s developed 
financial incentives. In this regard, the IIC encourages enterprises to collaborate 
in R&D with academics in terms of incentivization. The enterprise involved in the 
project can concurrently make its own R&D contribution/investment by paying 
only 25% of the knowledge production cost with 75% coming from the IIC 
(through IIAP). Additionally, this contribution can be either in cash or in-kind 
through providing the raw materials and resources (i.e. HR) required by the 
academics for production26. 
Moreover, the IIC encourages enterprises to commercialise the generated 
knowledge as discretionary, which is due to the IIC‘s underdeveloped (absent) 
commercialisation incentive. Commercialisation is still not included as one of the 
IIC‘s duties or KPIs.  A proposal has been drafted by the IIC Board of members 
                                                          
26
The development of in-kind contribution incentive was made by the IIC to ensure the success 
of the IIAP model as the enterprises were reluctant/or unwilling to pay.  The enterprises‘ 
reluctance to pay is in relation to the difficulty faced by the IIC in fulfilling the IIAP objective (one 
of the Key Performance Indicators) in encouraging enterprises to undertake R&D with 
academia.  The enterprises‘ boards were found to be unwilling (quite skeptical and resistant) to 
participate in R&D as they had a lack of R&D capabilities and skills.  They were afraid of taking 
a risk in involving R&D as there is a possibility of failure and money loss.  
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to the TRC, but it has not yet been approved.  Therefore, the enterprise is 
responsible for commercially exploiting the protected/unprotected generated 
outcomes in a way that they find yields profitable commercial returns (IIC-2, 
2010).    
3.3 Knowledge Production: 
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge production. These actions include: (1) establishment of 
collaborations and the actors‘ reasons/motives for involvement in such 
collaborations; (2) The formal and informal institutions enabling/supporting the 
process of collaboration. 
3.3.1 IIC Collaborations Establishments: 
The enterprise‘s concern for solving its clients‘ problem through the 
development of a high-tech product, described in the background section, 
necessitates conducting R&D.  The GM, because of its enterprise‘s lack of in-
house research skills, capabilities and professionals, approached many 
international world-class consultancy companies for help.   However, he found 
dealing with these companies in developing such innovative technology incurred 
a very high cost.  Therefore, he decided to search for local relevant consultants.  
He argued: 
“We don‟t have R&D in our company. Normally when we have an issue we 
solve it through international experts, but this time is different, the solution is 
supposed to be high-tech product and this includes high cost.  So we need to do 
it locally so we can afford the cost.‟‟ (CU3, SMEs)  
His search for a local consultancy firm overlapped with the birth of the IIC.   He 
became acquainted with one of the IIC consultants through the visits and 
seminars conducted by her and the client manager for the purpose of 
awareness creation.  The IIC provided them with an opportunity to access public 
funds and secure consultancy service money for solving their clients‘ problem 
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locally.  Within the rules of the funding program, the enterprise was treated as if 
it were the one who issued the fund, where the other party (e.g. academics) 
were treated as subcontractors to the enterprise, in return for a consultancy fee.  
Additionally, the enterprise contribution (of 25%) was considered to be in-kind, 
which involves non-financial cost.  In this respect, the enterprise contributed 
through providing the required resources (HR, tools/devices, and required 
information).  As stated by the enterprise‘s GM: 
„‟IIC provided us with consultancy service and allowed us to have in-kind 
contribution and provide 25% from the total cost.  They provided us 75/25 and 
told us to contribute.  They asked us to use our staff, equipment in buying the 
materials, and they are okay with it.‟‟ (CU3, SMEs)  
In accessing the IIC funding the enterprise also gained another opportunity.  
This opportunity is embedded within the IIC objective of industrial development 
of generating new products through engaging directly with knowledgeable local 
consultants, such as academics.  The GM found the face-to-face engagement to 
be encouraging in delivering accurate information and the requirements 
necessary to generate a technological design that can be tailored later as per its 
clients‘ requirements to achieve commercial viability.  He also found it useful for 
establishing good networks for lower-cost future research collaborations (e.g. 
consultancy services).  The following quote by the Enterprise GM provides 
supporting evidence: 
"I found this promising! The IIC encourages us to engage directly with 
academics.  This helped us in delivering our requirements accurately which was 
helpful in creating our design to be tailored afterward to be suitable for our 
clients.  By this also we could build good relation with academics that we can 
use in the near future when we have another problem to be solved with less 
cost.  We don‟t need to go outside.‟‟   (CU3, SMEs) 
In order for enterprise to access the fund and local consultancy service, the 
consultant approached many academic institutes in Oman through their 
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Technology Transfer Agents.  After reading and assessing the submitted 
general proposals, an SQU group in the field of ‗electrical engineering‘ was 
selected by the consultant due to their positive response and strong initial 
research proposal.  The academics‘ decision to participate with the IIC and 
enterprise is influenced by different reasons, which emerged from their personal 
motives as well as from the opportunities provided by the IIC within its 
developed incentives and process.  The first reason, as in Case-A, is related to 
the financial incentive provided by the IIC.  The IIC provided them with an 
opportunity to access public funds, securing additional income for themselves 
and their Department/College. Within the rules of the funding program, the 
academics were treated as subcontractors to the enterprise, in return for a 
consultancy fee. According to the university rules, a high percentage (60%) of 
the fee was allocated to the academics while the remaining 40% was retained 
by the University (20%), the College (10%), and the Department (10%). Thus, 
financial rewards and contribution to their university were significant incentives 
in engaging with the IIC funding.  As argued by one of the Co-Investigators: 
“We are getting salaries actually as an incentive.  We can use it for doing other 
researches, for buying equipment for college and department workshops and so 
on.  Even the university is getting a percentage.  So we are raising fund by this.‟‟ 
(Ac6, SQU)  
The second reason is related to the opportunity provided by the IIC in increasing 
the academics‘ and their students‘ industrial research capabilities through 
smoothing the process of engagement with industry, especially SMEs.  The 
academics usually face problems in convincing local enterprises to participate in 
their academic research.  Therefore, this collaboration gave them the chance to 
interact and communicate their ideas directly with the enterprise.  The following 
statement by one of the Co-Investigators gives evidence:  
“They (enterprises) are not willing to spend time to listen about ideas and 
knowledge. That is a big challenge for us … The IIC made it easy for us in 
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getting enterprises involve in our researches.  Now they are keen to listen to 
us.‟‟ (Ac7, SQU) 
In this respect, it helped the academics apply their scientific research outcomes 
practically for the purpose of furthering their research through knowledge 
advancement and contribution to the national requirement in developing 
manufacturing within the energy sector.  This motivation was with respect to 
their personal interest in gaining practical industrial experience that can be 
transferred to their students in classes.  They were eager to use the enterprise‘s 
resources and technical expertise to learn how to transform the scientific 
research outcomes into tangible products, useful to the enterprise‘s clients in 
the local market.  According to the Principle Investigator:  
“We contribute to the design, advancement in the knowledge… for me it is 
important to learn how to create the design practically by using their resources 
and expertise.  I also want know how the design is implemented and my 
knowledge is transferred in the real world…beside that we learn something new 
that we can transfer to our students.” (Ac4, SQU)  
Moreover, it helped them involve their final year undergraduate students in the 
project, consequently, saving the academics a lot of time and effort.  This 
opportunity exists as per the IIC‘s capacity building objective of introducing 
students, especially the local ones, to innovative thinking and involving them in 
resolving real life industrial challenges.  As stated by one of the Co-
Investigators: 
“It (collaborating with IIC) definitely helps us in building our students‟ research 
capacity by giving us a chance to include them in the same project.  by this we 
could save a lot of time.  You know they help us in our research.‟‟ (Ac6, SQU) 
In summary, the successful transformation of research outcomes into a 
tangible product (a product that has the potential for commercialisation) was 
supported by the collaboration motives of the involved actors. Although these 
motives differed, both actors were in a position to benefit.  Yet this benefit 
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differed between actors due to the prevailing institutional funding incentives 
(financial and non-financial).  For the user, the collaboration appears to involve 
relatively little cost apart from the time and usage of existing resources involved 
in developing the product; this was viewed as beneficial because those 
incentives assisted him in achieving his goal of ‗new product development‘. 
These incentives included coverage of the consultancy service financial 
expenses (in-kind contribution incentive) and the opportunity of accessing the 
university‘s resources (e.g. labs and scientists).  The former was viewed as 
significant in covering his weakness of bearing the high costs of high-tech 
product development, while the latter was viewed as being beneficial in 
generating the required technology, concurrently improving the chance of 
building future research networks.  For academics, the collaboration appears to 
involve the opportunities of: generating revenue for themselves and their 
organisation by securing additional income through consultancy service; solving 
the difficulty of establishing industrial networks, hence, gaining insight into 
practical industrial trends; and yielding positive effects on their student 
education.  For the IIC (as a fund operator), collaboration was to be encouraged 
as it constitutes the core justification for the existence of their organisation. 
3.3.2 Academics’ and the Enterprise’s Dissimilarity of logics: Divergence 
between academics’ research capabilities and the enterprise’s 
requirement of product development: 
After academics were selected by the consultant, a final research proposal was 
developed by the academics which was evaluated thoroughly by the consultant 
and the enterprise to ensure that it reached the expected criteria of: realism, 
time appropriateness, cost effectiveness, and most importantly solving the 
enterprise‘s proposed problem.  However, the enterprise found the time-frame 
of two years, suggested by the academics, to be too long and asked the 
academics to reduce the time-frame to no more than one year.  Consequently, a 
conflict resulted between the academics and the enterprise.  The academics 
found the time-frame of one year to be insufficient for instilling the basics before 
336 
 
developing the technology required by the enterprise.  From their perspective, 
and in order to achieve the goal of translating their scientific knowledge into a 
language that is understandable to the enterprise, there is a need to revisit and 
understand the basics in order to assess the reactions of basic concepts in 
producing such a technology.  Their logic is that the development of basic 
outcomes into industrial products requires time.  However, this was not 
absorbed by the enterprise in the same degree.  The enterprise‘s main concern 
was just to get a final commercial product (within a short-period of time) in order 
to solve its clients‘ problem and gain a quick commercial advantage.  It didn‘t 
pay much attention to the way the academics actually developed such a 
technology.  According to the Principle Investigator:  
„‟there is mismatch between the industry's needs and our capabilities.  And the 
research for us is mainly basic research and for industry means a product; I 
want a product and you can do a research to do that.  See the product has to be 
created but not at the cost of basic sciences. We need to revisit the basics first 
to get the knowledge from gross root to implement it.  But they want to get a 
final product quickly which I found it improper to do.” (Ac4, SQU) 
 
The enterprise‘s unwillingness to give the academics more time for instilling 
basics was influenced by its logic of considering basic research as time 
consuming as it requires more time for the solution to come (or to be obtained), 
this in addition to the probability of failure in getting the required, successful 
solution.  Moreover, the length of conducting research may affect the successful 
commercialisation of the generated technology as there is a possibility that it 
can become obsolete because other enterprises/competitors in the market 
might come up with better technologies within a shorter period of time.  
Therefore, the GM was afraid of taking the risk associated with long-term 
research, where success and immediate profit were not guaranteed.  According 
to him: 
„‟It is timewasting because you are trying to say I am doing research now and I 
am expecting to get the return maybe after two years‟ time or more to start 
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coming and we are not sure if it comes.  And when the time the technology 
comes to us to commercialise it becomes obsolete because someone else 
came with the same or something better.  So, there is a risk of taking long time 
to do it because we cannot guarantee success.‟‟ (CU3, SMEs) 
This is associated with the IIC‘s goal of focusing on fostering short-term 
partnerships between enterprises and academics.  As mentioned in the 
background section, IIC projects are mainly oriented towards conducting applied 
research for the purpose of answering enterprise‘s specific questions through 
coming up with solutions that have direct applications.  In this respect, and 
according to the IIC rules, the projects are considered as ‗development projects‘ 
that are directed mainly towards using existing scientific knowledge to address 
specific product problems.  The IIC‘s decision of focusing on applied research is 
driven by fulfilling the enterprises‘ preference of considering IIC projects as 
short-term solutions for their proposed problems, rather than long-term R&D.  
This is can be explained by the enterprise‘s common practice of looking for 
temporarily, rather than permanent, solutions.  A solution that allows it to survive 
for a while (or for a period of time) in the local market.  The following quote by 
one of the IIC consultants gives supporting evidence: 
„‟Enterprises look at our (IIC) projects as a solution not as an R&D.  They used 
to look for a company to give them solution even if it is a temporarily solution.  It 
is a solution that makes them live for a while.  So they don‟t wait for theories to 
come and solve their issues. They are looking to the practical (applied) side and 
therefore it is better for academics actually come and see what is happening at 
the industrial level.‟‟ (PFO3, IIC)  
As the enterprise is unwilling to give academics more time and the IIC is driven 
by its goal in achieving the enterprise‘s preference of short-term applied 
research, the academics had no choice but to agree to develop the required 
technological design within the agreed time-frame of one year, and according to 
the information given by the enterprise, in addition to the existing scientific 
literature and knowledge.  As argued by one of the Co-Investigators: 
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„‟we don‟t have any option.  There is a contract that we have to sign, in which we 
abide to it in obligation in terms of design within this time frame. Even if we are 
not satisfied about the time, we have to be able to design, build, and test the 
required panel within the time (one year) suggested by the company…. We 
need to design it in line with company requirements and by using whatever 
available information from publications and reading materials.” (Ac5, SQU) 
In summary, there is an apparent conflict between the academics‘ and the 
user‘s logics regarding the types of research outcome. While the user seeks 
saleable/profitable products in a short period of time, academics prize excellent 
scientific research outcomes, which only accrue in the medium/long run. Hence, 
time is a key element for the user, where quality is vital for the academics.  The 
user‘s requirement was satisfied by the fund‘s institutional condition of short-
term research partnership (e.g. applied research in favour of getting quick 
commercial return), which accordingly generated considerable costs for 
academics (inability to instill basics and skewing the research agenda towards 
marketable research at the expense of fundamental research). This meant that 
the academics had no choice but to compromise their academic values to 
comply with the funding rules in order to retain the perceived benefits of the 
collaboration. Hence, the trade-off between conducting basic research and fund 
benefits was inevitable. 
While the main concern of industrial research is time-effectiveness and 
marketability, the assessment of the academics‘ quality gives less importance to 
such concerns as the measure of quality is the scientific standard.  Yet, the 
allocation of the IIAP fund is not governed by the consideration of scientific 
criteria, but rather by industrial concerns and priorities.  For the fund, giving 
sufficient freedom for academics and long-term prospects for users is not 
preferable, because users are hesitant to collaborate in the programs of 
scientific and fundamental research.  This is due to competition, which forces 
the user to avoid the costs of the activities of long-term research (e.g. longer 
time to get the outcome and the risk of commercialisation obsoleteness).  
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Therefore, the dissimilarity between the user‘s motive (time) and the academics‘ 
motive (quality) merits exploration. 
3.4 Knowledge appropriation: 
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge appropriation. These actions were enabled and 
constrained by the formal institutions related to transferring knowledge through 
IPR (e.g. patenting) and Commercialisation. 
3.4.1 The academics’ choice of disclosing their expected IP to the 
enterprise and the enterprise’s inability to patent/protect the generated 
technological design:  
As there is a possibility of developing an innovative technology, there is a 
potentiality for an IP to be generated.  Therefore, and in accordance to section-
10 of the research proposal contract (as mentioned in the governance structure 
section), both the academics and the enterprise have to reach a mutual 
agreement regarding how the outcome from the project is going to be protected.  
After negotiation, the academics decided to disclose the expected IP to the 
enterprise. Their decision was influenced mainly by the IIC‘s IP developed rule.  
Since they are familiar with the university‘s IP disclosure rule, the academics, 
especially the Principle Investigator (as per his responsibility), didn‘t find it 
applicable to discuss and report the expected IP to the Innovation Director as 
the research outcome was not generated scientifically yet.  Therefore, and in 
accordance with the action enforced by the IIC consultant in safeguarding the 
ownership for the enterprise - mentioned in Case-A, the principle investigator 
and his co-investigators understand, as they agreed from the beginning, that 
they would collaborate through receiving a consultancy fee, and the IP would be 
disclosed legitimately to the enterprise.  According to him: 
“See the outcome was not generated at that time to disclose to our university 
and since we agree that we are getting this much of money then we agree at the 
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beginning itself that the ownership of the IP will be for the company…we are still 
getting a lot of benefits as I told you.‟’ (Ac4, SQU) 
After reaching mutual agreement on project time-frame and IP, the relationship 
between the academics and the enterprise was governed formally by two formal 
contractual agreements (as mentioned in the governance structure above).  
From the university‘s side, they signed the ‗research contract agreement‘ under 
the consultancy section in Research Department, while from the IIC‘s side, they 
signed a proposal contract.  The project went well and a new technological 
design was generated collectively within the specified period of time and as per 
the information received from the enterprise‘s GM and operational managers.  
To ensure safeguarding the ownership right for the enterprise, the IIC consultant 
asked the academics to fill a patent application, since they were the ones who 
developed the design scientifically and have patent knowledge.  Afterwards, the 
consultant left the decision to the enterprise‘s GM to submit the application and 
either to pay the registration fee through the MoCI-Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry‘s IP office or any international IP Office.  The reason for leaving the 
decision to the enterprise is linked to the absence of an IP/Patenting fund within 
the IIAP.  This can be explained by the boundary (parameter) that defines the 
scope of the processes or activities followed by the IIC, which are influenced by 
funding knowledge production in reference to knowledge appropriation in which 
a patent has taken part.  The IIC‘s responsibility finishes the moment that the 
outcome‘s prototyping (pre-commercialisation) is achieved.  Therefore, they 
don‘t anticipate patenting to fund research.  In other words, patenting is not 
considered as a direct outcome for academics and enterprise to participate in 
R&D since it is not carried out by the IIC.    The following statement by the IIC 
CEO gives supporting evidence for the above:  
‘‟It is down to the industry to protect the outcomes of the research.  This is 
because we don‟t expect that those researches result in patents because we 
don‟t fund patenting.  The way I recommend at the beginning if you come up of 
something and you think is going to be patented, you should protect it, and this 
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is up to the industry. They can go to the ministry of commerce and industry to 
get protection through applying to the MoCI IP department or they can protect it 
by themselves via any international office.” (PFO2, IIC)  
In response, the enterprise‘s GM decided to file a patent application through the 
Ministry of Commerce and Economics‘ IP Office as he found it costly to protect 
the generated design internationally.  He didn‘t want to bear the high financial 
cost of international registration.  Also he preferred to keep IP protection within 
Omani borders because of their unfamiliarity with the IP international rules and 
their aim to market (manufacture and sell) the generated technological design 
locally.  The following two quotes by the GM and one of the IIC consultants give 
supporting evidence: 
„‟Of course we cannot do it outside because it is costly for us, it requires money 
time and we also don‟t know the rules outside. And the main idea is to make it 
as an Omani product so we need to do it in Oman.‟‟ (CU3: Ln 98-100, SMEs)   
„‟If they (enterprises) want to protect it internationally, they face cost issue and 
… most of SMEs in Oman they don‟t have the capital to register patent in 
Europe and in China, everywhere around say they tended to keep it to Oman‟‟ 
(PFO2, IIC) 
However, the enterprise was slow in processing its patent application.  To date, 
an official recognition of the patent is still pending (for almost two years or 
more).  This is because, as explained previously in the governance structure 
section, the absence of the patenting process and professionals within the MoCI 
IP Office.  The GM found this unacceptable as he wasn‘t aware that the patent 
registration in the ministry is a timely process.  As stated by the Enterprise GM: 
„‟No still is not.  We submitted our papers to the ministry of commerce to get the 
patent through them… Now almost two years or more since we applied for 
patent and nothing yet came.  I didn‟t know the process in the ministry will take 
very long and they said it maybe will take more to get it which I think is too 
much.‟‟ (CU3, SMEs)   
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In Summary, the absence of a patenting process and recruited patent experts 
within MoCI, in addition to the absence of a patenting fund as one of the IIC‘s 
responsibilities hindered the user from reaching his goal of quick exploitation of 
the knowledge generated (e.g. failure of securing quick IP ownership).  For him, 
the implications of such deficiencies confronted him with the costs of: 
knowledge commercialisation obsoleteness and difficulty of achieving 
appropriate returns on time.  Hence, time is a key element for the user.  For him, 
the best way of achieving a competitive advantage in such markets is to 
accelerate the introduction of the generated technology in order to meet his 
logic of profit making.  This reveals that ‗time is important as changes in 
technology and customer demand generate changing markets in which a 
product becomes obsolete by the time it receives protection (e.g. slowness of 
patenting process).  Yet, the weaknesses of the prevailed patenting 
arrangements, as well as the absence of a patenting fund, create longer lead 
times which negatively affect the speed of technology market launch. 
3.4.2 The enterprise’s refusal to allow the academics to patent the 
generated technological design through their university:  
The academics knew that the enterprise faced difficulty in patenting the 
generated design because of the slowness of the process within the MoCI IP, in 
addition to its inability to endure the high cost of international patent registration.  
Therefore, they decided to make use of the situation.  The Principle Investigator, 
as per the issue of dissimilarity mentioned above, found this as an opportunity to 
have more time to develop the design further to make it novel and patentable.  
Although he knew that patenting was not included in their promotion as an 
incentive, the Principle Investigator wanted to get the credit and recognition from 
his university.  Evidence of this is the following statement given by him: 
„‟Yes it (patenting) is not written (as a promotion criteria) but by having a patent 
we are getting the credit not only in our career progress but also recognition 
from our management here as they are looking for such result…Yes there is no 
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financial award, but I believe a certificate of recognition is enough to build our 
academic profile.  so we are still gaining benefit.‟‟ (Ac4, SQU) 
Therefore, he decided to get support from the Innovation Affairs Department at 
his university.  This is, as in Case-A, in line with the department‘s responsibility 
of coordinating the IP protection process (with the help of the US law company) 
through the fund provided by the university for the purpose of protecting and 
registering the expected patentable research outcomes.  The University‘s 
Innovation Director, to avoid conflict, asked them to get the agreement first from 
the enterprise as it has the ultimate authority as the owner of the generated 
design.  However, the academics couldn‘t go through the process, as the 
enterprise was reluctant to give the academics the chance to patent it through 
their university.  The enterprise‘s refusal was influenced by the reason that, as 
mentioned in Case-A, it would be costly if the university patents the generated 
design because there is a possibility that the university, after patenting it, would 
sell it at a high price. This will hinder the enterprise from having the ultimate 
authority to manufacture and sell the design to its clients.  Therefore, the GM 
didn‘t want to bear the expense of licensing and preferred to keep it 
unprotected.  The following quotes from the Principle Investigator and the 
University‘s Innovation Director give supporting evidence: 
„‟We asked them if it is possible to let us protect the design through our 
university so we license it to them, but it was not allowed by the company.  For 
commercial purposes they said not possible.  They want to have it so they can 
sell it to their customers... Actually, yes they were afraid that the university will 
charge them high for the license.‟‟ (Ac4, SQU) 
“We are facing problem with patenting as they want things with less cost than 
going for high expenses, so patent will raise a price. They don‟t go for the 
university to patent the invention, because they know that it will be in a high 
price.” (UO2, SQU) 
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In summary, the conflict between the university and the user regarding 
ownership and royalty payment resulted in the failure of knowledge 
appropriation.  For the user, the university‘s licensing arrangements involved 
bearing the potential cost of high royalty payment (due to his weakness of 
financial incapability); while for the university it involved the benefit of generating 
additional revenue (e.g. patent-licensing income).  However, the rigorous 
enforcement of such an arrangement made the university overlook the 
opportunity of patenting, consequently losing the potential of achieving its goal 
of building a patent profile and supporting its academics in transforming their 
outcomes into inventions.   
3.4.3 The IIC consultant’s refusal to allow the university to patent the 
generated technological design: 
Since the enterprise refused to allow the academics to patent it through their 
university, the Innovation Director approached the IIC consultant involved in the 
project to negotiate the possibility of convincing the enterprise to allow them to 
protect the generated design.  From her perspective, it is not a win-win situation 
and the enterprise‘s refusal was not reasonable as it prevented patenting 
because of the above-mentioned reasons.  Consequently, this resulted in the 
university losing the opportunity to patent the outcome generated by its 
academics.  According to the university‟s Innovation Director: 
―We had several meetings with them (IIC) to modify the agreement with the 
enterprise and came up with another agreement that is fair to the university. We 
told them it is not a win-win approach…. we are giving the patent for them and 
we are not sure if they will patent it or not because it is not their mandate. 
Another thing is that it is slow to do it in MoCI.  They don‟t have expert staff … 
the industry cannot pay for the patent. So by leaving the patent disclosed to 
them, the university will not take advantage of it.‟‟ (UO2, SQU) 
However, the IIC consultant refused to discuss the matter with the enterprise 
because they didn‘t find IP negotiation with the university to be reasonable for 
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one main reason that it would be non-compliant with the IIAP funding rules.  The 
IIC have made the aspect of IP clear from the beginning to academics and their 
university.  They have a clear process, developed nationally for the benefit of 
local SMEs.  So safeguarding the IP for enterprises is its mandate since, the 
participating enterprises contributed to the cost of the design generation and the 
center paid the consultancy fees for the academics.  Thus, the university doesn‘t 
have the right to claim the IP.  It also doesn‘t have right as the university with 
their academics are still registered as the developers of the expected patent, 
thus, raising their profiles as industrial R&D specialists.  As stated by the IIC 
consultant: 
„‟they (university) think that it doesn‟t matter who paid and they are not 
contributing to the cost and got the idea, they still have a slice of the pie!! This is 
against our policy.  We have been developing projects, where the industry is the 
one who is the owner since it contributed in the cost and idea. The patent is 
registered to them; with an institute and its researchers to be named as the 
developers, so we still rewarding them.  The financial gain and IP goes to the 
industry.  We made this clear from the beginning to all.‟‟ (PFO2, IIC) 
In Summary, conflicting logics between the university (e.g. university‘s 
ownership for patent profile development) and the IIC (e.g. user‘s ownership for 
commercialisation) resulted in the university‘s failure in appropriating the 
knowledge generated.  For the university, leaving the IP disclosed to the user 
hinders it from achieving its goal of building a patent profile; While for the IIC (as 
a fund operator), leaving the IP disclosed to the user represents the justification 
for one of its mandates (e.g. role enforcement of safeguarding IP for user).  Yet, 
the university didn‘t have the right to claim for ownership, as a prior IP contract 
negotiation was missing.  The IIC communicated directly with the university‘s 
research department, specifically with the consultancy and contracted the 
research department where the two parties (academics and user) signed a 
single form in which the aspect of IP was not negotiated by the department 
officer.  The decision was left to both parties.  The missing of such ‗prior IP 
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negotiation‘ merits exploring as it resulted in the university losing the opportunity 
of patenting the outcome generated by its academics.  Despite the university‘s 
initiatives in developing its IP infrastructure, guidelines are still not 
operationalised successfully.   
3.4.4 Commercialisation Theme: The enterprise’s failure in achieving its 
choice of commercialising the unprotected technological design: 
The slow process of patent application created a threat for the enterprise in 
terms of successful and quick exploitation of the generated design.  They didn‘t 
want to wait such a long time as the possibility of guaranteeing successful 
patenting was not ensured, and at the same time the academics and their 
university were trying to make use of the situation.  They were also worried 
about losing their idea as there was a possibility that commercialisation of the 
generated design could become obsolete by the time protection was achieved, 
thus hindering them from gaining the expected appropriate commercial returns 
on time.  According to the enterprise‘s GM: 
„‟The process is taken very long.  And they said it maybe won‟t be protected.  
They are not sure.  We are afraid that we will lose the idea … when the time the 
protection come to us to commercialise the design it become outdated because 
technology doesn‟t wait and maybe others from the market will come with better 
design.  So there is a risk involved and we will not be able to commercialise it 
successfully.‟‟ (CU4, SMEs) 
Therefore, the GM decided to start commercialising and bringing the 
unprotected generated design into the local market.  His decision was also 
influenced by two other factors, which emerged from the IIC‘s underdeveloped 
IP and Commercialisation rules.  The first factor is related to the IIC‘s rule of 
leaving the decision of commercialisation up to the enterprise.  This is linked, as 
mentioned in the governance structure, to its underdeveloped (or absent) rules 
of commercialisation and can be interpreted again by the boundary that defines 
the scope of the process or activity followed by the IIC within IIAP.  The process 
is influenced mainly by the goal of achieving knowledge generation as a way to 
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encourage enterprises to adopt innovations/inventions generated by academics 
to be used for their own benefit.  In this regard, commercialisation is not 
involved in the interaction as one of the IIC responsibilities (or KPIs) in 
accomplishing the goals of IIAP.  As stated by the IIC Client Manager: 
„‟When we reached the final stage (prototyping) our role is done and it will be the 
enterprises responsibility not us to take it further towards commercialisation… it 
has the right to commercialise or not.  We don‟t interfere in commercialisation 
now maybe in the future.‟‟ (PFO4, IIC) 
The second factor is related to the IIC‘s consideration that filing a patent 
application is sufficient for use as protection for the generated design.  This is in 
relation to their aim in finding ways of safeguarding the ownership for 
enterprises to enable them to prevent others (particularly academics, 
universities, and competitors) from using, selling, manufacturing, or otherwise 
copying the generated design without permission.  Therefore, IP protection 
through patenting was not an issue for enterprises as they still have the ultimate 
right to produce, use, and sell the generated design locally.  According to the 
enterprise‘s GM: 
„‟The IIC doesn‟t mind and said go ahead with your marketing.  We registered 
our application through the ministry and they think this gives enough protection 
from being copied by other.  So we still can use it of course and produce and 
sell it to our clients.‟‟ (CU5, SMEs) 
To commercialise, the enterprise needed first to find a client interested in 
adopting the design in order to sell it after tailoring it as per their requirements.  
To do so, the GM, along with the academics, demonstrated the generated 
technological design to the concerned clients of local electrical SMEs through a 
workshop.  Although the clients‘ feedback was positive, they refused to invest.  
After determining the cost of production in order to evaluate the ratio of profit, 
they found it too costly to buy the generated technological design as it incurred 
high capital cost.  They considered it as fundamentally perilous (risky) as it 
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required a great deal of investment for buying electrical fittings in order to tailor it 
according to their system requirements.  They usually deal with calculated risks 
where risk premiums can be calculated and built into the cost of the money.  
Their decision was also in relation to the size of their enterprises as 
small/medium, as their main aim is to survive in the market. Thus, they didn‘t 
want to take the risk of spending a significant amount of money for buying and 
adopting such design where profit was not granted.  The following quote from 
the GM of the enterprise gives supporting evidence: 
“Cost is an issue here.  They are not willing to invest in our energy saving 
design because the capital cost of implementation is very high and they said 
that they cannot afford it.  To tailor it they need a lot of investment in electrical 
fittings…They are medium enterprises and they need to look for profit ratio in 
order to survive in the market.  So it is not viable for them to invest unless they 
ensure risk premium.‟‟ (CU3, SMEs) 
This necessitated the enterprise‘s GM and his clients to search for an alternative 
funding source.  Thus, they decided to approach large local investors.   
However, they faced difficulty in convincing them to invest.  They are reluctant 
to invest in innovative outcomes that generate locally and consider it as a cost 
rather than as an investment.  The GM attributed this to these companies‘ 
common practices of importing readymade technologies, which were applied 
successfully in developed countries.  Therefore, they were not willing to invest in 
such a project because they didn‘t believe that they could earn a massive return 
on their investment in case the innovative design was a success.  According to 
the GM:  
''See we are always struggling here to source finance support in 
commercialisation process…They (large companies) consider it as a cost not as 
an investment… They see it as an expense for producing such new design… 
and because most of these companies are importing technology and producing 
and not investing in technology that developed locally.‟‟ (CU4, SMEs) 
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In summary, the commercialisation of the unprotected knowledge was assisted 
by the fund‘s relaxed IP rules (e.g. sufficiency of patent application as a tool for 
safeguarding ownership from others).  However, the user‘s activity of 
commercialisation was impeded partly by the financing constraints in its local 
business institutional environment (e.g. the absence of venture capitalists and 
the lack of large companies‘ structure in supporting SME innovation projects 
financially); and predominantly by the absence of a commercialisation 
assessment as one of the IIC‘s institutional prerogatives (e.g. discharging 
responsibility to the user by giving him the freedom of either commercialising the 
unprotected knowledge or not).  For the user, the implications of such 
weaknesses are disadvantageous and resulted in his failure of securing 
investments for achieving his choice of commercialising the unprotected 
generated knowledge, hence, resulting in an inability to grow - such 
weaknesses merit exploring. 
4. Case (D): Quality Assessment Software Project 
4.1 Background of the project: 
The project was linked with research initiated by four academics in 2011.  Two 
Academics (the PI and Co-PI) came from CAMS College of Agriculture and 
Marine Sciences, Department of Soil, Water and Agricultural Engineering, in 
addition to two post-doctoral fellows from the same department and one 
academic from the College of Engineering, Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering.  It was funded by The Research Council‘s (TRC) Open 
Research Grants (ORG)27.  The collaboration with a small local enterprise was 
initiated by academics during the knowledge production to run pilot testing.   
                                                          
27
ORG has been developed in 2009 as part of the country‘s national research strategy, which 
was introduced by TRC in 2008.  ORG was based on the allocation of small to medium sized 
research grants for short and mid-term projects resulting from academics‘ open research 
initiatives.  Its main aim is to enhance research capacity in the country through promoting open 
research proposals triggered by individual, or groups of, researchers (academics) based upon 
their research areas of interest (ORG, 2014).   
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The research was on the subject of using an existing computer vision technique 
in assessing date quality in Oman.  Despite the high production of dates in 
Oman, the annual export average is only 2.5 to 3.5 % of the total production.  A 
problem of quality composition and packaging has been common for Omani 
dates to compete globally.  The research was preceded by two actions of 
engagement with the relevant users.  In the first action, they visited many local 
commercial date processing factories to understand the current analytical 
methods used in processing dates.  They found most of the methods to be time 
consuming, laborious, expensive, and of a destructive nature.  They were using 
visual inspection, which is considered as a subjective method of testing, where 
results vary from one person to another.  This encouraged the academics to 
design and develop an automated quality assessment system for the different 
stages of the supply chain in Oman in order to be able to harvest dates at 
precise stages and monitor the quality during handling, processing, and storage.  
In the second action, they obtained grade standards from two factories in order 
to determine the efficiency of the computer vision system with a color camera 
for detecting the surface cracks on dates. The outcome of this aspect was 
published in the university internal journal as well as through a workshop in 
2011.  
4.2 Governance Structure:  
This section explains the formal governance structures of the institutions that 
govern the relationships between the actors involved within the case. Initially, 
the relationships between the actors were governed by the rules of the ORG 
Public Fund and the university IP rules.  
4.2.1 University Rules:  
According to the disclosure rules, and as in Cases A & B, if the academic 
research (basic or applied) outcome contains IP, which is considered by the 
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university to be of substantial commercial value (from licensing royalties), no 
invention disclosure for a third party can be taken before assessing the option of 
seeking IP protection through the university‘s Innovation Affairs Department 
(SQU, 2014).  
The rules governing the actions of the university‘s innovation affairs department 
aim to maximize patent generation. ‗Building a patent profile‘ is stipulated as 
one of the department‘s main responsibilities in coordinating the IP protection 
through patent registration and maintaining an up-to-date database for all 
university generated patents (ibid). Additionally, to ensure the ability of the 
department for patent generation, they state this clearly as one of the Principle 
Investigator‘s (PI) responsibilities within the university research rules and 
regulations. The PI‘s responsibility is to ‗ensure the report of any intellectual 
property arising from research projects to the Deanship of research and 
particularly to the Department of Innovation Affairs‘ to assess its patentability‘ 
(ibid). 
Moreover, and as in Case-B, a budget of 22,500 OMR per year is allocated by 
the University Council for assessing and registering IP disclosures. Within this 
fund, the IP is protected through patenting as an exclusive right granted for an 
invention.  The assessment of patent protection is done through a US 
international IP company (Becker and Poliakoff Law).  As per the contract, the 
disclosures are evaluated according to the company‘s used international 
patenting criteria of: patentable subject matter; novelty; exhibiting a sufficient 
inventive step, this means that the invention must not be an obvious 
development of what has gone before; it also must have some utility and 
usefulness, for example, it must be industrially applicable and useful (SQU, 
2014). 
4.2.2 Open Research Grants (ORG) Rules: 
The relationship of University, Academics, and TRC within this project is 
governed by ‗The Research Grant Agreement‘.  The agreement states that, 
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unless specified otherwise, the ownership of Intellectual Property, and 
responsibility for its exploitation, rests with the university.  In this regard, TRC 
gives the university the freedom to retain the ownership of the generated 
knowledge either through publications or patenting.  As argued by one of the 
TRC‘s Officers: 
“We give the involved university the freedom to decide about how to own the 
outcome of their academics researches.  It is either to publish or to patent and 
they can exploit them nationally if possible.  So we don‟t interfere and leave it to 
them.” (PPMF2, TRC) 
In this respect, the agreement established the IP rights and responsibilities of 
the three parties.  The academics were responsible for the knowledge and its 
scientific production, in addition to, disseminating the full account of their 
research findings, provided that such dissemination does not preclude the ability 
to file for a patent where the research project leads to a potentially valuable 
invention (ORG, 2014). The university was responsible for ensuring the 
following: (1) Significant scientific advances are published in open literature 
without delay, unless such publications stand in the way of patent protection; (2) 
Appropriate efforts are made to exploit such advances of the research outcomes 
for the benefit of the economy or society (ibid).  TRC was responsible for 
ensuring that the outcomes of the academics‘ research provide accurate and 
properly reported information. 
The relationship between academics and commercial user is governed by a 
formal contract agreement.  In case the user is selected by academics as a 
research partner, a suitable agreement should be reached before applying to 
TRC.  The agreement might include reasonable delays in disseminating 
outcomes to allow any means of protecting the user‘s commercial advantage.  
In case the user is hired as a research assistant, the cost of the contract 
personnel must include all costs associated with their participation based on 
mutual agreed labour rates.  Moreover, the relationship between Academics and 
TRC was governed mainly by the researchers‘ incentives program, established 
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in 2009, exclusively for researchers conducting ORG research.  In this respect, 
the program provides financial incentives for both academics and students.  The 
students are given salaries (e.g. Master students: 1000 OMR; PhD student: 
2000 OMR); while academics are given rewarding funds, per se, for their 
contribution in research capacity building through attracting and graduating 
Omani postgraduate students (TRC, 2014).   
4.2.3 Publication Rules:  
The relationships among actors were governed by the underlying/fundamental 
consistency between the ORG and the university‘s developed incentive of 
publication for academics IP disclosure. Both entities encourage academics to 
disclose their IP to the public in terms of incentivization. In this regard, and while 
the university has the right to own the knowledge generated through patenting, 
the academics still hold the ultimate right/decision to disclose it through 
publication (e.g. publishing in journals, conducting workshops, attending 
conferences, etc.).  From the TRC‘s side, and as per the established program of 
‗researchers‘ incentives‘, the academics are rewarded with 1,500 OMR when 
they publish in a referred journal (i.e. SCOPUS, SIJ, etc.), 500 OMR when they 
publish a chapter in a book, and 2000 OMR where they publish a book (TRC, 
2014).  
Correspondingly, and as per the publication rules of raising academics‘ research 
profile, the university encourages and promotes the publication output of its 
academics in international journals by offering financial awards. These awards 
complement the recently introduced Best Researcher awards (outstanding 
researcher) and Best Paper awards (distinction in research) in the university‘s 
journals to a broader community of its researchers. This initiative aims to 
encourage higher standards of research publications and thus promotes the 
university as a reputable international research institution (SQU, 2013). 
4.2.4 Patenting Rules: 
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In addition, the relationship between actors was also governed by the underlying 
contradicted IP rules within the university itself.  It encourages academics to 
disclose their IP to the Innovation Affairs Department through the element of 
compulsion. As in Case-A, this is as per the universities‘ underdeveloped 
(absent) financial incentive of patenting. The development of IP is still not 
included in the criteria of academic promotion. A proposal has been drafted by 
the Innovation Affairs Department to the university‘s higher level, but has not yet 
been approved. Recently, the development of IP has been incentivized through 
management recognition only as a way to encourage academics to disclose 
their research outcomes with potential patents. Therefore, the academics‘ 
efforts are recognized by means of non-financial incentives such as rewarding a 
certificate of appreciation.  On the other hand, it encourages academics to 
disclose their IP to the public through the element of incentivization.  In this 
regard, and in addition to the publication rewards mentioned above, the 
university puts publication in internal and internationally high ranked or referred 
journals as the only criterion for academic promotion. 
4.3 Knowledge Production:  
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge production. These actions include: (1) establishment of 
collaborations and the actors‘ reasons/motives for involvement in such 
collaborations; (2) The formal and informal institutions enabling/supporting the 
process of collaboration. 
4.3.1 Academics’ Initiated Collaborations: 
The development of such quality system, mentioned in the background section, 
requires the involvement of the relevant user.  They needed to develop the 
system as per the requirements and carry out trial in one of the local date 
factories alongside systematic testing using their university‘s lab.  The 
involvement of the factory was encouraged as a way to ensure the practical 
applicability of the research outcome in solving the problem of concern.  This 
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was influenced particularly by the Principle Investigator‘s curiosity of learning 
how they can automate the new scientific algorithm in real life.  He believes in 
the importance of involving industry to gain practical experience, which 
consequently advances their industrial image/reputation and adds to their 
academic profile.  This can be evidenced from his past industrial experience, 
which he argues:  
„‟because I am coming from industrial experience background I believe the 
practical experience is very important.  I don‟t perform any projects without 
industry.  That is why I work with industry in most of my researches because I 
believe it is essential to get practical experience.  It builds our profile and 
reputation among companies.‟‟ (Ac8, SQU)     
The principle investigator‘s curiosity regarding practical applicability was 
important in establishing the collaboration.  In response, they communicated 
with the factories which they engaged with earlier during their research.  After a 
few weeks, an opportunity existed to work collaboratively with one of the small 
relevant local factories to assist them in carrying out the development and 
application of an automated quality evaluation system for handling and 
processing dates.  The GM of the factory was supportive since involvement in 
the project will help them enhance the quality of date processing by detecting 
the dates‘ surface cracks without encountering any financial cost.   As claimed 
by one of the project‘s co-investigators: 
“You know we visited many factories before, so the communication was easy.  
One of the factories was interested to help from the beginning.  The GM found 
the idea stimulating because the system will help them in detecting the surface 
cracks on dates which increase quality.  So they were looking for a system like 
this. We didn‟t ask them to pay a penny.  We didn‟t need that.  All what we 
wanted was to give us their time and share data and know-how.‟‟ (Ac8, SQU)       
Simultaneously, the conduct of such research with national relevance, 
corresponded with the inauguration of many of the TRC‘s public fund/grants.  
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The academics found a consistency between their driven research topic and the 
issues within the ‗Environmental and Biological Resources‘ sector, which is 
proposed by TRC in Open Research Grants as one of the national priorities.  
They found this to be an opportunity to gain access to funding, securing 
additional income for their college.  Within the rules of the funding program, 
academics are granted funds according to the project‘s required expenditure.  
The academics, with their college, wanted to establish a lab for computer vision 
technology.  Therefore, they targeted ORG to provide them with the capital 
required for buying relevant equipment and facilities.  As argued by one of the 
Co-Investigators: 
“What motivated us in collaborating in ORG researches is the huge amount of 
money allocated for such researches.  Yes, salaries are omitted here, but we 
can buy equipment and other facilities by using this money.  As I told you we are 
planning to establish a computer vision lab.  So such money can help us to buy 
the required equipment in the future.‟‟ (Ac9, SQU) 
“it is purely financial and when you have a contract with them you can claim 
some of your time as money, you can have them pay for your time…so for us it 
is beneficial to get such collaboration to gain money for us and our university” 
(AC2, SQU) 
In accessing the ORG funding, the academics particularly the PI, also gained a 
unique opportunity to effortlessly attract and recruit postgraduates (PhD and 
Masters Fellows) to assist them in the research.  This opportunity, as mentioned 
in the governance structure section, exists as per the developed incentive 
structure of capacity building which is embedded within the ORG researcher‘s 
incentive program, where students are rewarded by either a scholarship or 
stipends/salaries.  The PI found this extremely beneficial as it provided them 
with another opportunity to gain personal financial awards and incentives as 
pocket money, for every postgraduate they recruited in their research.  
According to him: 
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“In this project we could achieve a good capacity building… We could easily 
attract 5 MSc students who wrote their thesis in the same area; and two PhD 
students. You know we needed them to assist us in our research.  We also get 
better incentives and at the same time.  TRC rewarded us a pocket money for 
every student we involved and graduated in the project which is really 
stimulating.‟‟  (Ac8, SQU)   
The academics submitted a research proposal application through their 
university‘s TRC institutional focal point.  The application was accepted.  Before 
signing the Research Grant Agreement and granting the funding, and as the 
factory was involved from the beginning, TRC requested the academics to reach 
an agreement with the factory‘s GM about the nature of his involvement within 
the project (either as a research partner or a research assistant).  After 
negotiation, the academics decided to recruit one of the factory‘s experts as an 
industrial research assistant.  Their decision related to the freedom given by 
TRC to accomplish the research proposal criterion of ‗economic impact‘.  The 
TRC‘s non-interference is combined with the fact that the process is influenced 
mainly by generating knowledge according to the academics‘ interests and 
motives, where the decision and nature of user involvement is left to the 
academics.  The academics wanted to grab the opportunity of adding more 
value to their research by addressing the criteria in a practical way and without 
the user‘s interference in their right of appropriating the outcome in the future.  
This can be evidenced from the statement given by the Principle Investigator: 
“TRC gave free hands you know without interfering in anything.  They were 
supportive and agreed in any initiative we took… they gave us a chance to 
involve one factory as an assistant research that didn‟t have any right to 
interfere in the way we deal with our research outcome. So they give us the 
freedom which I found encouraging.‟‟ (Ac8, SQU)   
The academics‘ decision of user non-interference in their research outcome is 
linked to their anxiety in involving him as a research partner.   Within the rules of 
the funding program, and considering him as a partner, the factory‘s GM had the 
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right to pre-screen the proposed publications before publishing.  Moreover, he 
would have the full right to delay publications to allow for protecting commercial 
advantage.  Therefore, they preferred to avoid partnering with the factory where 
secrecy and withholding data was included, which would consequently hinder 
them from imminent appropriation of generated outcomes through publications.  
This is evidenced through the statement of one of the Co-Investigators: 
“No!  The factory wasn‟t considered as a research partner.  It was recruited as a 
consultant only after the contract with TRC was signed… You know if we have 
an industry as a partner in the project there is a possibility that they won‟t allow 
us to get use of our outcomes properly. For example, in ORG they will have 
right to withhold publications or information dissemination.” (Ac9, SQU) 
In summary, the successful collaboration was facilitated by the motives of the 
involved actors, which resulted in transforming the outcomes into a useful 
system.  Despite their different motives, all the actors stood to benefit.  
However, such benefit was perceived to be different for each actor because of 
the institutional financial incentives developed within ORG funding.  In this 
respect, the academics saw the opportunity of generating revenue: for their 
organisation through securing funds for establishing a laboratory (e.g. 
equipment, research assistants) which can be used for further research; and for 
themselves through securing personal income (e.g. reward funding for every 
student they involved in the project).  Likewise, the user saw the opportunity of 
securing additional income through industrial consultancy. 
The analysis also identified a positive factor that contributed to the decision of 
the user to engage in collaborative activities with academics.  For him, 
collaboration appears to involve relatively little cost apart from time and usage of 
the existing resources (e.g. HR) involved in helping the academics develop the 
recipe.  This was viewed as considerably beneficial because of the attributes of 
the knowledge to be produced: New technological development and 
implementation for enhancing date quality.  For ORG, collaboration was to be 
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encouraged as it constituted the core justification for the existence of their 
organisation/fund. 
 
4.4 Knowledge Appropriation:  
This section focuses on the actions/activities taken by the involved actors in the 
process of knowledge appropriation. These actions were enabled and 
constrained by the formal institutions related to transferring knowledge through 
IPR. 
4.4.1 IP Disclosure Theme: The academics’ choice of disclosing their 
expected IP to their university and the university’s failure to appropriate 
the generated outcome: 
After an agreement was reached, a Research Grant Agreement was signed by 
the three parties (academics, university, and TRC) and a fund of OMR 109, 100 
was granted successfully.  A formal contractual agreement was signed by the 
academics and the factory involved.  The contract included the recruitment of 
the factory‘s dates-quality-expert as an industrial research assistant subject to a 
fee of OMR 2000 per year (or OMR 35/hour) allocated by the academics as part 
of the project‘s direct costs/expenses.  The project made considerable progress 
in the form of system development and testing viability. The academics and the 
factory‘s expert worked collectively to make sure that the generated system was 
new and confirmed the required grade quality standards of dates.  
As the user was excluded from protecting the generated system for his own 
commercial advantage, and in accordance with the ORG rule of conferring the 
ownership to the university, the academics, with their university, have the 
ultimate right to either disseminate or not the full account (including the scientific 
aspect) of the research findings.  To ensure dissemination doesn‘t preclude the 
ability to file for a patent, the University‘s Innovation Director negotiated with the 
Principle Investigator the opportunity of assessing the potentiality of patenting 
for their generated quality system.  She asked him to file a patent application 
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before any scientific description of the potential invention was disclosed through 
publication. This is, as mentioned in the governance structure, as per the right 
given by TRC for the university to delay publication if it stands in the way of 
patent protection so that exploitation can be achieved through licensing 
afterward.  As argued by the Director herself: 
“We are trying to say don‟t publish. We are searching by our team in the 
innovation department by going to the principle investigator as he getting the 
benefits of 1,500 OMR of publication.  We asked him to file a patent application 
before publication.  I prefer for patenting not to go that way and better to wait for 
one and half year, it might patent and nobody knows about it at that time.‟‟ 
(UO2, SQU) 
After negotiation, and as per his responsibility of reporting any intellectual 
property arising from his research project, the Principle Investigator decided to 
disclose the IP to his University‘s Innovation Department, which consequently 
assessed the potential patentability of the generated system through the US IP 
Company.  However, the application was rejected by the company.  This is in 
relation to the action taken by the academics in knowledge production, of using 
and applying an existing computer vision technique in the Omani context.  The 
Principle Investigator also used his past experience of using the same 
technology as he had previously implemented it successfully in other 
international agricultural products.  Therefore, novelty was not maintained.  The 
generated system was found to be inconsistent with the international criterion of 
‗inventive step‘ as the academics‘ outcome was an obvious development of 
what had come before.  This criterion is a general patentability requirement of 
US patent international laws, according to which an invention should be 
sufficiently inventive.  Evidence of this argument is the statement given by the 
University‘s Innovation Director: 
„‟We evaluated the system.  It was not recommended for patenting because it 
didn‟t reach the criterion of inventive step.  The academics just developed and 
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applied an existed system in new context. So it was not an invention.‟‟ (UO2, 
SQU) 
The academics‘, particularly the PI‘s, action of developing their outcome away 
from patentability was influenced by the fact that the academics derived the 
research conducted primarily for the purposes of publication.  In this respect, he 
didn‘t believe that they should appropriate their generated system by patenting.  
He believed that this was not their job as scientists and preferred that they do 
their routine academic job of conducting research for the purpose of knowledge 
dissemination and awareness creation through publication.  Therefore, he found 
it costly to go through the long process of patenting as it delayed publications, 
evidenced in the following statement given by him: 
„‟I am not a patent person.  See I am not interested in patenting at all, because I 
like to disseminate as much as possible.  If you take that root you will scarify 
and compromise many things such as carrying on publication.  I don‟t want that.  
I am very happy with the routine academics; I am fine and I don‟t want to take 
that patent root.‟‟ (Ac8, SQU) 
In addition to their beliefs, the academics‘ action was influenced by many other 
factors. These emerged from the developed (publication) and underdeveloped 
(patenting) incentives of the university and the developed rules (incentives) and 
regulations followed by the TRC/ORG. From the academics‘ perspective, the 
main reason for their action is related mostly to the underlying contradiction of 
IP incentives within the university, mentioned in the governance structure.  In 
this respect, the academics found it costly to go through the patenting process 
as their academic promotion is based only on publications and specifically on 
the number of published papers rather than on patenting or IP development.  
There is a lack of tangible return, especially a lack of ‗patenting incentive‘.  This 
can be evidenced more by the fact that the system of research in the university 
has been approved to provide incentives, such as ‗publication awards‘, for 
researchers to carry out research with the aim of publishing, as publishing is the 
only way for them to achieve promotion. Therefore, going through the process of 
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patenting will not add any value to their professional profile within the university.  
Evidence is given by the following two statements: 
―You know publishing papers is important for our promotion…having patent it 
doesn‟t have any weight in our promotion here (in SQU).  So going through such 
a process (patenting) from my view doesn‟t yield much benefit as publication.‟‟ 
(Ac10, SQU) 
This is supported by one of the university‘s Officers, who relates the academics‘ 
action to their preference of gaining publication incentives in opposition to 
patenting, which is absent as an incentive for their academic promotion.  
Therefore, during knowledge production, the academics were not concerned 
about developing their research outcomes towards invention.  He argued: 
„‟They (academics) don‟t want to go through the path of IP, they get the money 
and publishing his work and get promotion… The incentive for patented 
innovation is still not there…They would say why I bother myself to go through 
IP process, so what is the benefit of patenting to academics, nothing.‟‟ (UO3, 
SQU) 
Moreover, and from their perspective, the other reason for their action was 
related to the underlying/fundamental consistency between the ORG and the 
university‘s developed incentive of publication for academics‘ IP disclosure, as 
mentioned in the governance structure. In this respect, and in the absence of 
patenting incentives, the academics found it more beneficial to use their time 
and effort in utilising opportunities that make them focus on disclosing their 
outcomes through publication.  From the ORG‘s side, they wanted to make use 
of the publication incentives provided by TRC within the ORG‘s Researcher 
Incentive Program.  As mentioned above and in addition to its intention to 
provide funds for publishing (e.g. books, chapters in books, and in referred 
journals such as SCOPUS), TRC acknowledges academics‘ roles in knowledge 
production by granting them personal financial incentives as rewards whenever 
the academics took initiatives to publish the outcomes of their ORG research.  
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This is in addition to the other aforementioned main reason of securing 
additional income.  Similarly, the academics wanted to make use of the 
publication incentives provided by their university.  The university recognized its 
academics‘ best research efforts by providing them with financial awards such 
as ‗outstanding researcher‘ and ‗distinction in research‘.  The academics found 
these incentives more beneficial as they give them better credits for their 
research efforts.  They are consistent with their motive of ‗achieving research 
productivity‘ by gaining credit for publishing their outcomes through different 
channels, thus increasing the number of publication in their research profile, and 
fulfilling the criterion for their academic promotion.  As argued by one of the Co-
Investigators: 
“Even TRC has omitted to that (salaries), if you publish a paper you get some 
money, books chapters these are more sufficient you know… we got 
publication, supervision for students, books and all credits are coming to us.. It 
is very motivating because this additive to our research profile which help in 
accelerating and achieving condition for our promotion.” (Ac9, SQU) 
In summary, there is a conflict between academics‘ logics of ‗openness‘ and 
university‘s logic of ‗secrecy‘, which is promoted by ‗patenting‘.  For academics, 
secrecy through patenting appears to involve significant costs of publication 
delay and publication rights infringement, which is important for their academic 
promotion (in which invention development is not included).  As academics are 
driven by the incentive of promotion, the university needs to rectify this issue by 
modifying the system, for instance, through introducing ‗the development of 
invention‘ as an incentive for academic promotion.  Yet, there is a likelihood that 
the academics‘ decision of creating knowledge away from invention was 
strongly affected by their logic of ‗openness‘ or ‗open science‘, hence, even if 
the university introduced such an incentive in promotion, the achievement of 
their motive of ‗secrecy through patenting‘ will not be achieved, due the 
academics‘ norms of knowledge dissemination.  Moreover, the academics‘ 
decision can be potentially affected by their personal remuneration from the 
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complementary benefits embedded within the publication incentives provided by 
the fund (e.g. securing additional personal income through students‘ 
involvement and publication actions, publishing books and journals, etc.); and 
their university (e.g. outstanding research financial awards).   
In this section another issue is discussed.  The absence of invention 
assessment during the knowledge production phase resulted in the university‘s 
failure of directing its academics‘ research action towards inventive outcomes, 
consequently, hindering it from appropriating the knowledge generated.  This 
was partly influenced by the fund‘s prevailing institutional procedure of 
permitting the engagement of the university‘s innovation department after the 
knowledge was generated, predominately, by the absence of operational 
guidelines.  Hence, the opportunity of directing the creation of knowledge toward 
invention while conducting research was neglected.  For the university, the 
absence of such an assessment throughout production appeared to involve the 
loss of time and money. While for ORG, the absence of such an assessment 
stemmed from its organisation‘s (TRC) objective of building research capacity 
(increasing number of researchers and publications) in areas of national priority. 
4.4.2 Academics’ and TRC’s action of exploiting the generated system: 
The non-commercial user’s refusal to implement the generated system 
within local factories: 
Since the university was unable to appropriate the generated system through 
patenting, the academics pursued their purpose of publication.  They could 
publish, through TRC/ORG, ten articles in ten high ranked international journals, 
three book chapters, and a full book, in addition to refereed conference 
proceedings and 18 posters.  As per the agreed responsibility of the university in 
making appropriate efforts to exploit the advances of the published research 
outcomes, mentioned in the governance structure, the academics, with their 
college, decided to demonstrate the generated system through a workshop 
funded by TRC.  They invited relevant commercial (private sector) and non-
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commercial (public sector such as ministries) users to the workshop, and they 
educated people by showing them the practicability of their proposed system, 
which is part of their role to improve the quality of agricultural products by 
creating knowledge awareness to ensure its application. This can be evidenced 
by the following statement given by the Principle Investigator: 
„‟we disseminated our quality assessing system through workshop.  There were 
people from the public sector such as ministries, Muscat municipality and some 
private industries.  It was a full day workshop and it was very full received 
because it was about dates.   See as agriculture scientists we want people to be 
aware about the system.  Creating awareness is important so they know how to 
use it in solving dates quality problem.‟‟ (Ac8, SQU)  
The users‘ feedback was positive.  Thus, TRC asked the concerned 
governmental entities overseeing ‗date‘ issues to adopt the system and 
implement it in existing local factories.  It also asked the academics to submit a 
full account (final reports, CDs) of their generated system to the same entities.  
However, the entities were hesitant to adopt the system and asked TRC to 
implement and cover the cost of implementation, since the system was 
generated through researches funded by their ORGs.  One of the TRC‘s 
Officers found this unacceptable as their responsibility ended the moment the 
academics submit the final report with the proposed system to the main 
stakeholders.  This concern can be demonstrated by the parameter that defines 
the scope of the process followed by TRC within ORG, which is influenced by 
the goal of achieving knowledge generation as a way to encourage academics 
to participate in research to find solutions to national issues.  In this respect, TR 
is not responsible for implementing the research outcomes (e.g. generated 
system) as this is not considered to be a funding objective within the ORG‘s 
knowledge generation process.  Therefore, the responsibility of implementation 
was left to the stakeholders.  As argued by him: 
―Now who is responsible to implement the recommendations (generated 
system)? The governmental organisations said TRC.  No it is not TRC job to 
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implement these, so our job is to fund researchers to come up with these 
recommendations. They said if you want us to implement these 
recommendations you have to fund us.  We say look we are not a funding 
agency to do your job!  This is an example of disagreement.  It is financial and 
also implementation of course.‟‟ (PPMF2, TRC) 
In addition to the financial cost, and from the TRC‘s Officers perspective, the 
stakeholders‘ hesitation of implementation was influenced by their lack of R&D 
policy.  They already have other assigned national administrative priorities.  
These priorities have been relatively well defined and distributed to all units in 
which R&D is not included.  This can be evidenced by the effort taken by TRC, 
during system generation, in involving entities informally in the negotiation 
meetings of the project committees, as a way to make them accountable for the 
application of the outcomes.  Therefore, TRC was not intended to impose 
implementation and left it to the ministry to decide whether to apply the 
generated system or not.  According to him:  
“In the project negotiation meeting we tried to include somebody from those 
units in the team of research.  But we do not see anybody from there…  In 
governmental units such as ministries research is not on their table!! This is not 
something that they are interested to do.  And if they are not interested they will 
not.  So this was a way of KT and implementation, but impose or force 
implementation no.‟‟ (PPMF2, TRC) 
In summary, the exclusion of the commercial user from the innovation process 
resulted in the failure of appropriating the value of the generated knowledge.  
Such exclusion was influenced by the academics‘ logic of ‗openness‘ in 
opposition to the user‘s ‗secrecy or data-withholding‘.  The academics‘ logic was 
achieved through the fund prevailing rule (e.g. academics freedom of 
including/excluding the user from IP ownership).  For them, the involvement of 
the user as a partner appeared to involve the considerable cost of violating the 
traditional ethos of their science and conflicts with their intrinsic aspect of the 
reward system, which is based on establishing IP priority through publications 
367 
 
(e.g. publication as an incentive for promotion).  The commercial user‘s inability 
to appropriate the knowledge generated was also affected by the fund and the 
non-commercial user‘s (e.g. ministry) misalignment strategies. Although the 
implementation of the research outcomes is absent as a goal within the fund, an 
operational initiative (e.g. implementation negotiation) was taken by its officers 
to ensure the practical application of the generated outcomes.  Yet, such 
initiative was not in synchronization with the non-commercial user‘s (ministry) 
prevailing institutional prerogative.  For the user, the practical application of the 
outcomes appeared to involve the cost of financial liability since it is not 
assigned as one of its mandates (e.g. lack of R&D strategy).  Hence, such 
misalignment merits exploration.  Again and as mentioned in case A, such 
misalignment can be explored through the lens of institutional fragmentation. 
4.5 Appendix conclusion: 
In conclusion, this appendix has isolated each individual case and examined it 
thoroughly. This allowed the researcher to develop detailed descriptions of all 
four cases in this study. As a result, patterns have emerged from within each of 
the individual cases.  Next is the cross-case analysis chapter, which will attempt 
to examine the data and the emergent patterns across all four cases. 
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SQU Council: chaired by the Minister of Higher Education: is the supreme governing body of the 
University. The Charter of Sultan Qaboos University empowers the Council with the formulation of the 
general policy of the University and the follow-up of its implementation, and undertakes particular duties 
pertaining to the enhancement of the University‘s standing and enabling it to fulfill its aims and achieve 
its objectives.  Members: Minister of Higher Education (Chair); SQU Vice Chancellor (Vice Chair); Four 
(4) Deputy Ministers appointed by the Council of Ministers; Assistant VC for Academic Affairs and 
Community Services; Two (2) rotating Omani faculty selected by the Vice Chancellor; Three (3) rotating 
members appointed by the Council of Ministers from prominent intellectuals and private sector 
representatives.. 
The Academic Council shall exercise the functions and responsibilities stipulated in the charter of 
Sultan Qaboos University and in particular the following: (the relevance is selected) 
To propose the University general policy for teaching and research; To propose introduction or 
abolition of academic posts and recommend promotion of academic staff; To review the 
University‘s executive regulations.  (Chaired by the University‘s vice chancellor; all members are 
internal staff) 
Deputy Vice 
Chancellor for 
postgraduate studies 
and research 
Vice Chancellor  
Coordination & 
Follow Up 
Office of mangt. 
Council & Committees 
Legal Affairs 
Department  
Customer Service  
Deputy Vice 
Chancellor for 
Administrative 
and Financial 
Affairs 
Deputy Vice Chancellor for 
Academic Affairs and 
Community Services 
Assistant VC for 
International 
Cooperation 
Colleges  
College of Science 
Dean of College: Oversee the research Activities at the College; Endorse CRC 
recommendations for research proposals/consultancy services following the College Board 
recommendations and forwarding these to his Deputy Vice Chancellor for Postgraduates 
Studies and Research   
Assistant Dean for Postgraduate Studies & Research (ADPSR): update the dean on 
research matters; coordinate research activities in the college; provide the communication link 
between the college and the deanship of research; provide leadership for CRC; submit CRC 
recommendations to College Board; keep an inventory for research facilities and activities in 
the college.   
Principle investigator (PI): initiate the research proposal/consultancy service and show 
importance of research after obtaining approval of the HoD; manage the project in a daily basis 
including expenditures, maintaining & up-to-date  of record of receipts/invoices; exercise quality 
control to ensure delivery of all required outcomes to the satisfaction of both the sponsor and 
university and to bring the project to successful conclusion on time; ensure that any IP arising 
from research project =s is reported to the Deanship of Research; submit progress reports; 
submit a final report with detailed expenditures account 
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Academic 
Publication Board  
Research Board (assist deans and academics from 
colleges):Formulate Criteria to meet the academic standards 
of research; set research future plans; propose the periodic 
review for research regulations; look into and express views 
on the research funding system; review the budget estimate 
for research; review the annual reports on research; set 
policies and regulations for innovation 
Postgraduates 
Studies Board 
Deanship of Research: Funding research projects conducted by faculty members 
and other university personnel; DOR ensures that most of applied research 
proposals are funded locally or from agencies; Publishing original research 
proposals, studies, books, translations and manuscripts; Issuing set of journals 
published in different fields. 
Researc
h 
Centres 
Deanship of 
Postgraduates 
Studies    
Dean of Research (DoR): assist DVCPSR to develop and implement strategies to enhance research 
productivity; identify research priorities with colleges/centres; encourage research leading to innovation 
and entrepreneurship; raise external funding to support researches; coordinate reviews of research 
proposals for financial support from internal and external grants; facilitate the negotiations of contracts 
between SQU and external agencies; engage staff of the highest calibre appropriate to their role in 
supporting research and outreach; Act as focal point at SQU for liaison with the Research Council 
(TRC);  
Department of Academic 
Publications & Outreach     
Department of Innovation 
Affairs Department of Research: coordinate the 
review of research proposals; review 
research agreements with sponsors and 
obtain approval DVCPSR; Maintain 
databases of research and consultancy 
activities; maintain an inventory of capital 
equipment acquired by research projects & 
contracts; acquire & disseminate 
information on external funding agencies; 
facilitate communication between 
researchers and sponsors; monitor the 
progress of research projects  
Intellectual Property Section: develop, implement and 
evaluate policies, procedures and practices of 
innovation; develop an intellectual property culture and 
awareness of the importance of innovation, patent 
registration; marketing & commercialisation through 
proper licensing agreements; provide legal support for 
confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements; 
coordinate with external innovation organisations; 
coordinate the IP protection process and maintain up-to-
date database for all university IP; Liaise with principle 
investigators to provide support on IP related matters;   
Internal Innovation Advisory Committee: 
members: Dean of Research (Chairman); Director 
of Innovation Affairs Department; Director of 
Research Department; Legal Affairs Department; 
TTAS: Assistant Deans of: Engineering; Science; 
Agriculture &Marine Sciences 
Responsibilities: setting IP rules and regulations; 
looking at IP disclosures and how further to patent 
them; develop policies for innovation, KT 
mechanisms; entrepreneurship and licensing; 
dealing with the companies that will take care of 
 
Deputy Vice 
Chancellor for 
postgraduate studies 
and research 
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Department of Research  
H.M. Trust Fund 
Grants 
The research 
Council Grants 
Consultancy 
Services  
Internal & Joint 
Grants  
Research 
Expenditures  
Administrative 
Affairs  
Open Research Grants & Strategic Research Grants: funding 
researches that fit with the economic and social issues in Oman and 
present the international trends in the concerned proposed field.  
Institutional Focal point: aim is to facilitate the procedures between 
researchers and TRC as well as facilitate the delivery all researchers‘ 
requirements to TRC 
Responsibilities: assess the eligibility of proposals to TRC format 
(check the formats that is required by TRC); send the proposals to the 
concerned research sector (there are six sectors); link between 
academics/researchers and TRC; Manage the funded projects by 
specifying the needs of researchers (financial, materials, time, etc.), 
create awareness about the TRC procedures and rules, finding new 
ways to fulfil the researchers needs, participate in TRC meetings to 
discuss the proposed researches (a way to negotiate the importance and 
value of the researches, in order to ensure getting the fund), send the 
researchers needs to TRC electronically, follow up the project 
expenditures during the project implementation period, matching 
expenditures of university and TRC, make sure the required fund is paid 
by TRC and entering the amount in the university‘s HR system; follow up 
the progress of those projects…. 
Contracts and consultancy 
services funded by government 
and private sector organisations 
(small & large) from inside and 
outside the Sultanate. 
The criteria for performing a 
consultancy will depend on the 
nature of the service, the 
deliverables, timeframe, 
expertise and facilities required. 
These will all be agreed on with 
the sponsor. 
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His Majesty the Sultan: 
Determines the strategic course of the country, taking key decisions 
expressed in form of Royal Directives; occasionally intervene in questions 
directly related to innovation and business environment. 
The Council of Oman (Majlis Oman): The highest 
level collective policy entity; In 2011, HM has 
granted the council new legislative and regulatory 
powers in a significant step forward in the 
modernization of the Oman‘s governance 
processes. 
The State Council (Majlis 
A’Dawla): The members 
are appointed by HM; 
They are the distinguished 
Omani experts in their 
fields 
The Consultation 
Council (Majlis 
A’Shura): Members are 
elected to represent 
‗wilayates‘ (districts) 
Both are now responsible for proposing legislative and regulatory decisions 
to meet the policy demands of Oman’s development.  However, there is no 
indication that the Council is involved in policy design, implementation and 
monitoring on science, technology and innovation issues…recently there is 
an involvement of a one member..  
The Council of Ministers: it is chaired 
by Deputy Prime Minister (his Majesty 
Cousin) A Cabinet of ministers who 
assist HM.  They are responsible for 
developing and implementing national 
policy on economic, political, social, 
executive and administrative matters 
including through proposing draft 
legislation.   
Ministers: enjoy an important 
autonomy in their fields of 
responsibility.  Particularly 
involved in the improvement 
of the innovation climate are 
the ministers of Industry & 
Commerce, Education, Higher 
Education, Manpower, 
Agriculture &b Energy 
Other Councils such as 
Supreme Council for 
Planning to which several 
ministers have been delegated; 
established to replace the 
Ministry of National Economy 
which dissolved in 2011; Its role 
to assist with policy 
development; It is charged 
specifically with development 
planning, service sectors 
development, economic affairs 
& private sector affairs…..  
The Research Council: in 
charge of R&D strategy and 
policy & covering innovation 
policy issues. It acts as both a 
policymaking and funding 
institution. 
Other specialised 
councils: such as 
ITA and KOM  
The Research Council established in 2005.  It has atypical position in 
the government setting since it doesn’t have a status of a ministry, 
but it acts more as an adjacent body, while being chaired by His 
Highness Sayyid Shabib Bin Tariq Al-Said high level adviser to His 
Majesty.  A staff of 80 led by a Secretary General, manages the TRC 
and administers its programs…an international advisory committee 
including many internationally well-known science or science policy 
The conduct & management of Science/Technology Innovation policies 
appear to be rather uncoordinated.  There is no duplications as 
administrative territories have is well defined and distributed among 
ministries.  But in absence of the overall national innovation strategy, the 
policies in each ministry and related agencies seem to be elaborated without 
much cross consultation and coordination.  Consequently there is no much 
apparent synergy and policies underperform as synergies across the system 
of institutions remains unexploited.  For example, as in SQU it is useful to 
develop research programs that will increase for instance the research 
activities but they will have a limited impact if administrative regulations or 
bureaucratic procedures prevent faculty members to engage effectively in 
research work, as having more teaching load and admins work 
 
TRC Governance and Organisational Structure 
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Appendix 3: TRC Governing Board  
 
Royal Decree 30/2010 
TRC Board Members 
TRC Chairman is the chair of the board 
Members: First as per their positions in the country: 
1. Minister of Higher Education, the Deputy Chairman (the chairperson of the SQU 
Council) 
2. Minister of Health  
3. Minister of Oil & Gas (chairman of the PDO Board of Directors) 
4. Minister of Education  
5. Minister of Social Development 
6. Secretary General of the Ministry of the National Economy  
7. Undersecretary of Ministry of Agriculture 
8. Undersecretary of Ministry of Fisheries 
9. Undersecretary of Ministry Commerce & Industry for Commerce and Industry 
(the chairman of the PEIE-Public Establishment of Industrial Estates) 
10. Secretary General of TRC 
11. Chairman of Chamber of Commerce  
12. SQU Vice Chancellor  
13. Chancellors of three private universities, who will be selected according to their 
active contribution in Scientific research; they are selected by the chairman after 
getting approval from the Board members; their membership last for four years 
up to renewal; no need to get the approval again as they got it in the first 
selection (Royal Decree 2005/54 these universities were: Sohar University, 
Nizwa University and Dohfar University) 
14. GM of KOM 
Second as per their personal identification: 
1. Two public persons who concerns about scientific research  
2. Two persons with high scientific qualification with practical experience in 
managing financial establishments or international/multinational companies 
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operating in Oman (they are appointed by the chairman after getting agreement 
for their organisations; their membership last for four years up to renewal for 
one time only) 
Responsibilities of the Board:   
Responsible to approve and make amendments to the organisational structure of TRC 
It should achieve the duties of the TRC as stated in article (5): TRC Objectives 
(overwhelming research or overpowering in effect or strength) 
1. Draw the TRC policy and strategy that it should follow to achieve its national 
duty 
2. Formulate a complete scientific research28 strategy with the participation of the 
concerned units in Oman and follow its developments 
3. Develop a national plan/strategy for scientific research (NRS) and specify its 
priorities with reflect to the requirements of economic and social development 
plans in coordination with the concerned units in Oman; to make it known to 
public (publicize) in order to create the motive towards scientific research 
development; Develop the required programs to implement the identified 
national research priorities as per the plan and supervise the implementation of 
these programs 
4. Support individual innovation and research programs/projects in accordance 
with national research priorities 
5. Support the publication of valuable outcomes; organize conferences and 
activities relevant to scientific researches 
6. Encourage private sector establishments, companies and others to participate 
in the arenas of scientific research and fund/support their participation 
                                                          
28scientific research in this context, and according to the Royal decree, means the 
activities that are organized in the different scientific and human aspects, which are 
aimed at production of new knowledge through following and performing a specific 
methodical study and it includes academic, applied and development researches 
including innovation  
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7. Distribute the allocated budget of the TRC over the different programs 
according to the priorities of the NRS (see the slides about the national 
priorities) 
8. Ensure achieving the cooperation and coordination between the governmental 
administrative units and between these units and the private sector in scientific 
research arenas in a way to ensure the achievement of the expected benefit 
from the research activities and programs (that‘s mean achieving the goals of 
each program) 
9. Develop the required parameters to evaluate the and approve projects of the 
scientific research (the parameters are in each program, read carefully and get 
them) 
10. Ensure the provision of the needs required to establish a strong infrastructure 
for scientific research 
11. Develop and apply/implement programs aimed at creating awareness about the 
importance of scientific research and innovation 
12. Give consultancy services regarding the areas of scientific research 
13. Build a national database for scientific research by getting use of the data, 
statistics and reports submitted by governmental and private units which 
concerned about scientific research (SMEs is not as they have lack of R&D, 
therefore they get it form large companies)  
14. Declare and approve the policy and programs for building research capacity of 
national researchers and students in scientific research areas 
15. Suggest the regulations and laws of the royal decrees relevant/specific to 
scientific research in coordination with concerned units; and declare/approve 
the decisions related to its specifications (special fields)… they are suggesting 
laws to be declared as a royal decree, they have the authority and freedom 
16. Represent Oman in national/regional and international conferences and 
meetings that relevant to the scientific research 
17. Ensure the development of initiatives in supporting and cooperating with 
international scientific establishments in Scientific research aspects; initiate and 
sign agreements and MoU that are required in coordination with the concerned 
units  
18. Study the subjects related to Scientific research that raised by the Council of 
Ministers 
376 
 
19. Perform any tasks relevant to Scientific research appointed by HM    
Decision-making: 
The Board meets at least three times annually via an invitation from the chairman; meet 
whenever it is necessary; most members should attend including the meeting chair 
person; 
Decisions are made by getting the votes of most members; if these votes are even in 
this case the side with the meeting chairperson will win; 
The Board regulations and work system are placed according to the bylaws decided by 
the Chairman, these bylaws should be presented to the Board before declaration; 
In case of the absence of the chairman his deputy (minister of higher education) takes 
his place; 
The Board can be assisted by a consultation committee, formulated by a decision from 
the chairman after getting the agreement of the board members as well as the 
concerned organisations; members should be the GMs of popular international 
companies, chancellors of well-known universities pioneered in scientific research 
practices; their rewards are assigned by the chairman of TRC (the advisory committee)  
The committee responsible to give advises and solution for issues brought by the Board 
members or the Chairman; the Chairman can invite the committee members to attend 
the Board meetings without giving them the right to vote in any decision;  
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Appendix 4: Statement of Ethics Approval 
 
 
Ethics Application:          E370 
 
  
Thank you for submitting the amendments, these have been reviewed now and the 
Chair of the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel has 
considered the documentation also.  I am pleased to inform you that the Chair of the 
Research Ethics Panel has confirmed approval of your research study, with no further 
ethics scrutiny required.  Please add a sentence onto any material you share with 
participants confirming that ethics approval has been granted by the Chair of the 
Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of 
Bradford on 16th June 2014. 
  
Best Wishes 
  
Omar Ali 
Research Funding Coordinator 
Research & Knowledge Transfer Support 
Room C.21, Richmond Building 
University of Bradford 
BD7 1DP 
 Tel: 01274 233112 
Email: o.f.ali@bradford.ac.uk 
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Appendix 5: Information sheet &Informed Consent Form  
 
 
Information Sheet 
 
Researcher Name: Faiza Awladthani  
Title of Project:  University Knowledge Commercialisation through Institutional 
Logics Perspective: the Case of Oman 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take your time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 
others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.   
The purpose of the research, which is part of my doctoral thesis, is to explore how rules 
governing knowledge transfer between university and industry are created through the 
interaction of multiple actors from universities, governmental bodies and enterprises. In 
order to achieve this it became imperative that I talk to people who are directly involved 
and have considerable experience of the research phenomena. This is why I am 
carrying out the interviews. 
 
You have been chosen because you are either a knowledge producer, knowledge user 
or a knowledge policymaker or an expert in the field, who are involved and interacted in 
the process of rules creation.  It is expected that the interview could well last 1-2 hours.  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and asked to sign a consent form.  If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason.  As well as you can take a short break or terminate the interview if you wish to 
do so.   
 
All the information that is collected from you during this research will be kept secure 
and any identifying material, such as names and addresses will be removed in order to 
ensure your anonymity.  It is important to mention that the data will be retained by the 
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university for ten years for audit purposes. It is also anticipated that the research will be 
written up into a report which may be published at a later date. However, your 
anonymity will be ensured, including the anonymity of your quotes, and all the 
information I have collected about you will continue to be kept secure and confidential.   
 
Please note that if you decide to withdraw your data from the study after participation 
you can do this within two weeks as after this period the researcher will have already 
written up the report.  
 
If you require any further information about the research please contact me by email; 
fssawlad@student.bradford.ac.uk or contact me at 0096892099876 or 
00447843709678. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in this 
research. 
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CONSENT FORM 
Name of Researcher:   Faiza Awladthani                                            
Title of Project:     University Knowledge Commercialisation through an Institutional Logics 
Perspective: The Case of Oman 
Thank you for considering being interviewed as part of this research project. I would be grateful 
if you would read through the following questions and indicate your response to each of them. 
The purpose of this is to ensure that you are fully aware of the purpose of this research and that 
you are willing to take part. 
  Yes No 
 
1 I have been informed about the purpose of the study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about it if I wished. 
  
2 I understand that I can withdraw from the study up to two weeks after the 
interview, without giving a reason and that my data will not be included in the 
research. 
  
3 I understand that I am free to choose not to answer a question without giving a 
reason why 
  
4 I have been informed that the interview will be audio-recorded and I give my 
consent for this recording to be made. 
  
5 understand that extracts from the recording might be used in a publication at a 
later date 
  
6 I confirm that I have not been involved in a similar study in the past 6 months.
  
  
7 I understand that if extracts from the recording are used any identifying 
information about me will be removed and anonymity will be ensured.  
  
8 I confirm that I require the name of my organisation to remain anonymous.   
 
I give my consent to take part in the research. 
Participant 
Signed     ……………………………………….. 
NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS …..……………………………………. 
Date     ……………………………………….. 
Date     ……………………………………….. 
(*note: if NO then the name of your organisation will be made available in my PhD thesis and 
any publications at a later date) 
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Appendix 6: Interview Guide 
 
The interview Guide 
 
This document will be used as a frame to guide the interviews.  The order and the 
nature of the questions within each section will be flexible and adapted to the course of 
the discussion in order to keep the talk flowing. Interviews always started with an 
introduction explaining the research scope and aims, and the objectives, proposed 
duration and course of the interview. 
Key Informants from University, Industry and Government 
Does knowledge transfer between universities and enterprises exist? 
What are the policies applied to enhance knowledge transfer from universities to 
industry? Can you please explain? 
Do you think both universities and enterprises have a good environment for knowledge 
transfer? 
What do you think motivate academics and enterprises to participate and become 
partners? 
What are the rules that govern knowledge transfer between universities and 
enterprises? Can you please explain? 
Who are involved in making those rules? 
How did their participation come about? 
What are their responsibilities? Could you draw a diagram of the actors in charge with 
their role?  Which one is most important? Why?  
 
What do you think the limiting factors for implementing these rules? Why?  
What do you think the factors that facilitate their implementation? Why?  
What do you think as the major challenges of knowledge transfer in Oman? Why? 
Academics: 
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Do you have any personal experience with knowledge transfer?  What is it? How did it 
come about? 
What do you think motivates you to participate with enterprises? 
How did this participation come about? When did it start?  
What are your responsibilities? Can you please explain? 
Who are the individuals do you network with from industry and government? What type 
of communication is involved in such networking? 
What are the rules you were involved in making in order to transfer your knowledge? 
Why do you think these rules are important? Can you please explain? 
Could you explain how rules have been implemented? When did they start? Have they 
been applied? 
Who are in charge of monitoring results? To whom are results sent? 
What do you think the limiting factors for implementing these rules? Why?  
What do you think the factors that facilitate their implementation? Why?  
Do you think your university provides you with required knowledge transfer 
environment?  Can you please explain? 
What do you think are the main challenges of knowledge transfer in your university? 
What do you think are the main challenges in interacting with other actors from industry 
and government?   
Based in your experience, what are the most important factors that make university 
knowledge transfer successful? Why?  
Overall, what are the impediments to successful knowledge/technology transfer in 
Oman? How do you think could this be improved? 
Enterprises: 
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Why do you participate with universities? What motivates/drives you in this 
participation? 
How did this participation come about? When did it start?  
What are your responsibilities? Can you please explain? 
Who are the individuals do you network with at the university and government levels? 
What type of communication is involved in such networking? 
What are the rules you were involved in making? 
Why do you think these rules are important? Can you please explain? 
Could you explain how rules have been implemented? When did they start? Have they 
been applied? 
Who are in charge of monitoring results? To whom are results sent? 
What do you think the limiting factors for implementing these rules? Why?  
What do you think the factors that facilitate their implementation? Why?  
Do you think the Omani universities have a good environment for knowledge transfer? 
Can you please explain? Has it been changed in recent years? 
What do you think are the main challenges in interacting with other actors from 
universities and government?   
Overall, what are the impediments to successful knowledge transfer in Oman? How do 
you think could this be improved? 
Government: 
Why do you participate with universities and industry? What motivates/drives you in this 
participation? 
How did this participation come about? When did it start?  
What are your responsibilities? Can you please explain? 
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Who are the individuals do you network with from the university and industry? What 
type of communication is involved in such networking? 
What are the rules you were involved in making with them? 
Why do you think these rules are important? Can you please explain? 
Could you explain how rules have been implemented? When did they start? Have they 
been applied? 
Who are in charge of monitoring results? To whom are results sent? 
What do you think the limiting factors for implementing these rules? Why?  
What do you think the factors that facilitate their implementation? Why?  
What do you think are the main challenges in interacting with other actors from 
universities and industry? 
Do you think both universities and enterprises have a good environment for knowledge 
transfer? Can you please explain? Has it been changed in recent years?   
Overall, what are the impediments to successful knowledge transfer in Oman? How do 
you think could this be improved? 
Closing:  
Thank you for your time. I will email you with a summary of this interview soon, so that 
you may make any corrections or further comments. 
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Appendix 7: Sample of Interview Transcripts 
 
Interview with an Asst. Professor, Food Science, College of Agriculture and 
Marine Science, SQU  
Date: 21/09/2014 
Time: 12:30 pm- 2.30pm 
Interviewer: Faiza 
 
Interviewee: Ac1 
Faiza: thank you so much for taking part in this research and the information will 
be mentioned in this interview will be treated as confidential and anonymous. 
 
Faiza: Mr, Ac1, do you have a personal experience in research collaboration with 
industry? Please explain 
Ac1: Yes, I have couple of collaborations with the industry as well as with ministries.  
For the ministry is like improving dates quality. And developing Omani Halwa with a 
halwa factory, to see for quality I mean to make low fat low calories halwa   
Faiza: how this participation come about? 
Ac1: actually I had a student, he did his master here then he went to Malaysia. From 
which he got the idea of collaboration.  He was very pleased to work on a local product, 
halwa product.  Then he started his research, we started to visit many factories. Then 
form his thesis we started this project and we contacted one company which was 
helpful in giving their facilities and the CEO allowed us to use all his piloted plans and 
we are taking all the ingredients and other thing.  But in that work we haven‘t publish 
any and the project now it is discontinued.  But in the long run maybe we will try to 
make a patent.  But things are still not clear, if we don‘t have any issues in patenting we 
could go in different way  
Faiza: can I know the reason why you couldn’t publish? 
Ac1: no, no they are not against publishing, we can publish.  They don‘t have any 
problem in publishing the project of Omani Halwa and it comes in the media.  Patenting 
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is not a problem also.  The issue is in producing the same name of the product, 
producing it as an Omani halwa is the issue.  We should give a different name such as 
sweet halwa or totally different name.  Many people asked us to change it to go for 
patenting.  But for the time being we discontinued and paths will go in different 
direction. 
Faiza: so who will do the patenting for you? 
Ac1: the patent evaluation is done by the university.  We need to submit two pages 
then the university has its IP office to handle that issue 
Faiza: Why did discontinued the project? 
Ac1: the direction has changed.  We having the intention that the factory will help us to 
produce the product and deal with the marketing aspect, but then I thought that‘s better 
to think little bit more about it and latter maybe we will decide. 
Faiza: what do you think motivates you to collaborate with the industry? 
Ac1: the main motivation is the satisfaction that you feel you are serving the industry.  It 
adds to your profession.  Second one is that you learn from them in the real world how 
they are doing it and also transforming science knowledge through their products and 
quality.  
Faiza: what do you think motivates the industry? 
Ac1: the enterprises are motivated to get some free services that is all.  They are still 
not ready to understand that R&D can give benefits to them.  They think government 
should give everything free.  That sort of.  They want everything for free. 
Faiza: what were your responsibilities? 
Ac1: the main responsibility is to identify ingredients include health aspects and the 
quality. And then apply, do trial one in the factory and bring it here to do other chemical 
testing; other research quality and also supervising PhD students. 
Faiza: who usually follow the outcomes of the research? 
Ac1: no one actually follow up.  We have published two papers, one about what types 
of Omani halwa do people like? We identify classification of people types.  Some like 
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sweets, some don‘t like, some like diet, some like yellow colour and from that study we 
could classify five types of people and their preferences to the industry community and 
the science, you can market only one generated type, you sell to everyone; we have 
different branding names and different brands targeting high class or at lease major two 
or three classes; this is one aspect of the research and we published it in a journal.  
And second one we again to identify what are the types of available in the market? 
Okay and we classified how many types, their quality and their characteristics, we 
found 3,4,5 classes based on sweetness, oiliness, etc. all of these, and that one we 
also published, only we didn‘t publish with the new formulation with the name of Omani 
halwa.  We are thinking either to change the name, changing name again another issue 
might come.  By discussing with the people from TRC they said patenting may be less 
because patent will go only through process and if anything happened they will take 
care, but until now nothing happened.      
Faiza, so the project is through TRC? 
Ac1: it is through IIC which is also a branch of TRC and ministry of commerce 
Faiza: who are the individuals and bodies do you network with from the industry 
and government? 
Ac1: the IIC form the government side.  From the industry with Almarai, and with an 
Omani Halwa company, and we visited some of companies like Oman sweet but we 
couldn‘t come up with a research work to develop some items for the school kids, like 
healthy, good protein food but we didn‘t do formal project, we discussed a lot of 
possibilities.  
Faiza: what type of communication channels do you use? 
Ac1: mainly through face to face meetings and through phone conversations.  But 
these are not regular, just when they or us fee we/they need something we call and 
making appointment for a meeting. 
Faiza: I believe you explained the actions that you have been taken within KT, 
which is publishing? 
Ac1: publishing and also news items and media, where there are some issues may 
occur. You sometimes write something, concern somebody and they make it different 
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which raise difficulty for researcher.  Then it is better to do it in scientific aspect instead. 
And also different factors involved in different cultures and different country, that‘s need 
to take care and it is not easy and simple as in science publications. But sometimes 
given workshops and presentations through ministry and other organisations. 
Faiza: so in the commercialisation side you have only one case isn’t it? 
Ac1: yeah but we are working now in some product that we are trying to patent.  We 
don‘t want to take industry as a partner because of the IP issue.  And if we worked with 
and see there is a patent, they will not give it to the university. We will let the innovation 
department to do it and handle everything. Then if the industry is interested and feel 
hmmm local or overseas, it will benefit the university and the researcher.  So we give 
knowledge to propose patent.  Another patent we are trying to do in my work of health 
financial product for magnate scale form Jabal Al-Akhder, they suggested to me to get 
more specific findings.  The university has a lawyer to help in filing the patent; and we 
worked in another one also, health formulation for preventing diseases like diabetic and 
others. But these are not completed yet but we are planning to make it as patenting. 
Faiza: do you think you will be able to do that, because the university still doesn’t 
have clear IP rules and regulations? 
Ac1: still it is possible because the university has funds to handle legal process. They 
also give its credentials to the university. I think they are motivated.  
 
Faiza: so why you didn’t approach the industry through and try to commercialise 
this idea? 
Ac1: no even you go to the industry the legal process we can handle it. You have to 
handle the whole process by yourself.  If something happened in between who will take 
care of you as a researcher, you will be in trouble and we will not be protected. But if 
we go through the university link, they have legal process and everything they will sort 
out. 
Faiza: why do you think the commercialisation of the ideas is very important? 
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Ac1: yes it is important.  One thing is to the benefit of the community and the country 
like one innovation happens actually it didn‘t benefit the university only like Microsoft 
Windows, Bill Gate got rich but at the same time the whole world get benefited from his 
idea. This is a one aspect and for the researchers it is important for credit that they 
have innovative ideas.  Patent is a different way of innovation than publications, it gives 
more weight for us within the university and industry also.  Maybe you will not get 
project but sometimes you get consultancy.  Sometimes you get invitation to participate 
in changing courses and so on.  Sometimes ahhh I will give you one like ahhh video 
conferencing; one company from USA arranged a video conference and they invited 15 
CEO of good industries in USA and they wanted to know what are the new 
technologies and there were two from USA and I was from Oman, this is one of the 
things that gives you courage you know.  
Faiza: who are in charge of monitoring results? To whom are results sent? 
Ac1: the assistant dean of research in out college though him we do everything and if 
we need an extension we have an assistant dean for extension services. Actually they 
communicate with us and we work through them. The same thing for commercialisation 
side such as patenting and others they also follow them for us.  
Faiza: what do you think the limiting factors for implementing these rules? Why? 
Ac1: the main limiting factor is that the industry is not trained up and dealt up in such a 
way of understanding the benefits of the R&D.  Another factor is the administrative 
process also which gives a lot of innovation limitations.  Other factor is the HR also, you 
may have enough funds but you may don‘t have enough skilled people to run the 
experiments.  These are the three factors: industry motivation; the administrative 
process and the HR  
Faiza: Do you think your university provides you with required knowledge 
transfer environment?  Can you please explain? 
Ac1: the university is encouraging now comparing to earlier days, because there are 
innovations, industry collaborations, and patenting and IP rights, mentoring the junior 
people.  
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Faiza: what do you think are the main challenges in interacting with other actors 
from industry and government? 
Ac1: in interacting is materialising at the end a product is very difficult. Reaching final 
stage is not that simple and easy. When we reached the application stage if the idea 
we usually face problems. But we are encouraged now to do more patenting to take the 
credit. 
Faiza: why do you think they dot materialise the outcomes of researches? 
Ac1: one aspect could be that don‘t clearly what they will do and they are not clear in 
their vision and in all aspects they are in their mind are hissy and then if you are clear 
okay we will support and they also think hundreds of issues which also we don‘t know.  
And also they but in such things that if we give this you have to give this which is in 
research and R&D is very difficult to do.  like there is a good shop and you want to buy 
you pay ten rials to have the product, but in research it is not like that; if you try to 
negotiate like that then for the researchers it is very difficult to negotiate and reach the 
final stage. 
Faiza: based in your experience, what are the most important factors that make 
university knowledge transfer successful? Why? 
Ac1: no in promotion and other career progress is also give credit.  If you have many 
people publish their work and you have patents, I think university and the committee 
understand that the one with patent has different weight.  This is clearly understood by 
the committee here and the people involved; yes it is not written but it is understood by 
the management here; but they explored and found that we still don‘t reach that 
tangible level.  
Faiza: overall, what are the impediments to successful knowledge/technology 
transfer in Oman? How do you think could this be improved? 
Ac1: many things are not clear.  When you want to do no one gives you a clear idea 
what it is and what to do. I mean the administrative process.  For example if I want to 
buy a pen, so what is the procedure to buy a pen, to whom you will write and how long 
it will take and then they will say we didn‘t receive this and that; i have again to go there 
and get this and that approvals, if IT i have to go to the IT department if not i have to go 
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to the dean office, innovation department, ahhh different place actually the process is 
not clear and very slow sometimes  
Faiza: any final word do you want to say 
Ac1: no thank you for this interview and hopefully it will help you in your study and it will 
be beneficial to Oman 
Faiza: Thank you for giving some of your time  
================================================================== 
Interview with GM of Expert Software company, Medium Enterprise, Ruwi 
Date: 07/10/2014 
 
Time: 3.15 pm- 4.07pm 
 
Interviewer: Faiza 
 
Interviewee: CU2 
 
Faiza: thank you so much for taking part in this research and the information will 
be mentioned in this interview will be treated as confidential and anonymous. 
 
Faiza: why do you participate with universities? What motivates/drives you in 
this participation? 
CU2: I think during our past operations we wanted actually to come up with something 
else useful for the market; looking to the market situation today the competition is too 
high okay it you try to maybe copy and paste and do the normal things as many people 
are doing you are definitely out of risks. So our way of doing business is trying to think 
totally different so we thought of areas that not many people can do and willing to do, 
so that‘s what we thought like okay we would like to try something else and do it in that 
way (it is a competitive advantage driver) 
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Faiza: what do you think motivate academics and universities to participate and 
become partners? 
CU2: Hmmm for me I think it is a win-win situation, academic can be definitely are very 
good in thinking, they can think, they can develop and analyse, they have the 
environment which is requirement for them to analyse things and maybe to come 
forward with a new technology and so on and we as a solution company as a service 
provider we are really hunting for those ideas, so I see there is a very good combination 
between these two entities or organisations if we can call them.    
Faiza: you said you have collaborations with academic, how many collaborations 
do you have? 
CU2: ahh I think we have only one we just started it very recent, the reason that maybe 
we don‘t have that much opportunities, we don‘t have much of exploration in that area 
but at the moment we are trying with one and the best, and the university that we are 
dealing with is one of the leading universities in the country.  
Faiza: so can you please give me some explanation about this collaboration? 
CU2: the whole was started just when one day I was watching the TV, in one of the 
programs I saw Dr. Jamail was interviewed and he was talking about his system, okay, 
I know Dr. Jamail personally so the system he was talking about it is actually very close 
to what we are doing in our business so I thought that why don‘t we talk together and 
understand more so after the interview I called him and told him that I saw you 
interview in the TV and can we meet and discuss about so there where it has started I 
spoke to him that the technology and the idea he has I told him very openly, he wants 
to bring the idea into the market I said I know the difficulties being a businessman and a 
solution provider and so, so I can help you from that angle okay, I would like to have a 
very good collaboration with you; you can come up with the idea and we can take it for 
you into the market.  The product and the solution it is more of ahhh you can say a new 
technology, the concept has been build in a such a way as it is M to M-machine to 
machine system where he came up with an idea where he can put a device in the 
vehicle and the device is responsible to transfer the information and you are linking 
actually the vehicle, linking the information of the road the GIS information, the ROP 
information; so there are a lot of information which the idea is to bring them together.  It 
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can definitely help many organisations who are maybe involved directly or indirectly 
with this arrangement.     
Faiza: what are your responsibilities? Can you please explain? 
CU2: we tried actually to learn about the strength of each party, so being an academic 
we cannot play your role and for sure you cannot play or role we are very good when it 
comes to business orientation, if someone wants to bring a product find a market, to 
price it to fund a manufacturer or to present it to the market doing the marketing plan, 
the sales plan and so on we are very good in those areas and you as an academic you 
are very good in doing research because it is your day to day activity so by 
understanding the strengths of two parties help us to decide okay fine you will be there 
and we will be here, so being a company an organisation who is doing business we 
have to focus more on our strengths, so we said okay you continue in doing the 
research give us the idea our responsibility is purely bringing that product into an active 
and actual product which can be utilised and used by the consumer    
Faiza: you said already the person that you are collaborating with is Dr. Jamail as 
an academic, any other academics? 
CU2: Hmmm yeah Dr. Jamail and his colleague Dr. Hafedh both are academics and 
from our side I have myself and my business partner Mr. Feliger, he is an American 
citizen so he is working with me; it is like a four people who are actually working closely 
into this arrangement. 
Faiza: are there any other people involved? 
CU2: I think very closely we are working with TRC, because the idea when it has 
started with Dr. Jamail and then we met together and he informed me that he 
approached TRC in order to get the funding and move forward, so we went together to 
TRC and say okay he introduced us as the company whose going to develop and run 
the business and he will be the person who will do the research and come up with the 
idea; so there is a very active involvement of TRC in this arrangement that we are 
doing. 
Faiza: what type of communication is involved in such networking? 
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CU2: yes I think after we getting in agreement with TRC we will sign a lot of documents 
of disclosure and confidential agreement and we have filled up the form and even we 
have short listed with the first group and the second group and third group today I can 
say we are almost in the final stage of getting the approval even TRC has arranged the 
patent form US he came and we sat with him, he went through all the documents and 
we submitted information that we had; I think they asked for information in details about 
the arrangements and collaboration, our forecast in how are we going to do this, what is 
the targeted market and so on.. I can say almost more than eight months we had a lot 
meetings between us hmm maybe the individuals with the academics also together with 
TRC and in between even they have arranged workshops.  They arrange a workshop 
where they have introduced a gentleman who has more experience in innovation; how 
innovation happens and what are the strengths and difficulties someone can face and 
so on; we had a lot of meetings between the three of us.     
Faiza: I think you already have answered the question: What are the rules you 
were involved in making with academics? With academics and TRC with regards 
to disclosing and confidentiality and patent, so do you have any other rules? 
CU2: hmm maybe because TRC is a local body and for them they really want to ensure 
that whenever they select any innovation and they want to put it in the market, they 
want to make sure if it is going to last, it is a very good story and idea, it comes in the 
parkit of innovative or innovation that can be copied that what I want to say even they 
invited one of the top IP and patent experts to come and study.  Even he has approved 
our documents.  They have also two consultants, one form Russia and the other one 
from Malaysia.  They have also study our documents in details, they asked many 
questions to understand the technology with the arrangements and so on. So we have 
signed a lot of documents because they really wanted to make sure that it is going to 
last and it is active. It is a serious arrangement between the two parties.‘‘    
Faiza: why do you think these rules are important? Can you please explain? 
CU2: it is, when we talk about innovation it is really important, because first of all it is 
not going to be innovation if it is not protected, you need to protect it you need to 
ensure that in certain extent that this idea is going to last and looking to commercial 
point of view is it going to really a business or just an idea and it is going to die; 
because there are many ideas that people thing that they are very good ones and when 
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you bring it to the market it is too late and so many has already done that, so I really 
want to say that TRC is really doing a very good job in order to ensure whatever it 
selected is healthy and can be run for sometimes and also it is very important that it is 
going to help the society  
Faiza: so the IP who will own the idea? 
CU2: ahh it is jointly owned, TRC is not going to be involved in this, they are only 
funding the idea; they just want to make sure we give the right idea and that idea is 
going to be materialised in the society.  So the ownership is joint between us and the 
academics; that‘s why TRC wants to reach a close, there should be an agreement 
between the two parties, because for them they want to ensure that it is going to last as 
long as it can.  They want to make sure before you start the real work and come 
forward, have you done your ground work, have you did your investigation, is it clear 
between both of you before you come to us so we can start giving you the fund, so 
definitely we have an agreement between us and the SQU.   
Faiza: have these rules been changed? Can you please explain why, how and 
who are involved in making these changes? 
CU2: I think most of changes are like improvements; whenever we see that this point 
needs to re-discussed again it may to add or to enhance we just add to the existing 
report.   
Faiza: can you give me some examples? 
CU2: ahh it suppose ahh understanding the market, when we say we suppose to have 
the product being manufactured outside, this was the idea before and when so the 
opportunities are locally here so we said better to manufacture and assemble the 
product here so the prospect has changed in that arrangement.  The pricing we keep 
changing because of many elements and so on.   
At the moment we are planning to add strong partners and I think you saw the signing 
of the contract between us and the Belguim company in the news paper; they are the 
partner that we want to involve because we wanted an experienced partner in this area 
who can maybe give us a support when it comes from the international point of view; 
even the idea of this product it is not just be locally viable we want to take this product 
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globally so we thought maybe they are the best people for us to support, so we have 
signed an agreement with them.  
Faiza: what is their responsibility? Is it to market the idea outside? 
CU2: No, they are going to be the solution provider jointly between us and them we are 
going to do, because for them they have a very good experience when it comes to the 
ahhh the world vehicle tracking and monitoring and so on, so they have very good 
experience in that area.      
Faiza: who are the one who came up with the changes? 
CU2: I think from our side we are doing it as a daily activity, understanding the market, 
learning the changes, and how to market what it is required, so form this area we 
mostly trying to most of the time brainstorming with all the parties.  We say fine why we 
don‘t think about this area what if suppose we faced sometime difficulties, what if things 
don‘t happen as we move, so I can see everyone is coming up with some points from 
time to time     
Faiza: are these rules implemented or are still in the implementation stage? 
CU2: we are now in the final stage of manufacturing the device, the testing is done, the 
prototype is also done; the idea and the concept, everything is done. So we are just 
waiting the green light or the fund from TRC and just go ahead and manufacture the 
device.  So you can see that we are almost in the final stage.   
Faiza: who are in charge of monitoring results? To whom are results sent? 
CU2: hmm last meeting we had with TRC we said now with the new arrangement we 
have new, they have done some new partnership with a small and medium entity which 
is newly established and Shell company and there is one more, so they said these are 
their partners.  This is because TRC  has a limitation of funding so anything above 
maybe a certain amount so they are not in a position to fund so they have to find other 
bodies to cover the remaining funds; so the monitoring maybe TRC is not going to do 
the monitoring because their role end whenever they give you the fund.  So may be the 
new partners ahh if you want to partner someone they will definitely take the role of 
monitoring, because maybe most of them if they want to invest in some projects they 
will definitely try to make sure that they will get good results. 
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Faiza: who is paying the lion amount of money? 
CU2: as I mentioned TRC fund has limit, that‘s why we will get fund from others, so 
others are the one who pay more  
Faiza: what do you think the limiting factors for implementing these rules? Why? 
CU2: maybe to be very frank, for the country it is typically new; what I found there are 
some missing factors that we need to consider them out, and according to my 
understanding we are the first batch in TRC; so there is a lot of learning, try and error 
and so on; new idea and new concept to the country but it is there in the world people 
are doing it in daily bases; maybe if someone ask me a question from my point of view 
of business we don‘t have any difficulties because we have been doing these and we 
came from far away as I mentioned to TRC, with you and without we will defiantly be 
able to do it, we have to do it so we will not go back so but sometimes definitely you 
keep some projects on hold based on your limitations.  Okay I want to start this project I 
have also other projects in the pipeline so where I divert my investment should I start 
with this or with the other one, these ones I consider them as limitations in this area 
maybe the environment is not ready, ahhh to accept such an idea and to make it fast; I 
hope with our batch because it was taking time but maybe with the new batches things 
will be faster.       
Faiza: do you mean there is a risk behind applying this idea? 
CU2: form business point of view there is no risk.  As I said from our side we are doing 
similar line of business and similar line of products and we have been very fine and we 
are doing very well.  So there is demand, there is market; there is buyer in the market; 
there is a need for such a solution, so I don‘t see any risk in investing in such an idea.  
Because even if we try to say actually the ahhh motivation of this idea is actually saving 
the life of people, because our system is ahh maybe I will give you an idea, it is a radar; 
the concept that you are putting a radar instead of having a fixed radar in the road we 
inviting that radar to be in your car, so you are the judge of your behaviour, shell I 
speed, I shell not, no outside monitoring you are monitoring yourself so the whole ideas 
came up with increasing the number of death causality that we having in Oman, it is too 
scary the number of deaths which we having in daily basis so coming up with such an 
idea ahh our aim was okay as per the analysis per day we have maybe four deaths 
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happening in the country, so if we reduce that from two to one then it is a big 
achievement; what we want to do is to see that how much we can contribute to society; 
what added value we can bring to the country, then if we are investing I am sure there 
wont be any risk in bringing this idea into the market.       
Faiza: is ROP involved? 
CU2: yes, we really thought about all angles, like what are the difficulties, the 
objections we will get from the market, so to drill that down and make it more simple we 
said okay let us start focus until the idea for the society become acceptable; Dr. jamail 
has a lot of interviews in the media in the TV, even ROP has interviewed him.  We are 
really surprised by receiving call form people and say when this device will be ready 
because we really need it.  we don‘t want it to be like ahhh going in larger scale at the 
beginning so let us focus maybe the objections will come from individuals so we wont 
touch individual vehicles we may start with school buses and I think no one will have 
any objection to but a system which will secure my kids and your kids so it is an area of 
no questioning why and how! That is the focus area that we said to have then gradually 
we will go to transpiration vehicles, go to taxis and so on we try to implement it by ahh 
we can say domain we can start in one domain and move to another domain for sure 
as a system there are too many to learn to see how effective it is       
Faiza: after manufacturing the device it should go to ROP to place it in every car? 
CU2: maybe the involvement of ROP they are going the principle because our system 
actually it has to have a direct link with ROP because the concept here is the rise will 
generate an automated fine whenever you speed the idea is that for a road where the 
speed limit is 60 okay and you have the device inside your car and you have over 
speed say 65 or 70 the device will warn you and tell you that you are over speeding 
now and you have 15 seconds or 10 seconds to reduce your speed; if didn‘t reduce 
your speed our device will connected directly with ROP so the automated fine will be 
generated.. so in this line ROP will act as a principle we need their server in order to 
generate the fine.    
Faiza: but people will play with it, if the warning last for 10 second they will reduce and 
again they will increase the speed, you the mentality? 
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CU2: we didn‘t think it as a black box we just put it inside the car and just monitoring 
the speed; the idea is actually beyond that even the ahhh the idea of Dr, Jamail is to 
have more information for analysis so imagine this device wont record just the speed 
even the behaviour of the driver, the harsh breaking, the harsh accelerating, the turning 
all these information will be recorded in order to come up with future (interruption from 
me) yes it is in the same device, as I said it isn‘t just a dummy box that ,… a dummy 
black box it is an intelligent box we just call it smart or intelligent black box which has a 
lot of elements not just helping the individual, because today we are not just talking 
about may be the results of having a lot of accidents; there are so many reason for that 
we cannot just say because if the road or because of the speed, speed is one of the 
reasons for that so monitoring the behaviour of the drivers maybe understanding even 
the new concept or ideas is to have information between machine and machine so that 
you can really post information and receive information so that there is two way of 
communication and we are opening a gateway between you and the individuals or 
between you and the vehicles so today ROP has access to these vehicles the can post 
information and receive information.  when we discussed we ROP they asked can this 
device helps in analysing accidents we said yes because this device can store second 
by second information so for you as ROP easily you can go back to the server 
download the information and then you can know what has happen before the accident, 
so it is not only a speed device is more as monitoring and analysis device.     
Faiza: do you think ROP is convinced now, because they were not at the 
beginning? 
CU2: I think it is a debate subject to say that ROP is convinced or not convinced; I am 
100% confident that ROP will definitely be convinced if you show them the results, you 
don‘t tell ROP that you want to test because they have a lot of things in their pipeline to 
be solved we are trying also to see it with them by telling them okay with very less 
involvement and very less effort from your side there is no problem anyway TRC is 
going to fund this prototype so let us implemented in certain number of vehicles and let 
us see the results, if you fine and want to improve this device we are coming to you as 
an association with you to help you; we see okay there is a problem today ROP has 
invested huge money in building and improving a lot of things, radar system they put, 
increase the fines from time to time but did we reduce the amount of causality we have 
not to the expectations so we are saying this is good, just try to use it; it is going to help 
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you and you are not going to lose anything at the end; it is not going to break or to kill 
or to do any bad thing, it is not going to harm anyone, let us try it if you are convinced 
and the society is convinced, it is fine we are successful otherwise no side effects of the 
solution, so they are I think many times we talked to them and discussed with them and 
they are accepting the idea.    
Faiza: what do you think the factors that facilitate their implementation? Why? 
CU2: yeah the difficulties are there, I want to see it more from the advantage way; 
today for anyone who want to go for business the only fashion is I will do what my 
father has done and he wont survive in the market, today it is completely different way 
of doing business, the old fashion of saying okay fine I have the product if you want it or 
don‘t want it, it is fine; today is a very fast market, very small village and you feel you 
have the product and you can get it within one second, I can just send an e-mail and 
thanks to Google I can find any information from anywhere, anytime and I can be 
expert in any area I just need information and today everybody is smart because world 
is open, this really required from people to come up with new ideas from time to time so 
what I want to say this arrangement what we are trying to do from research point of 
view is like we want to open new area of market.  By saying that we are not a company 
who just trying to push a product but we want to pull people like involving everyone; 
because his idea wont work if he is doing it alone and cannot be successful if we do it 
alone, today everyone needs each other it is a network where people need to set 
together and the missing part is just an idea, how did you get the idea, how do you 
utilise it, how materialise it and implement it in the right way and time, with whom are 
speaking to, and for sure anyone can succeed in this one, so we are saying the positive 
side of it whatever the difficulties are we are just moving forward..     
Faiza: do you think the Omani universities have a good environment for 
knowledge transfer? Can you please explain? Has it been changed in recent 
years? 
CU2: unfortunately it is not been materialised.  There are many very good ideas I think 
when you set with the individuals you surprised that they are amazing, ahhh even in the 
workshop that TRC has arranged I think they shortlisted 10 to 12 innovators, if you sent 
with the individual and discuss and see and hear from him it is amazing ideas what they 
have, so with my interactions with friends and relatives I see that there are a lot of ideas 
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but may difficulties maybe or the missing part is that creating those opportunities and 
allow them t have the opportunities of ahh taking the initiative of doing, very few 
universities are actually supporting it.  maybe some universities depend on the top 
person who put their money and invest on these talents, but we have universities with 
these talents but they don‘t have the required facilities to do it and they feel ahh I hope 
universities give attention to that because that is the only way where you can keep 
people thinking otherwise all of our ideas will die within our campus and nothing will 
come out; there is no harm is someone fails, failure is a beginning of any success story, 
so let people try, let them come out and do it my themselves even if you attend ahh 
because time form time I keep updating my knowledge in technology, if you attend the 
CMMEX or IT exhibition there are a lot of good ideas are happening but unfortunately 
we don‘t see them materialised, we don‘t see them in the market, I really see that there 
is very good talented ideas but for sure it requires me better arrangements  
Faiza: what do you think are the main challenges in interacting with other actors 
from universities and government? 
CU2: I think unfortunately as I faced it myself the amount of chances that people are 
providing or choices I can say unfortunately there is not matter of choices you have one 
and only one; if you don‘t choose then you don‘t have any other options and 
unfortunately whenever there is an announcement for an opening there is thousands 
and thousands will go there, so it will be very crowded and it will lose reputation, lost it 
aim and the motivation wont be there; so the choices within the region are very very 
limited, like for example if there is funding entity there are very few funding entities 
which take initiatives and if it is there then the queue will be very long you have to wait 
and if you wait they will kill you with the questions and you need to submit this and 
approve this and so on even I remember in one of the occasions they asked me to give 
a lecture for new business comers like to tell them our real story, I started and my first 
sentence was 'if you depend on x,y,z then you will do nothing, so you forget about 
someone will support you, someone will invest, you forget you need just to depend on 
yourself, prove, stand and let people come to you' but if you wait for people to come 
and help you it will not happen, so we have many limitations in terms of opportunities 
and funding is one of them, second it providing the individuals and talented people tools 
and facilities, form they will get if they want to start even Dr. Jamail when he came with 
the prototype it was bits and pieces and it wasn‘t very well organized, and so and so, 
412 
 
he didn‘t have ahh there is no workshop where someone can go and try.  We have 
explore and many of us have travelled and explored and see how they are actually 
getting chances and chances and opportunities okay if don‘t know well no problem you 
can come and give it a try I wont ask you about the results at the moment, so that is 
missing in this area I belive.      
Faiza: overall, what are the impediments to successful knowledge transfer in 
Oman? How do you think could this be improved? 
CU2: I mentioned some above. In addition, I think we need to be more practical on 
what we are proposing or what we are doing, if we just keep things in papers and it will 
not be implemented, we should try to implement things and see the difficulties; 
otherwise things wont happen.  So the practical part that what I don‘t see it happening 
very ahh because for sure if we need to learn from others so mine is the first idea, there 
are many possibilities to fail because it is my first idea, but I don‘t learn from anyone 
else who was before me  so I need a place where I am not the first one who has done it 
or the only one who is doing but I need place where 50 people are doing the same, so 
we can learn from each other and ,, as I said practically even you need to implement it 
without putting thousands of questions, like one of the question that I post everyone 
has posted like will ROP agree or not? Hahah sometimes I set with myself and ask 
myself why should ROP disagree it doesn‘t really harm them they are not going to pay 
a penny, they don‘t do anything we don‘t need anything from except ok is just can you 
please generate a fine if the speed is high? That what you are doing so why you should 
say no.  killing an idea and an innovator who wants to become with an idea, killing a 
talented people, if they say no then believe me a motivation of not me the generation of 
that age will be unmotivated, okay my friend tried and didn‘t happen!     
Faiza: Okay thank you Mr. Yousuf, is there any final word you want to say? 
CU2: no nothing I am hoping and I am a person who actually believes more in moving 
forward and not looking back.  I really hope that whatever we are doing today is going 
to be materialised and many people will learn from their mistakes and to see success 
happening within the society and everyone learn from what they did on the past.  Thank 
you   
Faiza: Okay thank you very much 
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Interview with the IIC’s CEO 
Date: 20/08/2014 
 
Time: 1.25 pm- 3.26pm 
 
Interviewer: Faiza 
 
Interviewee: PFO2 
 
Faiza: thank you so much for taking part in this research and the information will 
be mentioned in this interview will be treated as confidential and anonymous. 
 
Faiza: Why do you participate with universities, industry or governmental 
bodies? 
 
PFO2: personally, it is my passion to actually look at how the two contrasting 
organisations are come together to make things normally to be possible to look to 
institutions' needs; coming up with innovation; industry have the capacity to for 
innovation but that capacity low and very very intangible; university may be better in 
terms of capacity in coming up with innovation; so most of time it is a blue-sky 
innovation; they come up with new ideas. Really impossible; I think if we put these two 
together, I think we will come up with an innovation that is really able to be 
commercialised so that we reach balance I can say.  This is a personal reason. 
Professionally, we don‘t have this especially a country like Oman, if you don‘t have this 
particular model where academic and industrial get and work together in innovation it 
will never happen! Never happened because what we having, the industry here isn‘t 
technical, is experience based, it isn‘t educational based; it is in a very very low level; 
they buy the machines and get the instructions in how to operate the machine and that 
what they do; so they cannot go beyond that; and the academics in Oman they don‘t 
have the law of their ways in getting doing research out to the market; there is kind of 
disagreement in doing research; the only way to encourage innovation in Oman is to 
make sure that these two parties come together. 
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Faiza: so this participation comes as you are the CEO of the IIC? 
PFO2: Correct, you are right 
Faiza: do, when did it start? 
PFO2: I am the one who formed the IIC with two other professors from outside, who 
are expert in the field; I got team from Canada; Omani origin but ….. the built the 
framework of this center or the selection how should be.  Then I brought myself with 
another colleague to kind fine tone this and we built the structure where we actually can 
to run something, because they were something theoretical; so we actually came …?... 
the theory-practically and do the required changes, make it viable and run it as an 
experimental; the results I believe anybody can see today. 
Faiza: what are your responsibilities? Can you please explain? 
PFO2: my responsibility first to make sure the model is working correctly; the model is 
viable so that the researches that happen have to be viable as well and industrialised,  
because our form of commercialisation is related to the west; so my responsibility is to 
try to bridge the gap; the research I had done in Oman and the industry that 
having/doing the research have the capacity to realisation; this is very important and 
challengeable; if you looked hmmm what you call this hmmmm in Europe even the 
industry will collaborate with the researchers to do innovation; they may not willing, 
wanting or even aiming to do it internally in the industry; the aim is that there is a big 
fish out there; so they are gona to buy this…spend money in the research as a product, 
people don‘t do that, so we need very very tiny incremental …?... very increment on the 
changes in the factor that they will start to observe those; actually deliver that they 
…?... and this is the innovation that is was tasked to, so I was fine tuning the model; so 
I never set in the office and say okay this is fine and let us do it, none, I look at what the 
research they are doing, what is the next stage, step to this research, what we are 
doing, what we did wrong, discuss with people to find out what is get more of them; it is 
an everyday evaluated process; very new for the region; for the country, and for us in 
Oman      
Faiza: who are the individuals do you network with from the university, industry 
and government? What type of communication is involved in such networking? 
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PFO2: in the universities we have the Technology Transfer Agents (TTAs); TTA is a 
members recruited by the center to support us, his job is to understand his 
environment, who is there and who is doing research; the way our model works is; we 
take research according to the requirements of the factories and then connect 
universities and TTAs in particular system; so he is the one who can say look 
researcher x can do the research so let us talk to him; we have the model one to one, 
but we didn‘t target specific people; TTAs are elected by universities. 
Faiza: But you didn’t put any criteria from your side? 
PFO2: no, there is a criteria; the criteria is at the end of the day this is a competitive 
process, the university wants to participate and automatically they will put a person in 
the job, but we have put criteria and one of the criteria is the member should be old 
enough in the university; has to have a good portfolio, so we know, has to have 
collaborative research in fact, so we know people attitude towards research, know the 
university system, so this is a criteria, so that he knows the costs, is this way the 
university will observe the cost; if the university get the money they will come back to us 
in a certain way; if they have various way; so this is a competitive process, so set these 
criteria, but we don‘t actually monitor them; I am afraid of wasting my time in monitoring 
them, because it is up to the university to put the right candidate; it is a bottom line; we 
concern about the strength of proposal that they put forward. 
We can call any university to do the job; if they didn‘t provide proposals and didn‘t put a 
TTA then the only loser is the university itself. 
In terms of industry, we are networking with SMEs in all industrial estates, even the 
industries outside the industrial estates, not large only small and medium in all over 
Oman; the main aim is to help Omani SMEs; our focus yes is on industrial estates but 
we don‘t shy away from industries outside when they approach us.    
Faiza: What are the responsibilities of the industry? Do they got the problem and 
discuss with you? 
PFO2: no, not really; if they give the problem it will be bonus for us! normally we have a 
strong team who goes out and tell them how they can improve, because when it comes 
to innovation you …?.. you could yourself operating fine, perfect in everything; making 
profit 10% more that is good; do you to spend little and your profit will increase by 10%; 
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sometimes we would walk to a factory, the key point is the team in the factory has to be 
willing and wanting to do innovation and to do R&D; we approach different industries, 
we interview, set down and see where the idea coming from and then we go to the 
factory that we think more willing to take research seriously…Our idea is we are the 
expert, we do the big think-tank, we do the thinking; we walk and tell the factory that 
product x should move to this location, you are far behind, what if we change x,y,z what 
do you think? If yes then we do it; it is not a problem not at all!   
Faiza: what are the rules you were involved in making with them? 
PFO2: a lot of rules and regulations, I mean the most important thing is the process 
itself; I have to involve the industry and the academia and ask how do we approach the 
problem? For example, form the point that my consultants decide, no, not the 
innovation consultants, but the client manager, okay, I think this week we should focus 
on factory x and process of determining why is based on a structure which is agreed by 
the factories themselves; the next step is, how do we approach them? How do we ask 
them questions? Those all go down to the aspect of commercialisation, process, all of 
this we discuss with factories    
Faiza: so you have forms to be filled? 
PFO2: yes, we have, we involve forms tremendously; they are quite rigid to be honest, 
because they are formed by a third-party which is TRC, go to form 5 supplied; they 
agree many areas to be left empty, for example, due to experience, no need to ask the 
question twice, because the industry regulated/reheated by those forms.   
Faiza: is there any changes done on those forms? 
PFO2: no, I just want to refer to form x, is the question about finance, there is a 
repetition, so we asked them to refer to the debt form rather than filling that again. 
Faiza: Why you didn’t remove the repetitive points? 
PFO2: We don‘t have the authority to make any changes, we are not TRC and it is their 
money and we have to use their forms. 
Faiza: why you didn’t approach TRC, as far as I know there is a member from 
TRC in you board? 
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PFO2: yes there is one, but we are the one who is operating; I was in TRC but now I 
am not a member of TRC so I cannot physically manipulate TRC documents.  the 
bottom line is the forms, I have them and require a lot of thinking from us to operate 
research work and this is one of the reasons why the job that we have is very timely to 
put things go smooth; we worked now for 5 years, but things are still very very heavy; 
so we need changes   
Faiza: how were the rules developed? 
PFO2: I set with my innovation consultants, this is one, another one is that I know the 
system in the world.  They actually know what is happening in the academia and 
industry; so I set with them and try to tackle out which area that we think bad or there is 
no regulations at all or they are not working; or the regulations are good, so we set and 
take notes and when it comes to benchmarking with international laws; and what I know 
about the country then I take them to the board and we have a very board system, very 
active, so we set down and see what we think we should do; the chairman I have no 
chance competing with him; those guys working in the industry and innovation for the 
last 40-50 years, so I am a grandchild to them, as per his knowledge and experience; I 
often I got told by him, look it is good but I will tell problem x and y will occur and it like 
magic it all happens; recently, I asked him to give me advice in the future when I have 
my own company; he knows the culture, the system, what is the difference and others. 
Faiza: for changes of rules, can you please give me examples? 
PFO2: for example, we suppose to give maximum of the funds that 50% should come 
from factory we manage to change it and get 75%, that‘s one; but the biggest one we 
had originally the word in-kind was not understood, people thought in-kind is nothing; 
so they are saying ahhh the factory has to contribute and I said they can contribute 
either in-cash or in-kind where they don‘t have to contribute in cash; in cash they want 
them to give money and ask them to spend; automatically they don‘t want to do it; even 
if they have; as a factory manager if I took 20.000 OMR and gave it to you, I need to 
explain to the board why I gave 20,000 OMR, where did I spend the money; I am a 
manager is not my company, but I can spend the same 20,000 OMR in if we ask, the 
IIC ask the manager can spend 20,000, therefore, we consider it as in-kind so they will 
not question him about the money; it makes no difference to us, say this is the cost of 
the project 100,000 OMR you have to pay 50,000, 30,000 then you can put it in cash or 
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you can bought the component x,y,z for the project; it makes no difference.  There was 
a big problem because they wanted to be in cash, actually we managed to change the 
policy and make people understand, that doesn‘t mean zero, if I gave you a time, and I 
paid… I am a consultant and I am rated of 200 OMR per hour, if you gave a time and 
gave 4-5 hours that will be 1000 OMR; so either I gave you 1000 and then you repay 
me later or I turn up and I talk to you to build something, so instead of asking you to do 
that twice, you don‘t pay me for the project and I will pay you for the consultancy, so 
this is the case    
Faiza: so only it is in the financial side you made the changes? 
PFO2: a lot of, even the research process itself, I don‘t remember everything now, the 
process itself, the policy of who can get fund and who cannot get fund, for example, we 
change the word from SMEs to SMIs because we discovered small and medium 
industries rather than small and medium enterprises; see when it comes to factories, 
companies there is the size of response literally directly related number of waiters you 
have; we don‘t have like this place with 100 waiters, then you will have to serve almost 
10,000 people; unfortunately for a factory isn‘t the case, a factory that makes very low 
profit and have very little money; they are labour intensive; some factories are very very 
rich, but there are few labour; and the example that I always give people has 10,000 
workers, worth 400 billion dollars; Ford has more than 100,000 workers and it worth 
only about 40 million dollars; it worth a hundred times more, but when it is 10% of the 
people the way it works.  If I have an IT company and work in a computer only by me 
and you we can came up with a million rials; but if we bought 50 bicycles we cannot 
make one rial, we need more and more people to come and fix bicycles, it is not the 
competition, it is just the structure of work, if you have manual work and you make 
people work manually using their hands, okay I will give you an example, Barka, people 
who make fish cages, these cages are sewing by hand, each Bangaly makes one cage, 
if you want to make q 1000 cages per month you need 500 people to do the job.  A 
cage is for 10 OMR or 20 OMR the most, there is no much profit in the business; they 
are not big; because even if you sell cages a month you hardly selling 200 a month; 
after you paid salaries and do everything you may get 2000 or 3000 OMR even small 
enterprise… 
Faiza: what about the used KT mechanisms, commercialisation and non-
commercialisation, patenting, licensing and others..  
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PFO2: we are very simple in mechanism; look our job per se is only to do R&D with the 
biggest short comes about, is only to do R&D; what happened after doing R&D, 
successfully done of our business, the original idea is to open a commercialisation 
office; everything is …?.... out there, we have telling time and time, time again guys 
commercialisation has to be in different areas; written papers on this…?... area number 
one is to identify the product; area number two is building facilities to produce the 
product itself; taken part is what TRC is trying to build, the only neglecting is the first 
part, while is the most important part; in example I came up with a new kind of 
telephone or let me give you a real example, we came up with a new socket boards in 
house, very advanced once; before doing marketing for this, before doing 
commercialisation for everyone to know it, is it competitive in the market, even if it is not 
better that the ones exist there is cost benefit make sense? Would people buy it by 10 
rials more? maybe the benefit are more, so how do I know that? 
Does these changes will hold up compares to the future….people are moving forward, 
using new socket boards now, the future is looking for requirement of new socket 
boards…second line science behind the actual board itself, who are my clients; can I 
reach the market directly or get license from the government; these license based on 
partnership, many questions to be answered for the actual commercialisation to take 
place; commercialisation is the most expensive part in R&D; before the R&D 
prototyping is that this can be done, we can make new cup, we can make a new 
product this is very costly to produce, it costs 100,000 OMR; let us say million rials, but 
the commercialisation of that board will cost 100 million rials, as an example, you as an 
investor you will not put 100 million rials if you are not 100% sure… this what we call it 
small commercialisation will service two years and one to be fixed in the center, so the 
center will be confident that it is not there; it doesn‘t exist and I have to do this manually 
by myself     
Faiza: as far as I know one of your consultants try to patent some ideas through 
the ministry of commerce and industry, but still things not completed yet, it takes 
long time to process. 
PFO2: absolutely, literally, the consultants set with them say; I need to build this, go 
patent, this is not patentable forget about it; they need to do trademark or not, they 
have to see that physically apart from their management duties do this work; because 
our consultants are equipped to do that; and they don‘t bother about it; this is nor their 
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job, they come to me and say after this what would we do, we set down and say okay, 
you need to communicate with the ministry of agriculture as they have bigger clients; 
the technology; need this factory to do this component; this by the time we build that, it 
is a work from which we get paid for about 5,000 OMR, which obviously means work in 
that particular month,… becomes a big problem, so they should come…  
Faiza: regarding the individuals and bodies that you are networking with usually, 
whom do you think have the big influence or power over the process? 
PFO2: I think it should be the industry, but unfortunately that it is that the university, 
because it knows the actual R&D; I think the power id quite balance because the 
factories spent, they are the one who are contributing the fees..?... about technology; 
so they know what supposed to be done, if we come to the research, university has the 
full power, if the outcome of the research goes fully to the industry 199% ownership 
goes to the industry..  
Faiza: you have an issue with some of the academic institution regarding the IP, 
who owns it? 
PFO2: actually, we have a lot of issues, we don‘t mind the factory to share the patent, 
we don‘t interfere, what we work as an innovation center, maybe it is an elected model I 
cannot say it is complete; but the model that we are elected is based model, where the 
money we give to the researcher and industry,,, at the end it is their money… because 
the consultancy work, is my work, all consultancy work is even we discovered new 
world.  Otherwise everybody Microsoft, Google, will own the world; because the 
thinking doesn‘t come from the university, it comes from us and the factory; the 
university according to contract is to do the job; they do the job; they are getting paid to 
do the job; and this is the only way to encourage companies to do research at the 
moment.. Actually, we have a lot of issues, we don‘t mind the factory to share the 
patent, and we don‘t interfere.  Our elected model is a consultancy based model, where 
the money we are giving to the researchers at the end is the enterprises money.  
Because consultancy according to my experience in the entire consultancy works, even 
if you discovered new thing you don‘t own that discovery….Because the thinking 
doesn‘t come from the university, it comes from us and the factory.  The university 
according to contract is to do the job and they are getting paid for doing the job.  And 
this is the only way to encourage companies to do research at the moment..  
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Faiza: okay where there any disagreement when you tried to create rules and 
regulations? Any disagreement did you face? 
PFO2: always, form both universities and industries; because we are always getting 
disagreements about patent with universities, we are getting disagreement of what we 
do and how much we spend; the whole beauty is that industry is contributing; we say 
look guys why you pay this much; maybe you can get this material from here, cheaper, 
we have these; I cannot call them disagreements, but discussions, so we always 
discuss and  negotiate with and try to convince them and they are always convinced! 
We never been rejected, except from one, a research is cancelled due to old process, 
because I told you we have to change it, our old process was very scary to the industry; 
they were thinking…hhh with regards to legality, the industry backed out; we showed 
our capability, we gave then good ideas, said we don‘t want your funds, we want your 
support, and they actually do the research funded by themselves  
Faiza: form universities, what type of disagreements? 
PFO2: patents mainly, payment process and amount of money we paid; the number of 
hours we make them work; disagreement between for example smaller university and 
SQU; they don‘t consider those hours; they take the money, because is an income, 
money researcher getting from doing research; but yet they didn‘t give them extra 
hours; they don‘t five hours from their lectures; because they need to do research; 
because normally things are back dated; it should come from them. But we discussed it 
and resolved that.. I don‘t say that they completely solved; we still have some 
disagreements and it will take time.  SQU for instance wants to change the process; 
SQU wants the process to be fexible with them; if everybody wants it to be according to 
their process we gona be…So they should work with our process, agree do this; 
individually every time we try to do this we allowed to come and get these issues to be 
resolved; what SQU wants is impossible; I don‘t really want to comment on, but I built a 
policy where we should be as much aid to anybody; I refused, originally we used to turn 
down innovators when they bring their projects; I told them no no go away; then we 
gave them the chance, to see what type of ideas they have; to see what they can do for 
the factories, unless we get benefit from them, so our policy, but issues don‘t finish with 
academia, especially SQU… 
Faiza: why do you think these rules are important? Can you please explain? 
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PFO2: we are a very young country; we zero in terms of this; R&D and innovation 
started fresh; we can copy every model; the best model in the world and match with it; 
we can take Singaporian, Malaysian, Canadian, take whatever we want; the bottom line 
is that we also have our own cultural issues; we need to keep adopting policies to the 
point we the world and the people feel comfortable when the outcomes come out; the 
bottom line is commercialisation; what we really want; what we really want; is to see 
new innovative products/services come out, we should improve the system as much as 
we can to get out of these results, then discuss how governmental rules in how getting 
money; but this is not the point; the point is we want innovation, and this is the reason 
why I do 4 times almost more than what I required to be doing; not twice, not three 
times, almost four times,, end up of 36, my aim is that if there any problem that occur in 
the project; I will resolve it; that‘s the aim… Every time we have a problem we study it 
and work what particular policy that can overcome this problem; whatever we can 
resolve we resolve; whatever we have a third policy like MoCI or SQU or whatever we 
turn to see if we can do it, that project bases. 
Faiza: could you explain how rules have been implemented? When did they 
start? Have they been applied? 
PFO2: benchmarking! Based on benchmarking, originally and all the used rules are 
from benchmarking, but eventually the rules were twinkled and customized according to 
the culture around.. so they are implemented by the IIC, the original work done by me 
and others, in fact I did very little;  most of the work is done by two very high ent. people 
from Canada, one from Canada he is an expert and two from here 
Faiza: who are in charge of monitoring results? To whom are results sent? 
PFO2: the TRC and the MoCI because they are the one who established this, so every 
year we send an evaluation report, what are the results coming out 
Faiza: How about the center itself? 
PFO2: we want to make sure that we get funded for the next year to ..?.. from day to 
day basis, we monitor by ourselves, we document them, we evaluate them, send 
evaluation to the funding bodies; so we monitor them and evaluated by TRC and 
MoCI…. 
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Faiza: what do you think the limiting factors for implementing these rules? Why? 
PFO2: disparity!! Too many different entities and regulations; for example, until now we 
cannot commercialise.  I am not scared to say anything except the truth! when it comes 
to commercialisation things are in hold, because TRC 5 years age said they will do this; 
we told them what about this, you allowed us to do commercialisation, until you open 
your commercialisation office, we will shift our experience but we cannot; for 5 years 
without commercialisation; we do research then when we finish we look what to do 
next; because we are waiting for TRC, when they are ready to do commercialisation… 
Actually there are few factors, all the limiting factors are already resolved; all in the 
same level; what they didn‘t like is that the financing is slow, but this is basic structure 
in most international systems, we are infant actually we are 5 years old in innovation 
policy you are talking about a 3 years old child, still not in school, we have 10-20 years 
to change in the line, if we couldn‘t change then there is a problem; we built a good 
foundation where we should be able to build a good system  
Faiza: what do you think the factors that facilitate their implementation? Why? 
PFO2: communication! Good communication and good cooperation, we need to get 
together and determine how to solve issues and think haaa but this doesn‘t exist, so it 
is a limiting factor then, if you look to the good factors, we have people who listen, nice 
people to talk, Hilal is really a fantastic you can talk to him at any time; Dr, Aldhab is a 
superman I can call him, he just good in what he does; so we are looking for people 
who supporting the system; but there is a little bit of hesitation from everybody for a 
reason that I don‘t want to mention. 
Faiza: you said one of the obstacles you are facing is regarding the 
communication 
PFO2: we having this at the moment but originally we need effective communication 
and corporation between innovation entities.  And we also need this what we already 
started this not to the level we like to be but we started; to have inter-governmental 
relations; we have a relation now with the MoCI, minitsyr of agriculture, PIPAID, PDO, 
these are the governmental entities that we are collaborating with, the innovation 
entities don‘t collaborate; these entities are the IIC, first they have their own innovation 
program, academic innovation program, there is a commercialisation program, 
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everybody is getting his way in doing the work,, so they are doing the work separately! 
They need to be one, we need a process that says okay, this is where you start and 
this is where you end as an innovation; this is the way you go.  There is ‗Raffed‘, many 
entities they are all over the place; but there is no see you as an innovator you will be 
lost in the sea! You will be drawn! And this is a major limiting factor; this has to be 
resolved, efforts are there we are spending thousands of millions, but ….. I cannot 
comment in the outcome.. there are plenty things everywhere in Oman.. we 
approached for instance TRC but what I want to say is that we need to build new 
system for innovators; it will go according to my capability, according to my level of 
education, according to what I need or I want; which is not there.  
Faiza: what do you think are the main challenges in interacting with other actors 
from universities, industry and government? 
PFO2: Policy! Policy! Policy doesn‘t allow us to be flexible within it mandated; this is 
innovation, innovation isn‘t an exclusive science, a scientist will not do it! Isn‘t an 
exact/exist science, I was given somebody an example yesterday of a single phase 
bump used, sorry, there is a three phase used for generation; if you have a single 
phase generator you have a single phase bump and vice versa. This is the same story; 
have a flexible system that has no structure and you establish policy, you put your 
regulation your bottom lines and you tell managers you should be experienced you 
come up with something; what I do I tell them instead that I want 5 commercialisation in 
work; I want 20 researches; I don‘t care about, I am going to give you one million rials, I 
want to see 5 products, you know what you are doing , you use my money; just let me 
work.. Because the system is rigid; I can only work in my salary, I cannot go out of the 
box; too much regulations, no too much restrictions, not regulations; so we need to 
have more flexible system; a system where we know exactly how innovation and 
limitations and could those limitations be covered; innovational center, educational 
center, community innovation center, can cover it! We build a new mini structure, 
manages on those clasps so the place where ahhh… see we know this is a gap, this is 
what the IIC and educational innovation program what supposed to meet; you put a 
person okay you telling him this is your job and works on it, but hopefully it will change..    
Faiza: do you think universities, enterprises and governmental bodies have a 
good environment for knowledge transfer? Can you please explain? Has it been 
changed in recent years? 
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PFO2: no, not yet; I think it relies on the country, especially in the academic side; we 
have teaching universities, they are trying their best at the moment and some young 
universities are getting into research; you cannot compare it for instance to UK, I will 
give you an example, there are universities which age 50 thousand more older than 
SQU, but they are not research universities, they are not Cambridge, not Imperial 
College, you see what I mean; you have to understand, so we are developing as far as 
my concern.  The industry guys they are working in trading business to produce sales, 
machine broke up, put a new one, bring their scale up to continue; nobody will look at 
new ways to work effectively, but this is changing… 
Faiza: overall, what are the impediments to successful knowledge transfer in 
Oman? How do you think could this be improved? 
PFO2: a better eco-system is required, that‘s the short answer that I can give 
Faiza: okay thank you very much for giving me some of your time 
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